Fifteen Years of Data on Hope Creek's 2 Stage SRVs

Ok, put together these recent events. Put the puzzle together. What picture do you see. The dual recirc pump trip. The out of alignment srv and it piping. The come-along who broke the SRV before operation. The dinged SRV piping...many pipe...with a pipe wrench gouge weakening it. The prolong operation with the leaking SRV on strong indications. The whole deal with the SRV set point inaccuracy. Leaking SRV and using safety equipment (torus cooling) to accommodate poor maintenance. Hope Creek has painted a picture with these events…what commonalities do you see in it all. What picture do you see in the puzzle?   

I called two Hope Creek telephone numbers this morning explaining the SRV problem...gave them a opportunity to talk to me. Nothing yet

Right, in 2000 Hope Creek said all is fixed with the SRVs. I see a trends from 2000 to today of a drastic increase in the magnitude of inaccuracies going higher than required tech spec limits and a drastic increase in testing valve failures per operating period. The reliability the Hope Creeks SRVs has drastically declined in 15 years. Over and over again Hope Creek has opined after each poor operational period, we now are positive we got a handle on the SRV maintenance and reliability issues. But each operational period only gets worst. In 2000 Hope Creek had a SRV failure of 14%. In the most recent period in their NRC reporting it is at a 71% failure rate. The current failure rate is 5 times worst than 2000.

Hmm, Hope Creek had their first power up rate in 2001. It was 1.4%? Had another uprate in 2008 @ 15%. Is the SRV inaccuracy deal uprate related? 

Just saying, a 16.4% increase in power and no comparable increase in safety relief valve capacity?

How is the insulation situation around the SRVs with all this movement and power increase?   

There is clear and convincing evidence a majority of the SRVs aren't reliable enough to stay within tech specs limits for the operating period and the majority of the operational time Hope Creek really is prohibited from being at power according to plant licencing. I bet you at the 6 month operational period, if the plant was required to be shutdown and test their SRVs for lift pressure accuracy...five SRVs would be inop. According to tech specs, Hope Creek is required to have thirteen of fourteen fully functional.   

It is beyond shocking Hope Creek and NRC hasn't made a operability determination and why there was so many failures this past operating period. It is mind boggling! Why did we have 10 failures out of fourteenth...why have the rates changed so drastically in recent years. Isn't anyone inquisitive?

Why do I feel like the corrective actions on the distance past failures have led to a rash of new failures? 

Fifteen years of SRV LERs: 

Licensee Event Report 2015-004-01

10 of 14 failed tech specs testing 

Licensee Event Report 2013-007-00

5 failed 

Licensee Event Report 2013-005-00

SRV P solenoid failed to operate-they didn’t know at what point in the cycle. Manufacturer defect. Why didn’t testing pick this up before installation and during cycle?

  

(If this is a LER, how come the cold spring H SRV isn’t a LER?)

The SRV-P SOV (S/N 481) was a new valve purchased from Target Rock for installation in refueling outage H1R17.

A new SRV…it this why the Target Rock new SRV replacement deal fell through? What crap quality new valves.

Licensee Event Report 2012-004-01

6 failed

Outside tech specs by a huge margin  

Licensee Event Report 2010-002-01

6 failed

5 failed by corrosion bonding.

1 failed through a spring failure.

Taking about the change from plus or minus 1% t0 3%.

Outside Tech Specs by a huge margin.

Licensee Event Report 2009-002-001

6 failed with another with a question

Outside tech specs by a huge margin.

Was  the H SRV this period, was the bellows assemble noticeably distorted. What cause this distortion in 2009...

“For the sixth SRV, the bellows assembly was noticeably distorted.”

15% Power Uprate

LER 354/2006-003-00

3 failed tech specs accuracy.

All failed by 3.2%. It is highly implausible they all at the exact rate. It is an indicator of fraud.

LER 354/2004-009-00

“PSEG determined that the setpoint value for several safety relief valves” :)

5 failed set point accuracy

3 failed oxidation bonding

Unknown reason for the other two. The LER update on the two unknown failures are missing? 

LER 354/2003-003-00

8 failed tech spec setpoint testing

6 on setpoint testing

2 by leaking. A leaking SRV has a high probability of failing to operate on demand and the valve just opening on its own. A leaking SRV has a high probability of failing on setpoint inaccuracy. 

Implies these valves were leaking from the beginning: The offsite test procedure was revised to require the performance of an additional seat leakage test at 10 psig higher than the seat leakage certification test. This additional test provides added assurance of the valve's ability to be leak tight. The certification seat leakage test pressure is currently performed at the maximum operating pressure of 1010 psig.

LER 354/2001-007-00

3 failed tech spec testing

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 2000-003-00

2 failed tech spec testing;

If only the next 15 years Hope Creek had two failures per refueling outage. Look at with the future record I provided.  In the next fifteen years, the magnitude of  inaccuracies have drastically worsened and the number of valves failures per operating period have drastically increased. Remember the most recent period had ten of fourteen SRVs being inop.

•  Prior to Cycle 9, pilot discs for thirteen of the fourteen SRVs were modified with platinum ion implantation to address problems with setpoint drift caused by corrosion bonding of the pilot disc to the pilot seat.

I think the below is basically a public con job and coning the public about fixing the SRVs is just going to continue in the future. Hope Creek and the NRC are just addicted to being deceptive. 

“On May 4, 2000, the results of the Safety Relief Valve (SRV) setpoint testing were received. The testing revealed that, following Cycle 9, 2 of the 14 SRVs experienced setpoint drift outside of the Technical Specification limit of +/ 3%. One of the failures was of a valve with a pilot disc that was modified with platinum ion implantation. The drift for this valve appears to have been caused by friction on the sliding surfaces resulting from poorly controlled maintenance performed by the valve vendor. These practices have been addressed via a NUPIC audit. Corrective actions have been proposed and their effectiveness is being monitored. The cause of the drift for the other valve is corrosion bonding of the pilot disc to the pilot seat. The SRVs were inspected, refurbished and satisfactorily re-tested at a test facility. SRV drift in two-stage Target Rock valves is being addressed generically by the Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group. Platinum ion implantation has now been implemented on all 14 SRVs. The ion implantation process has resulted in a marked reduction of setpoint drift and will continue to be the primary solution for pilot disc to seat corrosion bonding.”

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES 

LER 95-004, LER 95-036, LER 354/97-024, and LER 354/99-003, reported events where SRV setpoint drift exceeded the Technical Specification allowable limits during previous operating cycles. The corrective actions taken to address setpoint drift have not been fully implemented; therefore, they were not entirely effective at eliminating this phenomena. However, the ion implantation process has reduced the magnitude of the setpoint drift and is expected to further reduce it after the corrective actions are fully implemented. As described in the following Corrective Actions section, PSE&G continues to work with the BWROG to resolve this issue.