Junk Perry-Extremely Infrequent Event With Two SRVs Opening At Power

Reposted from 2/9...

Mike I see you have this and the prior Perry shutdown posted.

I highly suspect that steam leak drove a lot of steam / condensate into some instruments and controls. 

This condensate might have caused this erratic SRV control problem.

and looking ahead, there may be more problems, this one event may be just the tip of the iceberg.

You can add in to your blog"Is there a link between the steam leak and SRV inadvertent actuation?"  

I am disappointed the manual scam didn't come sooner. This is such a rare event, I am not sure their emergency procedures carry a specific event with two SRVs slamming open. You would think this is a so rare event and they never trained on it, they would emediately scram the plant.  

So what would happen if all the SRVs would open at the same time? How about opening and shutting two or more SRVs many times while at power. I'll bet you this was the first time in the plant's history two SRVs were opened at the same time while at power?

This is the example with inadequate resources and maintenance, you just might create an event never before seen in the industry. There is no way to predict how a complex machine will fail with not enough funding?   

Opening a SRV adds negative reactivity to the plant at power (void coefficient). Shutting a SRV adds positive reactivity. Say all SRVs open then shut...how much reactivity would it add? Would it be controllable? Would it break something? I'll bet you only one SRV opening at power was ever analyzed. SRVs basically are a system assumed to be used when the reactor is shutdown.   

Do you really think reactor water level was controllable with TWO SRVs open?

Say on two SRVs opening without any operator action, what would  automatically end the transient? I am saying the low steam pressure scram?  

This guy is so infrequent it calls for a special inspection.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51716
Facility: PERRY Region: 3 State: OH Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: MICHAEL DOTY HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD	Notification Date: 02/08/2016 Notification Time: 17:50 [ET] Event Date: 02/08/2016 Event Time: 15:03 [EST] Last Update Date: 02/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL	Person (Organization): DAVID HILLS (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	M/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Shutdown

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM FOLLOWING SPURIOUS OPENING OF TWO SAFETY RELIEF VALVES "At 1500 EST on February 8, 2016, two safety relief valves (SRV) opened upon a spurious Division 2 initiation signal. This caused suppression pool temperature to increase. At 1503 EST, plant operators took action to manually SCRAM the reactor at 95 degrees Fahrenheit in the suppression pool per plant procedures. The SRVs closed immediately following the scram at 1503 EST. The cause of the SRVs opening is currently under investigation. "During the scram, all rods fully inserted into the core. Reactor Pressure is stable with decay heat being removed via turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. Reactor level control is currently being maintained via feedwater. Main Steam Isolation Valves are open. Cool down and depressurization to Mode 4 to follow. The plant is in a normal post SCRAM electrical line-up." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector