New Al Qaeda Attack In USA: Fast Attack Nuclear Submarine USS Miami SSN 755 in Maine

USS Iowa turret explosion

After most of the water was pumped out, the corpses in the turret were removed without noting or photographing their locations.

Morse directed a cleanup crew, supervised by Lieutenant Commander Bob Holman, to make Turret Two "look as normal as possible". Over the next day, the crew swept, cleaned, and painted the inside of the turret. Loose or damaged equipment was tossed into the ocean. No attempt was made to record the locations or conditions of damaged equipment in the turret.

"No one was preserving the evidence," said Brian R. Scanio, a fireman present at the scene. A team of Naval Investigative Service (NIS) investigators (the predecessor of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service or NCIS) stationed nearby on the aircraft carrier Coral Sea was told that their services in investigating Iowa's mishap were not needed.

"They got to paying off the on scene ship yard workers, throwing a military high security fence around this, warning the on scene sailors you will go to jail if you squeal. Rumors at the bars in Portsmouth say al Qaeda destroyed a United States fast attack nuclear submarine. That is the chatter on the internet.

How about a new thrust with the Yemen al Qaeda...a Somali undocumented or falsified shipyard underwear incendiary bomber bilge painter or trash can emptier?"

It could be a disgruntled shipyard worker or sailor who sabotage the ship. nay history of suspicious fires in the shipyard?

How about a strategy of the shipyard itself with approaching Navy cutbacks...expand the scope of work on this sub through sabotage? 

The Navy is declaring the cover up has begun today within days of putting out the fire.

..."Snowe said McCoy told her the heat damage was such that "they may not even be able to determine the cause of the fire."

..."She said there's a "critical shortage" of submarines in service, a fact McCoy reiterated in discussions with her."

..."Snowe says it is believed to be the most serious fire ever at the shipyard, and possibly the worst on a Navy nuclear sub."

So why isn't there a press conference with the sailors and people in the sub when the fire started? Tell us what they seen...how the fire started and developed. Well, you know everyone got to get their story straight and this is terrorism related anyways?

You get it, light smoke, then the sub exploded in flames coming out the hatch.

Submarine Created Hellish Scene

 Whitehouse said when he first arrived at the Miami, there was some light smoke coming out of the submarine and the ship's crew had been dealing with the fire. He said his firefighters located the fire in the front of the sub and on the middle deck of the submarine's three decks, but it quickly spread to the upper deck. At one point, flames were shooting out of the forward hatch.

It's a whole different beast,” Spinney said, adding despite the metal components, submarines have a lot of flammable material — like insulation and other items — which fueled the fire.

Mayor Eric Spear met Tuesday with Capt. Bryant Fuller, commander of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, to discuss the submarine fire of May 23. Markel said he was told smoke from the sub was toxic.

And you know, with our extremely flammable inside hull sprayed on thermal and sound deadening foam and electrical cabling... the cornucopia of the extremely flammable environment we created for our heroic submariners through the profits oriented and funding starvation with building out our fleet of nuclear submarines. Our fleet operations of nuclear submarines would be decimated with prolong emergency related rework costing billions of dollars over the fire.

The Portsmouth Navel Shipyard has been implicated in two terrible accidents. The destruction of the fast attack submarine USS Thresher and now the USS Miami. Gets you to wondering what the reputation of this shipyard is to the Navy, what the sailors think of the quality of the Portsmouth shipyard ships.

The contract to build Thresher was awarded to Portsmouth Naval Shipyard on 15 January 1958, and her keel was laid on 28 May 1958.

And you know what, other ships beside submarines might be involved...

I don't believe a word of the Navy with their guess on their recent GW fire. You notice the GW was constructed around the same time as the USS Miami. They are both east coast ship builders but different corporations. I believe a motor or cable overheated and caught fire on the GW. Maybe a spontaneous combustion of a barrel of old rags. The general combustibility of the ship materials overwhelming the crew of the ship much like the USS Miami. The illegal cans of oil and butts was just was a product of a fire started somewhere else and caught up in the material negligence of the Navy. In both fires we are talking about approaching $1.5 billion dollar of lost taxpayers monies and we have no idea of the magnitude of other fires in Navy ships that might be related to ship general material fire combustibility.

As senator Snowe says, the Navy with the investigation on this aircraft carrier fire didn't find evidence how this fire started and the factors that made this a ship a combustion conflagration.

It is interesting, both fires took about the same time to put out.

It was only a guess from the Navy...

May 22, 2008

The USS George Washington, the fourth Navy ship to bear the name, was commissioned July 4, 1992. It is a Nimitz class nuclear-powered supercarrier with a crew of 3,000 but can carry up to 5,000. "The smoking was happening in an unauthorized space and the evidence points to it probably was a lit cigarette that ignited the oil," said Capt. Scott Gureck, a spokesman for the U.S. Pacific Fleet. He said the investigation did not reveal who was smoking.

