The plant was wildly spinning out of control this shutdown...
So what is going to happen when fuel damage is threaten...the training is going to fail and a host of pumps are going to trip on over current and over heating bearing?
Does Braidwood have a maintenance department? Do they got any federal oversight...
***at approximately 15% power, operators attempted to start the Start Up Feedwater (SFWP) pump and the pump immediately tripped on Phase A Overcurrent.
***2A MDFWP was manually secured due to pump inboard journal bearing temperature exceeding its [200 Degree-F] operating limit. At 0105 [CDT] an anticipated automatic Auxiliary Feedwater actuation signal was generated on low Steam Generator level (36.3%) and both the 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater pumps (AFP) auto-started.Wait a minute, the start feeedwater pump and then the humongous #2 motor driven feedwater pump? My bad.
Was feed water regulating valves were on service? Some aren't designed for the dynamic condition of withdrawing steam and high decay heat load. Thus the word start-up feedwater pump and start up feedwater regulating valves. I don't see feed water start-up and shutdown word in there?
Power Reactor | Event Number: 51450 |
Facility: BRAIDWOOD Region: 3 State: IL Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: LINDSAY GREEN HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 10/05/2015 Notification Time: 08:41 [ET] Event Date: 10/05/2015 Event Time: 01:05 [CDT] Last Update Date: 10/05/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION | Person (Organization): STEVE ORTH (R3DO) |
Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATIONS "Braidwood Unit 2 was performing a planned plant shutdown for refueling outage A2R18. In accordance with plant shutdown procedures while in Mode 1 (Power Operations) at approximately 15% power, operators attempted to start the Start Up Feedwater (SFWP) pump and the pump immediately tripped on Phase A Overcurrent. The 2A Motor Driven Feedwater pump (MDFWP) was manually started to maintain Steam Generator Water Level during the shutdown and subsequent plant cooldown. While in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) at [550 Degree-F], the 2A MDFWP was manually secured due to pump inboard journal bearing temperature exceeding its [200 Degree-F] operating limit. At 0105 [CDT] an anticipated automatic Auxiliary Feedwater actuation signal was generated on low Steam Generator level (36.3%) and both the 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater pumps (AFP) auto-started. Also at 0105 [CDT] a Reactor Protection System (RPS) Reactor trip signal was received due to low Steam Generator level (36.3%) with the reactor not critical. Both Auxiliary Feedwater trains operated as designed with the Main Steam Dumps in service and the Main Condenser providing the heat sink. "All systems operated as designed with the exception of the SFWP and the MDFWP described above. "The plant is currently stable in Mode 5 with both AFPs secured. "This report is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for automatic actuation of the (1) RPS Reactor Trip with the reactor not critical and (6) Auxiliary Feedwater System, 8 hour notification." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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