Junk Plants Browns Ferry Back To Bad Old Days?

Was the progress from the red finding (clearing it) just a mirage, illusion or worst?

The column 4 heightened inspection has been cleared too. They are back under a regular inspection regime. 

Do they really deserve it and have they earned it? 

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 'red finding' removed, but plant still under intensive inspection status
By Brian Lawson The Huntsville Times

on January 30, 2014 at 9:48 PM, updated February 01, 2014 at 1:01 PM

ATHENS, Alabama -- Federal regulators have removed a critical "red" finding from TVA's Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, but the plant remains in a state of heightened inspections due to other problems.

The announcement that Browns Ferry had completed work related to the 2011 red finding that identified a significant safety problem, was made during a public meeting hosted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Athens tonight.

Browns Ferry remains in the NRC's Column 4, which means a heightened inspection regimen for Browns Ferry's Unit 1 reactor. Regulators will monitor plant operations, safety culture, maintenance, equipment reliability and work planning. The Category scoring system reflects a number of problems or safe operations over a defined period of time.

Victor McCree, the Atlanta-based regional administrator for the NRC, said the red finding removal shows TVA has made progress, but needs to do more.

"We've seen areas of significantly improved performance, but is there still room for improvement? Yes," McCree said, Browns Ferry's upgraded procedures and a new approach to addressing equipment reliability. "But TVA didn't arrive at this point overnight. There were a number of years where they didn't take care of the plant equipment well enough, they didn't invest in people, procedures or processes.

"It will take some time to see sustained performance, but they're on the right track. They need to continue to invest."

Regulators issued a "red finding" in 2011 after the fall 2010 discovery of a 600-pound valve blocking the primary emergency cooling line at Unit 1 at the plant. TVA cited poor manufacturing, but the NRC found it was TVA's own inadequate testing, that let the blocked line sit undiscovered for years.

The NRC determined that the broken valve would have prevented TVA from successfully implementing its shutdown procedure at the plant in the event of a fire.

The inspection results reported today indicate TVA has taken the necessary steps to address the issues that contributed to the problem and has a plan in place to prevent it from happening again.

Keith Polson, site vice president for Browns Ferry, said TVA is committed to not only making the improvements called for by the NRC, but sustaining its performance with an improved safety culture, accountability, upgraded procedures and a program that ensures equipment reliability. Polson said TVA is also committed to meeting increased fire safety standards.

Polson pointed that the plant's three reactors had no problems meeting power demand during the recent snap of bitterly cold weather.

In leaving Browns Ferry Unit 1 in its Column 4 - Column 5 is unacceptable performance - the NRC cited reliability problems related to a high pressure injection system that is central to the plant's safety cooling system. McCree said the system had problems identified last January in both starting and staying on during testing. The NRC's grading system faults a utility for the number of hours a given critical system is unavailable.

Browns Ferry was also marked down due to the need to upgrade its diesel generators The eight huge diesel generators that are needed in case of a loss of off-site power. The generators needed significant maintenance and TVA has undertaken that effort. McCree said the program to improve the generators was the right thing to do and will benefit TVA in the long run, but the recorded downtime during the maintenance was also counted against TVA.

Both of those problems fell under the "white finding" category, less serious than a red finding, but multiple white findings can also lead to a plant being placed, or remaining in the Column 4.

McCree said the current Column 4 standing will likely be changed over time as TVA continues to make improvements and the downtime problems associated with the downtime cycle out.

Updated at 11 p.m. to correct TVA column class term. Updated Friday to correct plant size designation.

The UCS's take on the Browns Ferry red finding problem.

TVA’s Bad Nuclear Report Cards
Dave Lochbaum, director, Nuclear Safety Project | February 11, 2014, 6:00 am EST

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) owns six of the 23 reactors not in the Licensee Response Column. TVA owns five of the eight reactors in the third and fourth columns of the Action Matrix. In other words, TVA owns 62.5% of the worst performing reactors currently operating. Its three reactors at the Browns Ferry nuclear plant in Alabama occupy the second, third, and fourth columns of the Action Matrix—the only company to earn “Win,” “Place” and “Show” podium spots.

Our Takeaway

Why does TVA have six reactors outside of the acceptable column of the NRC’s Action Matrix?

