Friday, February 08, 2013

Pilgrim's Safety Relief Valve Leaking Boondoggle

Feb 28: been at 94% power for two days?

So this was released today....or released for the first time. This is part of the SRV Amendment Request for the new three stage valves. One wonders why they are releasing it...it educates me how the valve works.

Right, all the new temperature and bellow pressure instrumentation is a hell of an advancement from the old two stage valves. As the three valves failures subsequently showed us on thesnew valves, the containment is still a formidable barrier with understanding what was failing on these valves. 
September 21, 201
Entergy Response to NRC Request for Additional Information dated July 21, 2010, in support of Proposed License Amendment for Pilgrim Setpoint and Setpoint Tolerance Increases for Safety Relief Valves (SRV) and Spring Safety valves (SSV), and Related Changes (TAC NO. ME3543.
Feb 15: Doesn't sound like there was a NRC inspector in the control room the night of the historic blizzard, considering all the troubles with the SRV valves...?
Feb 14: Stand corrected, two 345 kv lines and one 23 kv line for a total of three lines...

Feb 13: Is reactor water debris or particles of some kind causing the valves to leak. Hmm, are these valves cycled upon first start-up, thus getting particles flushed through them and stuck between the seat and disk?

A plague of problems with new nuclear safety components at Pilgrim...SRV valves.















You notice, Entergy is utterly silent with the on going events at the plant...the only source of information on Pilgrim is the neutered NRC.

It sounds like my influence?
Pilgrim nuclear plant remains shut for repairs
By Erin Ailworth, Globe Staff

The Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth, which shut down after losing power to its safety systems during the weekend snowstorm, once again has electricity, but will remain out-of-commission while repair work is done on a leaky safety relief valve that caused a problem at the plant last month, federal regulatory officials said,

The power, provided by local utilities, returned at midnight on Tuesday, according to a statement from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

“Our resident inspectors assigned to Pilgrim will continue to closely follow the repair work and other activities as the company plans to return the unit to service,” the Commission statement said.

Pilgrim, which is owned by Entergy Corp. of Louisiana, first lost power Friday night when three offsite power lines were knocked out of service during the storm, according to regulatory filings and the NRC. The plant was taken offline, and diesel generators powered its safety systems. Electricity temporarily returned to the plant on Sunday morning, but went out again when plant operators believe a transformer was struck by falling ice.

Entergy representatives did not immediately be reached for comment. But Entergy spokeswoman Carol Wightman said Sunday that Pilgrim would only come back online once it had gone through testing and maintenance. She could not say when that would be.

Pilgrim’s current shutdown is its third this year. The first two -- both in January -- were caused by equipment issues at the plant, not an offsite power loss.

The leaky safety valve that is now being repaired caused one of the January shutdowns. The other happened when the plant’s recirculation pumps, used to adjust power levels, stopped working.

Erin Ailworth can be reached at eailworth@globe.com. Follow her on Twitter @ailworth
I think he did mention it or maybe I already knew it...the three lines can sway in the heavy wind. So two line can get close to each other in the sway and thus this creates huge short circuits.

Neil told me indeed Pilgrim did have "offsite line power availability has been fluctuating" while the plant was up at power...huge swings in power to the lines. The safety breakers to the lines were opening and shutting like a mad man having not a clue why this was happening.

Pilgrim does have procedures requiring them to start up the diesels generators in preparation for their emergency use, even scram and disconnect the whole site, if the transmission system become extremely unstable. The transmission system did become extremely unstable this night. Why didn't they follow their emergency procedures?   
"Offsite power availability has been fluctuating in and out to the site.
I asked him about the startup transformer inoping right at the reactor scram, then failing later with the ice, the main transformer faulting a few years earlier by ice on the insulator or breakers, why can't they stop it,  implied there is nothing they can do about it, asked him, well how come Millstone had more snow and blizzard and they never had troubles with ice crashing on their start-up and  main transformer, asked actually what was causing the off site lines to trip. He said trees were falling on the 345 kv lines. I said these towers and lines were 65 feet off the grounds...the right of ways were designed so no tree could ever fault a line. I asked him did you ever see a right away on the 345 kv transmission corridors. Most of the questions he knew nothing about and he was trying to feed me or throw me off by absolute bs not depending on the facts.

...This is Entergy's public relations spokesmen within the NRC. I called the on site resident inspector today. They generially don't answer their phones to take direct questions from the public. The agency allows you to leave a recoding, but the history is they never call people back because telling the truth is too troublesome.

Neil Sheehan,

From: Michael Mulligan
To: "neil.sheehan@nrc.gov"
Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 12:35 PM
Subject:
 

Remember Pilgrim with all the recent shutdowns indicate they were a very stressed and troubled plant.

