A Old Security $70,000 Special Inspection At RIver Bend finding Decorum Problems

I wonder how these guys are doing today? 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY SECURITY RELATED INFORMATION 

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

REGION IV 

EA-14-009 

December 3, 2014 

SUBJECT: CONFIRMATORY ORDER, NOTICE OF VIOLATION, AND CIVIL PENALTY- NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2014407 AND NRC INVESTIGATION 

REPORT 4-2012-022- RIVER BEND STATION 

Dear Mr. Olson: 

The enclosed Confirmatory Order is being issued to Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy), as a result of a successful Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mediation session. The enclosed commitments were made by Entergy as part of a settlement agreement between Entergy and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The settlement agreement concerns an apparent violation of NRC security requirements as discussed in the non-public enclosures to our letter dated July 16, 2014 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) ML 14198A338). The apparent violation involved the willful actions of an unidentified security officer which occurred at Entergy's River Bend Station on March 18, 2012. The willful actions of the unidentified security officer caused Entergy to be in violation of Title 1 0 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR) Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials." Our letter also informed you that the apparent willful violation was being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy and provided you an opportunity to (1) respond to the apparent violation in writing; (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference (PEC); or (3) request ADR. In response, Entergy requested ADR to resolve differences it had with the NRC concerning the apparent willful violation. An ADR mediation session was held on September 22, 2014, during which a preliminary settlement agreement was reached. The elements of the preliminary agreement were formulated and are incorporated in the enclosed Confirmatory Order (Enclosure 1 ). 

This Confirmatory Order confirms the commitments made as part of the preliminary settlement agreement. In addition, this order includes a Notice of Violation (NOV) documenting the final significance determination of Apparent Violation 05000458/2014405-01 opened in NRC Inspection Report 05000458/2014405, dated July 16, 2014. The NRC and Entergy

Nobody knows what security officer did the dirty deed? Was it porn? Kinda impugns the integrity of all the security officers when nobody rats on their buddies.  

agree that the actions of an unidentified security officer at River Bend Station, on March 18, 2012, constitute a willful violation of 10 CFR Part 73. However, the NRC and Entergy disagree on the specific aspects of the willful characterization of the violation. At the ADR mediation session, Entergy agreed that a Notice of Violation would be issued. In addition, Entergy agreed to pay a civil penalty of $70,000 as part of the settlement.

Did not identify the individual responsible?  

While the NRC investigation did not identify the individual responsible for the security-related violation, the 01 Region IV Field Office did establish several facts that are germane to the conclusion of the investigation. Details of the security event and the subsequent inspection and investigation are described in Attachment 2 to this Order. Attachment 2 includes Security Related Information (SRI); therefore, it is not publicly available. 

A willful violation on a individual they can't identify?

The NRC determined that as the result of the willful actions of an unidentified individual, Entergy failed to comply with 10 CFR Part 73. 

The NRC and Entergy agree that a willful violation of Title 1 0 Code of Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR) Part 73 occurred on March 18, 2012, at River Bend Station. However, the NRC and Entergy disagree on the specific aspects of that willful characterization of the violation. The details regarding these aspects are described in the non-public Attachment.

What does SRI mean?  

Within 3 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will, at each of its nuclear plants, conduct a review of its controls for SRI and communicate to the NRC the results of the review. Within 6 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will establish new controls and will provide its proposed controls to the NRC for its review… 

I get it now, they didn't know compliance to rules was mandatory?  

Entergy will develop a "commitment to compliance" statement or a similar document highlighting the special responsibilities of nuclear security personnel. This document will explain that nuclear security personnel need to comply with regulations and procedures, and it will describe the potential consequences if compliance does not occur. Within 12 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will require at each of its nuclear plants that nuclear security personnel read and sign the statement (subject to any collective bargaining obligations it may have). Entergy will include the reading and signing of this statement in the initial qualification process of nuclear security personnel.

This secrecy isn't protecting us from terrorism> It's protecting Entergy from accountability. This is undermining our confidence in government using the fear of terrorism as a means to protect a corporate interest. 

The details are described in the non-public Attachment. 

Within 6 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will identify those security posts in each of its nuclear plants that should be subject to certain decorum

What is decorum standards?   

standards that will ensure a professional environment in those areas. Once identified, Entergy will establish decorum protocols for those security posts. In addition, within 6 months of the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will provide its proposed decorum protocols to the NRC for its review. The NRC will communicate to Entergy any concerns regarding the proposed decorum protocols within 60 days of submittal for resolution in a manner acceptable to both parties. Entergy will implement the decorum protocols within 12 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order. 

Within 6 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will ensure that an independent third party

The NRC fears Entergy has a security force safety culture problem? It won't be the first time...Palisades has the same. How does the public know if they will be protected from a terrorism event at River Bend with security culture problem and decorum problems? The terrorist just by reading this NRC document would know this site is the weak link nationwide?  

conducts a safety culture assessment of the Security organization at River Bend Station. The results will be incorporated into Entergy's corrective action program as appropriate. A copy of the completed assessment will be made available for NRC review.