Probably because TVA only operates six reactors. If it operated more reactors, their performance levels would likely be languishing too.

The worst performing reactor in the country—Browns Ferry Unit 1—was shut down between 1985 and 2007. Its two decade rest and recuperation didn’t prevent it from relatively quickly sinking to last place on the performance charts.

The three Browns Ferry reactors are of similar design and age to the two Brunswick reactors sitting comfortably in the Action Matrix’s first column.

The Sequoyah and Watts Bar reactors are of similar design and age to the two Catawba reactors sitting comfortably in the Action Matrix’s first column.

All of these reactors are in NRC Region II.

Is TVA's Junk Nuclear Fleet In Trouble?

So the natural gas and coal brothers carried the nuclear brother?

Nov 2015

Cheaper fuel helps cut TVA electric rates over past four years 

As the economy of the Tennessee Valley has gained back most of the power it lost during the Great Recession, the cost of power in the region has declined over the past four years...

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TVA mulls sale of unfinished Bellefonte Nuclear Plant 

By Robert Walton | February 19, 2016
Dive Brief: 

*Tennessee Valley Authority is considering selling the unfinished Bellefonte Nuclear Plant in Alabama, the Associated Press reports. Construction on the facility was begun in 1974, but was halted decades ago.  

*While no pricetag was set, the federal utility has spent $4 billion on the plant. 

*TVA said last year it was halting all development of the plant, turning instead to focus more heavily on gas-fired generation and efficiency, and less on nuclear power. the utility operates about 6,700 MW of nuclear capacity. 

Dive Insight: 

The Bellefonte Nuclear Plant could be for sale, and if you've got a few billion to spare, here's what you'd get: Parking lots.Transmission equipment. Rail lines, a heli-pad and multiple finished buildings. And, of course, a matching pair of unfinished nuclear reactors. 

According to the AP, TVA is considering putting the unfinished plant up for sale, less than a year after the utility said it was permanently halting construction. No price tag is set, but TVA has spent $4 billion on the facility to date.

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...TVA said Monday its average cost of delivered power has declined from 7.2 cents per kilowatthour in fiscal 2011 to 6.9 cents per kilowatthour in fiscal 2015. The rate savings, mainly due to lower operating expenses and cheaper fuel, helped make TVA more competitive with neighboring utilities in the South, although some TVA industrial rates remain above the regional average.

Bill Johnson speaks as the TVA board of directors hold a public meeting at TVA's Chattanooga Office Complex.

Bill Johnson speaks as the TVA board of...

Photo by John Rawlston /Times Free Press.

The rate cuts came despite relatively flat electricity sales coming out of the recession and growing profits for TVA.

The Tennessee Valley has added back most of of the jobs lost in the region during the 2009-2010 downturn. TVA's power demand, however, has not returned to its 2007 level, in part, due to improved energy efficiency at many homes and businesses.

Despite only sluggish growth in power sales, the federal utility has boosted net income in each of the past four years, rising to a record $1.1 billion in the fiscal year ended Sept. 30.

"The costs of generating electricity were substantially lower this year, reflected by large reductions in TVA operating costs," Johnson said Monday in a conference call about TVA's financial results for the past year. "As a result, we finished 2015 with a record high level of net income, which was invested back into the power system to keep debt mostly flat for the year."

Natural gas and coal costs have declined amid a glut of fossil fuels, while above-average rain this year helped boost production from TVA's cheapest power source — its 29 power-generating dams.

Johnson, who joined TVA three years ago as CEO after heading Progress Energy and Duke Power Co., said he initially estimated TVA could pare $542 million of annual operating and maintenance expenses at TVA.

"I'm happy to say we not only met that goal, we exceeded it with more than $600 million of savings in operating and maintenance expenses," Johnson said. "Operational savings go right to the benefit of our customers, keeping rates affordable and freeing up funds that can be invested to make our power fleet cleaner and more reliable."

Overall, TVA's operating expenses in fiscal 2015 were down 8 percent, or $760 million, from the previous year.

TVA invested a record high $3.6 billion in capital projects last year. At the same time, TVA has trimmed its full-time staff by about 2,000 positions since 2012 to end last year with 10,918 jobs.

TVA raised its base rates on Oct. 1 by an average 1.5 percent at the retail level. But most of those increases will be offset next month by another drop in TVA's monthly fuel cost adjustment.