The new SRV valves in May 2011, the shutdown for leaking SRV in Dec 26 2011, another shutdown for a leaking SRV in Jan 20th this year, then the same SRV leaking again into this blizzard causing the plant to be a 80%. So the D SRV, the B SRV and then the B SRV again...who knows what condition the A and C main steam line SRVs are doing. And the most humorous of it all in the "first" new SRV shutdown, Entergy, Target Rock, the Southern Company and the NRC could find no reason for the seat erosion. Couldn't prevent it from happening twice more. This isn't the results of a strong federal regulator or competent engineering of Target Rock or Entergy.

By the way, at VY and Peach Bottom in around 2010 they replaced all their SRV's with new ones...on the first cycle a threaded seal failed on the actuator causing two SRVs to fail their leak test and were secretly broken most of the at power time. They had put the wrong seal material in the SRV. Pilgrim today sounds exactly like VY?

So here is my blog on the SRVs and the trip:

http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2013/02/pilgrims-safety-relief-valve-leaking.html

Again, because of the ongoing VY state issue, Indian Point, Pilgrim and Entergy in general, the nuclear safety credibility crisis throughout the liberal bastion of the Northeast...we think the NRC is covering up events at Pilgrim this shutdown. You are afraid disclosures would worsen the agency's image...thus the agency is shaping the public image at Pilgrim with selective disclosers of information...

All I am interested in right now is the issue over blizzard shutdown... down to the big break and large asterisk. I didn't want you to think I was a lonely nut who could on and on about nothing.

This guy is interesting to with the grid transmission system:

http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/

Sincerely,

Mike Mulligan

Feb 12: 

Think about this, In Hurricane Sandy the Oyster Creek nuclear plant only lost all off site power for 11 hours.

Ok, what is really going on here

Event Number: 48736 Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Notification Time: 22:50 [ET]
Event Date: 02/08/2013
Event Time: 22:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/10/2013

The Startup Transformer has been declared inoperable. The Unusual Event was declared under EAL SU 1.1 based on loss of offsite power greater than 15 minutes [at 2200 EST]."
The licensee originally experienced an automatic reactor scram at 2117 EST due to a load reject with a turbine trip/reactor scram due to loss of power. Offsite power availability has been fluctuating in and out to the site. The licensee states that all systems are functioning as required. All rods fully inserted and the reactor is stable in Mode 3. Both Emergency Diesel Generators are providing power to the safety related buses. The loss of offsite power is believed to be weather related.
So the scram accrued at 21:17...they seemed to be saying they lost offsite power at 2200.
What does the below statement mean...was the start-up transformer damaged in the power surges? Was the start up transformer damaged after the scram and during the power surges before the the UE at 22:00? Should Pilgrim have isolated the start-up transformers in all the offsite lines power fluctuations beginning with a scram. Was there other equipment damaged in this. 

"The Startup Transformer has been declared inoperable."
What does this really mean, how long was the offsite power fluctuating while they were up at power before the scram? This questions if they should have been up at power at all as the storm was closing in on them. What would have been the conservative call? Should Pilgrim began shutting down at the first hint of offsite power fluctuations while at power. Where was the grid authority with a big warning phone call to the site, our transmission system has become extremely unstable, you better scram and shutdown before we damage you.
"Offsite power availability has been fluctuating in and out to the site.
 
Then these lying bastards tell you ice mysteriously took our both start-up transformers when they initially called the start-up transformer inop on the scram more than 24 hour earlier? Remember they pay absolutely no penalty telling your lies and knowing inaccuracies. 
"On Sunday, February 10, 2013 at 1405 [EST], with the reactor at 0% core thermal power, all control rods fully inserted, and in cold shutdown conditions, the plant experienced a loss of off-site power. With Pilgrim Station aligned to off-site power via the start-up transformer (SUT), a fault on the 'B' phase of the SUT was experienced due to suspected falling ice striking the phase's insulator
So Oyster Creek had a 11 hour LOOP in Super Hurricane Sandy...we are going on a four day LOOP with a unstable grid or serious plant damage with no hints when Pilgrim will recover offsite power.

On all levels this was a terribly botched response to the approaching historic Nor'easter and resultant unstable grid and scram going on for four days.


...Whether it was a Millstone nuclear plant last summer being forced to shutdown because they didn't have enough plant cooling capacity for the expected increase of the Long Island Sound summertime water temperature or the Pilgrim Nuclear plant trip during the lead up to a severe winter snow storm-blizzard...the commonality is the corporate interest, the federal and state regularity interest and the politicians don't have the power to enforce nuclear supplied electricity reliability in the seasonal extremes of expected New England weather.

I can't tell if it is they are bringing on poorly designed new equipments and components or allow old and obsolete equipment to fail or be degraded going into a seasonal hard weather.

...So what about the extent of condition/cause in the LER-006-00 I identified a few days ago?

The Main Transformer wasn't designed for the climate in 2008 and now the Start-up Transformer is shown to be poorly designed. So when the plant was in a LOOP and on the Diesel Generators, considering how vulnerable the plant is to severe winter weather, how come all the components of the Main Transformer and Start-up Transformers weren't thoroughly inspected for ice and snow as itwas a known vulnerability? How come there wasn't a check off list on that?

