Wednesday, June 20, 2018

South Texas Project Nuclear Plant: Example Of the Amazing Secrecy In The Industry

Began construction in about 1975. Why don't we know what is wrong with the piping insulation? My bet it is asbestos. Are they saying in the drywell or primary containment nationwide, the pipes are still insulated with a asbestos? Why didn't they admit it today.

I worked on shift at Vermont Yankee with this guy Don. I will never forget him. He had two daughters, man were they lookers. We talked about his teenage daughter problems for a decade. They were really good girls. But they had there issues with boys. Don would say boy after boy dismayingly, the guys were absolutely slavish to his girls. Right, we all are. He kept saying these young guys were poor examples of manhood. Everyone one of them.

I was there for his bitching surrounding a new cough. It went on to repeated bouts of pneumonia. The local swamp doctors had no idea what was going on. He had Asbestosis. He knew it was losing battle, as we all did. He got one lung cut out. I visited him in his last week of life. He told me it is like drowning for years. It was a beyond horrific death. He broke his new nuclear industry working teeth in at a secret Department of Defense nuclear plant in Alaska. Then worked many years at Oyster Creek until escaping to Vermont Yankee. He never graduated from High School. He was a aux operator for life. We had stainless steel mirror insulation first in Vermont Yankee's drywell.         

Vermont Yankee was loaded with Asbestos. They finally took it out. It is a shadow over everyone's life.               

STP awarded for Nuclear Industry Innovation

Wadsworth - Employees from South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) received a Top Innovative Practice (TIP) award from the Nuclear Energy Institute for solving an industry-wide concern that would have required substantial insulation removal from piping and associated radiation exposure risk. 

The award was presented during this year’s Nuclear Energy Assembly, hosted by the Nuclear Energy Institute in Atlanta, Ga. The Nuclear Energy Institute is the nuclear energy industry’s policy organization.

This solution, which was accepted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, provided a solution that preserved a high level of nuclear safety, meant a significant savings of radiation exposure to employees who would have been required to remove the piping insulation, and resulted in a cost savings of approximately $43 million.

The innovation was awarded as a risk-informed resolution of an industry-wide General Safety Issue-191 (GSI-191).

“I am proud of the persistence and effort of the STP team over many years,” said Dave Rencurrel, senior vice president, Operations. “We came up with an innovative, risk-informed solution that guards safety and benefits our industry.”

“Innovations like the ones celebrated today help ensure nuclear power plants continue to run safely and stay competitive in today’s marketplace,” Sue Perkins-Grew, senior director of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, said at the TIP awards ceremony.

The TIP awards celebrate industry leaders for new practices, enhanced processes and improved technology. To be considered for an award, the process or practice must be implemented and address one or more of the following criteria: innovations, safety, cost-savings impact, productivity/efficiency, transferability, communications, or vision and leadership.

STPNOC was one of 12 awardees recognized at the awards luncheon in Atlanta. The award winning team includes Steve Blossom, Mike Murray, Ernie Kee, Wayne Harrison, Drew Richards, Wes Schulz, Rob Engen, Kristin Kaspar and Fatma Yilmaz.

We Are In A Profound Economic Boom, Is That Good For New Build Vogtle?

Think About it. Is the economic boom going to worsen? That sucking sound, it is stealing labor from Vogtle. There must be severe labor shortages all around this plant. The gigantic Atlanta area dominates this state. This is going to continue on for years...
ENG: Plant Vogtle Needs Hundreds More Craft Workers to Meet Schedule

State construction monitors are skeptical that builders of the Plant Vogtle nuclear expansion can overcome a daunting labor shortage and meet Georgia Power’s accelerated project schedule. In testimony submitted June 6 to the Georgia Public Service Commission, the monitors stated that general contractor Bechtel will need a “significant increase in production” to meet the owner’s accelerated schedule that anticipates completion of Units 3 and 4 by April 2021 and April 2022, respectively. Noting that “the number of craft on site will need to be increased significantly” to meet the accelerated schedule, the monitors estimated Bechtel would need to hire roughly 400 more electricians and 700 more pipefitters to meet production goals.

