Like to know a little bit more with what was going on with K-111 air compressor.
Basically there was no simulator training over loss of instrument air, simulator fidelity issues across the board...Blizzard Juno indicts plant training and the NRC oversight of same.
It horrendously indicts the NRC for allowing the competence of the Pilgrim staff to decay away to such low levels. It was chaotic and extremely unprofessional on the set up for Juno and with the staff during the plant accidents.
It took 8 hours of no service air to hook up the flex air compressor. Like to understand the reason for that.
Then the flex diesel compressors was undersized for the job. What poor engineering...
Within about 6 months two nuclear sites got into terrible troubles in NE with a loss of instrument air system.(Pilgrim and Millstone)
1/27/15 04:02 Line 342 faulted. Automatic reactor scram on load reject at 52% reactor thermal power.
1/27/15 04:08 Operations entered Procedure 5.3.8, “Loss of Instrument Air.” Electric-driven air compressor K-111 was out-of-service for motor replacement, electric-driven air compressor K-110 lost its power source due to the loss the 345 kV power lines, and diesel-driven air compressor K-117 attempted to start but failed to run.
1/27/15 13:59 FLEX diesel air compressor installed to supply station compressed air. Instrument air pressure increased, however, the capacity of the compressor was not sufficient to increase system pressure to normal.
1/28/15 10:47 Temporary offsite air compressor is placed into service. Loss of Instrument Air Procedure is exited
So the K-117
diesel generator air compressor failed consecutively in two separate LOOP
accidents on two different problems.
Once by bad
fuel and the other with batteries.
I thought
they test these guys with a approach of threat???
Junk plant...
2013: Final Precursor AnalysisAccident Sequence Precursor Program – Office of Nuclear Regulatory ResearchPilgrim Nuclear PowerStationTwo Losses of Offsite Power Due to Winter StormNemoEvent Date: 02/08/2013 LER: 293/13-003IR: 50-293/13-02 CCDP = 8×10-5Plant Type: Boiling-Water Reactor (BWR); General Electric-3 with a Mark I ContainmentPlant Operating Mode (Reactor Power Level): Mode 1 (81% Reactor PowerAdditional Event Information.
On February 11th, operators responded to a failure of the diesel-driven instrument air system compressor (K-117) during a time when no other air compressors were available to supply the instrument air system due to the loss of offsite power. The inspectors responded to the control room to assess the impact of the loss of the K-117 air compressor and operator response to the event. Entergy implemented the loss of instrument air procedure, evaluated the impact of the loss of instrument air on plant components (e.g., spent fuel pool cooling was lost), and made preparations to install a portable compressor located onsite as part of the response to the Fukushima orders. The K-117 air compressor fuel was found contaminated; the fuel tank was emptied, cleaned, and refilled. The K-117 air compressor was restored on February 12th. The unavailability of the air compressor is expected to have a negligible impact on the CCDP of the 2nd LOOP event.
No comments:
Post a Comment