The root cause of the event was ice and snow build up on ACB-105 "A" phase bushing on the main transformer side and flashover which resulted in a significant current to ground fault. ACB-105 is an ac circuit breaker; model number HVB-SF6, manufactured by the General Electric-Hitachi company.
Come on, we are in the year 2013 and they can't design transmission and switch yard components into being ice resistant to faults, damage and trips. How come Millstone is still up at 100% power and they had much more snow.
Notification Date: 02/10/2013
Notification Time: 20:20 [ET]
Event Date: 02/10/2013
Event Time: 14:05 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/10/2013 Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY


"On Sunday, February 10, 2013 at 1405 [EST], with the reactor at 0% core thermal power, all control rods fully inserted, and in cold shutdown conditions, the plant experienced a loss of off-site power. With Pilgrim Station aligned to off-site power via the start-up transformer (SUT), a fault on the 'B' phase of the SUT was experienced due to suspected falling ice striking the phase's insulator. This resulted in the tripping of the feeder breaker, ACB-102, and the loss of power to 4160 KV buses A1 through A4. Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) 'A' and 'B' auto-started as designed and are powering emergency buses.

"The loss of off-site power resulted in de-energization of both Reactor Protection System (RPS) channels resulting in a reactor scram signal and isolation of shutdown cooling. At 1418, shutdown cooling was returned to service. All other plant systems responded as designed. Station personnel are in the process of establishing back-up power in accordance with plant procedures.


"The following press release was made at 1715 hours: 'Offsite power to Pilgrim station was interrupted this afternoon. The plant is in a cold shutdown condition and Pilgrim's diesel generators are providing power to the site. There is no worker or public safety concern. Plant personnel are troubleshooting the cause of the interruption
So basically the NE ISO and all the grid/transmission authorities have lost control of the power going into the Pilgrim nuclear plant. All this tearing up the grid responsibilities, is the very troubled National Grid responsible for this...so the grid is balkanized into many companies and government authorities...thus nobody is in charge of maintaining the quality power to a nuclear plant. The idea that all these grid companies have lulled the state and federal regulatory authorities into sleep walking to the nothing ever matters philosophy ...have lulled all the politicians to turn their heads with managing the quality of the electricity on the grid.  

I can't begin to tell you how dangerous it is for off site electricity/power to be supplied to a nuclear power plant erratically...how unprofessional it is to tolerate that. These are huge amounts of electricity and energy.

 
Event Number: 48736 Facility: PILGRIM
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN Notification Date: 02/08/2013
Notification Time: 22:50 [ET]
Event Date: 02/08/2013
Event Time: 22:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/10/2013

 UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

"Pilgrim Station scrammed on a loss of offsite power. All systems performed as designed. Groups I, II, VI went to completion. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) is injecting to the vessel controlling level. High Pressure Coolant Injection is in pressure control and slowly cooling down. Offsite power was lost multiple times. The Startup Transformer has been declared inoperable. The Unusual Event was declared under EAL SU 1.1 based on loss of offsite power greater than 15 minutes [at 2200 EST]."

The licensee originally experienced an automatic reactor scram at 2117 EST due to a load reject with a turbine trip/reactor scram due to loss of power. Offsite power availability has been fluctuating in and out to the site. The licensee states that all systems are functioning as required. All rods fully inserted and the reactor is stable in Mode 3. Both Emergency Diesel Generators are providing power to the safety related buses. The loss of offsite power is believed to be weather related.
The uncertainty with not exactly knowing what is causing the power fluctuation..."believed to be weather related"...is a pall over every citizen of Massachusetts and the electrical engineering profession as a whole. The NE ISO is doing a horrible job at managing the transmission and electricity quality... whatever service provider who owns the grid transmission components. It goes to say, the transmission system is not designed for the current climate and future climate. This plant didn't have one LOOP...they multiple LOOPs in a very short time.
Pilgrim terminated the Unusual Event and has transitioned to recovery effective at 10:55 AM on 02/10/2013. Offsite power has been restored to safety-related and non-safety-related electrical buses through the station Startup Transformer via a single 345 KV line. The other two offsite power sources remain out of service. The emergency diesel generators have been secured and are in standby. Residual heat removal is in shutdown cooling mode maintaining the reactor in cold shutdown. Fuel Pool Cooling is in service with fuel pool coolant temperatures trending down.
Feb 11:

The Associated Press
Pilgrim and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission announced that power resumed on Sunday, restored from one of the three off-site lines. As work was continuing to restore the other two lines, Pilgrim offiials said off-site power was interrupted.
Eleven inches of snow took out three independent high voltage power lines...come on. Sounds like something locally took out the switch yard effecting the ring bused.We will find out tomorrow morning with the event report...
Hmm, something is really wrong, Plymouth-Boson Globe (Pilgrim nuclear plant ) got 11.5 inches while Old Saybrook-New Londen Day got 30 inches....