Fitz's Junk 2 and 3 stage SRVs: 3 Stage Calibration Issues Euphemism For Mechanical Production Defects

There is more of a story on the 3 stage defects. These are a new design. These valves originally came with the plant. They had numerous problems with these and got rid of them. They replaced them with the 2 stage. The 2 stage leaked and failed testing most of the time, this is the reason why they went back to the 3 stage. Remember the Pilgrim plant went to the 3 stage in 2011 leading to eventual grand failure of the valves and the plant closure.


Remember there are so called calibration problems in other "new" 3 stage plants. I don't think they can control the manufacturing characteristics of the components and the 3 stage are just too complex for the duty of the valves. I anticipate as theses valves aged into a plant, maybe two or three cycles...they will magically become too erratic to keep in the plant. Then they will got back to the 2 stage in an expedited manner just like Pilgrim. 

The 3 stage is prone to opening according to the NRC    

I going hunting for calibrated issues in other new 3 stage SRVs!!!

ABSTRACT (Limit to 7400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) The As-Found test results for the eleven Safety/Relief Valve (S/RV) pilot assemblies removed and replaced during the 2017 Refueling Outage at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) identified ten (10) S/RV pilot assemblies that lifted outside of the allowable tolerance required by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement Nine (9) two-stage S/RV’s were found out of tolerance high, and one three-stage was found out of tolerance low. The ten S/RV pilot assemblies are assumed to have been inoperable at some point in the operating cycle that preceded the 2017 Refueling Outage resulting in a condition reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
The S/RV design features an electric actuation capability that provides a diversified means of opening the S/RV’s despite the out of tolerance condition. However, the electric lift function is considered a backup to the mechanical S/RV’s and is not credited in the accident analysis. Therefore, the TS inoperability of the ten (10) S/RV’s also resulted in a condition reportable pursuant to 10 CFR5O.73(a)(2)(v)(D).
The cause of the two-stage failures has been identified as corrosion bonding; the cause of the three-stage failure is attributed to calibration and subsequent setpoint drift. The safety consequences associated with this event are considered low due to the electric actuation capability.

