Nearly Identical To Pilgrim’s SRVs: 71% Target Rock Two Stage SRV Tech Spec Failure Rate

These are the 2 stage SRVs that replaced Pilgrim's 3 stage SRVs…they would be the same size 2 stage as Pilgrim? I doubt anyone is happy staying with the 2 stage?

***I would say Hope Creek's SRVs are identical to Pilgrim.

Part 21 on Pilgrim's 3 stage

While we have yet to determine if a specific defect exists, the following plants were supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:

- Pilgrim (Model 09J-001) Quantity Shipped = 8

- Fitzpatrick (Model 09H-001) Quantity Shipped = 4, Quantity on order= 8

- Hatch 1 and 2 (Model 09G-001) Quantity Shipped= 24, Quantity on order= 12

The following plants will be supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:

- Hope Creek (Models 14J-001, 14J-002) Quantity on order = 7

I hear rumor the borrowed Pilgrim 2 stage SRV valves come from Hope Creeks. Would it make a difference if they came from Hope Creek?  

Originally posted on 9/3 

Update 9/3, 2015

***Until recently there has been very little srv setpoint testing failures at Hope Creek. The last three operating periods sit outside the normal. The first two operating period consist of three or four SRV setpoint testing failures, while the last setpoint testing failures has 10 failed SRVs. Why are the failures skyrocketing? What has changed to cause this.    

You can't do a SRV lift setpoints accuracy test up at power. You have to shutdown to test these valve. If one of Pilgrims SRV valves was known to be outside their plus or minus 3% tech spec limit, they would be required to shutdown within 24 hours.

This exact problem with repeated two stage Target Rock inaccuracy setpoint testing problems at Hope Creek...the ones in the Pilgrim plant now... is the reason why Pilgrim dumped their two stage SRV valves and jumped into their defective three stage SRVs valves.

You get it, Target Rock hasn't made nuclear plant grade two or three stage safety relief valves for many decades. They are out of manufactor for decades. Currently the whole USA nuclear fleet (BWRs) gets their reliefs from canceled or decommissioning plant junk yards.

Current one of the Hatch plants is trying to get out of the unreliable Target Rock two stage SRV valves. They installed three Target Rock three stage relief valves in their plant in anticipating shifting all of their 12 Two stage reliefs into three stage. They are testing the reliability of the three stage reliefs. The issue of unreliable three stage relief  at Pilgrim had delay shifting over to all three stage reliefs in the Hatch nuclear plants.

***There is a fix to corrosion bonding or welding on inaccurate setpoint testing with the safety relief valves. You open and shut them once for a bi monthly or monthly bases during the operating period. The problem of this is duty of monthly testing is really the two or three stage Safety Relief Valves are too delicate for installation in these nuclear plants. They are a obsolete technology. They would quickly start to leak much like Pilgrim and then leakage would drive the valves into breaking and not operating when called upon. These utilities would begin to lie to stay up power with leaking valves saying they will definitely operative...then they won't. Then you got regulatory issues like Pilgrim today. As for today, we make believe this valves are operational when they are not. Lying, cheating and not telling the whole truth has a high probability of damaging the whole safety culture in a nuclear plant.***

***We really need a new bullet proof design for safety relief valves. We could beat the hell out of these valves without them degrading and not passing setpoint testing for many years. We can keep these valves in the plant for many operating cycles without excessive burdens with testing and maintenance.***

LER: As-Found Values for Safety Relief Valve Lift Set Points Exceed Technical Specification Allowable Limit

On June 2, 2015, Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) received initial results of the 'as-found' setpoint testing for the safety relief valve (SRV) pilot stage assemblies. The initial results indicated that three SRV pilot stage assemblies had exceeded the lift settings prescribed in Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.2.1. The TS requires the SRV lift settings to be within +/- 3% of the nominal setpoint value. During the nineteenth refueling outage (H1R19), all fourteen SRV pilot stage assemblies were removed for testing at an offsite facility. Between June 2 and June 1 O, 2015, HCGS received the test results for the remainder of the SRV pilot valve assemblies. A total of ten of the fourteen SRV pilot stage assemblies experienced setpoint drift outside of the TS 3.4.2.1 specified values. All of the valves failing to meet the limits were Target Rock Model 7567F two-stage SRVs. This is a condition reportable under 1 O CFR 50. 73{a)(2)(i)(B) as an Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications.

The cause of the setpoint drift for the ten SRV pilot stage assemblies is attributed to corrosion bonding between the pilot disc and seating surfaces, which is consistent with industry experience. This conclusion is based on previous cause evaluations and the repetitive nature of this condition at HCGS and within the BWR industry.

Technical evaluations performed to assess the aggregate safety significance of ten SRVs with out of tolerance initial lift setpoints concluded that this condition had no safety significance.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRRENCE

During the nineteenth refueling outage (H1R19) at Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS), all 14 Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (SRV) pilot stage assemblies {SB/RV} were removed and tested at NWS Technologies. The SRVs are Target Rock Model 7567F two-stage SRVs. During the period from June 2, 2015 through June 10. 2015, HCGS received the results of the 'as-found' set pressure testing required by Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.4.2.2. A total of ten of the 14 SRV pilot stage assemblies had setpoint drift outside of the required

TS 3.4.2.1 tolerance values of +/-3% of nominal value. The 'as-found' test results for the ten SRVs not meeting the TS requirements are as follows:

Valve ID As Found TS Lift Setting Acceptable Band % Difference

(psig) (psig) (psig) Actual

F013C 1216 1130 1096.1 -1163.9 7.61%

F013F 1240 1108 1074.8 -1141.2 11.90%

F013G 1208 1120 1086.4 - 1153.6 7.86%

F013H 1148 1108 1074.8-1141.2 3.60%

F013J 1161 1120 1086.4 -1153.6 3.66%

F013K 1161 1108 107 4.8 -1141.2 4.80%

F013 L 1165 1120 1086.4 -1153.6 4.00%

F013 M 1207 1108 1074.8 -1141.2 8.90%

F013P 1221 1120 1086.4 -1153.6 9.00%

F013R 1169 1120 1086.4 -1153.6 4.38%

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of the setpoint drift for the ten SRV pilot stage assemblies is attributed to corrosion bonding between the pilot disc and seating surfaces, which is consistent with industry experience. This conclusion is based on previous cause evaluations and the repetitive nature of this condition at HCGS and within the BWR industry.