Flames were initially spotted near the auxiliary boiler room and air conditioning and refrigeration space in the rear of the ship. The safety of the ship's nuclear reactor was not threatened. The Navy over the years reduced the fire combustibility over the years on our submarines. I personally don't think they are combat ready and can't stand up to the rigors of the sea. The new electronics seem to be particularly combustible and toxic to a crew in a fire. Post Admiral Rickover career, I think the defense contractors and the shipyards conspired with each other to put a excessive national security shield over DOD systems with the politicians. I don't think the materials and ships were ever properly vetted for safe material combustibility limits for the duty in military ships. Considering the outcome of the fire on aircraft carrier USS George Washington and USS Miami, the submarines are a fire trap for our submariners and are unsafe. My fear is we got a host of ships other than submarines out in the fleet where a small fire could ignite, with the resulting fire conflagration caused by runaway secret reduction on material combustibility limits severely damaging the combat effectiveness of the ships. I fear we have a grave fleet wide national security threat because our Navy ships have become amazingly vulnerable to a fire contagion.
As far as the exhausted state of the Navy, a sailor's death on the USS Essex, and later the collision with the oil tanker USNS Yukon with the Essex.  

“How far has the rot spread?’

With a looming hull swap, how much of an attitude that this-won’t-be-my-problem-much-longer existed amongst the crew?” he asked.

1) Considering the history of the US Navy gaming investigation, I request a professional out side the Navy investigation of this incident.

2) I request the Navy head of the shipyard be removed from his duties until the investigation is completed.

3) Request the NTSB be called in.

Al Queda attack on USS Miami submarine notes

Snowe, Collins: Navy will rebuild fire-damaged sub

KITTERY, Maine
(NEWS CENTER) -- The U.S. Navy is determined to rebuild the submarine damaged by fire at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. That word came from both of Maine's U.S. Senators after visiting the shipyard Friday. They also had high praise for all the firefighters and the sub's crew members who battled the fire for more than 12 hours.

The Senators say that shipyard workers are still ventilating the remaining smoke and fumes from inside the submarine and pumping out the three million gallons of water used to fight the fire.

The Navy is starting its investigation to determine how the fire started.

The flames broke out Wednesday night in what's called the forward compartment of the Miami, and officials report significant damage to that part of the sub. Senator Snowe and Collins say the Navy will investigate the cause, the extent of the damage and whether there was any criminal activity involved.

Sen. Snowe says there is no reason to suspect any wrongdoing, but regulations require that to be included in the investigation.

The Senators the submarine will be repaired and sent back to sea, and that the work will be done at the Kittery yard. They say Congress will have to find the money to make the repairs.

Snowe says it is believed to be the most serious fire ever at the shipyard, and possibly the worst on a Navy nuclear sub.

...Is she sick or what? If the fire was the shipyard fault, they get double bonus,  and get to benefit for their negligence.

Maine Congresswoman Chellie Pingree:

Pingree said Capt. Bryant Fuller told her the fire came at a good time because the USS Miami had been at the yard for three months, and so workers had already removed a lot of equipment from the damaged area. "It's in their favor that it had been emptied out."

...Ultimately, he is accountable for this fire, he is defending his bad behavior. The fire was good for us because we get a double bonus.

Capt. Bryant Fuller

The USS Miami's reactor was not operating at any time the fire broke out and remained unaffected and stable throughout, said Capt. Bryant Fuller, commander for the shipyard, which is in Kittery, Maine.

...pumped a million gallons out of the submarine, that is about 8 million pounds inside the hull. They are dam lucky the sub never collapsed into the dry dock. And the sub was up on blocks. Certainly the sub was never designed for that weight and that is probably the reason why the sub will never see the sea again.

..."Oops"

"All told, the firefighters rotated 75 times to battle the fire, using 3 million gallons of water, nearly filling some compartments, Snowe said."

Aluminum, cabling and insulation caught on fire?  
24 million pounds
1200 tons
300 semis...

...where do they keep the diesel generator fuel oil in a sub for the diesel generator...did that contribute to the fire?

...Ultimately it questions if the fleet of nuclear submarines are fit for combat and fire casualties...unfit for human habitation out to sea.

A Failure Of Imagination, again?

This isn't a failure of a technology, maybe a failure to keep modern a technology. I think the Japanese nuclear disaster for us in groups, organization and as a culture, as individuals and collectively, it is a failure of us to manage our brains, thinking and our hearts. Oh, the sorrows over all our failures to manage our hearts...

A failure of imagination?

Is there a exercise plan in which you can make your imagination muscle stronger? Can you productively strengthen the individual and group imagination muscle. I believe there is such a muscle in out heads.

How many times we going to hear heart sick people, who were involved in trillions of dollars and damaging thousands of people lives, lamenting it was a failure of my imagination after the tragedy. Why does organization culture kill imagination? And I will tell you a fact, imagination ain't shit unless you get it recorded on the organization's paperwork. The ability to create a organization wider discussion on it.

Do we get the choice, in order to fit into the group I am required to cripple my imagination. Or I can have infinite conscience imagination if I leave the group. Is it choice of starving or not?

And we know we are forced to be in groups where our thinking is forced to be stove piped into artificial ideological, culture or organizational bins. This is what we tell everyone what we know and this is what we say we don't know, when we do?

You know, like, who and what do you serve?

And a little altruism can overshadow a much larger altruism...altruisms abuse or altruism blindness. To what ends do to we use altruism for, to open up our eyes to the spectacularly beautiful wider world or to limit ours or our organizational field of view for selfish purpose?

Our greatest failures and sins occur over altruism blindness...our inability to discriminate altruism for self interest over altruism for our common good. Does doing good for another make me feel good or does it set another free? Does it make me feel good, when i should feel very troubled and compelled to act.

Isn't that at that at the bottom of the failures of the philosophy of our free and completive economic markets...?