TVA has become more competitive with its power rates than a few years ago, but major industrial customers point out their power rates are lower at some other Southern utilities, such as Duke and Georgia Power, than they are with TVA.

"TVA rates are getting better and we're pleased with the improvement, but we'd like to see them do even better," said Pete Mattheis, an attorney for Nucor Steel who serves as chairman of the Tennessee Valley Industrial Committee.

Junk Plant Pilgrim Now Gets New Individual NRC's Web Page

Additional NRC Oversight at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant

The Pilgrim nuclear power plant, in Plymouth, Mass., is under increased oversight from the NRC. In September 2015, the agency announced the finalization of a "White" (low to moderate safety significance) inspection finding that stemmed from issues involving the plant's safety relief valves. Based on that enforcement action, in combination with two earlier "White" findings received by the plant, Pilgrim moved to Column 4, of the agency's Action Matrix, which dictates the agency's level of oversight at plants. The NRC has embarked on a review process that will entail three phases and numerous hours of inspection.

(NRC)"Subject: 2.206: Pilgrim Nuclear Plant SRV Request for Emergency Shutdown"

(My blog Write-up) 2.206: Pilgrim Nuclear Plant SRV Request for Emergency Shutdown

I presented this 2.206 to the regional officials at the SRV white finding public meeting this summer. I asked them why didn't you move on this 2.206 petition. They said, "at the time there was no evidence available to show the SRVs were inoperable or broken to anyone. This 2.206 was just based on wishful thinking." Everything in this 2.206 has come to be true post Jan storm Juno and the resulting NRC investigations.

I have these conversations recorded...

From: Michael Mulligan [mailto:steamshovel2002@yahoo.com]

Sent: Thursday, March 07, 2013 12:33 PM

Yep, I was desperately trying to get people to believe what I was saying. Took a shot at getting the Boston Globe involved. 

To: newstip~globe.com; NRC Allegation

Subject: 2.206: Pilgrim Nuclear Plant SRV Request for Emergency Shutdown 

Dear sir, 

I called this into your hotline by telephone and left a message to a reporter an hour or so ago. This is just a follow-up. 

I'd like to get Gov Patrick to demand an immediate Pilgrim shutdown and demand a special investigation of these events. 

Mike 

*** So the below is my 2.206 request to the NRC. You'd do me a favor if the BG calls our region I public relation people.. .Neil Shaheen.

March 7, 2013

This was shortly after storm Nemo...

Bill Borchardt

Executive Director for Operations

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

Dear Mr. Bochardt, 

(March 2013)Request an emergency and for a exigent bases, that the Pilgrim Nuclear plant be immediately shut down.

Don't tell me just before Nor'easter Nimo struck the Pilgrim plant with a leaking safety relief valve and down at 80%, Entergy was intending to operate that plant with a defective leaking safety relief valve till the next refuel outage. Tell it ain't so. It certainly looks like with the current leak today that are intending to operate till next month.

Is the game plan today to incrementally increase reactor power from 94% by 1% to see if a new SRV leak is getting worse? 

Timeline: 

1) New three stage safety relief valves installed in the plant around May 2011.

***Actually, later discovered the first leak with new SRVs occurred within the first weeks after first plant start-up in May 2011.

2) First leak and shut down on Dec, 26. 2011 (SRV RV-203-3D). 

3) Second leak and shut down on Jan 20, 2013 (SRV RV-203-3B). 

4) Third leak occurred a few weeks later and the Nemo blizzard tripped the plant...the NRC promised these valves would be fixed. (SRV RV-203-3B).

5) Basically they operated for 20 days at 100% power operation post shutdown, then reported on Feb 27 the plant is operating at 94% power with no explained reason until today. The reason for the down power was kept secret from the public. Don't forget the repetitive nature of the recently broken scram discharge volume vent and drain valves...implies Entergy is incapable of maintaining safety components of a nuclear plant. 

The repeated nature of the failures of the safety relief valves means Entergy doesn't know the mechanism of the failure...it is a common mode failure. The design and manufacture of these valves are defective and it is extremely unsafe to operate a nuclear plant with all safety relief valves being INOP. A condition adverse to quality... 

