Bottom line, considering the political sensitivity of Pilgrim, I think the NRC and Pilgrim were burying the problem fearing it wouldn't reflect well on them to admit a possible meltdown evacuation would be severely impacted.
Every time either a primary or secondary met tower goes inop...there should be a LER report on it.
From: Mike Mulligan [steamshovel2002@gmail.com
Sent: Sunday, May 26, 2013 1:53 PM
To: Guzman, Richard
By The NRCPower Reactor Event Number: 49062Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: NATHAN L. BEGER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 05/23/2013
Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2013
Event Time: 10:19 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:Can I be clearer?
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
Unit
SCRAM
Code
RX
CRIT
Initial
PWR Initial RX Mode
Current
PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event TextTEMPORARY LOSS OF METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING SYSTEM DURING PLANNED MAINTENANCE"At 1019 CDT, AC power was removed from the site meteorological monitoring system (MET) equipment for planned maintenance in order to remove abandoned equipment left in place since installing the new meteorological system in October 2012. Removing AC power was not expected to have an effect since all MET information would continue to be available due to an 8-hour battery backup system installed at the meteorological tower. However, when power was removed, all onsite meteorological data was lost to the control room via the Plant Management Information System (PMIS). PMIS is the only display of local direct meteorological conditions available. Subsequently, [Cooper Nuclear Station] CNS determined the interface between MET system and PMIS was not powered from the 8 hour MET battery backup system which accounted for the lost MET indication. CNS corrected the condition and restored meteorological data to the control room via the PMIS system at 1219 CDT."Site backup assessment capability relies on Meteorological model estimates from the National Weather Service out of Valley, Nebraska or on default values derived from historical local weather patterns. Since there was no direct information of site meteorological conditions during the period of lost power, CNS considered this to be a major loss of assessment capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.Mr Guzman,So here is an official concern to the NRC by me. I not crazy!With LER 2013-003-00 Entergy admits the the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data. Whatever that means? Was the spinning cups out in the weather frozen and iced over during blizzard Nemo or did the instruments fail because of the power failure? Was it just a data recording issue or did the site lose wind speed and direction indication in the control room or at the tech support center?
- Cover-Up: Public Notification And Radiation Evac Plan Broke During Accident
- http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2013/05/loss-of-off-site-power-events-dueto.Html
I am calling it, they lost wind speed and direction indication in the control room and the evacuation plan was severely impaired.2013-003-00: "During the storm on February 8, meteorological instruments at PNPS recorded sustained wind speeds between 42 and 49 mph through 2338 hours at which time the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data until 1840 hours the following day. The wind direction was predominantly from the ocean toward the switchyard during the storm
Here again?So why didn’t Pilgrim during the Nemo Blizzard make an event report like the Cooper station?
- Cooper: "At 1019 CDT, AC power was removed from the site meteorological monitoring system (MET) equipment for planned maintenance in order to remove abandoned equipment left in place since installing the new meteorological system in October 2012
Why was there no “major loss of assessment capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)" like the Cooper station?
- Cooper: Since there was no direct information of site meteorological conditions during the period of lost power, CNS considered this to be a major loss of assessment capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
And it raises questions if this should have been reported in the emergency classification system such as a Unusual Event.It is beyond utter incompetence and negligence with public reporting on plant events with Entergy and the NRC on this atrocious incomplete statement: "the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data". Entergy should have been forced to add a few sentences in the LER like, we still had wind speed and direction indication in the control room or this is how the site would have carried out the evacuation if we had become blind to knowing wind speed and direction.
The NRC inspection reports are terribly incomplete. I discovered this in the NRC inspection report timeline...it was amazing they didn't comprehensively explain why the met towers didn't work in a emergency on the first inspection report.Why didn’t Entergy carry fully out their licensing reporting responsibilities during Blizzard Nemo and why is the NRC negligent with enforcing their rules?I see the meteorological instrumentation issue wasn’t
"This is so shoddy documentation reporting by both of you."-why did it take the NRC three years to comprehensively report on the met tower unreliability problems?carried at all in your most recent inspection report. And the diesel smoke in the reactor building wasn’t covered in
the LER. This is so shoddy documentation reporting by both of you.Would you add this to the docket?Sincerely,Mike MulliganHinsdale, NH
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