Pilgrim got a dusting and had  LOOP...Milstone got 30 inches of snow and still making power at both units...


...Just saying, for the NE ISO and all the local power authorities, Pilgrim nuclear plant must have had the highest resource priority above everyone else for power restoration. They stole resources from everyone else....

The local distribution system is supposed to be devastated by a storm like this...the transmission system is supposed to be designed to be survivable...

 Remember, I have complained to the NRC that Pilgrim has 4 bad quality SRV valves. They were at 80% power because of a leaking SRV B valve. You know they were banging around the SRV valves during this scram... 

LER-006-00
On December 19, 2008, at 1831 hours, an unplanned automatic reactor protection system scram signal and scram occurred while operating at approximately 100% power. The event occurred with a severe winter storm in progress with predominantly easterly winds and snow depositing at a rate of approximately one (1") inch per hour

The root cause of the event was ice and snow build up on ACB-105 "A" phase bushing on the main transformer side and flashover which resulted in a significant current to ground fault. ACB-105 is an ac circuit breaker; model number HVB-SF6, manufactured by the General Electric-Hitachi company.

The turbine trip resulted in automatic closing of the turbine control valves and stop valves. Three (3) turbine steam bypass valves opened to divert steam flow to the main condenser. These turbine steam bypass valves have a capacity for diverting 25% of the rated steam flow. In accordance with the analyzed transient analysis for a load reject event, reactor pressure increased and three (3) of the four (4) main steam relief valves (MSRVs) opened when mechanical set pressure was exceeded. The MSRVs reset and long term reactor pressure control was accomplished using the turbine -steam bypass valves.
What Pilgrim is saying...that the Pilgrim plant is not designed for the extremes of our existing and future climate...
A review was conducted of Pilgrim Station LERs since 1974. The review identified a number of similar events which involved switchyard electrical faults resulting in load rejection and reactor scram. LERs 1985-025, 1992-016, 1993-004, and 1993-022 identify events where reactor scram occurred due to the effects of severe weather events including lightning strikes and winter storms. LER 2003-003 identifies an event where a fault on the UAT resulted in load rejection and reactor scram.
 Remember, the locality all around the the Pilgrim plant had their transportation, electrical distribution and grid transmission severely disruptive and destroyed in the Nemo Nor' Easter.
Right, you have seen a peek at Fukushima...the outlines of a future crisis. A media that is asleep at the wheel totally isolated by a region in a crisis of infrastructure isolation. A historic Nor'easter or a 9.0 tsunami...society in a deep crisis with disconnection caused by physical, communication and electrical separation. The media wholly caught up with pubic crisis...with being totally dependant on the NRC and corporate disclosures with problems at a nuclear plant in a deep crisis. All the local government organizations terrified a public declaration of a troubled nuclear plant will drain emergency life saving resources away from the weather emergency. So shut up says government authorities to the nuclear plant and NRC...let us do life saving duties without your nuclear plant disruptions. 
Will the nuclear corporation or NRC dare tell you the whole story when it is most needed or will they keep their problems close to the vest for their own self protection and for the protection of life savings to the whole regional community...

I think the regional society, the local governments and the media are terribly overloaded with the emergency...the natural response is to ignore the nuclear power plant.

A hint might be in tomorrows NRC event report by Entergy...if they begin reporting it was a complicated shutdown. That means in the heart of the LOOP and regional weather crisis with widespread loss of electricity and the ability to evacuate the public around the plant...the selective disclosures were an attempt by the NRC of a beginning to shape the image of the industry and Entegy to the public.

They could have had a nicely controlled and slow shutdown during day and 24 hour before the snow hurricane struck...

One of the most worrisome meltdown accident initiators is a stuck open relief valve. Most LOOPs are two hours or less and a LOOP of 5 or 6 hours are very rare event. A multi day LOOP is an extremely rare event like Pilgrims.

All LOOPs are very dangerous events and should be avoided at all cost. A LOOP going into it with leaking and questionable SRVs is extremely reckless and shutting down a plant in a historic Nor'Eastor...  

So what is the LOOP rate from "Analysis of Loss of Offsite Power Events: 1986-2004-NUREG/CR-6890" to today?
"Overall, LOOP frequencies during power operation decreased significantly over the 37 years from 1968 through 2004. The overall trend shows a statistically significant decrease through 1996, and then stabilized from 1997 through 2002. This decrease in the frequency of LOOP events is largely attributable to a decrease in the number of plant-centered and switchyard-centered events beginning in the mid-I 990s.

In fact, only one plant-centered event occurred during the period from 1997 through 2004. Nonetheless, the number of LOOP events in 2003 and 2004 was much higher than in previous years. Specifically, 12 LOOP events occurred in 2003, and 5 occurred in 2004.