The NRC should have made a public comment about the new leaking safety relief when they first became aware of the leak. The implication is the agency was going to allow the plant to operate with unsafe SRVs until the refueling outage next month. The NRC is involved in a serious cover-up of an extremely unsafe operation of a nuclear power.

1) Request an immediate shutdown the Pilgrim Plant. 

I called for a big special inspection in early 2013. One wonders if the NRC a full scale special inspection in 2013; would Pilgrim not have a had permanent shutdown hanging over their head today?

2) The is the second time I requested a special NRC inspection concerning the defective SRV valves.  

3) Not allow the plant to restart Pilgrim until they fully understand the past failure mechanisms of the four bad new three stage safety relief valves. 

The NRC OIG just below blew this request for help off without even a notification to me.

4) Request the OIG investigate this cover-up to keep an unsafe nuclear plant at power.

References:

The Popperville Town Hall (my blog):

http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/ 

"Pilgrim's Safety Relief Valve Leaking Boondoggle"

Http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2013/02/pilgrims-safety-relief-valve-leaking.html

 

Sincerely,

Michael Mulligan
PO Box 161
Hinsdale, NH 03541
1-603-336-8320
(Cell)1-603-209-4206
steamshovel2002@yahoo.com 

No Such Thing As Science today-Just Aimless Interest?

This is my example there are no such thing as scientist and engineers. We have no higher belief others than self interest and money. Scientist and engineers are more corporate or business gun slingers. I think all real science and engineering is the illumination of universal truths according to great ethical and moral codes and rules. A interest in serving the greater good of the universe.

When I hear this thing today is based on science, I thinking it is a paid opinion based on money.

We have no agreed on and enforce structure defining science. We just pick and chose half-ass data to push a selfish agenda..

Like everything Flint Michigan poisoned water.

There is no such thing as government anymore- just aimless interest. 

Scientists can’t agree whether salt is killing us. Here’s why.

By Peter Whoriskey February 17 at 7:05 PM  

FILE - This May 14, 2013 file photo shows salt shakers at a restaurant in Alexandria, Va. A large international study challenges the advice for most people to cut back on salt. Unless they have high blood pressure, the amount most folks consume is OK for heart health, and too little may be as bad as too much, the study suggests. (AP Photo/Cliff Owen, File)

The debate over the perils of salty diets may be one of the most polarized in all of science.

On one side, scientists warn ominously that most Americans are killing themselves with salt. On the other, scientists insist most Americans are fine.

The inability to resolve this question may seem puzzling. It is a question with deadly consequences, at least potentially. How much salt is healthy? Given the marvels of technology, it seems like that ought to be an easy one.

Now a review of hundreds of papers on the topic indicates that the inability to reach a consensus stems at least partially from the fact that the two groups of scientists operate, in essence, in parallel scientific universes.

In one, the scientists write papers about the dangers of our salt consumption, and typically cite other papers that point to the same conclusion. In the other, the scientists write papers dismissing or minimizing the danger, and typically cite papers agreeing with their position.

Each side, in other words, steers away from taking into account contrary results.

“We found that the published literature bears little imprint of an ongoing controversy, but rather contains two almost distinct and disparate lines of scholarship,” according to the paper from researchers at Columbia University and Boston University, and published by the International Journal of Epidemiology.

The researchers offer one particular image that shows how polarized the salt debate has become.

The blotches of red and blue here represent instances where scientists cited  like-minded research; those in green show instances where scientists referred to research that challenges their results.

In a more perfect world, where scientists sought balance in the evidence they reviewed, you would see more green - signs that scientists were considering evidence that is contrary to their beliefs.

As you can see, the image is dominated by red and blue, a sign that scientists are more likely to cite the research that conforms to their outlook. Overall the papers they reviewed were 50 percent more likely to cite reports that drew a similar conclusion than  to cite papers drawing a different conclusion.

"This shows the polarization within the scientific community," said Ludovic Trinquart, who completed the paper with colleagues David Merritt Johns and Sandro Galea.

Trinquart and his colleagues also turned up another factor that might pose even more profound problems in the salt research. It appears scientists could not even agree on what ought to be counted as evidence.

This finding arose from their review of ten "systematic reviews" of the evidence that have been conducted. In systematic reviews, scientists collect all of the primary research on a topic and, in effect, weight it on the whole. But there appears to have been widespread disagreement about what research papers ought to be included in a systematic review. If a research paper was selected for one systematic review, it was more than likely not selection for another, the researchers found.

