The inspectors have identified multiple examples of PSEG’s failure to evaluate the impact of an equipment issue on interfacing systems, including:
- In September 2013, the inspectors identified that PSEG failed to evaluate the impact of a failure of a feedwater crosstie valve on the feedwater sealing functions for the reactor core isolation cooling system and HPCI system. This observation resulted in the creation of a new feedwater system maintenance rule function and subsequent maintenance preventable functional failure classification that would not have been otherwise counted. (NOTF 20619913)
- ***In May 2014, the inspectors identified that PSEG failed to evaluate safety relief valve setpoint failures under all applicable interfacing system functions. The condition was evaluated for the automatic depressurization system functions, but not for the main steam functions. (NOTF 20650346)
- In August 2015, the inspectors identified that PSEG failed to evaluate the loss of the 10B431 480VAC (alternating current) 1E motor control center (MCC) as a Maintenance Rule functional failure of the interfacing 1E 480VAC system. This is the third instance identified in three years of PSEG failing to evaluate the impact of equipment issues on interfacing systems. This observation resulted in the assignment of a maintenance preventable functional failure to the 480VAC 1E MCC system that would not have been otherwise counted. (NOTF 20702217)
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