They assume the first time (1/06/2016) it was a actuator problem.
This is the second time (2/02/1016) the turbine bypass flings open?
Power Reactor Event Number: 51755 Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DEREK ETUE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKERNotification Date: 02/25/2016
Notification Time: 16:35 [ET]
Event Date: 01/06/2016
Event Time: 15:14 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2016Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SDPerson (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
Event Text
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode 2 N Y 100 Power Operation 91 Power Operation
POWER REDUCTION DUE TO AUTOMATIC OPENING OF THE TURBINE BYPASS VALVES
"On January 6, 2016. at approximately 1514 EST, with Fermi 2 in Mode 1 operating at 100 percent reactor thermal power, the East and West Turbine Bypass Valves (TBVs) automatically opened for 3 minutes and 32 seconds in response to the number one High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve (TSV) drifting from full open to 25% open. Reactor power was subsequently lowered to 91.0 percent reactor thermal power and the bypass valves closed.
"Per Technical Specification Bases 3.3.1.1, TBVs must remain shut while reactor thermal power is at or above 29.5 percent to consider the TSV closure and Turbine Control Valve (TCV) fast closure Reactor Protection System (RPS) functions operable. The condition was recognized at the time of the event and the RPS functions were not declared inoperable since the functions were verified to remain enabled.
"Since the RPS functions were not declared inoperable, Fermi 2 did not report this event within 8 hours of occurrence. However, after further evaluation, it was determined that this event met the reporting criterion. Accordingly, this event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A).
"The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector."
The cause of the High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve drifting was due to an actuator malfunction that has since been corrected.
This event was determined to be reportable at 1200 EST on 02/24/16. See EN #51756 for a similar event that occurred on 02/21/16.
It is now called a "communication card failure" not a actuator problem.
Again not reporting accurate event reports.
Power Reactor Event Number: 51756 Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DEREK ETUE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKERNotification Date: 02/25/2016
Notification Time: 16:35 [ET]
Event Date: 02/21/2016
Event Time: 00:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2016Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SDPerson (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
Event Text
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode 2 N Y 100 Power Operation 91 Power Operation
POWER REDUCTION DUE TO AUTOMATIC OPENING OF A TURBINE BYPASS VALVE
"On February 21, 2015, at approximately 0030 EST, with Fermi 2 in Mode 1 operating at 100 percent reactor thermal power, the West Turbine Bypass Valve (TBV) automatically opened in response to the number two High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve (TSV) cycling from full open to closed and then to 22 percent open. Reactor power was subsequently lowered to 91.5 percent reactor thermal power and the bypass valve closed.
"Per Technical Specification Bases 3.3.1.1, TBVs must remain shut while reactor thermal power is at or above 29.5 percent to consider the TSV closure and Turbine Control Valve (TCV) fast closure Reactor Protection System (RPS) functions operable. The condition was recognized at the time of the event and the RPS functions were declared inoperable. The Limiting Condition for Operation was exited at 0031 EST following TBV closure.
"Since the RPS functions were verified to remain enabled, Fermi 2 did not report this event within 8 hours of occurrence. However, this event was subsequently determined to meet the reporting criterion and is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A).
"The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector."
The cause of the High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve cycling was due to a communication card failure that has since been corrected.
This event was determined to be reportable at 1200 EST on 02/24/16. See EN #51755 for a similar event that occurred on 01/06/16.
MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO LOSS OF TURBINE BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATERIt starts out as a leak in the Turbine Building Closed Cooling> So this event occured on Sept 13 and it takes them all this time to fix the event report. Sounds like the NRC provoking Femi to fix inaccurate
"At 2305 EDT on September 13, 2015, a manual scram was initiated in response to a loss of all Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water (TBCCW). All control rods fully inserted. The lowest Reactor Water Level (RWL) reached was 137 inches. All isolations and actuations for RWL 3 occurred as expected. Decay heat was initially being removed through the Main Turbine Bypass System to the Main Condenser, however, as a result of the loss of TBCCW, the Main Feed Pumps lost cooling and had to be secured. At 2310, Standby Feedwater was initiated and Main Feedwater was secured.So they got a scram on cycling SRV valves twice. It indicates problems with training.