"There is no agreement or very poor agreement on what should be counted as evidence," Trinquart said.

Exactly what governments and other public health organizations ought to tell people about salt has been the focus of fierce debate in recent years. The U.S. government, through the Dietary Guidelines for Americans, as well as the American Heart Association, have long warned that most Americans are consuming far too much salt, and that excess consumption raises risks for high blood pressure, strokes and heart disease. However, research in recent years by some prominent scientists have raised doubts about those warnings.

While advocates of salt restrictions often disparage their opponents by saying the food industry has funded their efforts, in truth, some milestones in the research were not funded by corporate interests. The new research did not assess which research efforts had industry funding.

But the researchers said their review found evidence of bias arising from scientists reluctant to change their view in light of new facts.

"Our findings support a strong bias towards the status quo and the absence of a genuine scientific conversation where each side engages the other."

Junk Plant River Bend’s Crazy February 2016 Power History So Far...

So they normally installed the butterfly valves backwards. Screwed up in the piping diagram and procedure not saying the normal position of the valve is backwards. Put the valve back in the original orientation …then it failed on high torque. Upped the setpoint. Then found problems with Part 21

Basically the valve has now abnormally high torque, it been qualified for a limited number of operations.

Why didn't they see the increasing torque in mov testing and ask questions.

It is massive "Normalization Of Deviance". 

It is a clusterpuck all around.

Part 21

Based on the PSEG unit in service valve, Weir determined that the friction was

increasing with age. The degradation of performance will be based on several factors

including;

1. Water quality

2. Materials

3. Applied load.

Based on the complexity of this issue, Weir will add a safety factor on the friction factor

for both of the calculations, The PSEG testing revealed that after 9 years of service in

aggressive water conditions, friction had increased to 150% of the calculated friction.

When maintenance was performed on only the seal stack and seat, the unit was

returned to the calculated values of torque.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1532/ML15329A157.pdf

Description. 1EAHV-2198C is the ‘C’ SW pump discharge isolation valve. The valve is a 28-inch Weir Tricentric butterfly valve with a SMB-1/HBC-4 (60-1) Limitorque motor operator. The valve has an active safety function in the open position to provide normal SW flow to the safety-related safety auxiliaries cooling system (SACS) heat exchangers (HXs) and non-1E reactor auxiliaries cooling system (RACS) HXs, and emergency SW flow to other systems. PSEG had originally intentionally installed all four 1EAHV-2198 valves in the reverse flow direction to permit the downstream header pressure to seat the valve tighter to minimize seat leakage during SW pump and strainer on-line maintenance. During refueling outage 18 (RF18) in October 2013, PSEG performed a planned refurbishment of the 2198C valve and SMB-1 actuator under work order 60112463-410, Step 1.D. On October 22, 2013, maintenance technicians initiated NOTF 20626219 to document that while installing the 1EAHV-2198C adapter plate, they noticed that the valve was installed 180 degrees different from where it was removed and requested support. The NOTF also documented that the MOV engineer agreed that reconfiguring the valve operator would be the easiest way to correct the issue. In an October 23, 2013, update to the NOTF, maintenance stated that they had applied match marks to ensure that the valve would be installed in the same orientation, but during the course of the work the match marks were erased. Maintenance also updated the NOTF to reflect that they had identified that the 2198 valve installation orientation design specification was not documented in valve drawing M-10-1 or the vendor manual (VTD 323981) as expected. The team also noted that several diagrams within the work order depicted the wrong valve orientation and may have contributed to the configuration control error. Finally, the team noted that there was no documented evaluation of the impact of this misalignment and configuration error prior to operations declaring the ‘C’ SW pump operable following the 2198C maintenance on October 23. PSEG initiated NOTF 20705874 for this operability screening performance gap.

update 2/18/2016

(1pm)I just talked to the River Bend acting NRC senior resident. I asked about the stinking capacity factor since the last scram, and why the shutdown today. I got out of her vague equipment troubles. Basically because of propriety/market issues and NRC rules, she couldn’t give me any information. You know when a NRC inspector is trying to dump you, is when she tries to give you the licensee number. I wished the normal senior resident was at the plant. I pressured her a little gentlemanly. She don’t realized what a difficult job she has. She is going to always be my hero. She is going to get back to me. I think I got her to read my blog.    

