My Indian Point Nuclear Plant Problem: Huge Plant Design Flaw

Update 11/16: 

Hey, amazing timing.

Cuomo administration to NRC: Shut down Indian Point
 

By Casey Seiler, Capitol bureau chief

November 16, 2015 at 3:47 PM

Gov. Andrew Cuomo’s Director of State Operations Jim Malatras on Monday penned a letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission calling for it to deny Entergy a new license to operate the Indian Point nuclear plant.

 “To be blunt, Entergy’s aging management plan is woefully inadequate,” Malatras wrote, pointing to aging infrastructure and recent “unplanned shutdowns.” Cuomo has long opposed the relicensing of the plant, due to its age as well as the unique security risks associated with its proximity to New York City and its northern suburbs.

Gov. Andrew Cuomo speaks to reporters near the main entrance of the Indian Point nuclear power plant in Buchanan, N.Y. on Saturday, May 9, 2015, following a transformer fire. (Craig Ruttle, AP)

“Allowing Entergy to operate these facilities for another 20 years puts the lives of too many New Yorkers at risk and cannot be justified by Entergy’s present plan to address these defects,” Malatras writes.

The NRC’s Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will hold an evidentiary hearing this week on Entergy’s application.

Entergy is expected to make the case that Indian Point is both safe and a necessary component of New York’s power supply system.

First published on Nov 15. Republished 

Why does the NRC treat Point Beach diesel generator postulated flooding as the severing of the eight inch fire water fire water piping, while the NRC at Indian Point uses only the piping on the deluge valve small bore automatic drain valve piping. It is similar to the small bore piping with the service water relief. The magnitude of the differences is some 50 grm versus 4300 gpm. 

“Near Street New” The Department of State in New York is attempting to block the relicensing application for the Indian Point generating station 24 miles north of New York City on grounds that it is harmful to the fish habitat of the Hudson River and a threat to the city's population. 

About 17 million people live within a 50-mile radius of the plant. The state says that it would be impossible to evacuate the area in the event of an accident, which is a risk given the seismic fault lines near the plant. 

The state also says this threatens the New Croton Reservoir, a major source of drinking water for millions of people. In addition, the plant kills billions of fish larvae each year, drawing 2.5 million gallons each day for cooling. A major estuary region downstream is affected, the state claims.”

It just might come down to keeping a fire water main pressurized to fight a fire or shutting down the fire main in order to not drive the plant into a station blackout by flooding out the safety 480 volt switchgear room. 

On the far side of the switchgear room is another door. It opens to one of two diesel generators. I think IP 3 has two diesel generators. Surprisingly the next leak in the deluge room threatening the safety switchgear buses, the NRC is allowing Indian Point to open up diesel generator room door such that the flooding switchgear room water drains into the diesel generator sump. Seems it has a larger sump pump.

“The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel will hold a hearing next week to gather information on whether Indian Point is ready to handle safety-related challenges for the next 20 years. 

Entergy Corp., which owns and operates the Indian Point nuclear power plant in Buchanan, is seeking to extend licenses for its two reactors for 20 more years.
The panel's three administrative judges will ask questions to experts representing groups — including the state and Riverkeeper — who have raised safety concerns over license renewals because of Indian Point's aging facilities. 

A similar hearing was held at the same location in the fall of 2012, when the panel listened to concerns over both safety and environment. The upcoming hearing will focus on the remaining safety concerns, according to Diane Screnci, spokesman for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the panel's parent organization. 

"This is a very important part of the process," Screnci said of the hearing. "The license renewal process has the NRC staff look at whether there are safety issues, whether there are environmental issues that should preclude the issuance of licenses."”

Obviously Indian Point has large defective design problem. Check out how much this design vulnerability eats up precious and limited on shift human capital.    

RidsNrrPMIndianPoint.Resource@nrc.gov   

Nov 14 at 11:14 AM

 

Mr. Pickett,

In Indian Point unit 3, why didn’t the NRC assume the safety switchgear largest postulated internet flood was the preverbal Point Beach 8-inch fire water pipe leak?  Why is Indian Point’s largest postulated fire water delude valve automatic drain valve piping diameter or the largest diameter service water relief valve leak the smallest possible diameter pipe in the systems? The magnitude of these leak differences are tremendous (50 gpm versus 4100 gpm).

It sounds like fraud to me in Indian Point.

Hmm, doesn’t say if the PB 8” fire water pipe is seismic? 

 

Doesn't the probability of an accident in "one in a million years" at Indian Point sound like the pre Fukushima mentality all over Japan before their accident?  

Please place both my e-mails to you on the docket.

Mike Mulligan

Hinsdale, NH

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 – NRC INTEGRATED

INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2015003; 05000301/2015003

Description: During the inspectors’ review of Prompt Operability Determination (POD) 02044783, “Reduced Available Operator Response Time For DGB Flood,” Revision 1, they found that the licensee had previously identified an error in POD 02044783, Revision 0, which had failed to identify all affected SSCs for a postulated 8-inch fire water pipe leak. The DGB contains predominately Train B emergency power systems; however…

Specifically, when the licensee identified that internal flood sources in the diesel generator building (DGB) were larger than the drain capacity, they failed to identify all affected SSCs.

****To: RidsNrrPMIndianPoint.Resource@nrc.gov

Nov 13 at 11:20 AM

Mr. Pickett,

You and me got back a long way. Them god damn SRVs.  As does Mrs. Rich. The good old VY days.

I talked to Mrs. Rich yesterday about the large service water and fire water pipe being able to knock out the safety switchgear room spoken to in the transformer special inspection. It sounds like both safety bus divs are in the switchgear room. Sarah says the NRC considers a large pipe taking out both safety divs are too improbable to worry about. So this is a threat that can take out both safety buses, as spoken about with the water level getting too high in the switchgear room, it could drive the plant into a SBO.

Personally I think Indian Point and the NRC has been misinterpreting NRC regulations over this for decades. And it is not innocence either. 

The terms we are talking about is not a 50 gpm flood, but a 4100 gpm… 

I basically believe Indian Point is prohibited from having a piping system threatening both divisions of the safety bus. The accident is basically the largest diameter piping gpm, such as the fire water piping and the service water pipe in the vicinity.

Based on the probability of the large pipes breaks that have occurred in the industry with the fire water system and service water piping to date, the failure mechanisms,  the risk calculation of “1 in a million years” is utterly ridiculous.   

“Scenario B, resulted in a change in core damage frequency of low E-8 per reactor year (an increase in 1 in 100 million reactor years).”

The fire water and service water piping needs to be removed from the area or the switchgear room or needs to be water proofed such that a postulated internal or external flooding event never threatens both safety buses at the same time.  

We are all aware of the contentions in this facility. 

Mike Mulligan

Hinsdale, NH

1-603-209-4206