Whistleblowing can be used as a potent creative tool to help your bureaucracy evolve towards a more enlightened organization.
Phone: 1-603-209-4206 steamshovel2002@yahoo.com
Note: I constantly update my articles.
Comments at the bottom of the article are always welcome!!!
Mike Mulligan, Hinsdale, NH
Tuesday, October 13, 2015
Pilgrim Again: The Scandalous NRC!!!
The NRC says they are always responsible for nothing. I say the NRC has a secret policy to let some plants to knowing, along with the acknowledgment of the NRC...to intentionally and secretly violate licensing and NRC rules.
“We will be assessing that,” Sheehan said. “Generically speaking, it is the responsibility of the company to comply with our regulations and address any safety issues,” Sheehan added. “We perform targeted inspections to evaluate compliance with our requirements, but we cannot touch on every aspect of plant operations.”
I think the shutdown notification was about this. The NRC is investigating itself over Pilgrim oversight. It just going to snowball from here on in. I certainly knew the right person Jim Isom to talk to? If you ever went not to talk about a painful episode, just say its under investigation. Then you got four to six months delay in talking about till everyone forgets. "Its under investigation, we can't talk about it :)"
Sheehan said it was also not clear why NRC inspectors had never noticed the lapse. “That’s something we’re going to have to look at, too,” he said.
Certainly Entergy knew I was raising the eyebrows in the Louisiana
news market. Don’t think for one moment your Louisiana nuclear plants were safe
from the regulators?
Update: they still using Freon as a fire extinguishment in the cable vault and 4160 volt switchgear room. We worried the Freon would kill us(suffocate)before it put out the fire.
I talked to the
“design engineering inspection working group Jim Isom, NRR/DIRS/IRIB (Chair)
today. I asked him are you doubling or cutting the design engineering inspections.
All he would say to me
Operators at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station have acknowledged a longstanding safety lapse after a review of its fire-protection system this week revealed the plant had failed to comply with a government advisory issued in 1992.
In the latest setback for the Plymouth facility, engineers disclosed Monday they had discovered vulnerabilities in two areas of the plant that required “fire watches,” where trained personnel monitor sections for any evidence of a fire.
The lapse raised the alarming — if remote — possibility that a fire in the control room would compromise the plant’s ability to safely shut down the nuclear reactor.
“It had never been properly addressed, for whatever reason,” said Neil Sheehan, spokesman for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which regulates commercial nuclear power plants. “We’re going to have to assess why it took them until now.”
Sheehan said it was also not clear why NRC inspectors had never noticed the lapse. “That’s something we’re going to have to look at, too,” he said.
The plant’s owner, Entergy Corp., said it has increased monitoring at the plant and is working on engineering changes.
The 1992 advisory, issued after a Washington power plant discovered that valves required for a shutdown could be damaged by a control room fire, was not a formal requirement. One specialist called the problem relatively minor.
But critics said the disclosure spoke to broader, persistent problems at the aging Pilgrim plant, which has come under increasing scrutiny from federal regulators.
“It’s not as if this is the first time safety concerns have been raised,” said Emily Norton, director of the Massachusetts chapter of the Sierra Club, which opposes nuclear energy. “We don’t need any more evidence.”
News of the lapse, first reported by the Cape Cod Times, follows a downgrade in the plant’s safety rating, raising the prospect that the plant may shut down to avoid millions of dollars in required improvements. A series of unplanned shutdowns in recent years, along with substantial safety problems that included recurring issues with relief valves, led to the downgrade.
Sheehan said the plant identified the “potential vulnerability” during a review of its fire protection system. He said the scenario of a fire threatening the plant’s ability to shut down is “highly improbable” but operators should be aware of the threat.
Regulators will review what steps the plant has taken during a November inspection, Sheehan said. It was too early to tell whether the plant would be fined, he said.
“We need to gather more information,” he said.
In a statement, Entergy said the station had established “robust levels of manual and automatic fire detection and suppression in all critical areas.” It added, “Engineering modifications are under development and will be implemented to address the issue.”
The company said the plant will conduct hourly watches “as an additional layer of protection” until the underlying problem is resolved. Workers already are patrolling the areas of concern, including rooms in the reactor building, every four hours.
The company will make phased improvements that will be completed in 2017, a spokeswoman said.
David Lochbaum, director of the Nuclear Safety Project for the Union of Concerned Scientists, said the problem was “relatively minor,” although it should have been noticed earlier. Resolving the issue would be straightforward, he said — “a simple fix compared to the other things on the to-do list.”
In the past two years, regulators have stepped up enforcement of previous advisories, Lochbaum said.
Under the scenario outlined in the advisory, a fire in the plant’s control room could cause short circuits, threatening motor-operated valves needed for a shutdown. The valves could sustain mechanical damage before operators could shift control to an alternative source.