River Bend is secretly shutdown and at 0% today. Does anyone know why they shutdown?

reposed from 2/17/16

You are suppose to be seeing for as far as the eyes can see at 100% power.

(Jan 2015) River Bend Start-Up Power History

(June 2015) River Bend: What A Junk Plant’s Power History Looks Like

By regulatory good will:

U.S. nuclear energy facilities generated electricity at a record high level of reliability in 2015, according to preliminary estimates. 

Ninety-nine nuclear power plants operating in 30 states posted an estimated average capacity factor of 91.9 percent, based on preliminary 2015 data compiled by the Nuclear Energy Institute. That surpasses the industry’s prior record set in 2007 by one-tenth of a percentage point. Capacity factor measures the total electricity generated as a percentage of potential generation for the entire year. 

Actual electricity production from nuclear energy facilities last year was the fifth-highest ever, at an estimated 797.9 billion kilowatt-hours (kwh). The industry’s record high electricity generation came in 2010, when the 104 reactors then operating produced 806.9 billion kwh of electricity while posting an industry average capacity factor of 90.9 percent. 

The amount of electricity generated in 2015 exceeded the amount produced in 2014, even though one less plant operated due to the 2014 closing of Vermont Yankee. This record efficiency is even more important as states strive to meet new carbon-reduction targets for the electric sector. 

Louisiana has nothing but kooks in it?  

Feb 17 30%

Feb 16 90%

Feb 15 95%

Feb 14 79%

Feb 13 71%

Feb 12 27%

Feb 11 100%

Feb 10 100%

Feb 9 100%

Feb 8 100% Special inspection announced over cooling the core problems.

Feb 7 100%

Feb 6 86%

Feb 5 90%

Feb 4 78%

Feb 3 57%

Feb 2 58%

Feb 1 18%

Jan 31 001%

Jan 30 0%

Jan 9 Shutdown over a lightning strike to plant. Can you imagine the amount of plant shutdowns if no plants have lightening surge protection? Lightening plant trips are very rare in the USA. They are all protected against it. So a switch was out of place or a safety component was broken to cause the trip.

NRC Begins Special Inspection at River Bend Station

(Feb 8) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has begun a special inspection at the River Bend Station nuclear power plant to review circumstances surrounding events that occurred following an unplanned reactor shutdown on Jan. 9. The plant, operated by Entergy Operations, Inc., is located in St. Francisville, La.

The plant was operating at full power when a lightning strike caused a momentary surge in the plant’s offsite power supply, triggering an unplanned shutdown. Operators subsequently took appropriate actions to place the plant in a safe shutdown condition. The following day, operational errors led to a one hour loss of shutdown cooling.

“The purpose of this special inspection is to better understand the circumstances surrounding the loss of shutdown cooling, determine if operator response was appropriate, and review the licensee’s corrective actions to ensure that the cause of the event, including associated equipment problems and any contributing operator actions have been effectively addressed,” NRC Region IV Administrator Marc Dapas said.

Several NRC inspectors will spend about a week on site evaluating the licensee’s root cause analysis, maintenance of some plant systems and adequacy of corrective actions. An inspection report documenting the team’s findings will be publicly available within 45 days of the end of the inspection

The Lightning strike caused about a 21 day outage. You get it, the NRC gave them a week’s at power grace period and a 21 day outage grace period before they called the special inspection. They waited to the plant was up and running, though crappy capacity factor.

Just look at this horrendous month of capacity factor…they ain’t making money with is.

Right, I have been documenting for about the past year the horrendous capacity at River Bend.  

Commissioner Ostendorff A Goner

Go USA: NRC Commissioner Ostendorff is Going to Answer My Email

False Ostendorff Senate Confirmation Testimony in 2010

Commissioner Ostendorff a goner. We are already down one commissioner.

William Ostendorff will not seek another term in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) after his term ends June 30, he announced Wednesday.
After six years in the five-member body that oversees the safety of the country’s nuclear power plants, Ostendorff has elected to return to the United States Naval Academy to teach, said Eliot Brenner, a spokesman for the agency.

