More Safety Breaker Problems at Junk Plant River Bend.

So where is the reset button to make a plant, fleet, employees and management all new. Where is your reset?  We all deserve a second, third, forth and fifth chance. So where is our next second chance? 

I like riding my mountain bike in the small mountains around my house. I spend a tremendous amounts of time on my bike seat. Being outdoor and in nature reminds me how close we all are to the infinite and god. It is just right there without any deniability. I am heading out to the infinite right now.

It is like coming to a swampy area on my bike. Five or six mosquitoes are on my arm and many more attached to my body. I am getting extremely uncomfortable. I can imagine itching for hours. It's like swatting one mosquito to death on my arm and wondering why I am still being attacked by a cloud of bugs. I should be not thinking stupid thoughts at all, but moving my bike(me)bike out of the swamp.

Honestly, I would never give up on the human spirit and our intelligence. The ability of people to dig a hole nobody can imagine them getting out of. The ability of person at any point, to transform their lives. We are all one higher choice away from a world we dream of. Maybe it not dream at all, but a world god provides for us. It is our choice.  

I don't think this event went down this way they said it did. I think Entergy was worried the NRC would request a shutdown. Or the NRC hinted they might do that. 

Basically by March of 2015 the NRC and Entergy realized they have systemic breaker quality and reliability issues at River Bend. It is unbelievable after all this time and the special inspection, they would discover new breaker problems at River Bend. 

What would a plant reset look like to you?            

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51754
Facility: RIVER BEND Region: 4 State: LA Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: JACK McCOY HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN	Notification Date: 02/24/2016 Notification Time: 18:16 [ET] Event Date: 02/24/2016 Event Time: 11:00 [CST] Last Update Date: 02/24/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD	Person (Organization): JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	N	0	Cold Shutdown	0	Cold Shutdown

Event Text

ELECTRICAL BREAKER ISSUE IDENTIFIED DURING AN ENGINEERING REVIEW "At 1100 CST on February 24, 2016, with the plant in cold shutdown (Mode 4), the shift manager was notified of a condition that could potentially prevent the automatic closure of the circuit breakers powering the emergency ventilation fans in the both the Division 1 and 2 emergency diesel generator rooms. These fans are not in Technical Specifications, however, they provide a support function to the emergency diesel generators, requiring that both diesel generators to be declared inoperable. This inoperability constitutes a condition that could potentially prevent fulfillment of the safety function of onsite AC power sources, and is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). "Four additional breakers are affected by the same condition. These breakers supply power to Division 1 and 2 containment unit coolers and the Division 1 and 2 auxiliary building 141 ft. elevation general area unit coolers. The auxiliary building unit coolers are not in Technical Specifications, however, they provide a support function to the electrical distribution system. The Technical Specification required action is to declare both trains of the residual heat removal system (shutdown cooling mode) inoperable. This inoperability constitutes a condition that could potentially prevent the fulfillment of the decay heat removal safety function, and is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). "Division 2 residual heat removal is operating in shutdown cooling, satisfactorily maintaining reactor coolant temperature. The affected breakers can be manually operated to start/stop their associated equipment, if necessary for operation." This condition was identified during an Engineering review. The licensee has compensatory measures in place. Long term corrective actions are under review. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

Special Inspection at River Bend: The Chiller Thriller

(Feb 24, 2016@ 5pm) "Yea well, right after the 2014 Christmas plant trip I noticed the troubles River Bend was having controlling vessel water level. Don’t even get me talking about all the plant trips nationwide in the industry, with them having feedwater control system problems. My favorite recently is Callaway. They partially reverse-engineered an obsolete aux feed water safety controller cards. It is cheaper to replace a card than replace the system (“Failure to assure that the design of the replacement reverse engineered Modutronics controller cards for the auxiliary feedwater control valves were suitable for their application”). 

So I looked at a bunch of LERs about plant trips at River Bend. In most of the trips, the level was unprofessionally banging from the high feed pump trip to the low level scram. I doubt you could call it control. The feed pumps were constantly tripping also. I just couldn’t believe how they were getting away with acting so unprofessional scram after scram. So I made out notes on my blog…I talked to the senior resident explaining the problem. He flipped it into an allegation, I hate the NRC’s allegation
department. They in turn called a special inspection. They discovered known massively leaking feed regulating valves and the simulator had serious fidelity problems. No wonder they didn’t know how to control reactor vessel level. Here is the NRC’s response to me. 

“NRC: Proof I instigated The 2014 Christmas River Bend plant Scram Special Inspection” 

In this response, the NRC says in investigating my vessel level problem, the NRC discovered an almost identical issue with ventilation breaker. The NRC said I caused two special inspections. It startles me to death to think the licensee and NRC can’t figure this out without an outsider provoking them. 

“Junk Plant River Bend’s Crazy February 2016 Power History So Far...” 

Here I am explaining River Bend’s disgusting recent capacity factor problems on my blog. I again called the senior resident inspector. Basically she told me the down-powers and shutdowns are caused by a host of equipment problems. She wouldn’t get specific. She won’t tell me why they shutdown on Fed 16. River Bend is in a lot more trouble than the ROP and inspection reports disclose. 

Since the 2014 Christmas trip River Bend has had three special inspections. It’s got to be a record. The three special inspections are: the 2014 Christmas scram, the magniblast breaker issue and the recent lightning scram where they flubbed putting on shutdown cooling. I am dying to see if River Bend controlled vessel level in the lightning scram?

NRC Allegation response to me: “Based on the multiple failures of the feedwater system, the potential generic concern with the Magne Blast circuit breakers, and the issues related to reactor vessel level between the Level 3 (low) and Level 8 (high) setpoints following a reactor scram, the NRC determined that the appropriate level of NRC response was to conduct a special inspection.”"