The plant is one of just three nuclear reactors nationwide in the next-to-lowest performance category, officials said. There are no plants in the lowest category.
Critics of the nuclear plant said that even if the lapse was minor, the stakes are too high for virtually any risk.
“Even if there’s a small probability, the consequences when something goes wrong are very large,” said Mary Lampert, director of the group Pilgrim Watch. “And it further undermines the public’s confidence that the reactor is safe.”
is we are increasing the efficiency of the program. Jim reminded me I listen in by phone to the design engineering public meeting 6 months ago and made comments. The guy does have a great memory.
Update: Jim asked me if I was the guy who made a FOIA request on all design engineering inspection documentation. It wasn't me.
I asked him why
all the design inspections had missed the Pilgrim hot short problem. Basically a electrical problem. He told me
he would get back to me with a answer.
That is basic
deception and lying. Please define what "increase efficiency" and "ROP Realignment" means…is it high highfalutin deregulation and regulatory capture by the rich utilities.
So here is the
list of names of the working group. I believe these guys are saying we need
less design engineering inspection. I doubt the agency has a “god’s eye view” of
all past and current design engineering violations…more the agency field of
vision is 99% restricted. What proof do they have that all the unknown design violations have been seen by the NRC? ***You get the inspection contractors are now limited to the 2009 budget???
VIII.
DEIWG MembershipJim Isom, NRR/DIRS/IRIB (Chair)
................................................ (301)415-2954Don Norkin, NRR/DIRS/IRIB
......................................................... (301)415-1109Chris Cauffman, NRR/DIRS/IRIB ..................................................
(301)415-8416Frank Arner (lead), Region I/DRS
................................................. (610)337-5194Steve Pindale (backup), Region I/DRS
......................................... (610)227-5116Wayne Schmidt (SRA), Region I/DRS
.......................................... (610)337-5315Robert Berryman, Region II/DRS
.................................................. (404)562-4817Andy Dunlop, Region III/DRS
....................................................... (630)829-9726Laura Kozak (SRA), Region III/DRS
............................................. (630)829-9604Wayne Sifre, Region IV/DRS
........................................................ (817)860-8193Gerond George (backup), Region IV/DRS
.................................... (817)276-6562
Is there any validity that you only get one shot at a enginering sample set for the life of the plant? Basically you get the NRC policy here with the greater than green risk hurdle. The NRC doesn’t enforcing licensing and regulatory rules violation with a less than or green potential violations.
IX. Duration As part of the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP)
self-assessment process (Inspection Manual Chapter 0307) periodic (at least
biennially) reviews of the ROP inspection procedures are conducted to determine
if the inspection program is meeting the goals and intended outcomes. In
accordance with Appendix B of the Inspection Manual Chapter 0307, “ROP
REALIGNMENT PROCESS,” IRIB and regional staff conduct effectiveness review of the
inspection elements of the ROP to determine if the inspection’s effectiveness
can be improved. During this review it was determined that a working group
should be formed to evaluate the current CDBI procedure to consider a new
engineering design inspection procedure and to enhance effectiveness of the design
engineering inspection program. The following reasons were identified and
precipitated the need to form a working group to evaluate the current design
engineering inspection program:
Is the any validity that you only get one shot at a sample
set for the life of the plant? Basically you get the NRC policy here with the
greater than green risk hurdle. The NRC doesn’t enforcing licensing and
regulatory rules violation with a less than or green potential violation.
1) The feedback on the CDBI process indicates that the
number of high risk low margin component samples that remain uninspected at
each site is approaching exhaustion since the process does not normally allow
for the re-inspection of the same component unless there is good justification.
2) Concerns have been raised over the inspection’s effectiveness at identifying risk significant findings. Based on this observation the working group will explore a wide variety of options.
***So why didn't one of their Engineering inspections catch the hot short problem at Pilgrim? Are they all getting big bucks and away from home vacation time to turn their heads the other way?
This reminds me of the double yellow flooding findings at Arkansas Nuclear One. The NRC allowed ANO to operate for many years with flooding seal problems. It took them killing a employee recklessly dropping a 600 ton stator and massive seal leaks for them to enforce the violations. The shorts deal has been around for decades and the NRC has had many ineffective processes for catching this kinds of violations. If a licensee can't keep their plants safe, then the agency needs to command them to be safe. This violation is on a ineffective federal regulator.
"as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety"
I can make the case there our many scenarios with hot shorts. Take the case of a knowingly unsafe high voltage breaker. You could hire some sap minimum wage fire watch to stand next to the breaker cubicle waiting to catch the smell of a shorting breaker. You might not get any warning what-so-ever, just a massive electrical explosion incinerating the low wage sap contract employees.
