Junk Plant River Bend’s Crazy February 2016 Power History So Far...

So they normally installed the butterfly valves backwards. Screwed up in the piping diagram and procedure not saying the normal position of the valve is backwards. Put the valve back in the original orientation …then it failed on high torque. Upped the setpoint. Then found problems with Part 21

Basically the valve has now abnormally high torque, it been qualified for a limited number of operations.

Why didn't they see the increasing torque in mov testing and ask questions.

It is massive "Normalization Of Deviance". 

It is a clusterpuck all around.

Part 21

Based on the PSEG unit in service valve, Weir determined that the friction was

increasing with age. The degradation of performance will be based on several factors

including;

1. Water quality

2. Materials

3. Applied load.

Based on the complexity of this issue, Weir will add a safety factor on the friction factor

for both of the calculations, The PSEG testing revealed that after 9 years of service in

aggressive water conditions, friction had increased to 150% of the calculated friction.

When maintenance was performed on only the seal stack and seat, the unit was

returned to the calculated values of torque.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1532/ML15329A157.pdf

Description. 1EAHV-2198C is the ‘C’ SW pump discharge isolation valve. The valve is a 28-inch Weir Tricentric butterfly valve with a SMB-1/HBC-4 (60-1) Limitorque motor operator. The valve has an active safety function in the open position to provide normal SW flow to the safety-related safety auxiliaries cooling system (SACS) heat exchangers (HXs) and non-1E reactor auxiliaries cooling system (RACS) HXs, and emergency SW flow to other systems. PSEG had originally intentionally installed all four 1EAHV-2198 valves in the reverse flow direction to permit the downstream header pressure to seat the valve tighter to minimize seat leakage during SW pump and strainer on-line maintenance. During refueling outage 18 (RF18) in October 2013, PSEG performed a planned refurbishment of the 2198C valve and SMB-1 actuator under work order 60112463-410, Step 1.D. On October 22, 2013, maintenance technicians initiated NOTF 20626219 to document that while installing the 1EAHV-2198C adapter plate, they noticed that the valve was installed 180 degrees different from where it was removed and requested support. The NOTF also documented that the MOV engineer agreed that reconfiguring the valve operator would be the easiest way to correct the issue. In an October 23, 2013, update to the NOTF, maintenance stated that they had applied match marks to ensure that the valve would be installed in the same orientation, but during the course of the work the match marks were erased. Maintenance also updated the NOTF to reflect that they had identified that the 2198 valve installation orientation design specification was not documented in valve drawing M-10-1 or the vendor manual (VTD 323981) as expected. The team also noted that several diagrams within the work order depicted the wrong valve orientation and may have contributed to the configuration control error. Finally, the team noted that there was no documented evaluation of the impact of this misalignment and configuration error prior to operations declaring the ‘C’ SW pump operable following the 2198C maintenance on October 23. PSEG initiated NOTF 20705874 for this operability screening performance gap.

update 2/18/2016

(1pm)I just talked to the River Bend acting NRC senior resident. I asked about the stinking capacity factor since the last scram, and why the shutdown today. I got out of her vague equipment troubles. Basically because of propriety/market issues and NRC rules, she couldn’t give me any information. You know when a NRC inspector is trying to dump you, is when she tries to give you the licensee number. I wished the normal senior resident was at the plant. I pressured her a little gentlemanly. She don’t realized what a difficult job she has. She is going to always be my hero. She is going to get back to me. I think I got her to read my blog.    

River Bend is secretly shutdown and at 0% today. Does anyone know why they shutdown?

reposed from 2/17/16

You are suppose to be seeing for as far as the eyes can see at 100% power.

(Jan 2015) River Bend Start-Up Power History

(June 2015) River Bend: What A Junk Plant’s Power History Looks Like

By regulatory good will:

U.S. nuclear energy facilities generated electricity at a record high level of reliability in 2015, according to preliminary estimates. 

Ninety-nine nuclear power plants operating in 30 states posted an estimated average capacity factor of 91.9 percent, based on preliminary 2015 data compiled by the Nuclear Energy Institute. That surpasses the industry’s prior record set in 2007 by one-tenth of a percentage point. Capacity factor measures the total electricity generated as a percentage of potential generation for the entire year. 

Actual electricity production from nuclear energy facilities last year was the fifth-highest ever, at an estimated 797.9 billion kilowatt-hours (kwh). The industry’s record high electricity generation came in 2010, when the 104 reactors then operating produced 806.9 billion kwh of electricity while posting an industry average capacity factor of 90.9 percent. 

The amount of electricity generated in 2015 exceeded the amount produced in 2014, even though one less plant operated due to the 2014 closing of Vermont Yankee. This record efficiency is even more important as states strive to meet new carbon-reduction targets for the electric sector. 

Louisiana has nothing but kooks in it?  

Feb 17 30%

Feb 16 90%

Feb 15 95%

Feb 14 79%

Feb 13 71%

Feb 12 27%

Feb 11 100%

Feb 10 100%

Feb 9 100%

Feb 8 100% Special inspection announced over cooling the core problems.

Feb 7 100%

Feb 6 86%

Feb 5 90%

Feb 4 78%

Feb 3 57%

Feb 2 58%

Feb 1 18%

Jan 31 001%

Jan 30 0%

Jan 9 Shutdown over a lightning strike to plant. Can you imagine the amount of plant shutdowns if no plants have lightening surge protection? Lightening plant trips are very rare in the USA. They are all protected against it. So a switch was out of place or a safety component was broken to cause the trip.

NRC Begins Special Inspection at River Bend Station

(Feb 8) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has begun a special inspection at the River Bend Station nuclear power plant to review circumstances surrounding events that occurred following an unplanned reactor shutdown on Jan. 9. The plant, operated by Entergy Operations, Inc., is located in St. Francisville, La.

The plant was operating at full power when a lightning strike caused a momentary surge in the plant’s offsite power supply, triggering an unplanned shutdown. Operators subsequently took appropriate actions to place the plant in a safe shutdown condition. The following day, operational errors led to a one hour loss of shutdown cooling.

“The purpose of this special inspection is to better understand the circumstances surrounding the loss of shutdown cooling, determine if operator response was appropriate, and review the licensee’s corrective actions to ensure that the cause of the event, including associated equipment problems and any contributing operator actions have been effectively addressed,” NRC Region IV Administrator Marc Dapas said.

Several NRC inspectors will spend about a week on site evaluating the licensee’s root cause analysis, maintenance of some plant systems and adequacy of corrective actions. An inspection report documenting the team’s findings will be publicly available within 45 days of the end of the inspection

The Lightning strike caused about a 21 day outage. You get it, the NRC gave them a week’s at power grace period and a 21 day outage grace period before they called the special inspection. They waited to the plant was up and running, though crappy capacity factor.

Just look at this horrendous month of capacity factor…they ain’t making money with is.

Right, I have been documenting for about the past year the horrendous capacity at River Bend.