Wednesday, February 17, 2016

NRC: Proof I Instigated The 2014 Christmas River Bend plant Scram Special Inspection


***Like who ever in the industry ever got two special inspection at one plant every in a year...


Reposted from 7/23/15

Update Sept 11

They are going to say they are trying to protect my confidentiality...they know what is best for me.

Generally the NRC gets very few, if any, request like this.

I bet you very few outsider ever gets a double header special inspection to a trouble plant. 

I think the agency and industry fears openly disclosing the "allegation letter" will raise my stature. 

note: It is a poor choice of mine making this letter on 9/11...anything 9/11 has nothing to do with this.  
Michael Mulligan   
RIVER BEND STATION – NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2015009; PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING

 I wanted to get the message out (holy crap) that I was really impressed with the agency's response to my complaint. How many outsiders ever initiated two special inspection at a US nuclear plant ever?  
Mrs. Weaver,  
 
I want the agency to put this response on the River Bend docket. So far this is just between me and the NRC. They have had issues with that in the past. Their wording is; as to not inhibit the NRC's allegation process and to protect your confidentiality/ anonymity...we are going to override your request to add secret allegation material onto Adams documents in the nation's and your best interest.     
Mike Mulligan
PO Box 161
Hinsdale, NH 03451
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV
1600 E. LAMAR BLVD
ARLINGTON, TX 76011-4511

June 2, 2015

SUBJECT: CONCERN YOU RAISED TO THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC) REGARDING THE RIVER BEND STATION
RE: RIV-2015-A-0004

Dear Mr. Mulligan:

The NRC has completed its follow up in response to the concern you brought to our attention on January 5, 2015, regarding the River Bend Station. Your concern was related to equipment issues leading to scrams and operator performance following scrams. The enclosure to this letter restates your concern and describes the NRC's review and conclusions with regard to the concern.

Thank you for informing us of your concern. Allegations are an important source of information in support of the NRC's safety mission. We take our safety responsibility to the public seriously and will continue to do so within the bounds of our lawful authority. We believe that our actions have been responsive to your concerns.

You should note that final NRC documents may be made available to the public under the Freedom of Information Act subject to redaction of information pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. Requests under the Freedom of Information Act should be made in accordance with 10 CFR 9.23, Requests for Records. Information is accessible from the NRC's website at http://www. nrc. gov/reading-rm/foia/foia-reouest. html#how.

Should you have any additional questions, or if the NRC can be of further assistance, please contact Mr. Jesse M. Rollins, Senior Allegations Coordinator, at the Region IV toll-free number 1-800-952-9677, extension 1245, Monday - Friday between 8 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. Central time. Information in writing may be provided to the address listed in the letterhead.

Greg Warnick, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch C
Division of Reactor Projects
RESPONSE TO CONCERN

ALLEGATION RIV-2015-A-0004

Concern

Equipment issues leading to scrams and operator performance problems following scrams continue at the River Bend Station and are not being addressed and resolved.

Response to Concern

You made a valid observation with regard to a number of contributing factors involved in the most recent events at the River Bend Station. These factors are currently being reviewed by the NRC staff. For instance, the NRC's most recent End-of-Cycle assessment of the River Bend Station identified that the River Bend Station's safety-significant performance indicator for Unplanned Scrams with Complications, crossed the White threshold during the 4th Quarter 2014. This was due to two unplanned scrams that the River Bend Station experienced in the 4th Quarter of 2014. As a result, the NRC plans to conduct Inspection Procedure 95001, "Supplemental Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area." The main focus of this inspection will be to review the contributing factors that led to the scrams, and the conditions that gave rise to the complications encountered.

In looking at your concern, the NRC found that the specifics of the following event, and the NRC's response, to be relevant:
On December 25, 2014, at 8:37 a.m., the River Bend Station scrammed from 85 percent power following a trip of the B reactor protection system motor generator set. At the time of the motor generator set trip, a Division 1 half scram existed due to an unrelated equipment issue with a relay for the No. 2 turbine control valve fast closure reactor protection system function. The combination of the B reactor protection system motor generator set trip and the Division 1 half scram, resulted in a scram of the reactor.

The following equipment issues occurred during the initial scram response:
  • An unexpected Level 8 (high) reactor water level signal was received which resulted in tripping all reactor feedwater pumps.
  • Following reset of the Level 8 (high) reactor water level signal, operations personnel were unable to start RFP C. They responded by starting reactor feedwater pump A at a vessel level of 25". The licensee subsequently determined that the circuit breaker (Magne Blast type) for reactor feedwater pump C did not close because an interlock lever for a microswitch that controls the breaker close permissive was not fully engaged in the cubicle.
  • Following the start of reactor feedwater pump A, the licensee attempted to open the startup feedwater regulating valve but was unsuccessful prior to the Level 3 (low) reactor water RIV-2015-A-0004 level trip setpoint at +9.7". The licensee then opened main feedwater regulating valve C to restore reactor vessel water level. The lowest level reached was +7.5". Subsequent troubleshooting revealed a faulty manual function control card. The card was replaced by the licensee and the feedwater regulating valve was used on the subsequent plant startup.

Following restoration of reactor vessel water level, the plant was stabilized in Mode 3. A plant startup was conducted on December 27, 2014, with reactor protection system bus B being supplied by its alternate power source. During power ascension following startup, reactor feedwater pump B did not start. The licensee re-racked its associated circuit breaker and successfully started reactor feedwater pump B.

The NRC evaluated this event through its Management Directive 8.3, "NRC Incident Investigation Program," to determine the level of NRC response appropriate for this event. Based on the multiple failures of the feedwater system, the potential generic concern with the Magne Blast circuit breakers, and the issues related to reactor vessel level between the Level 3 (low) and Level 8 (high) setpoints following a reactor scram, the NRC determined that the appropriate level of NRC response was to conduct a special inspection. 
On January 26, 2015, the NRC began the special inspection. This inspection was concluded on May 21. Similar issues to those listed by you were identified during this inspection. The results of this inspection will be documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000458/2015009. This inspection identified a number of observations, issues, and findings-with regard to the licensee's equipment, maintenance, and operations personnel performance. 
In addition to the above event, on March 9, 2015, the River Bend Station experienced another event, whereby the HVK chiller 1 C failed to start, followed by the subsequent loss of the control building ventilation system. This event and associated equipment failures revealed a much broader concern that has been ongoing with an identified master pact breaker deficiency related to the breaker's ability to open and close. This, along with the issues associated with the GE Magne Blast circuit breakers described above, calls into question the overall adequacy of the licensee's breaker maintenance program. These concerns resulted in a second special inspection, which began on March 30, 2015 and was completed on May 28. Again, similar concerns to those listed by you were identified during this inspection.

These reports will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC's Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agency wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). If you are unable to retrieve these documents from ADAMS, you can request a copy from the NRC resident staff at the River Bend Station. 
Therefore, your concern that equipment issues leading to scrams and operator performance problems following scrams continue at the River Bend Station is valid. As previously stated, the NRC is currently monitoring the licensee's actions to resolve these issues, and the results of our inspections will be made available to the public upon issuance of our inspection reports.
RIV-2015-A-0004 2







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