So the NRC's campaign contribution scenarios with wire run fires and defective plant designs, is there will be a warning before the catastrophic fire. The fire watch could detect small fires and abnormal small/smoke to inform the control room. They might scram the plant or de-energized the wire runs. I say there are scenarios of no warnings, such as the high voltage breaker failure that self identifies itself with no need of a fire watch. Then the plant widely spins out of control because of a plant's poor design.
Catch the "political campaign" nuclear safety philosophy affecting
"as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety".
all of the nuclear industry here? You have to have triplicate perfect proof a plant is not safe that is never available to return a plant to the safe condition. The absence of proof it is safe is unnecessary.
***IN 92-18 : I am not sure if I provoked the inspection notice or not. I am not sure if this came before my complaint, after, or as a results. We knew we had shoddy procedure, can you even imagine the madness if these hot shorts occurred with the shoddy procedures and being severely undermanned
Why doesn't Pilgrim just shutdown until they get their ducks in a row. Shutdown until it is corrected. They will be dragging their feet for years until the final decision to permanently shutdown. That is why I think the final years of the plant is a unreview safety problem. It is a very dangerous period of the plant's life...the most dangerous. The idea of spending money is just a waste of money in the gray shadow of the prolonged decision point to a permanent shutdown!
Aren't you dying to hear the opinion of this by the Massachusetts's governor??? This could take out the governor on credibility issues and scandal. When did they really discover this?
By the way on Vermont Yankee: the operations employees in 1992 thought we didn't have enough operators to safety carry out a big fire in the plant and to abandoned the control room because of the fire and safety shut down and cool the plant at alternate shutdown panels. It would be a absolute circus. I made a complaint about this and got a huge internal Vermont Yankee investigation and then the NRC came in. This is one of the reasons I got fired. It is in the docket!!!
SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS FOR FIRE EVENT - OPEN ITEM WITH POTENTIAL TO IMPACT CAPABILITY TO OPERATE MOTOR OPERATED VALVES
"At 1725 [EDT] on Monday, October 5, 2015, while updating the site fire safe shutdown analysis report, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) identified vulnerabilities in two (2) specific fire areas that required a compensatory fire watch. The compensatory fire watches have already been established.
"The specific concern involves the unlikely scenario that fire forces evacuation of the control room. In addition, it is postulated that motor operated valves cannot be operated from their alternate control location due to spurious operation caused by hot shorts in control wiring. The specific failure mode is described in NRC Information Notice (IN) 92-18.
"Engineering modifications are under development and scheduled for implementation to address this specific IN 92-18 concern.
"Based on the above, the condition is reportable to the NRC as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. As such the condition is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), and requires an 8 hour notification.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Honestly, isn't this the universe helping me?
I got to translate what is going on. A lot of the anti governmentalism republican teabagger pronukers like minded people have gone off in a darkened room and decided engineering inspection are no longer needed. The NRC is portraying this corruptly carrying the industry's interest.
1) Basically, why have there been so many decades old engineering and licensing violations identified in recent years. There has been many violations picked up in malfunction and degradation by the residents these engineering inspections should have picked up?
2) How come these engineering inspections didn't pick up the Pilgrim hot short issues.
Design engineering inspections have been and continue to be
part of the NRC’s power reactor inspection program to ensure adequate public
safety. In the past, several different design engineering inspections process
have been implemented and they include Safety System Functional Inspection (IP
93801); Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection (IP 93811);
Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection (IP 93810); and Safety System
Design and Performance Capability Inspection (IP 71111.21). The Component
Design Bases Inspection (CDBI) (IP 71111.21) is the current design engineering
inspection. This inspection is performed under the ROP baseline inspection
program and will continue through
CY 2010 in its’ present form.
As part of the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) self-assessment
process (Inspection Manual Chapter 0307) periodic (at least biennially) reviews
of the ROP inspection procedures are conducted to determine if the inspection
program is meeting the goals and intended outcomes.
In accordance with Appendix B of the Inspection Manual
Chapter 0307, “ROP REALIGNMENT PROCESS,” IRIB and regional staff conduct
effectiveness review of the inspection elements of the ROP to determine if the
inspection’s effectiveness can be improved. During this review it was
determined that a working group should be formed to evaluate the current CDBI
procedure to consider a new engineering design inspection procedure and to
enhance effectiveness of the design engineering inspection program. The
following reasons were identified and precipitated the need to form a working
group to evaluate the current design engineering inspection program:
1) The feedback on the CDBI process indicates that the
number of high risk low margin component samples that remain uninspected at
each site is approaching exhaustion since the process does not normally allow
for the re-inspection of the same component unless there is good justification.
2) Concerns have been raised over the inspection’s effectiveness
at identifying risk significant findings. Based on this observation the working
group will explore a wide variety of options.
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