METI boss fired for nuclear crisis regrets underestimating tsunami threat

Kyodo

The man who was the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's top official when the Fukushima disaster unfolded said he regretted underestimating the tsunami danger when METI was reviewing earthquake-resistance guidelines for nuclear plants before the crisis.

"We should have used our imagination," said Kazuo Matsunaga, who was vice minister of economy, trade and industry when the meltdowns began in March last year, told a Diet-appointed panel probing the disaster Wednesday.

I consider this an intentional distraction that allowed him to drive intoxicated?

..."My mind was occupied with handling the accident at Kansai Electric Power Co.'s Mihama plant," Matsunaga said, referring to a pipe rupture in August 2004 that killed five workers and injured six.

Does NRC's Director Troy Pruett Work in Region II?

Is the NRC's III Division Director Troy Pruett political disease in Region II?

I bet you if they had shut down Browns Ferry their could have concentrated their resources a lot more effectively. It would have made their job as a regulator a lot more easy?

Sounds like Swafford is saying, bug off NRC or I will sic my mad dog southern Republicans and the gang of four pro industry commissioners at you.

Browns Ferry isn't ready to inspect

excerpts:

TVA's nuclear operations chief told officials with the Nuclear Regulatory Agency on Tuesday that Browns Ferry is not ready yet for a third and final special NRC inspection to clear its "red" safety rating.

"We will not invite an inspection team in until have confidence we are ready. ... I can't even give you a ballpark estimate now when that will be."

NRC's regional administrator, Victor McCree, said after the meeting that the federal regulatory agency will take that answer in stride.

"I've been at the mindset that there's no point stressing accountability for procedures we know will change. Holding people accountable to inferior products isn't fair to the employees," Swafford said.

If I Won The NRC's $700 Million Dollar Reform Lottery

You know he is downplaying it...it is huge. And it's a spreading cancer on the nukes.

Exelon's CEO Mayo Shattuck:

"Even the existing fleet is feeling a little bit of the pressure in this kind of environment,” he said. The U.S. has 104 commercial operating reactors."

?
I would get the Allegation department outside the NRC...make them a stand alone entity.

　US Senator Bernie Sanders and Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell to speak at rally to support Vermont.

April 6, 2012
Saturday, April 14, 2012, Noon to 2:00 pm
Brattleboro Common, Brattleboro, Vermont 05301
(rain location: Brattleboro Union High School)
statements issued day-of from
Governor Peter Shumlin and
Former Governor Madeline Kunin
and other elected officials
Special Musical Guest:
Fenibo (a rousing 12-piece Afro-beat ensemble1) April 2, 2012

...I have spent an enormous of time talking to NRC officials and local NRC plant inspectors over the last year at VY, Palisades and Peach Bottom nuclear plant. I've submitted many 2.206s. A lot of NRC officials know my name and have spoken with me over the phone and in person.

If you really wanted to help me and the nation...you would help me reform the NRC's 2.206 petition process.

The below is in a condensed from...it designed to protect careers. It is in a nuclear industry technical lingo-speak that the NRC understands. They know these people are Root Cause Analysis professionals and have broad vision over many plants.

I am absolutely certain we have understated the problem. I am certain if this was investigated and mandatory testimony...we could prevent a lot of trouble.

Remember, I think they think doing a RCA gives factual ammunition to the NRC and in pending regulatory or court proceedings.

My blog: 'The Popperville Town Hall'

http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/

What we are talking about here in broad terms: it is the immune system of every nuclear plant in the nation and the nuclear industry.

...Of course, taking out the NRC Allegations section and the 2.206 petition process, that is call being in heaven.

I would want the NRC to be in partnership with me, not as a hyper rules based prosecutor or judge where I have no chance of ever getting past this corporate sponsored rules mandated to the NRC. I got to go up against this highly legalistic system even when it not really designed to be that way, where it is mostly laissez-faire and voluntary rules to a nuclear power plant. It is a check valve regulator!

They got a tons of laws and tools that limits my transparency to the problems of a plant and the agency; with very limited rules that mandates transparency to the public or me.

It is like a one way check valve on a host of issues, very little is spun my way in the interest of the USA (public), the vast majority are spun in the industry direction.

The overriding issue here is transparency and truth telling...the single most important determinate to nuclear and public safety is the nuclear industry showing their cards.

These guys got a lot of incentives to take shortcuts!

I won't bug you any more unless you ask for advice.

...Honest to god last time:

When I go through these NRC government processes...the 2.206 and Allegations...I feel it as the government is in a word, language, rules and process war with me. My government is at war against me and is using language as a weapon of war to me. It is not as a tool of understanding the issue or me. They become a understanding disruptor weapon.

A nuclear plant is so engineering, technically and organizationally complex...interacting with the NRC is 1000 times more complex.

I really need a seasoned senior NRC official who has seen everything and he has the horsepower to know the system and demand transparency. He needs to be assigned to me like my advocator and lawyer...his job is temporarily serve me and my issue ...to guide me through the agency's complex processes. All us outsiders need this kind of help.

I met and talked to a lot of NRC officials. Most of them are kind and decent when you get them by themselves. Most of them make us proud.

2) April 4, 2012

To who it may concern:

I can't believe I am doing this after having such a painful outcome talking to NRC Region 1 Allegation officials just a few days ago. I told myself I would never talk to Allegations again. If you want to talk to me I suggest it be outside Region I Allegations and preferably somebody from headquarters. I know there are lots more experienced people in the NRC than what I was recently exposed too.

