1) Same service air pressure at power and during shutdown ops?
2) Obviously there is a huge change in temperature in the area at power and shutdown?
3) Usually the dried lubricant excuse, right, they have to come up with some plausible reason for the how they corrected the problem The dried lubricant is just a generic canned made up excuse so they wouldn't have to totally rip open the valve and maybe find a generic issue forcing a shutdown.
4) This is a really expensive nuclear safety valve and it is an extremely mature design, why would there even be bum lubricant in there.
5) It is implausible it would be the wrong lubricant knowing it is so important of a valve
6) If it was bum lubricant, why isn't there a slew of sticking SDV valves throughout the industry. Cause it would have caused an information notice, everyone would have changed the type of lubricant.
And you can totally count on the daily event report and the first rendition of a licensed event report to be comic books...accepted by the NRC and totally fictitious.
Pilgrim scram valve fails again
Is this a sign of an aging plant past its prime?
PLYMOUTH —
The second “event” at Pilgrim in as many weeks – the failure of a “scram discharge valve” – is also the second time this particular valve has failed in the last two months.
The scram discharge volume valve – referred to in the event releases as CV-302-22B – failed Feb. 18, a week after the blizzard knocked out power to the plant. (In another case of twos, Pilgrim also lost power twice during the strom.). The valve failed again last Friday, March 1.
According to the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), the CV-302-22B is one of the valves on the drain line from the scram discharge volume, a metal tank that is supposed to contain all of the water vented during a scram (a sudden, rapid, shut down of the reactor).
“When a scram signal occurs,” the UCS reported, “this valve automatically closes, or is designed to do so. Whether it does so is another matter.”
For critics of the plant, including EcoLaw.org Founder Meg Sheehan, this is a sure sign that the plant is past its prime.
“Pilgrim is old and worn out,” Sheehan wrote on her blog this week. “It presents an unacceptable risk to our region, and this is just one more example of that.”
A 1975 report on reactor safety, widely known as the Rassmussen Report, argues against that conclusion.
That report specifically stated that the valves in question have only a “one in a million” chance of interfering with a reactor shut down.
But the UCS said the Brown’s Ferry Nuclear Power Plant in Alabama must have hit the lottery, because in 1980 a plugged scram discharge valve prevented plant operators from successfully removing all of its control rods, three times, before the reactor staff was able to complete a planned shut down of their reactor.
That event at Brown’s Ferry did not occur during an emergency, however, and the 15 minutes it took to withdraw all of the reactor’s control rods did not, therefore, result in a disaster.
This week’s failure of Pilgrim’s scram valve, the official event notice released by Pilgrim concluded, “has no impact on the health and safety of the public.”
Plant staff had actually been monitoring the valve since it first failed in mid-February.
“A similar event report was generated for the same valve on Feb. 18, 2013,” the event-notification report states. “Compensatory measures applicable to the original event report included a revised lubrication application and additional surveillance testing.”
In other words, Pilgrim has been testing this valve since it first failed.
According to the NRC, the valve was lubricated, retested and restored to operability soon after the issue was discovered.
But tests conducted March 1, Pilgrim stated, “did not meet opening stroke time operability requirements for the valve.”
According to the NRC, during the power outages that shut down the plant twice during the February blizzard, the valve worked properly to support the scram.
“That is, it closed within the timeframe necessary to support the scram,” NRC spokesman Neil Sheehan told the Old Colony.
“The problem resulting in the report on Feb. 18 was discovered,” Neil added, “during routine surveillance testing conducted on these valves in the ‘open’ direction and was unrelated to any of the shutdowns.”
The NRC spokesman acknowledged that this valve plays an important role in supporting the scram function.
“That said, nuclear power plants have numerous systems and components that are important to safety,” Neil said. “The ‘defense-in-depth’ approach for nuclear power plants is based on multiple layers of safety through redundant systems and equipment.”
Neil wouldn’t comment directly on the assertion that the problems with this valve were related to the plants overall age.
“The company (Entergy) is continuing to evaluate the exact cause of the slowness of the valve to operate in the open direction,” Neil concluded. “Our inspectors will review the results of that review.”
July 29, 2005 Scram Discharge Volume Valve License Amendment Request.
So this is the secret deregulation going on that over rides initial plant design. If this happened prior to July 2005 they would be required to shutdown in 12 hours...today they got 7 days. They have had an unrecognized defect in the valve for two weeks now...might be three weeks at the end.
In a real incident it would have to operate under reactor pressure....for this test its only at atmospheric.
Old requirementJuly 29, 2005 Scram Discharge Volume Valve License Amendment Request.
"...If one or more SDV vent and drain lines have a single valve that is inoperable, the existing required action (Action A) is for the plant to be in hot shutdown within 12 hours.
New
With one SDV vent or drain valve inoperable in one or more lines, the isolation function would be maintained since the redundant valve in the affected line would perform its safety function of isolating the SDV. The current ACTION statement requires the plant to be in hot shutdown within 12 hours if any SDV vent or drain valve is found or made inoperable. The proposed changes are to allow for the isolation of the affected line and continue operation. For a single inoperable valve, the revised Required Action A requires the affected line to be isolated within 7 days (or restore the inoperable valve), or the plant is required to proceed to MODE 3 in the next 12 hours. The 7-day completion time (CT) is acceptable because of the low probability of the concurrent events of a scram within the 7 days of the CT and a failure of the redundant
valves. Alternately, if the inoperable valve was initially closed, there would be ample time and warning available to drain the SDV before an automatic scram would occur due to SDV high level. The proposed addition of Required Action B to address both valves being inoperable in a vent or drain valve is likewise acceptable in that isolation of the affected line provides the safety function and the shorter completion time (8 hours versus 7 days) reflects the increased importance of addressing the problem when multiple valves are inoperable..."
So this is the secret deregulation going on that overrides initial plant design. If this happened prior to July 2005 they would be required to shutdown in 12 hours...today they got 7 days. They have had an unrecognized defect in the valve for three weeks now...might be three weeks in the end.
In a real incident it would have to operate under reactor pressure....for this test its only at atmospheric.
Old requirement
...If one or more SDV vent and drain lines have a single valve that is inoperable, the existing required action (Action A) is for the plant to be in hot shutdown within 12 hours.
New
With one SDV vent or drain valve inoperable in one or more lines, the isolation function would be maintained since the redundant valve in the affected line would perform its safety function of isolating the SDV. The current ACTION statement requires the plant to be in hot shutdown within 12 hours if any SDV vent or drain valve is found or made inoperable. The proposed changes are to allow for the isolation of the affected line and continue operation. For a single inoperable valve, the revised Required Action A requires the affected line to be isolated within 7 days (or restore the inoperable valve), or the plant is required to proceed to MODE 3 in the next 12 hours. The 7-day completion time (CT) is acceptable because of the low probability of the concurrent events of a scram within the 7 days of the CT and a failure of the redundant
valves. Alternately, if the inoperable valve was initially closed, there would be ample time and warning available to drain the SDV before an automatic scram would occur due to SDV high level. The proposed addition of Required Action B to address both valves being inoperable in a vent or drain valve is likewise acceptable in that isolation of the affected line provides the safety function and the shorter completion time (8 hours versus 7 days) reflects the increased importance of addressing the problem when multiple valves are inoperable.
Came out this morning...March 4...
Typical delaying tactic..two weeks...trying to buy time before they call it inop. Probably to order parts. It's been inop already for two weeks, but they can play the "we are analyzing it game" before they call it.
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48801 |
| Facility: PILGRIM Region: 1 State: MA Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-3 NRC Notified By: KENNETH GRACIA HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL |
Notification Date: 03/01/2013 Notification Time: 17:37 [ET] Event Date: 03/01/2013 Event Time: 10:45 [EST] Last Update Date: 03/01/2013 |
| Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT |
Person (Organization): ART BURRITT (R1DO) |
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
| 1 | N | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation |
Event Text
| 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION OF INOPERABLE SCRAM DISCHARGE
VOLUME VALVE BASED ON NRC BULLETIN 80-14 "Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Valve Declared Inoperable. "On March 1, 2013 at 1045 hours, with the reactor at 94% core thermal power (CTP), a scram discharge volume valve, CV-302-22B was declared inoperable as required by station procedural direction due to an observed degradation in opening stroke timing during performance of a compensatory surveillance test of the Scram Discharge Instrument Volume Vent and Drain Valve. This report is provided consistent with NRC IE Bulletin 80-14. "Currently, station engineering is evaluating the valve stroke time trend data of CV-302-22B and plans to address this issue will be developed as part of the Corrective Action Program (CAP). Pilgrim Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.G applies due to the inoperability of CV-302-22B. "This notification is being made in accordance with the NRC IE Bulletin 80-14, 'Degradation of BWR Scram Discharge Volume Capability,' Part A.3., which states, 'By procedures, require that the SDV vent and drain valve be normally operable, open and periodically tested. If these valves are not operable or are closed for more than 1 hour in any 24 hour period during operation, the reason shall be logged and the NRC notified within 24 hours (Prompt Notification).' "A similar event report was generated for the same valve on February 18, 2013. Compensatory measures applicable to the original event report included a revised lubrication application and additional surveillance testing. Although surveillance tests subsequent to the original February 18, 2013 tested demonstrated valve operability, the initial March 1, 2013 test did not meet opening stroke time operability requirements for the valve. Subsequent stroke time testing has met the opening stroke time operability requirements for the valve. "This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public. "The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed." See similar event EN #48766. |
Unit
|
SCRAM Code
|
RX CRIT
|
Initial PWR
|
Initial RX Mode
|
Current PWR
|
Current RX Mode
|
2
|
N
|
N
|
0
|
Refueling
|
0
|
Refueling
|
Event Text
| REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM SCRAM SIGNAL DUE TO SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME HIGH LEVEL "On 2/16/13, at 0310 EST, with the reactor shutdown for a refueling outage, a full RPS actuation was received on Hatch Unit 2 due to Scram Discharge Volume High level. The Operations crew placed the Unit 2 mode switch to the Start-up/Hot Standby position per approved procedure for the purpose of performing the U2 Refueling Interlock functional test. The cause of the Scram was due to a Scram Discharge Volume high level caused by a malfunctioning SDV drain valve. Hatch Condition Report 591279 has been generated to document the event." The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. |
| Facility: PILGRIM Region: 1 State: MA Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-3 NRC Notified By: MIKE HETTWER HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN |
Notification Date: 02/18/2013 Notification Time: 16:30 [ET] Event Date: 02/18/2013 Event Time: 05:15 [EST] Last Update Date: 02/18/2013 |
| Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT |
Person (Organization): ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO) |
Unit
|
SCRAM Code
|
RX CRIT
|
Initial PWR
|
Initial RX Mode
|
Current PWR
|
Current RX Mode
|
1
|
N
|
Y
|
100
|
Power Operation
|
100
|
Power Operation
|
Event Text
| 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION OF INOPERABLE SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME VALVE BASED ON NRC BULLETIN 80-14 "On February 18, 2013 at 0515 hours, with the reactor at 100% core thermal power, a scram discharge volume valve, CV-302-22B was declared inoperable as required by station procedural direction due to an observed degradation in opening stroke time during performance of quarterly surveillance testing of the Scram Discharge Instrument Volume Vent and Drain Valves. This action was taken consistent with NRC IE Bulletin 80-14. "Currently, station engineering is evaluating the valve stroke time trend data of CV-302-22B and a plan to address this issue will be developed as part of the Corrective Action Program. Pilgrim Technical Specification 3.3.G applies due to the inoperability of CV-302-22B. "This notification is being made in accordance with NRC IE Bulletin 80-14, 'Degradation of BWR Scram Discharge Volume Capability,' Part A.3, which states, 'By procedures, require that the SDV [scram discharge volume] vent and drain valves be normally operable, open and periodically tested. If these valves are not operable or are closed for more than 1 hour in any 24 hour period during operation, the reason shall be logged and the NRC notified within 24 hours (Prompt Notification). "This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public. "The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed." The licensee will inform the State. |
Hmm, I hope these aren't new valves?
You think this is a coincidence?
They are air operated valves I think?
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