Background The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requires the reactor pressure vessel be protected from overpressure during upset conditions by self-actuated safety valves. As part of the nuclear pressure relief system, the size and number of SIRVs are selected such that peak pressure in the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) will not exceed the ASME Code limits.
The James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) used ten (10) two-stage and one (1) three-stage Target Rock Safety/Relief Valves (S/RV) [EIIS Identifier: SB] for emergency pressure relief during operating Cycle 22. These valves are located on the main steam lines between the reactor vessel, and the first isolation valve within the drywell. Each S/RV discharges steam through a discharge line to a point below the minimum water level in the suppression pool.
The S/RVs can actuate by either of two modes: the safety mode or the relief mode. In safety mode (or spring mode of operation), the spring-loaded pilot valve opens when steam pressure at the valve inlet overcomes the spring force holding the pilot valve closed. Opening the pilot valve allows a pressure differential to develop across the main valve piston and opens the main valve. This satisfies the code requirement.
Each S/RV can be opened manually in the relief mode from the control room by its associated two-position switch. If one of these switches is placed in the open position the logic output will energize the associated S/RV solenoid control valve directing the pneumatic supply to open the valve. Seven of the installed S/RV solenoid control valves can also be energized by the relay logic associated with the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS).
During each refueling outage all eleven of the pilot assemblies are removed and replaced with vendor tested and certified components. The pilots that are removed are sent to a vendor facility for testing, refurbishment, and certification. The test results for pilot assemblies removed in 2017, during Refueling Outage 22, identified ten (10) S/RV pilot assemblies that were out of allowable tolerance. Nine (9) of the pilots (all two-stage) lifted at greater than the allowable setpoint range, and one (three-stage) lifted at less than the allowable setpoint range.
In order to address the concerns with corrosion bonding, JAF will commence replacement of two-stage with three-stage Target Rock S/RVs in the next Refueling Outage (RO). Industry experience has shown that the three stage S/RVs are less susceptible to corrosion bonding. The design of the three-stage S/RVs produces a greater mechanical force on opening, resulting in a greater likelihood of overcoming any potential effects of corrosion bonding that might occur.
Event Description As-Found testing was performed on all eleven main S/RV pilot assemblies removed in 2017, during R022. The testing was conducted by NWS Technologies. The TS setpoint for each S/RV is 1145 +1- 34.3. During the initial lift test, ten of the eleven pilot assemblies failed to open within the allowable range (1110.7 to 1179.3). Nine of the ten two-stage and the three-stage S/RV pilot failed high and low outside the allowable range, respectively. As-Found failed test results are tabulated below.
NRC FORM 366A (06-201 6) Page 2 of 4
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03131/2020 (04-2017) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported ,“ “., LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Sendcomments ‘‘‘ CONTINUATION SHEET regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (1-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to /, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means
. . .
used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the (See NUREG-1 022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the informahon collechon. 022Ir3I)
1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LER NUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant 05000 — 333 NUMBER NO. 2017 —004 —01
Table 1 — As-Found Test Results
In-service Pilot Serial First Test Acceptance Range Location Number (psig) (1110.7— 1179.3 psig)
O2RV-71A 1088 1184 Unsat—High
O2RV-71B 1080 1254 Unsat—High 02RV71C(a) 51 1103 Unsat—Low
O2RV-71E 1235 1245 Unsat—High
O2RV-71F 1195 1183 Unsat—High
O2RV-71G 1194 1202 Unsat—High
O2RV-71H 1111 1228 Unsat—High
O2RV-71J 1192 1242 Unsat—High
O2RV-71K 1193 1239 Unsat—High
O2RV-71L 1056 1214 Unsat-High (a)Three.Stage
Cause JAF has extensive internal Operating Experience with the S/RVs failing higher than the allowable setpoint. Causal evaluations identified corrosion bonding as the cause for the upward setpoint drift on the two-stage S/RVs. The As-Found test results shown above in conjunction with the successful second lift of all two-stage valves support this conclusion. Corrosion bonding is a crevice corrosion phenomenon that occurs between highly polished metals in a wetted solution in close proximity to each other. This close proximity (usually a gap of between 0.1 and 100 iJm) creates a crevice-like condition between the two wetted surfaces setting up the conditions for crevice corrosion to occur. An oxygen rich environment is created by the accumulation of oxygen in the area of the pilot disc due to the breakdown of water into hydrogen and oxygen. Susceptible material in the tight geometry with exposure to oxygen and high temperatures are the conditions which cause corrosion bonding in JAF S/RVs. There is extensive industry experience with corrosion bonding in the Target Rock two-stage S/RVs pilot assemblies. 
As stated above, the three-stage S/RV pilot valve failed the As-Found testing low. Disassembly and testing was performed by NWS Technologies to determine cause. NWS concluded that the three-stage S/RV pilot was originally calibrated within the lower half of the acceptance range in the OEM specification. Calibration within the lower half of the acceptance range resulted in a greater setpoint drift, which ultimately resulted in the S/RV pilot being outside the allowable range.

“i., LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Sendcomments ‘*, CONTINUATION SHEET regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, ** NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means
. .
used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the (See NUREG-1 022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LER NUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant 05000 — 333 NUMBER NO. 2017 —004 —01
• Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 1: LER-16-004 “Safety Relief Valves As Found Not Meeting Tech Spec Surveillance Criteria,” May 26, 2016 • Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2: LER-08-004 “Safety Relief Valves Allowable Exceeded Due to Setpoint Drift,” August 12, 2008
Corrective Actions Future Corrective Actions • Commence replacement of S/RVs with redesigned three-stage (R023) Previous Corrective Actions • Installed Stellite 21 discs in all eleven S/RV pilot assemblies during refurbishment at the vendor facility • Installed the S/RV Electric Lift System recommended by the Boiling Water Reactor Owner’s Group • Installed enhanced insulation on the S/RVs
Safety Significance Nuclear Safety Actual Consequences There were no actual consequences to the general safety of the public, nuclear safety, industrial safety, or radiological safety associated with this event.
Potential Consequences The potential consequences of this event are associated with the over-pressurization of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary. The S/RVs provide overpressure protection for the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary as required by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Events similar to the one reported herein may be significant if design limits are challenged. The potential consequences of this event are considered low based on the operation and availability of the Electric Lift System.
Radiological Safety There was no radiological safety impact associated with this event.
Industrial Safety There was no industrial safety impact associated with this event.
References • Issue Report No. 04077124, R22 SRV As-Found Testing Failures • Issue Report No. 04082823, R22 3-Stage SRV As-Found Testing Failure • JAF Technical Specifications

The Magnitude of the Financial Troubles in the Nuclear Industry

Nuclear power shutdowns could cut energy prices, increase air pollution: Penn State, TMI weigh in  
Updated 5:55 AM; Posted 5:55 AM 

While a study, soon to be published by a Penn State researcher, shows nuclear power shutdowns will not spike power prices, Three Mile Island officials counter that is not the case, and the increased cost would come with more air pollution. (File. )

By Steve Marroni

As the shutdown of Three Mile Island seems imminent, researchers at Penn State released a study indicating that, despite the economic woes this could mean for some in the community, power prices will remain steady.

And that is because natural gas power plants will be able to fill the void left behind by nuclear power at a lower cost, according to Seth Blumsack, associate professor of energy policy and economics at Penn State.

Both Three Mile Island and the Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station near Pittsburgh have cited financial troubles due to low electricity prices, and in his study, to be published in an upcoming issue of The Electricity Journal, Blumsack says those rock-bottom power prices are expected to continue for years to come.

But Three Mile Island Vice President of Government Affairs David Fein said the closure of the plants would result in a significant economic impact - meaning the loss of 1,700 full time jobs at the plants and thousands of related jobs, like workers at restaurants and shops serving plant employees and their families.

And there is one other thing.

"If you care about the air we breathe, it neglects the harmful air emissions that come from fossil-fuel plants," Fein said about the Penn State findings. "If we lose the Beaver Valley and TMI plants, we're talking about putting 50 percent more cars on the roads. That's how much more carbon dioxide will be in the air."

Blumsack acknowledges his study focuses solely on energy prices and does not take into account environmental factors or fuel-security, but he argues the economics strongly support natural gas. 

According to his research, if TMI and Beaver Valley come offline and are not replaced, wholesale energy prices would rise 4 to 10 percent each year over a three-year period. When that lost nuclear capacity is replaced by natural gas, however, those same prices drop between 9 and 24 percent.

He also poses a triple-whammy against nuclear power plants, indicating:
Energy use has plateaued,
Efficient natural gas power plants operating at nowhere near peak production have come online,
And natural gas prices are projected to remain low.

"There's just so much extra generation capacity in this region," Blumsack said. "These nuclear power plants are big, but even if you were to lose these big power plants there's so much other generation capacity that can produce electricity at costs competitive with the nuclear plants that the market outcomes aren't going to change and the reliability of the grid won't be compromised."

In May, TMI failed for the fourth year to sell its power in the annual PJM energy capacity auction.

The plant lost $300 million over the last eight years, officials from the owning company, Exelon Corp., said last year. TMI has not been profitable for six years as a result of persistently low wholesale energy prices and market rules that treat polluting plants the same as emissions-free sources of power, Exelon says.

