Junk Plants Browns Ferry System Irrational Response to Dangerous Steam leak.

(works in progress)

Junk Plants Browns Ferry Irrational Response to Dangerous Steam leak. 

February 12, 2016

EA-16-14

SUBJECT: BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION

REPORT 05000259/2015004, 05000260/2015004, AND 05000296/2015004; AND

APPARENT VIOLATIONS

This would be my example of how the NRC trains their inspectors to act in a minimalist manner. Risk perspectives tells that we are are always save…our role is to stand by and let problems develop. If we just follow the minimalistic rules and procedures…tomorrow will just turn out like yesterday. It’s all programmed into the system with our rules and procedure. There is nothing more dangerous when a group gets complacent and in a trance.

Again, this is a three plant facility…this is a massively complex system between all the human interactions and the machinery. One plant has upwards to 5 million parts in. They are abysmal and have a poor replacement pairs stream. Or none at all. The new buzz in modern times at these facilities is, we have to reverse engineer all replacement part.

Then NRC is supposed to step in here, size up the situation when the problem first emerges. Once they see small leak like this, notify the licensee, they are supposed to bird dog the issue until the degradation if fix.

I just don’t think the inspectors are trained to wheel power. To control the licenses if they can’t control themselves. They are too afraid their reputation can be ruined by the licensees and their bosses. If you talk to these NRC guys and question why the event payed out like it did, to the one they will talk about they are a sampling agency and there just isn’t NRC resources on site to know everything going on. And I’ll make the case the licensees have an intentional policy of hiding information from the NRC. They are cagy as hell with hiding information. The licensees know the scale of the complexity in their facilities, the resource and political limitation…the NRC has to have a impossible triplicate proof to accuse anyone at a nuclear plant. And especially the big dog suits who sets up the plant to fail. So fundimentally the NRC doesn’t have enough power to inforce truth-telling. They will get bogged down in uncovering perfect triplicate evidence of not telling the complete. These guys are having a lot of problems keeping their HPCIs and RCICs operable and fully maintained.

Man, lets say the HPCI area and surroundings where camera’d up. The control room was camera’d up. You had a god’s eye view of how this problem developed and the incident itself. Seeing it all would  radically change your opinion of TVA nuclear.

I see the system basically set up as the NRC inspector, management and the employees…they are all insecure and fighting for survival. From these human perspectives, the only way to survive with the outsider wolfs howling at the door, is too secretly all collude. Either inadvertently or intentional, they all collude to keep the wolves at bay.

What is hear is systemic all across the nation, is the severe mental illness of normalization of devience (NOD). These guys can’t see when they are doing things wrong. I can make the case their brains were trained over and over again how to do NOD. They created new neural pathways and strengthen old pathways. They are hardwired to think deviance doesn’t matter. This is a addiction thing that changes the hard wiring in your head. Numerous people in the organization have this mental illness. Everyone! It is a pernicious mental illness, humans doesn’t recognized it in themselves. The organization constantly reinforces it…it takes a tremendous amount effort to rewire you head. You got to recognize in yourself its a hard-wiring thing in your head and dedicate yourself into rewiring you head. I am talking science here. What you do repeatedly, it rewires you head. 

The enclosed inspection report discusses two findings for which the NRC has not yet reached a preliminary significance determination. As described in Section 4OA3.3 of the enclosed report, two findings related to the failure of the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) turbine steam admission valve 2-FCV-73-16 packing. The first finding was identified for Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) failure to maintain the design of 2-FCV-73-16 packing assembly. The failure to correctly install the packing gland follower and the use of an incorrect packing type resulted in the development of a progressively degrading high pressure steam leak through the packing gland of 2-FCV-73-16. A second finding was identified for TVA’s failure to characterize the steam leak in accordance with procedure NPG-SPP-06.8, Leak Reduction Program, which required it to have been characterized as the highest priority, a Category 1, Severity level 5 leak. This classification would have required an expedited repair of the steam leak.