I consider Region 1 Allegations compromised much like the March 2007 Peach Bottom sleeping guard incident where Allegations needed 500% absolute perfect inside evidence that was never obtainable in our existence. The NRC was too lazy to go down to Peach Bottom to investigate it on their own and they took the false assurances of Peach Bottom that there was no sleeping guards until the inside video came out that shook up the nation.

I consider the below a "cry for help" to me from multiple plant high nuclear employees and nuclear safety officials. And I certainly assert my confidentiality rights with this because this is so explosive to many careers. Nuclear Industry safety consultants might become blacklist from the nuclear industry. It exemplifies a pervasive of "I don't care" nuclear safety attitude throughout the nuclear industry. And these utilities are disrespectful to nuclear safety oversight in general.

I bet we are painting the most accurate leading indicator the NRC has seen in decades and we know the industry is in deep troubles as seen with all of your issues in recent years. These guys got a attitude problem and so doesn't the NRC!

I wish you would send a copy of this to the OIG?

　
...So is this about the reforming NRC Allegation process or RCA?

 Just kidding, or not.

 I kinda open here with my time. I could converse with you with within 24 hours, say tomorrow morning or beyond. I am good with before the end of the week, but I understand you people are busier than me.

What the hell does "specific information" mean?

　
...3:00pm on 4/10 is a excellent choice.

 By the way, what are my needs that enables the exercises of my democratic Constitutional ideals or rights with the agency's rules.

1) Full access to the target site, documents and employees of a nuclear power plant or NRC.

2) My sufficient funding, skills and education to do my own independent investigation to give the agency its rule enabler.

"Specific information (e.g., which site/plant, organization, personnel) is necessary, for the NRC to respond to any issues, which are raised by concerned citizens."

...Really, I am a ant...you would need a sufficient independent "organization" with sufficient uncontested access, resources and intellectual horsepower, which could counteract or challenge the Republican ideological influences over of the agency and the influences of the cohesive nuclear industry and their owners.

It should neither be pro nuke or anti nuke...just hunting for the truth!

You would need a transformational organization...

A submarine and aircraft carrier metaphor…USS Hampton, Enterprise and Midway….

I originally published this on Nov 18, 2007?

...A submarine and aircraft carrier metaphor…USS Hampton, Enterprise and Midway….

As we have seen in recent congressional and executive level problems with funding our military…I think funding problems has undermined the ethics of the military in general since 9/11. Everyone is resourced strained…everyone is lying or distorting in order to meet a legitimate national security commitment….everyone wants to make it look good to their superiors. Nobody want’s to tell the president and congress that the “Emperor has no clothes”…that a con man has entered our minds declaring that it’s not as bad as it looks. I believe the military’s ethics is at a historic breaking point…worst than Vietnam.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Emperor's_New_Clothes

Our submarine fleet is the weak link in the chain…it’s the loudest and leading indicator with the ethics and integrity of the whole military system. We have mismanaged this war so badly….it has undermined the ethics of the whole organization and our political system.

I believe our military is near a historic breakdown. Half of it is conscious…and the other half is cultural attributes of human behavior, in stress, and a lack of resources. At the end of the day, we have blinded ourselves from observing the behavior of each other in the name of survival and evolution…it’s a survival tactic.

I believe my Navy aircraft carrier fighter pilot buddy wasn’t talking about an event in the 1960’s and 1970’s… he was talking about the slide into devaluing and dehumanizing life…the sliding into self blindness and distortion….in the name of altruism and national security…that unstoppable decline into taking shortcuts and falsifying documents and events in the name of protection and doing your job with limited resources.

It is an extremely important metaphor for the military today and tomorrow.

What gem? Several of Mike's emails caused me to rethink a notion I held since my first day observing this august body. That notion was that "can do," "make do," "go the extra mile," "not on my watch" were the necessary and appropriate watchwords of military service during the 60s and 70s, a time when an increasingly unpopular war was being financed very often out of operational, training and maintenance budgets, a time when the insanity of "Mutually Assured Destruction" became understandable, ergo, possible. These ill conceived notions caused us to devalue human life by wagering death and injury against "national security," and "getting the job done." It led us to several deaths, and near loss of Enterprise, to a very preventable fire, essentially caused by the lack of a jet starter hose of sufficient length to keep the starter engine exhaust a safe distance from missile warheads held on an F4's wing. Starter hoses were in short supply, so when the hose developed holes or breaks, it was common practice to simply shorten the hose. It led to my crash one night on the flight deck of USS Midway, killing 5, injuring dozens, destroying 8 aircraft, all for the shortage of operable Multiple Ejector Racks (MERs). The MER's failure caused two 500-lb bombs to be hung up on my starboard wing; normal procedure would have had me jettison both the bombs and the MER, but since MERs($4,000) were in short supply, the decision was made to bring the bombs and attendant MER aboard, a common decision primarily determined by the skill and experience of the pilot. Unfortunately, my starboard axle failed upon touchdown, and I rode the aircraft into the pack of parked aircraft, having lost the arresting cable. We must be constantly reminded of the atmosphere under which Scorpion was operating. I had minimized and discounted this "constantly scrambling and always behind" atmosphere as "Standard Operating Procedure." Mr Mulligan reminded me to not overlook the operating tempo of the time. I accuse no others of requiring this same reminder, but I owe Mike an apology for my discounting of him.

