Indian Point Needs New Yard Loop Fire System and Distribution Piping

Update May 20: 

The NRC is worrying about the poor attitude reflecting the care of the fire water system at the facility?

May 4, 2015: SUBJECT:REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE INDIAN POINT NUCLEARGENERATING UNIT NOS. 2 AND 3, LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION, SET 2015–01 (TACNOS. MD5407 AND MD5408)

RAI 3.0.3–5 

Background 

The response to RAI 3.0.3 1 dated December 16, 2014, states that the fire protection water and city water systems have experienced recurring internal corrosion (RIC), as defined in LR-ISG- 2012-02. With regard to the fire protection water system, the response states, “[l]ocalized corrosion has resulted in minor through-wall leaks that have no impact on system performance and do not threaten the structural integrity of the piping or the safety function of nearby equipment.” No changes were proposed to the Fire Water System Program to address RIC.
With regard to the city water system, the response states, “[h]owever, based on past operating experience, they [through wall leaks] do not compromise the intended functions of these or any other system, and do not warrant aging management program activities beyond those provided by established aging management programs and the corrective action program.” Issue 

Past performance does not provide reasonable assurance that throughout the period of extended operation, internal general corrosion will be revealed by a through-wall leak prior to the general corrosion potentially impacting the structural integrity of the system. Nor does it provide reasonable assurance that larger through-wall flaws sufficient to challenge the pressure boundary function will not occur. It is also unclear to the staff that a sufficient representative sample exists for the carbon steel piping to demonstrate that general corrosion is progressing slowly enough that it will not prevent an in-scope component from performing its current licensing basis intended function during the period of extended operation. Although to date through-wall leaks have not affected the safety function of nearby equipment, the staff lacks sufficient information to conclude with reasonable assurance that this will be the case throughout the period of extended operation. Request 

1) State the basis and justification for concluding that existing inspection data are sufficient to demonstrate that general corrosion is progressing slowly enough that it will not prevent an in-scope component from performing its current licensing basis intended function during the period of extended operation. 2) State the basis and justification for concluding that through-wall leaks will not impact the safety function of nearby equipment throughout the period of extended operation. 3) Provide the staff with sufficient quantitative data for it to reach the same conclusion. Alternatively, propose periodic inspections in response to SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.8, “Loss of Material due to Recurring Internal Corrosion.” RAI 3.0.3–13 

Background 

As amended by letter dated December 16, 2014, LRA Sections A.2.1.13 and A.3.1.13 state that the enhancements to the Fire Water System Program will be implemented by December 31, 2019. Issue 

As stated in RAI 3.0.3 12, it is not clear whether an enhancement is necessary to address augmented testing for fire protection water systems that are normally dry but periodically subject to flow (e.g., dry-pipe or preaction sprinkler system piping and valves) that cannot be drained or allow water to collect. SRP LR Table 3.0 1, as amended by LR ISG 2-12 02, states that the augmented testing should commence 5 years prior to the period of extended operation. Given that IP2 is beyond the expiration of its initial license (September 2013) and IP3 will be beyond its initial license period in December 2015, the staff questions why the augmented testing would not commence sooner than December 31, 2019. RequestState and justify the basis for why the augmented testing for fire protection water systems that are normally dry but periodically subject to flow (e.g., dry-pipe or preaction sprinkler system piping and valves) that cannot be drained or allow water to collect will not commence until December 31, 2019

*** guess they mean once they pressurize the fire nozzle by the automatic fire system control valve and they then secure the system...water would stay in the pipes up to the nozzle unless they had a way to drain this water. It would cause corrosion in the pipe and it would freeze in the winter thus blocking off the water to fight the fire. So they have an automatic valve that opens upstream of the main automatic, or it actually it is in the main automatic valve that drains the upstream water down into the sump in the power room. . It sounds like the main valve stayed open while header drain valve was opened for some period of time. One or both of the valve had a maintenance problem.

“The spokesman for Indian Point's owner said water from a sprinkler system flows to a floor drain in the electrical room by design, but did not drain as quickly as expected.” 

They might test the main automatic value on yearly bases or every outage. They actually fake a fire signal...this opens up the main valve pressurizing all the transformer fire water nozzles. It is actually a great show with all the nozzles spraying. This is all documented. Did they know there were issues with main automatic fire system control valve, but didn’t get it fix. Did they have extra water in the sump before in the testing.

Bottom line, it is a terrible place to have a fire system header drain down line into a main electrical room sump...

Just submitted the to the NRC blog, I am pretty controversial talking about Gov Cuomo.   

I think the Independent National Transportation and Safety Board did a wonderful job at explaining the tragic crash of the Amtrak Philadelphia commuter train.  I’d give them an “A” plus.

I do miss NTSB chairperson Deborah Hersman’s pretty face and especially her ability to communicate.  

Hmmm, the NTSB is missing a commissioner just like the NRC? 