"The loss of TBCCW also caused all Station Air Compressors (SACs) to trip on loss of cooling. The loss of SACs caused the Instrument Air header pressure to degrade to the point at which the Secondary Containment isolation dampers drifted closed. This resulted in the Reactor Building vacuum exceeding the Technical Specification limit. At 2325, operators started the Standby Gas Treatment system and manually initiated a Secondary Containment isolation signal. Secondary Containment vacuum was promptly restored to within Technical Specification limits. Additionally, Operators were monitoring for expected MSIV drift due to the degraded Instrument Air header pressure. When outboard MSIVs were observed to be drifting, Operators closed the outboard and inboard MSIVs at 2345. At 2352, Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) reached the Low-Low Setpoint and began cycling to control reactor pressure.
"RWL is currently being maintained in the normal level band with the Standby Feedwater and Control Rod Drive systems. Reactor Pressure is being controlled with Safety Relief Valves. Operators are currently in the Emergency Operating Procedure for Reactor Pressure Vessel control. Investigation into the loss of TBCCW continues.
"No safety-related equipment was out of service at the time of the event. All offsite power sources were adequate and available throughout the duration of the event.
"The NRC resident inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE AT 0555 EDT AT 09/14/15 FROM CHRIS ROBINSON TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"At 0409 EDT the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was placed in service due to identification of an unisolable leak in the Standby Feedwater System. Reactor water level and pressure is now being controlled though the RCIC system and Safety Relief Valves. This event update is reportable as a valid manual initiation of a specified safety system under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"The NRC resident inspector has been notified."
The leak rate was reported as approximately 5-10 gallons per minute from a weld on the standby feedwater pump header drain valve F326. The licensee reported the leak stopped once RCIC was placed into service. The licensee is still investigating the issue.
Notified the R3DO (Pelke), IRD Manager (Grant), NRR EO (Morris).
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY CHRIS ROBINSON TO JEFF ROTTON AT 2135 EDT ON 09/14/2015 * * *
"At 1847 EDT on September 14, 2015, a valid automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation occurred due to Reactor Water Level 3 while shutdown in MODE 3. Operators were manually controlling Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level and pressure with Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) and Safety Relief Valves (SRV). While operators were cycling SRVs, the RPV level went below the Level 3 setpoint. Operators promptly restored RPV level by manual operation of RCIC. The Level 3 actuation and associated isolations were verified to operate properly.
"The scram signal has been reset. Fermi 2 remains in MODE 3 controlling RPV Level and Pressure through manual operation of RCIC and SRVs.
"This is the second occurrence of a valid specified safety system actuation reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for this ongoing event.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R3DO (Riemer), IRD Manager (Grant), and NRR EO (Morris)
* * * UPDATE FROM BRETT JEBBIA TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1446 EST ON 2/27/16 * * *
"This update provides clarification of the applicable reporting criteria for this Event associated with primary containment isolation actuations.
"Upon the manual reactor scram at 2305 EDT on September 13, 2015, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Level 3 actuated and Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Groups 4, 13 and 15 actuated as expected. The applicable reporting criterion for these actuations is 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"The applicable reporting criterion for the manual closure of the inboard and outboard main steam isolation valves at 2345 EDT on September 13, 2015, is also 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). In addition, the manual closures of all MSIV lead to a loss of condenser vacuum which resulted in the actuation of PCIS Group 1 at 0001 EDT on September 14, 2015, as expected. The applicable reporting criterion for this actuation is also 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"Upon reaching Level 3 at 1847 EDT on September 14, 2015, PCIS Groups 4, 13 and 15 actuated as expected. The applicable reporting criterion for this actuation is 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified the R3DO (Stone).
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