The analyses documented in Volume I also indicate that, on average, LOOP events lasted longer in 1997-2004 than in 1986-1996. However, the LOOP duration data for 1986-1996 exhibited a statistically significant increasing trend over time. By contrast, no statistically significant trend exists for 1997-2004.

However, when we focus on grid-related LOOP events, the SBO risk has increased. Our current results show that the grid contributes 53 percent to the SBO core damage frequency. Severe and extreme weather events, which are generally related to grid events, contribute another 28 percent. Therefore, the increasing number of grid-related LOOP events in 2003 and 2004 is a cause for concern."

You got to know, it is a hard plant trip like a loss of all off site electricity and the lost of the main condenser for decay heat removal and cool down. Least they were at 80% power when it happened. So the main steam line isolation valves tripped shut. They were solely dependant on HPCI, RCIC and the SRV valves...turbine driven pumps for decay heat removal and pressure control. You know for a fact, they shifted into using the safety relief valves for pressure and level control at some point.

Entergy and the NRC have the total control when to announce the bad news about plant personal problems in an incident...they absolutely control the timing of disclosures usually many days, months and years later when it won't make the industry look bad... 
First published on Feb 2, 2013

Think about it, if it was a worst accident, would you admit it if it was an alert or a site area in this weather and frighten all the people living around the plant who couldn't leave anyway.

Think about more, you think those Diesel Generators were designed for a snow storm as this and actually tested for these conditions. It is piss your pants time, if the air suctions into the engine became clogged with snow and stopped the engines.
The area around the plant are also in a blackout...that is 400,000 people surrounding the plant.

*****Feb 9, 1130 PM: Pilgrim just had a plant trip and a loss of all off site Power. It is not the first time they had a bad scam in a blizzard****
The Plymouth nuclear power plant has lost power and has declared an emergency condition, a spokesman at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said tonight.
The plant is on generator power -- as designed -- yet has issued a low-level warning of "an unusual event," the NRC told the Herald tonight.
The plant has been shut down and back-up power is taking care of the plant's needs, at this time, the NRC added.
Plymouth fire officials said there were widespread outages in town. Nstar reports 81-90 percent of the town is without power tonight. (See the outage map here.)
Feb 8 still 83% power and Boston is being shutdown...

Feb 7: See, this can set up a big accident. Pilgrim plant is going to enter a snow Super-Hurrican wounded with at least three injuried SRV valves that includes A,C and B?   

Feb 7: 83% power

I think as they reduce pressure and power...it is leaking less stream still at such a rate as being non detectable. The lesser leak is still there and leaking...you are just not picking up the temperature with the detectors.

I had a bazillion 2.206 over SRV problems at  Peach Bottom and Vermont. It is very similar to this?
From: Michael Mulligan
To: "Kim, James"
Sent: Tuesday, February 5, 2013 9:28 AM
Subject: Re: PRB's Initial Recommendation on your 2.206 petition-Peach Bottom 2 and 3 SRVS
Mr Kim,
You remembered I talked about a 300% increase with BWR SRV LERs in about a decade, then now Pilgrim's with new SRVs on the first cycle shutdown with the D SRV leaking, then a shutdown with B leaking, then leaking B again threatening another shutdown that brings us to today. We know VY's SRV actuators were brand new and on their first cycle when they discovered grossly inappropriate sealing material that was used in the actuator. I still don't know if the Peach Bottom's actuators were new and how Buna n material got in there. I suspect now all the buna material is out of Peach Bottom (2 and 3) if you can still trust Exelon with their integrity issues on decommission funding and Pentas Controls. Like i have been saying, the NRC doesn't have enough horsepower and independence in order to make the nuclear industry behave in a coherent manner and serve our long term national interest. And the environment is getting much worse at an increasing rate.   

I laughed my ass off when I read all the organizations involved with the first Pilgrim SRV investigation stated in their LER, saying the "failed and eroded pilot valve" showed no defects... the NRC, Entergy, the Southern Company, Target Rock and the laboratory. I'd die laughing to see all the internal documents on this?

I suggest a special NRC with the Pilgrim new SRV problems and consider all the Pilgrim's SRVS defective and unsafe? 

Please may I have another shot at the PRB.Mike
Feb 6: 80 %...they still got a problem. How can they not call it inop and require a shutdown.
"The valve is the same one that was replaced in January after a similar leak was detected.'
pcassidy@capecodonline.com 
The Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth is again experiencing problems with a finicky safety relief valve that shut the plant down last month. Power at the plant was reduced Sunday because of a leak in a safety relief valve that helps control steam pressure at the facility, according to Carol Wightman, spokeswoman for Entergy Nuclear, which owns the plant. 
Reducing the power allowed the valve to reseat itself, but as power gradually was increased again another minor leak was detected, Wightman said. When power was reduced again the valve again reseated itself and the leak stopped, she said. 
"Right now we're holding at about 82 percent," she said at about 1:30 p.m. Tuesday, adding that plant officials were continuing to evaluate the problem. The NRC website later showed power at the plant had increased to 87 percent. 
The valve is the same one that was replaced in January after a similar leak was detected.
The plant has four of the valves, Nuclear Regulatory Commission spokesman Neil Sheehan wrote in an email to the Times. 
Entergy officials installed new safety relief valves during the last refueling and maintenance outage, Sheehan wrote. 
"They are used to relieve/control pressure in the reactor coolant system and therefore perform an important safety function," he wrote 
 Feb 5: 80% power yesterday to 87% today?

CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO. (Target Rock)

This letter is issued to provide initial notification of a potential defect in Plug Insulators (P/N: GB-1A-1) supplied as part of GRAYBOOT 'A' (GB-1A) Connector Kits. There are two affected lots of Plug Insulators (Lot #: BA59961 and BA67711). The potential defect is an out of tolerance dimension that will possibly affect the sealing ability of the Plug Insulator to wire interface.

EGS GRAYBOOT Connector Series


2011 007 00

Event date: Dec 25.,2011
Report date: Feb 23, 2012

2011 007 01

Event date: Dec 25, 2011
Report date: Dec 12, 2012

In other words, they are winging the valve full open and then shut it. They might do it more than once.  It is a hail Marry pass. Something is up when they can't right back up to power.  
2pm: "Entergy spokeswoman Carol Wightman said Monday afternoon that plant engineers and crews cut the output to 80 percent on Monday morning because they needed to reseat a pilot valve that’s connected to one of the plant’s four safety relief valves.'
I am calling for a special NRC inspection.

So maybe not shutting down right away to fix the SRV...maybe Entergy is running away from the penalty of more inspections and NRC attention as stated in there last post shutdown nRC evaluation? .
"...there have been three unplanned shutdowns at Pilgrim in just more than six months:
 Last May: Reactor scram from degrading condenser vacuum due to a valve failure. 
Jan. 10: Reactor scram due to trip of both reactor recirculation pumps due to personnel error during testing.

· Jan. 20: Reactor shutdown due to a leaking safety relief valve (These safety release valves are a new design and have been installed since the last outage in 2011.)

The NRC does compile with what it calls “performance indicators,” Sheehan explained. These are the records of unplanned nuclear power plant changes and shutdowns.  We look back at the last 7,000 hours of online operation to see if they have more than three” shutdowns, said Nuclear Regulatory Commission spokesman Neil Sheehan. “As of now, the latest shutdowns would not appear to put them over the performance indicator"...that performance indicator would cross from ‘green’ to ‘white.’ ”
If that happened at Pilgrim, according to Sheehan, Entergy would have to perform a root cause evaluation and the NRC would evaluate the cause and the corrective actions Entergy took in a supplemental inspection.

“Pilgrim is currently ‘green’ in all performance indicator categories,” Sheehan said, “including unplanned shutdowns.”

But if another scram occurs in the next month or so, it would be time for a root cause evaluation."
...newly installed in April/May, 2011, during Refueling Outage 18.

 
1) December 26, 2011: SRV RV-203-3D

In conclusion, the as-found tests and inspections could find no evidence of a defect in design, material, or workmanship that could lead to the onset of leakage. The pilot and second stage were leaking as-received at the TR facility and the as-found condition of both the pilot and second stage disc/seat was directly attributable to the installed plant leakage. The tests and inspections did not conclude any direct cause for the leakage.
 
2) Jan 20, 2013: RV-203-3B

3) Feb 3, 2013 RV-203-3B

...You remember my issues with VY's and Peach Bottom and SRV actuators threaded seal leaks. They were brand new replacement components. They had defective and wrong poor quality threaded seals in the actuators which lead to two of four actuators failing their fist leak test.

So Pilgrim has four SRV's as VY. We are heading to our third shutdowns and failure with Target rock Relief valves at Pilgrim. The new 3D valve leaked first in late 2011 requiring a shutdown. The new 3B leaked in Jan 20th this year and required a shutdown...supposedly the pilot assembly was replaced. Fourteen days later the 3B is leaking again and is INOP requiring another shutdown.

So Pilgrim went from 2 stage SRVs to brand new three stage SRVs in the April/May 2011 refueling outage.

You get it, these guys don't need the certainty of operability with this important nuclear safety components. 


So we are on the first LER revision or update already. Here are excepts for LER-2011-007-01 dated Dec 26, 2011. The defect is on the 3D valve. This guy was a 3 day shutdown...

"On Monday, December 26, 2011, at 1250 hours, with the reactor at 100% core thermal power, the station entered a 24-hour action statement to initiate a controlled shutdown and be less than 104 psig reactor pressure due to suspected leakage across the first stage of safety relief valve (SRV) RV-203-3D. The SRV was declared inoperable due to criteria specified in a Pilgrim plant procedure. Specifically, the SRV is inoperable if the pilot stage thermocouple temperature is 350 F below its baseline temperature. The safety relief valve was declared inoperable and the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.D was entered. Due to the valve being declared inoperable, the station was required to be shutdown and reactor coolant pressure be below 104 psig within 24 hours per TS 3.6.D.2."   I don't know what is wrong with this damn valve...so just stick another pilot valve in there and button her up.
Following the shutdown, RV-203-3D was repaired with a new pilot valve and the plant was returned to full power operation. Hey baby, we got absolute positive triplicate proof that nothing is wrong with these valves; where the industry and us have 43 years of perfect mature operational experience with the design of these valves. We are mature people here I tell you.

