Farley Pressurizer Safety Valve Troubles

I didn't find any other  problems on their PORVs, but problems with their turbine driven aux feed pumps are a train wreck.  

You see how much higher the pressure is in PWRs.

 

October 9, 2015

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 LicenseeEvent Report 2015-004-00 Pressurizer Safetv Valve Setpoint Pressure Outside of Technical Specification Tolerance Band

On 8/11/15 Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Unit 1 discovered that a pressurizer safety valve (PSV), which had been removed during the May 2015 maintenance outage and shipped offsite for testing, failed its as-found lift test below the Technical Specification (TS) allowable value. The cause of the test failure was attributed to the seat leakage of the valve that occurred during and after startup from the Spring 2015 Refueling Outage (1 R26). This failure constitutes a condition that is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B), "Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications." The 18 pressurizer safety valve was replaced during a May 2015 planned maintenance outage.

Leak began upon startup on 5/4/2015.

Shutdowned plant to fix leak on 5/26/15

They assumed they could manage the leaking for the next two years. You see how far off their engineering instinct are…they should have shutdown on the start-up and fixed the valve. You see how deep this mental disease is in the nuclear disease.  

You see how lenient the NRC is with not requiring Farely to disclose why the valve leaked? This LER doesn't disclose it. This plant is deep into Republican land...they use the rules differently than anyone else.    

The moral of this story is anytime time a nuclear plant safety relief valve leaks they are intentionally aiming at violating tech specs with them demanding an immediate safety shutdown. Basically we are intentionally entering a immediate shutdown requirement and we are going to knowingly ignore it with the knowledge the component is not work as required. 

 

These guys got safety culture problems... 

On 8/11/15 during testing at an offsite facility the as-found lift setting for the Unit 1 1 B pressurizer safety valve (PSV) (EllS Code RV) was discovered to be 2425 psig which is outside of the Technical Specification (TS) allowable lift settings of ;:: 2460 psig and s 2510 psi g. On 5/4/15 during startup from 1 R26 with the plant in Mode 3, it was determined that the 1 B PSV was leaking into the pressurizer relief tank (PRT) based on elevated tailpipe temperatures. On 5/8/15 the tailpipe temperature leakage indication stabilized with average PRT in-leakage at 0.12 gpm. Compensatory actions were established which included increased monitoring of leak rate, PRT parameters, radiation levels, PRT venting, and decision points for re-evaluating the need to replace the valve. Based upon the continued leakage Unit 1 entered a planned maintenance outage on 5/26/15 to replace the 1 B PSV. The valve was then shipped to an offsite facility for lift testing and valve disassembly and inspection.