The plant is scheduled to close on September 30, 2019, barring any changes at the government level to compensate nuclear power for its low-carbon pollution emissions.

And that's one of Three Mile Island's arguments. As it stands now, nuclear power plants are not permitted to participate in clean energy programs, though they provide 93 percent of the clean energy out there, Fein said.

The other options are less reliable or harmful to the environment, too, he added.

"It's intermittent with wind or solar and its dirtier fuel if you're going to rely on gas or coal," Fein said. "You'll see an increase in carbon emissions."

Fein added retiring the plants "would really erase the clean-energy gains we've made throughout the whole PJM region over the last 25 years."

And Fein said the costs calculated in the Penn State study come to a different sum than another study from the Brattle Group economic consultants, showing the retirement of these plants would actually cost Pennsylvania $285 million annually in higher electric bills.

But Blumsack cited the World Bank Natural Gas Price Forecast indicating there would have to be a 300 percent increase in natural gas prices in the Appalachian trading hubs for nuclear power to again be competitive.

"The competition is really fierce and it's essentially being driven by really low natural gas prices," Blumsack said.

While the two plants also employ about 1,700 people, Blumsack says the public cost to retain these facilities would be about $200,000 for each job preserved.

Blumsack's research is part of a larger effort among a team at Penn State's Initiative for Sustainable Electric Power Systems that looks at issues confronting conventional and renewable energy markets as well as how rapidly moving shifts in the electricity market will impact consumers and businesses.

Don't You Wish ANO Was Pilgrim?

Is there really a big difference between a failing plant, but not a cat 4 plant, and a cat 4 plant? They certainly retrained the organization at ANO and Pilgrim, but they never mechanically or electronically brought the plant back to a acceptable condition. It is all a NRC Trump scam.     
NRC to Commissioners: Pilgrim Making Progress But Concerns Remain
WASHINGTON – The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s five-member commission was provided an update yesterday in Washington on the underperforming Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.
NRC staff and officials from Entergy, the plant’s owner, discussed the actions taken over the last year to improve safety at the plant, which was placed under the highest level of oversight in 2015.
The station was placed in Column 4 of the NRC’s action matrix, which is one step away from a federally mandated shutdown, in the wake of a series of safety violations and unplanned shutdowns of the reactor.
Unplanned scrams led to the Column 4 designation.
The federal agency has been conducting additional inspections at the station, which is expected to shut down by the end of May 2019, ever since.
NRC Regional Administrator for Region 1 David Lew said Pilgrim has made notable progress in its recovery in 2017 and early 2018.
“Our inspectors have observed continued emphasis and reinforcement to the Entergy staff by senior site leadership on standards, expectations and conservative operational decision making,” Lew said.
Lew provided several examples of conservative decision making including remaining at 70 percent power during an additional tidal cycle through Tropical Storm Jose last year to ensure that tide and wind effects would not challenge temperature limits in the intake while the plant was at full power.
Entergy also delayed the startup of Pilgrim and took precautions in anticipation of the effects of Winter Storm Skyler earlier this year.
“Also in response to a trip of the startup transformer Entergy could not conduct its significant testing and inspections which led to the identification of an internal fault and the replacement of this risk significant transformer,” Lew said.
Pilgrim did not experience any scrams in 2017, which is significant as scrams led to the plant being placed under Column 4 and increased oversight.
There was a scram in January of 2018.
“But plant equipment and licensed operator response were appropriate and the loss of the one offsite power supply that led operators to manually scram the reactor was due to equipment not owned by Entergy and located miles away from the plant,” Lew said.
Lew says concerns remain for the plant in areas of work control, human performance and equipment reliability.
The plant will remain in Column 4 until Entergy proves they have addressed all of the issues outlined in the NRC’s Confirmatory Action Letter.
The plant’s first quarterly report of 2018 indicated that Pilgrim had addressed 25 percent of 156 areas of improvement.
Pilgrim has had two straight quarterly inspection reports without any documented violations.
The NRC recently finished a third quarterly inspection at the plant and will soon be issuing a report.
“There remains a substantial amount of NRC inspection to be completed before we can determine the sustainability of performance improvement at Pilgrim,” Lew said.
Entergy Chief Nuclear Officer Chris Bakken says Pilgrim is committed to safely operating the plant until its June 2019 shutdown and through the decommissioning process.
“At Entergy our top priority continues to be operating our facilities in a safe, conservative and deliberate manner,” Bakken said. “In addition to safety our other values are teamwork, always learning, integrity and respect.”
Bakken said the company’s goal is to return Pilgrim to Column 1 in the spring of 2019, prior to shut down.
Pilgrim Site Vice President Brian Sullivan echoed the statements from Bakken and said an ongoing focus will be made over the next year to continue improvement and sustainability.