As I said earlier, if Indian point and the NRC did a proper 50.59 and License Amendment Request (LAR)...the replacement of nonflammable PCB coolant to flammable vegetable oil coolant...they would have hardened the area around the transformer expecting a big vegetable oil fire and tremendous amounts of fire hose water being used.

Published on May 18 at 12:45 pm: 

"Indian Point Needs New Yard Loop Fire System and Distribution Piping"My guesses are: 

1) A leaking fire water system piping or component.

2) The copious fire hose water leaked down outside of the concrete foundation and then entered though a concrete foundation crack into the power supply room. Are there many concrete foundation cracks in IP buildings?  The fire fighters must have directed copious hose water protecting the turbine building siding. Was there damage to the siding?

3) The building siding was damaged by the fire...that is how the water got into the power room?

4) The overflowing transformer holding tank backed up into the supply room if both connected to each other. Does the supply room have a drain and where does it go? 

Did the NRC shame Gov. Cuomo by not telling him about supply room water on the floor or did the Governor intentionally withhold the water leak in the said electrical room from the public for some reason? Why didn’t the Governor disclose the water on the floor? The information was big deal heading into a special inspection.

Bet you the equipment operator has to inspect that room every four to eight hours.

Mike Mulligan Hinsdale, NH

May 19 2015 at 2 pm: NRC Begins Special Inspection at Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant to Review Issue Associated with Transformer Event on May 9

A team of NRC inspectors will seek to better understand the presence of water in an electrical supply room at the Indian Point 3 nuclear power plant following a main transformer failure event at the site on May 9th.
Starting today (Tuesday, May 19), a three-member NRC Special Inspection Team will report to the Buchanan (Westchester County), N.Y., facility to review the issue. The room in question contains electrical equipment that provides power to plant safety systems.

“None of the electrical equipment became wet or experienced any damage or failures as a result of the water,” NRC Region I Administrator Dan Dorman. “Nevertheless, the NRC inspectors will be tasked with gathering information on how the water accumulated in the room and the potential for impacts had there been a significantly larger volume of water.”

At 5:50 p.m. on May 9th, with the plant operating at 100-percent power, one of its two main transformers experienced a failure, the cause of which is not yet known. The failure resulted in an automatic shutdown of the reactor that occurred without any complications. Plant operators declared an “Unusual Event” -- the lowest of four levels of emergency classification used by the NRC -- at 6:01 p.m. because of the fire that erupted following the transformer failure.

The Unusual Event was terminated at 9:03 p.m. after the fire was fully extinguished.

A fire suppression system for the transformer automatically doused the fire. In addition, the plant’s on-site fire brigade and off-site firefighters sprayed water and foam onto the transformer to help put out the fire. Among other things, the NRC inspectors will be reviewing whether those sources account for the water observed in the electrical equipment room.

A report summarizing the findings of the Special Inspection Team will be issued within 45 days after the conclusion of the inspection.

Indian Point 3 remains offline while work to replace the transformer. 

May 18 at 1245 pm:

Can you imagine a Unit 3 transformer fire and the big system supply pipes fail leading to flooding in other buildings and dry fire stand-pipes in a big fire. think of the media then? 

This site needs to rip all all their corrosion degraded fire system piping and replace with new. The whole site needs new piping and not piecemeal. 

May 12, 2015  INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING – NRCINTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000247/2015001AND 05000286/2015001

Annual Sample: Review of Fire Protection Piping Failure

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergy’s evaluation and corrective actions associated with through-wall piping leaks and a degraded piping section in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 common fire protection system. The piping section cracked and leaked on December 29, 2014, causing all fire protection pumps to auto-start. Operators stopped all of the pumps for a period of about two hours while isolating the failed piping section.

Entergy documented the piping failure in CR-IP2-2014-6668. The inspectors reviewed earlier CRs such as CR-IP2-2010-5187 and CR-IP2-2008-0044 which were written to document through-wall leaks in the same fire protection pipe section. The inspectors assessed Entergy’s problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timeliness of corrective actions to determine whether Entergy was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with the degraded piping and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate, timely, and in accordance with Entergy’s procedural requirements. The inspectors compared the actions taken to the requirements of Entergy’s CAP, FPP plan, and operating license. In addition, the inspectors reviewed subsequent testing, performed field walkdowns, and interviewed engineering personnel to assess the effectiveness of the corrective actions.

Introduction: A self-revealing Green NCV of license condition 2.K. was identified when Entergy failed to take adequate corrective actions for degraded fire protection piping following leaks identified as early as 2008. These earlier leaks contributed to a large piping leak in a 10-inch fire protection line which required operators to secure all high pressure fire pumps until the affected section could be isolated.

Description: On December 29, 2014, plant operators received alarms for low pressure on the fire header and observed a start of all three fire pumps due to low fire system pressure. The low pressure was caused by an axial split in a 10-inch diameter fire protection piping spool piece. After verification that no fire existed, operators turned off both motor-driven fire main booster