The following observations were made during the inspection and disassembly observations
1. There was no evidence of a design defect that could be the root cause for the onset of leakage. The basic design of this 3-stage valve is mature and had been in operation since 1970. Adherence to design and specification parameters were certified by witnessed steam tests before the valve left the Target Rock (TR) factory. The valves were assembled and tested under TR's ASME Section III, 'NV' stamp. The pilot assembly and second stage assembly were steam tested at TR to confirm steam pressure within 1% of 1155 psiq and shown to be leak tiqht at 1055 psiq (91%).

2. There was no evidence of material defect that could be a root cause for the onset of leakage. All components were found to be structurally sound. The only damage observed was the seat cutting that resulted from a pilot stage steam leakage described earlier.

3. There was no evidence of a defect in workmanship that could be considered a root cause for the onset of leakage, including bellows run out and preload gap,
In conclusion, the as-found tests and inspections could find no evidence of a defect in design, material, or workmanship that could lead to the onset of leakage. The pilot and second stage were leaking as-received at the TR facility and the as-found condition of both the pilot and second stage disc/seat was directly attributable to the installed plant leakage. The test and inspections did not conclude any direct cause for the leakage.
Yea babe, the extent of condition investigation was surely accurate. Can you trust any future "extent of condition investigation" at any other Entergy nuclear plant.
EXTENT OF CONDITION
The identified condition is a leaking SRV pilot. Based on a review of plant data, the only pilot to exhibit signs of leakage is RV-203-3D. The leaking pilot has been replaced. No additional pilots have this condition at this time. Any corrective actions that are identified to prevent reoccurrence of leaking SRV pilots will be applied to all four SRVs.
 
The complete list of dopes sitting in Entergy's Pilgrim engineering conference room.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: To determine the root cause, a joint team of Wyle Laboratories, Target Rock, Entergy and Southern Nuclear Operating Company engineering staff worked together to disassemble and inspect the pilot and second stage of the valve.Excepts from my Vermont Yankee Dec 5, 2012 2.206 complaining about Inaccurate Documents and Reports:  So the plant, industry and NRC will conspire to allow the plant to cold bloodily start-up and remain in operation with bad nuclear safety parts, usually under the euphemism of we always get what we want out of risk informed and nothing ever matters regulation...running with knowingly unsafe replacement or new parts in the plant. This is what happened with Vermont Yankee. They just might secretly allowed a unsafe plant to operate for a cycle or two until the unavailable and appropriate quality components and repaired parts are reverse engineered, acquired or purchased.