Monday, June 18, 2018

ANO: What A Garbage Plant Looks Like Within Weeks Of Being Cleared With The Worst Plant In The USA

June 21

65% looking more like a normal startup.

Confused ANO with Grand Gulf. ANO didn't have a 50 day outage. Sorry.

June 20


Update June 19

ANO stated up and at 2% today.

They are beating the hell out of their plants. ANO is already in a startup. At one point is the NRC going to say says shutdown and carefully think about your erratic operations.  

Welcome to the trump's NRC. Well, welcome to the utilities' NRC? 

***Makes A Mockery Out The NRC's ROP. 

Obviously the plant was never ready for startup after their prolonged outage, and worst, the NRC didn't know about it. This has just got to be a world record. The fastest a plant has ever been cleared of the worst record in the nation and they are now on the road to get a special inspection over erratic power operation.  

May 16 Startup from 50 day outage(very long outage)

May 17 Reactor trip

May 22 Reactor startup

June 4 2018: Arkansas Nuclear One and its over 900 employees got some great news Thursday when the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) hosted an afternoon meeting to go over the plant’s 2017 assessment.

Kriss Kennedy, NRC regional administrator for Region IV, told the audience that after more than three years of hard work by staff and employees, ANO improved its performance and addressed several performance issues that got them into an increased regulatory oversight.
June 13 Reactor Trip

June 15 Reactor startup 

June 17 reactor trip with serious complications 

Troubled ANO 1: Stuck At 15% For Two Days And Their Recent Scram

Sounds like really poor training and not enough simulator time. 
Power Reactor Event Number: 53459
Region: 4     State: AR
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
Notification Date: 06/16/2018
Notification Time: 15:56 [ET]
Event Date: 06/16/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):

Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 2 Startup 0 Hot Standby

Event Text


"At 1121 CDT on June 16, 2018, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1) performed a manual reactor trip due to a Turbine Bypass valve failing open on reactor startup. At the time, ANO-1 was in Mode 2 at approximately 2 percent power.

"The failed Turbine Bypass valve resulted in an overcooling event and the Overcooling Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) was entered.
Main Steam Line Isolation (MSLI) automatic actuation occurred on 2 of the 4 channels of Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control during the overcooling event in the 'B' Steam Generator. The remaining channels of MSLI were manually actuated by the control room staff from the control room. Overcooling was terminated after the closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) and reactor coolant parameters were stabilized as directed by the Overcooling EOP. Additionally, Gland Sealing Steam was lost to the main turbine due to the closure of the 'B' Steam Generator MSIV and Loss of Condenser Vacuum Abnormal Operating Procedure was entered.

"This is a 4-hour non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) notification due to a Reactor Protection System actuation (scram) and an 8-hour non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) notification for safety system actuation."

All control rods fully inserted into the core during the trip. Heat removal is via the Atmospheric Dump Control valves to atmosphere.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee also notified the State of Arkansas.