ADVERTISEMENT

Ostendorff, a Republican, has served at the NRC through numerous challenges to the agency, including its response to 2011’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in Japan and a very public leadership scuffle at the agency later that year. 

Phase II On The Mike Mulligan NRC Special Inspection Report at River Bend

works in progress. 

My first special inspection got four green findings and a white finding…

My second got three green findings plus another white findings.

Why do I feel like these findings were selectively chosen.

February 16, 2016

EA-15-140

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION– NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2015010 AND PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING

Dear Mr. Olson:

On March 24, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed its initial assessment of the circumstances surrounding a loss of control building ventilation, which occurred on March 9, 2015, at the River Bend Station. Based upon the risk and deterministic criteria specified in NRC Management Directive 8.3, “NRC Incident Investigation Program,” the NRC initiated a special inspection in accordance with Inspection Procedure 93812, “Special

Inspection.” The basis for initiating the special inspection and the focus areas for review are detailed in the Special Inspection Charter (Attachment 2 of the enclosed inspection report). Based on this initial assessment, the NRC sent an inspection team to your site on March 30, 2015.

On January 20, 2016, the NRC completed its special inspection. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings that were discussed on January 20, 2016, with Mr. Dean Burnett, Acting Director, Regulatory and Performance Improvement, and other members of your staff. The team documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report. The enclosed inspection report documents a finding that has preliminarily been determined to be White, a finding with low to moderate safety significance that may require additional NRC inspections, regulatory actions, and oversight. As described in Section 2.6.a of the enclosed report, the team identified an apparent violation for a failure to adequately assess the increase in risk of operating the control building chilled water system chillers in various single-failure vulnerable configurations. As a result of this deficiency, the station reduced the reliability and availability of systems contained in the main control room and failed to account for the significant, uncompensated impairment of the safety functions of the associated systems.

***TBD. The NRC identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.65, “Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,” paragraph (a)(4) with preliminary white significance.

Prior to March 30, 2015, before performing maintenance activities, the licensee failed to adequately assess the increase in risk that may result from proposed maintenance activities. Specifically, the risk assessment performed by the licensee for plant maintenance failed to account for certain safety significant structures, systems, and components that were concurrently out of service. On multiple occasions, the licensee failed to adequately assess the risk of operating the control building chilled water system (HVK) chillers in various single failure vulnerable configurations. As a result of this deficiency, the station reduced the reliability and availability of systems contained in the main control room and failed to account for the significant, uncompensated impairment of the safety functions of the associated systems. In response to the NRC’s conclusions, the licensee initiated Condition Report CR-RBS-2016-00095. The licensee also completed engineering analyses to evaluate alternate cooling methods, including cross-connecting service water and the HVK chiller systems, in order to provide cooling to spaces housing electrical components.

***Green. The team reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” for the licensee’s failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality related to Masterpact circuit breakers. Specifically, the licensee did not promptly identify and correct a Masterpact breaker failure mechanism, even though related industry operating experience was available. The licensee determined the failure mechanism caused nine breaker failures since 2007, and may have contributed to an additional six failures where the cause was not conclusively determined. In response to the NRC’s conclusions, the licensee initiated Condition Report CR-RBS- 2015-03951. Further, the licensee modified all vulnerable Masterpact circuit breakers to remove this failure mechanism.

***Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” for the licensee’s failure to accomplish an operability determination in accordance with procedure EN-OP-104, “Operability Determination Process,” Revision 8. Specifically, the licensee referenced non-conservative data, contrary to steps 5.5 and 5.11 of procedure EN-OP-104, when assessing the reduced reliability of Masterpact circuit breakers as a degraded or nonconforming condition. The licensee restored compliance by completing a design modification to eliminate the failure mode and initiated Condition Report CR-RBS-2015-03952.

Notes on 2015 River Bend

Remember Entergy's Arkansas One and Pilgrim are the worst operating plants in the USA according to the NRC.

When does Entergy and the NRC become overwhelmed by Entergy's fleet of power plants. When does the declining financial conditions in the nuclear industry start to overwhelm and numb the NRC?

River Bend: Why are allthese component failures and human errors in the same scram?

River Bend: Unprecedented Four Special Inspections Ongoing at Entergy Plants

The Mike Mulligan's Special Inspection At River Bend?