CNO: Stressed fleet can’t sustain op tempo

By Sam Fellman - Staff Writer
Posted : Thursday May 3, 2012 9:54:14 EDT

The past year has seen the fleet straining to respond to successive crises around the world, from air and missile strikes against Libya and aid missions in the wake of Japan’s devastating earthquake last spring to escalating tensions with Iran over the past five months.

The Crews are seeing quicker turnarounds between deployments and longer cruises. In some cases, these have stretched past the normal six to seven months, out to eight months and beyond.

Recent examples abound. In March, the Enterprise Carrier Strike Group headed out on what’s expected to be a 7 1/2-month deployment only eight months after returning from their last cruise. Similarly, the Carl Vinson strike group deployed in late 2011 after 5 ½ months stateside. And then there’s the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group, which returned from an epic 10 1/2-month deployment in February.

Officials are warning this can’t keep up indefinitely.

Asked at an April 16 speech whether these mounting demands were allowing crews enough time at home and giving ships the opportunities for needed maintenance, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jon Greenert replied: “If we continue through, if you will, the [future years defense program], the next five years, at the pace we are at today, the answer to your question is no, we can’t run at that rate.

In testimony this spring on the budget, a chorus of Navy officials reiterated the continuing strain on the fleet.

The Navy can surge ships when war beckons and can also support a handful of very extended deployments, like the Bataan ARG’s 10 1/2-monther, one of the longest in decades, said retired Vice Adm. Peter Daly, former deputy commander of Fleet Forces Command, who said carrier deployments may stretch to meet the two-carrier requirement. “But when you wake up one day and find that your deployments, instead of being six to seven months, are 11 months and you’re not able to do the maintenance and the sustainability over the long-term, then you’re going to break things,” he said. “You’re not going to have a whole force.”

“The risk that I see is we maintain this op tempo going forward,” said Vice Adm. David Architzel, head of Naval Air Systems Command, at a March 22 hearing. “We have to ensure we can sustain the funding to allow us to have this in place.”

At that same hearing, Vice Adm. Bill Burke, deputy CNO for warfare systems, testified that “Navy readiness remains under stress as a result of our efforts to push the maximum available force forward.”

Money is the central issue. The current demand for ships, submarines and air wings outstrips the funding for them, Greenert said in testimony a week earlier, on March 15.

Daly, the retired three-star, agrees that there is a “mismatch” between the Navy’s operations and its funding. Each Navy budget is put together with assumptions about the operations pace and how much this will cost. And each year, it seems, this funding is quickly surpassed by the Navy’s real-world operations without adding funds back in later, Daly said.

Referring to Greenert’s remarks at the Navy League conference, Daly said, “I think he’s giving a cautionary note that if you continue to do that, you will get to a hollow force, you will break the force.”

“Ultimately, you’re balancing this on people, and your people pay the price. They work longer hours. They get over-stretched on deployments and family stress,” continued Daly, who is now the chief executive of the U.S. Naval Institute in Annapolis, Md. “And so if you just do more with less over too long a time — and I can’t tell you exactly where that marker is — then you got a problem.”

American Tissue Corp

American Tissue Corporation
I would gladly talk to people about my activities concerning American Tissue corp to any legitimate people. It is a fascinating story. I bankrupted the 4th largest paper mill company in the USA and this lead to putting executives in jail.

It was a fascinating learning experience for me. It was a $300 to $400 million dollar fraud case. It was a warning to us about the upcoming financial crisis we ignored.

Pilgrim's failed Target Rock SRV

New April 5, 2:30pm
The OIG gave me a call today.

...He humiliated and disrespected me with this phrase " if your were a decent whistleblower" you would have a complete report.

You know what I say, record and transcript every conversation I have with NRC official. If you were with me on my conversation you would see how disgraceful and uneducated some officials are.

Mostly the front line NRC inspectors and their bosses are really decent people...but the support people like Allegation and the OIG are atrocious and with their knowledge of the nuclear industry. They generally don't have the skills and are not trained to talk in a non threatening manner and have a open discussion.

This guy began exactly like the Allegation...what was the LER nmber?
  
...So were talking about target rock and why components immediately failed on new installs.

This guys didn't know what a safety relief valve did in a BRW. I had to educate him on its function.

You know what, these are really complicated components and organizational issues. You just can't come into a conversation with me without deeply researching my issues or I have to give you grammar school class in BWR designs. Both Allegation and the OIG did this.

If you don't do your background work before you get to me...i am going to lose you within the first five minutes.

The NRC OIG guy said its not fraud waste, misconduct or abuse within the rules of the OIG...so it a licensing or NRR thing. I said believe me i got it with your NRC people, you are going to pass me from one department to another because some NRC employees are too lazy to do their jobs. I am going to have to explain myself 100 times to different departments and NRC employees, who don't even know what the function of a SRV is.  ...The NRC is doing one of those teenager la la la la deals while covering their ears to the obvious.

Basically, I asserted LER's are insanely incomplete and inaccurate...

...I would say i was exposed to a militaristic use of language to disrupt communications....the use of rules and regulations in way to disrupt communication and knowledge of the problem to the
public. It is using words, language, rules and regulations, indeed government as weapons against the innocence...the intent is deny public participation with government. They militaristically trying to rule me and everyone out of public participation.