I suspect they throw these broken, wrong or defective and degraded components to contracted investigative or testing vendors...the sole purpose of it just might be a delay mechanism to get past the heat of a brewing scandal. It is more protective if a vendor gets caught in a lie...that won’t challenge continued plant operation. I think these investigative and testing contractors are corrupt as hell... they are lying professional engineering gunslingers. It is a pay-to-lie engineering service business and absolutely no NRC enforcement of integrity and truth telling. The stinking lying abscess of payola with investigative contractor and vendors testing is a critical nuclear safety sore on the whole industry and it is a national energy security threat also. 
 It might throw the broken or wrong material part investigation to a half ass testing contractor or vendor testing process, again, the sole purpose is to come up with a first wrong investigative result. It has nothing to do with finding the whole truth "so help me god" at the earliest opportunity. Then you have to throw it into another troubled testing contractor...it eats up years of wasted time and it gets out past the bad result many years after problem. Most worrisome, is they throw the bad part investigation to vendor or contractor who manufactured the bad part...they would never be expected lie of fudge the facts in support of stock price due diligence. Worst, in order to get business from a nuclear plant or corporation, it becomes a contractual requirement the investigation service lies to the regulator and the public. This corruption allows the plant to operate with defective nuclear safety equipment for more than one cycle and this has the ability to destroy the nuclear industry.Worst, in order to get business from a nuclear plant or corporation, it becomes a contractual requirement the investigation service lies to the regulator and the public. This corruption allows the plant to operate with defective nuclear safety equipment for more than one cycle and this has the ability to destroy the nuclear industry. Most of these defective or degraded parts get thrown into vendor or manufacturer investigation who have total control of the results. It is like investigating, prosecuting and judging your own robbery. How can you expect to get a clear and accurate investigation when so much self interest is on the line?  You just have to have much shorter investigative periods...it has to be enforced to the industry by the NRC. People should be punished for coming up with wrong answers! I think the NRC has to take control of many of these investigations and pay the contractors. The results of these investigation should be in the interest of the rate payers, stockholders and in our national interest. An investigative and testing result should never solely support CEO lying bonuses and the destructive short term utility stock prices. A broken part or degraded safety system investigative report should never try to support and mitigate sinking stock prices by telling structured half truths for years on end. These kinds of lying games destroys the conscience of good employees all through the nation." 
The second new SRV leak causing a shutdown occurred about fourteen days ago. It is on the 3B valve. It is Event notification Number: 48685 dated Jan 20, 2013. Exact same problem as the one above. This guy is a two day shutdown to repair. "While at full power, indication of a steam leak across the first stage pilot of RV-203-3B was determined in accordance with criteria specified in procedure 2.2.23. Specifically, the SRV is inoperable if the pilot stage thermocouple temperature is 35 degrees F below its baseline temperature (with a lower decrease at the 2nd stage thermocouple) and cannot be explained by a corresponding downpower. The safety relief valve was subsequently declared inoperable and the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.D was entered. Due to the valve being declared inoperable the station is required to be shutdown and reactor coolant pressure below 104 psig within 24 hours per TS 3.6.D.2. Then today's event notification number 48712 dated Feb 3, 2013. You don't think it could get worst with these three stooges, worst than three leaks on different brand new SRV valves. The SRV that caused the shutdown and replacement of the pilot...FIXED..is re-leaking.
So everyone is comfortable with a leak developing in a defective designed and manufactured safety component...then they get it to reset by changing the pressure. Insanity!
INFORMATIONAL NOTIFICATION - SAFETY RELIEF VALVE POTENTIALLY INOPERABLE
"On February 3, 2013 at 1245 EST, with the reactor at 100% core thermal power (CTP) safety relief valve, RV-203-3B was declared inoperable as required by station procedural direction due to an observed reduction in first stage pilot valve temperature of greater than 35 degrees F from baseline temperatures. At 1300 EST, reactor power was lowered to approximately 80% CTP at which time the relief valve parameters returned or trended to normal steady state values. Consistent with a reactor power reduction, reactor pressure also lowered from 1035 psig to 1000 psig. This action was taken consistent with industry operating experience related to three stage target rock relief first stage pilot valve leakage. 
"Currently, station engineering is evaluating the operability of RV-203-3B. Additionally, the current valve performance is being closely monitored by the main control room operating crew. 
"Station Technical Specification 3.6.D.1 requires that the safety modes of all relief valves (four for [Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station] PNPS) shall be operable during reactor power operating conditions and prior to reactor startup from a Cold Shutdown, or whenever reactor coolant pressure is greater that 104 psig and temperature is greater than 340 degrees F. If this specification is not met, Technical Specification 3.6.D.2 requires that an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor coolant pressure shall be below 104 psig within 24 hours. 
"This is an informational notification at this time. PNPS has not initiated an orderly shutdown as of this notification; rather reactor power was lowered to reseat the safety relief pilot valve and there is a high degree of confidence that the high standard of operability will be restored for RV-203-3B and the associated Technical Specification will be exited. If RV-203-3B is not restored to an operable status, a formal and required notification will be completed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), 'Initiation of any plant shutdown required by the Technical Specifications.' 
"This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public. 

INFORMATIONAL NOTIFICATION - SAFETY RELIEF VALVE POTENTIALLY INOPERABLE
"On February 3, 2013 at 1245 EST, with the reactor at 100% core thermal power (CTP) safety relief valve, RV-203-3B was declared inoperable as required by station procedural direction due to an observed reduction in first stage pilot valve temperature of greater than 35 degrees F from baseline temperatures. At 1300 EST, reactor power was lowered to approximately 80% CTP at which time the relief valve parameters returned or trended to normal steady state values. Consistent with a reactor power reduction, reactor pressure also lowered from 1035 psig to 1000 psig. This action was taken consistent with industry operating experience related to three stage target rock relief first stage pilot valve leakage.

"Currently, station engineering is evaluating the operability of RV-203-3B. Additionally, the current valve performance is being closely monitored by the main control room operating crew.

"Station Technical Specification 3.6.D.1 requires that the safety modes of all relief valves (four for [Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station] PNPS) shall be operable during reactor power operating conditions and prior to reactor startup from a Cold Shutdown, or whenever reactor coolant pressure is greater that 104 psig and temperature is greater than 340 degrees F. If this specification is not met, Technical Specification 3.6.D.2 requires that an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor coolant pressure shall be below 104 psig within 24 hours.

"This is an informational notification at this time. PNPS has not initiated an orderly shutdown as of this notification; rather reactor power was lowered to reseat the safety relief pilot valve and there is a high degree of confidence that the high standard of operability will be restored for RV-203-3B and the associated Technical Specification will be exited. If RV-203-3B is not restored to an operable status, a formal and required notification will be completed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), 'Initiation of any plant shutdown required by the Technical Specifications.'

"This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public.























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