Emails To NY DPS Concerning Junk Plant Indian Point

Showing the DPS my credentials. 

1)

mailto:steamshovel2002@yahoo.com 

To: brandon.goodrich@dps.ny.gov

Mr. Brandon.

It was a nice talk with you today. I was a little nervous talking to you and a bit hyped up. 

Here are my talking points concerning our conversation. I was very please how quickly the DUP responded to my concern. You never know what information they will release from this...how big it will be. This applies to many other plants. We are talking about hundred of millions of dollars. 

"Indian Point: It's Core Components Highly Irradiated Differential Of Expansion, Stupid" 

Feb 04, 2016Victor M. McCreeExecutive Director for OperationsU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, DC 20555-0001 

SUBJECT: Runaway Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) Tech Spec lift Setting Failures at Indian Point since 2009. 

Dear Mr. McCree, 

Why is the NRC sleeping at the switch? I request a 2.206 petition at Indian Point. 

Why has there been an astonishing increase in Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint drift testing failures beginning in 2009? There seems to be none before 2009. Why did these failure begin in 2009…considering all corrective action and processes at the site. It continues today unabated. 

It is like they caught some mysterious disease and there is no cure. These valves being opened cool the core and control steam generator pressure.

Shearson Harris mysterious began having similar failures. Two valves fail in 2013 and in the most current LER five valves failed. They have a similar clean record before 2013. Why has this mysterious problem popped up from nowhere and the failure rate has been drastically increased as time goes on. Why can’t these two plants get control of this problem? 

There seems to be vibrations issues. An odd assortment of internal parts degradations seems to be the culprit. What new has changed?

What new has changed in both these plants to cause the internal parts to fail? I am particularly irked by pressurizer safety internal coil or spring being stretched. It reminds of the test stand damage seen a Pilgrim before installation. It is known, when most of these guys fails lift setpoint and out of federal tolerance, they just adjust the setting to acceptable Tech Spec limits. They don’t do any further inspection or proactive or preventative maintenance. No doubt this in happens at many plants. 

What is the concern to me the most, is there is no new “Information notices” on SRVs, MSSVs and pressurizer valves degradation or failure? We know the LERs really only capture-report on a small proportion of the valve problems. Your industry wide trends and information is not being kept up to date on these components. Your NRC notices are grossly out of date (most of them a decade out of date or more) on the components and these licensees are constantly referencing these grossly out of date notices in the current LERs.

You would think a nuclear plant having problems like this would go the market to get a better reliable design and up to date components new. Is Indian Point have problems with component replacement and can they buy sufficient valve new internals? 

1) Request an immediate special inspection on the magnitude of the valves involved anthe constant reoccurrence of these failures. These guys have constantly said in each LER the problem is solved. If they can’t keep these valves operable, then both plants shouldn’t be operating. I am sure NY State would agree with me. 

2) Please create a new NRC Information notice on the failures of the valve and the organization. 

3) I request Indian Point immediately eradicate any problems with their MSSV up to and Including a shutdown. They are controlled by technical specifications.
.The involved LERs at Indian Point below. Why did it start in 2009…what has changed? 

LER 2015-002-01LER 2012-003-02LER 2012-005-01LER 2011-004-00LER 2010-002-00LER 2009-002-00 

I suspect they will have more MSSV unreliability issues. 

Will you let me know if there are new LERS? 

The NRC response to me: 

http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2016/03/nrc-2206-response-junk-safety-valves-at.html 

I was heavily involved with the Pilgrim’s unsafe Safety Relief Valves, the 2015 plant trip…the resultant special inspection and Entergy shutting the plant in 2019.  I was on the SRV problem in 2013 and it is in the record. 

“NRC: Proof Iinstigated The 2014 Christmas River Bend plant Scram Special Inspection” 

This is ridiculous. 

The aim of my game is to fix problems early and anticipate then, not fix big costly problems re-activity.

Please read my comments on the NRC blog:  
An Outage Twist: Degraded bolts at New York Nuclear Plant Warrant Attention

An Outage Twist: Degraded bolts at New York Nuclear Plant Warrant Attention Neil Sheehan Public Affairs Officer Region I When the Indian Point Unit 2 nuclear power plant entered a refuelin...

Did I mention I was a licensed operator at Vermont Yankee? 

North Anna had Baffle Jetting in 2014. The edges of the baffle plates widened. Basically caused by the same phenomena as Indian Point. The jetting damaged fuel pins leading to a large release radioactively in the coolant, but no offsite release. Before the fuel pins leaks, they have wear marks on the pins from slowly spinning in place by the water jet. This can be seen under close inspection. 

I have already given you way too much information. 

I apologized  to you for that.


Sincerely,
Mike MulliganHinsdale, NHHome 16033368320Cell 16032094206
Call or email me anytime?

2)

To: brandon.goodrich@dps.ny.gov 

May 14 at 9:57 AM 

I went over the last SG report coming from IP 2. They say they discovered some foreign debris in the SG, but don't accurately (nothing) detail what the new debris is on the steam side. This is highly suspicious. Most plants detail the discovered debris in this report. You need to know if components are spitting off metallic parts from the rest of the plant and threatening the steam generator tubes. With debris, you need to hunt down where the metal came from. It is important to put it in a trend, is the threat to the tubes increasing or decreasing over time. Read up on their last SG tube rupture event at the site. Did baffle debris end up in the steam side of the SG? Was this a cover-up? This is a regulatory failure, in that the NRC should have forced IP to publically document in detail all SG debris in the refueling outage tech spec mandated report.

You need get the NRC to list and describe all SG debris in their upcoming inspection report for the last ten years. I believe its in IP's secret internal reports? The NRC knows where its at.   
Mike MulliganHinsdale, NH

3)

To : brandon.goodrich@dps.ny.gov
May 4 at 5:51 PM
How are these guys at IP? I know IP has intensive relicensing contention core inspections. See attachment. It's the Cook root cause on the degradation. I hope the state is going to pry the RCA on the baffle bolt issue from IP.

Clevis Insert Bolts
" Clevis Dowel Pins
* LRSS Lug Weld
* BMI Nozzles and Welds

Can you even imagine the  plant vulnerability with the worst case degradation on the above components and the worst case degradation of the baffle plates? I like to see the risk perspective numbers on that baby.

It is a accident never conceived by anyone before. Sound familiar? Thank you UCS!