I think what we got here is systemic breakdown with the utilities and NRC to control vender repair, new parts and basic off site engineering services. I think these vendor component and engineering suppliers are not required to tell the truth. I would say since I been hitting them on these issues the NRC has tried to come to grips with their vender service provider problem.

Bottom line, they are having trouble getting replacement parts on these obsolete plants. Companies have gone out of business and ceased production streams, and the new deal is they are hiring companies who specialize in doing "reverse engineering" on replacement parts that are dangling without any new parts stream.

...As example, all the new Mitsubishi kids are making the San Onophe SGs and the old experienced engineers have retired or died.  

New March 28
I backed out of the NRC allegation process. They got hyper legalistic and evidence thingy on me...they knowing that the agency and the utility had all the cards. I said the Peach Bottom 2.206 administrator sent my issue into allegation...I didn't call in allegation on my own. I thought it was going to be a conversation between me and agency...not this one way deal where if i said i sneezed then I had to prove I sneeze. I asked, should I have brought my lawyers and engineers into the deal.

I didn't think the Allegations process was fair and opened...it was hyper legalistic and hyper regulatory rules thingy where you couldn't sneeze if it wasn't in the rules. The Alligation team went cold into this not even researching my involvement with VY and Peach Bottom, and the LERs and inspection reports.   

I said I withdrawal my concern and I don't want to be updated about this. They told me you can't withdrawal a concern once one was given to the NRC....but you can be anonymous.

  ...At the bottom of it over VY and the Peach Bottom SRV issue, I spent days researching everything i could about the SRVs. I spent a hour and half each with both inspectors at VY and Peach Bottom for a total of four plant inspectors and three hours talking to me. I knew the territory and what I was talking about...I was frustrated that these four officials went cold into this meeting. Then they played the, mike this thing is evidence driven and we got to know the LER number and we got to know who the VY inspector's names are. It was humiliating and disrespectful for me. There was one official talking to me as I was discussing my issue, then none of the other three officials could even do quick search on the VY docket for the LER document number to get us past the sticking point. What BS!

I got a e-mail trail from Don, lets schedule a meeting beginning last thurs. I say I ready right now, tomorrow and any time at your convenience next week. Just set the time and date and i will be there. I wanted to make it easy for him. Then I get a e-mail tues saying I can't find anyone to have a meeting with you without any explanation. Next day he tells me the following day the meeting is on, what time.

They don't even have the courtesy on their own to read my 2.206s and transcripts surrounding the VY and Peach Bottom seals. These Allegation idiots have in their documents I make a recent allegation by phone about VY seals again and they are the ones who made the VY inspectors call me without going though the Allegation process.

That is another more specfic information not disclosed in the VY LERs or inspection reports...the 400 degree vitol seals.

We should go through the VY seal LER and update, then contrast what got in the NRC inspector report and then what came out in the NRC inspectors meeting with me. We should then discuss what should have been disclosed in LERs and further inspection reports. As far as i am concerned, the inspectors at both plants should be on the phone bridge. We should go over it point by point and not have any other commitment to rush anyone, until everything is completely hashed out. We should do the same thing with the Peach Bottom LER.

Again, we don't have public participation with the NRC and utilities around our homes, unless all the aspects of the problem is out in the public arena.

March27 

Mr. Mulligan:

I have been unable to contact the appropriate NRC technical staff, for a telephone call with you. I will contact you when I know more.

Sorry for the late information.

v/r,

Ron Schmitt

USNRC

New

From: "Schmitt, Ronald"
To: "Michael Mulligan (steamshovel2002@yahoo.com)"
Cc: "James, Lois"
Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2012 8:33 AM
Subject: Time to discuss your concerns (RE: Quality Assurance program at Target Rock)
  
Dear Mr. Mulligan:

This email is in regards to your email that you sent to Mr. John Hughey, of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on March 17, 2012. In your email, you expressed concerns regarding the Quality Assurance program at Target Rock, as a result of failed safety relief valves at Vermont Yankee, Pilgrim and Peach Bottom nuclear power plants.

We would like to set up a call with you so that our staff can ask additional questions to better understand your concern.

Please respond to this email with some days and times that are convenient for you so that I can schedule the call.

Thank you for informing us of your concern. If you have any questions, please contact me or Ms. Lois James at .

 

Ronald V. Schmitt

Office Allegation Coordinator

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Pilgrim's failed Target Rock SRV
Licensee Event Report 2011-007-00: Safety Relief Valve leakage

So you get it, with the SRV threaded seals at VY and Peach Bottom they failed within the first cycle from degradation due to poor quality seals. Now at Pilgrim another SRV fails with months due to leakage and they blame poor pilot valve workmanship at Target Rock.

Sounds like systemic QA problems with Target Rock. I request a investigation of Target Rock and all similar safety valves.

I talked to your nice Peach Bottom inspectors over increasing the SRV's set inaccuracy from plus or minus 1% to plus or minus 3%. Does the NRC have any evidence that decreasing the margin of set point accuracy reduces the entry into applicable tech spec LCO. I see all the utilities have different guesses on what cause pilot valve bonding. Some say its oxygen or hydrogen that sets up bonding on the surfaces, others say its just bonding and they don't care. Others again say its outside insulation and temperatures that sets it up.

As far as the statement that increasing the relief valve testing set point inaccuracy will reduce entry into a LCO, I don't think that is true. The limited data I see indicates when you increase testing set point inaccuracy, you increase entry into a LCO in the long run.

PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION

REPORT 05000293/2011- 005

October 1, 2011 through December 31 , 2011

 The inspectors selected the issues of safety relief valve (SRV) and automatic depressurization system (ADS) valve leakage and setpoint test failures as an inspection sample for in-depth review to assess the corrective actions taken by Entergy to address these long-standing issues. Entergy's corrective actions included replacing the four ADS valves and the two safety relief valves with a Target Rock three-stage relief valve design, increasing the capacity of the two safety relief valves, and amending the license to allow for a set-point pressure band of +/- 3%. Additionally, the new valves were equipped with multiple leak detection temperature indicators.

The inspectors reviewed procedures, condition reports, engineering evaluations, modification packages, post maintenance testing, and license amendment correspondence, and interviewed plant personnel to assess Entergy's problem identification, evaluation, and corrective action effectiveness with respect to SRV and ADS valve leakage and set-point drift. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the technical specifications and UFSAR to assess the change to the relief valves with respect to design and licensing bases requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment. Findinqs and Observations

Findinqs and Observations

No findings were identified.

The ADS valves and SRVs were originally a two-stage Target Rock-type design, consisting of a pilot-stage assembly and a main-stage assembly. Industry Operating Experience had shown that two-stage Target Rock relief valves exhibited some amount of pilot-stage leakage during plant operation. Additionally, the technical specification allowed valve setpoint pressure band was +/- 1%, which left little margin to maintain the valves operable in the event of valve leakage. As a result, SRV and ADS valve pilot stage leakage were challenges throughout the plant's operating history and caused several forced shutdowns.

The inspectors noted, based on nuclear industry operating experience, that the replacement of all the ADS and SRVs with the three-stage Target Rock design was a significant positive step in reducing the likelihood of relief valve seat leakage.

Additionally, the inspectors noted Entergy's evaluation of an expanded relief valve setpoint pressure band and subsequent license amendment have resulted in significantly more operating margin for the plant in the event that a valve does exhibit signs of leakage. Finally, the inspectors determined the addition of several temperature monitoring points on the valve would allow Entergy to more effectively evaluate the operability of the valve should any leakage occur.

Mike Mulligan's US Government Renaissance

First published as comments in the NYT's in: The Nurture of Nuclear Power

I always thought the problem with nuclear power was ideology not technology. The dominant control ideology of the industry has been increasingly the hard right wing conservatives and this ideology is dominant at every plant. There are very few democrats at any of these plants and certainly even less as you go up the management ranks.

The model has defaulted into a autocratic and a decentralized form...every plant is a one off. We serve profits and self interest, and not the greater good of our nation.

The true benefits of nuclear industry has never been shown. I propose a government take-over of the 25 Fukushima plants in the USA. As a national security issue, we should replace those plants with brand new identical models. Lets begin another grand experiment. They would be large plants and centrally controlled in the initial construction and early operation phase. Imagine the efficiency if these plants were built to one set of codes from both the regulator and the designer/builder stand point. It should be a government controlled and modeled like the TVA project.

What if we woke up one day and we discovered government could be more efficient and 'just' than any corporation...or at least could complete with them.

President Obama could say these plants are a dire threat to the USA and the only way out is to replace them. We just about got negative interest rates with QE2 and why couldn't we come up with a revolutionary borrowing mechanism. It would be a giant jobs and public works project. It would split the Republicans this fall and who knows the size of the political coalition we could create for the nation?

There is more value than the traditional economic benefits than cheap and reliable electricity over a project like this. We should value a project like this for how much advanced education and advance managerial experience it drives into our nation. How much advanced intellectual experienced it drives into all the employees who are associated with this voyage. This is, and always was, the real wealth of our nation!

An Unforgettable Night - ATC Operator Event at Palisades

There are a lot of these CRDM seal shutdowns at Palisades. No other plant in the nation has these kinds on troubles. These complex seal repair shutdowns have been involved with unpredictable interactions and incidences.

A initial plant design defect that is not corrected is driving enormous complicity into the control room and their employees are being overwhelmed by it.

I told the NRC this was a very important event for the industry and there should have been reports to the industry about what went on this night a Palisades. What nobody can get away from, the agency doesn't have the capability to capture events in such detail as this employee did.

This event occurred on Oct 23, 2010 and Palisades has had another seal shutdown on Jan of this year. We got to see this letter for the first time this March 8 2012.

I believe the event was entered into the Palisades ROP as a question of why did one of their employees leave the control room. Nobody has yet answered why were they winging this vacuum fill procedure, why did they lose reactor water level for a period of time worrying about vortexing and why did they allow so many distraction going on while they were manipulating core water level during a high risk alignment of the plant.


An Unforgettable Night - ATC Operator Event at Palisades

Introduction
On the early morning of October 23, 2010, I left the ‘at the controls’ area of Palisades nuclear plant without a proper relief or turnover. Up until that time, I had always considered myself to be a very conscientious and safe operator. I never imagined that I would leave the control room without a proper turnover – but I did. I hope by writing this article, others can learn from my mistakes and avoid making the same or any similar mistake. With that objective, this article describes the events that led to my actions, the effect this event has had on me, the lessons I have learned, and my experiences with the NRC investigative and enforcement processes.

Description of Events
Palisades was nearing the end of a refueling outage, which was on course to be our most successful ever due to the short duration and large number of major projects completed. We were about to enter our third reduced inventory period to perform a vacuum fill operation.

