Think about it...coming on to this LER is 5 years. The document doesn't cue you into the NRC flipped this event into special inspection and problems associated with systemic problems with all four discharge flow control valves. I call it as federal falsification with not reporting this in this document.
Basically their is very little oversight with LER public reporting and the industry has forced the NRC into writing skimpy LER rules for reporting.
It just bothers me, the industry just operates collectively to the minimum intent of the regulatory requirements. The professional are just rule and procedure automaton without any intent of thinking and acting in a holistic manner.
I am just saying Callaway is starved for founding and the problems at this one-off plant are overwhelming everyone.
***This event was caused by the inadvertent inclusion of jumpers in the current transformer (CT) circuits of the main transformers that were installed as part of Main Transformer Replacement Modification 09-0044 implemented in Refuel 19. following the event, the inadvertently placed CT jumpers were removed and the plant was successfully restarted.
***The reactor trip was uncomplicated, as systems responded as expected. This included satisfactory operation of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFP), which provided flow to all four steam generators. For the “B” Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (MDAFP), discharge flow control valve ALHV0007(MDAFP Bto S/G A HV) initially responded as required (i.e., closed on demand). However, in response to a subsequent demand to open the valve, the valve remained closed and could not be manipulated from the control room using ALHK0007A, SG A MD AFP AFW CTRL. ALHV0007 was declared inoperable, and Condition C of Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.5, “Auxiliary feedwater (AfW) System”, was entered for the inoperable ‘B’ MDAFP train. An Operating Technician (01) was dispatched to the valve, and the valve was manipulated locally by turning its handwheel. The valve was repaired prior to the end of the TS 72-hour Completion Time for Required Action C.1. Inoperability of this valve did not prevent the delivery of adequate auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators.
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