This vacuum fill procedure was relatively new for Palisades, having successfully

performed it for the first time during the previous refueling outage. It is a procedure to lower the water level in the reactor to the middle of the hot leg, and then draw a vacuum on the Primary Coolant System (PCS) to evacuate air and other non-condensable gasses. We devised this procedure in an effort to improve plant reliability—specifically to extend the life of our control rod drive mechanism pressure boundary seals.

Excerpts:

During the brief, I mentioned that during my turnover briefing, I heard that the reactor head did not have a vent path.

We lined up the drain path and commenced, but the PCS level indications did not respond as expected and we stopped the drain.

During this period, we had Auxiliary (non-licensed) Operators (AO's) troubleshoot the problem by verifying level glass and vent path lineups.

Concurrent with the PCS drain, most of the control room staff was at the Infrequently Performed Test and Evolutions (IPTE) brief for the vacuum fill work.

While this occurred, we had more issues with the EHC system; a reactor operator called the control room and stated he was not sure we had a good EHC flow path.

I felt this was a problem that required reviewing the prints and was too distracting with the PCS drain taking place while in reduced inventory, so I handed off the call to a different operator.

I told a Senior Reactor Operator that we were having issues with the EHC system, but he was busy overseeing the PCS drain.

A few moments later, however, the EHC low level alarm came in.

Several minutes later, the low level alarm was still not clear and I was concerned about a possible leak, so I secured the pump. I quickly heard back that there was a spill...

Consequently, they requested that the pump be placed in service for their vendor work, stating the cooling and flow path issues were solved.

This was all happening while the PCS level indication troubleshooting was in progress.

Eventually, Maintenance workers removed some temporary flange covers on the reactor head for a better vent path.

The drain that we initially briefed to be about 17 minutes ended up taking over three hours.

After we got to mid-loop, I lowered shutdown cooling flow to about 3100 gpm, which was the high end of the vacuum fill requirements.

...commented that he did not like the pace I was making my adjustments.

The previous time we performed the vacuum fill procedure, it worked flawlessly, but this time was different.

There was indication of a leak somewhere that was intermittently venting and allowing pressures to equalize throughout the system.

While Operator 1 and other members of the control room staff were troubleshooting the problems with vacuum fill, we received the low critical service water alarms and entered a procedure for "Loss of Service Water."

...the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) had to come down off the CRS’ “island” and speak with me directly to ensure effective communications during this very active period in the control room.

We soon learned that the work control center sent out a lube and stroke PM for the main lube oil service water isolations, and that was probably the cause of the low header pressure.

During the hold, I noticed the shutdown cooling flow rate had slowly started to trend down to 2900 gpm on its own and I voiced my concerns to the Control Room Supervisor. I showed him the one minute shutdown cooling flow rate trend on the Palisades Plant Computer (PPC), and said there may be some vortexing or other flow phenomenon that I did not understand.

He stated we could also enter the LCO, if necessary.

Suddenly, however, PCS level indication sharply fell to an elevation below the bottom of the hot leg.

As PCS pressure rose, the primary coolant level slowly recovered to an expected value and I received the order to raise the PCS level to exit reduced inventory.

By this time, it was early morning and we exited reduced inventory during SRO turnover.

Byron Switchyard Insulator 2.206

So what would prevent all the defective switchyard insulators from breaking and shorting in a heavy storm, tornado or earthquake and then causing another LOOP...

The last LOOP at the plant was extraordenary, in that the plant was disconnected from grid for 31 hours. LOOPs are generially 1,2 to less than 4 hours duration.

March 20:

Exelon upgrades equipment at Byron nuclear plant

The Associated Press

BYRON, Ill. -- Exelon Energy says it has finished upgrading equipment at a northern Illinois nuclear plant where a power failure caused a reactor to shut down two months ago.
The company says it has replaced electrical insulators in the switchyards that help move power to and from the reactors at the Byron Generating Station, which is located about 95 miles northwest of Chicago.
In January, an insulator in Unit 2 switchyard failed and interrupted power, causing the reactor to automatically shut down as a precaution.

Insulators are protective equipment that helps regulate the flow of electricity. Exelon says Unit 1 was taken offline last week while upgrades were finished, and Unit 2 upgrades were finished over the weekend. Both units are back online at full power and generating electricity.

Read more here: http://www.bnd.com/2012/03/20/2107206/exelon-upgrades-equipment-at-byron.html#storylink=cpy

Vermont's Appeal over VY

Interesting, the chairman posed the same question I did but in a more delicate manner...
Gregory B. Jaczko: "Looking to the Future”

February 9, 2012

"So the question is: what does that tell us about the use of risk? Is it an effective metric? To some extent one could argue that based on the risk models, accidents like Fukushima will happen -- hopefully with a very unlikely or low frequency, but they will happen -- and they are acceptable. They are well within our risk metrics, primarily because we ultimately had a robust system that allowed people to be evacuated and allowed ultimately for people to be relocated from any exposure to radiation.

Now, I think if I were to talk to an average person on the street and say that, people would say no, that was a pretty significant event. And I personally think that's right. I think that this was a significant event, and it was an unacceptable event. But if we look at the risk models that we use today, it is not -- in our risk model -- an unacceptable event."

Feb 18: I also spoke, "imagine if we had a core meltdown without fatality in a severe accident in the USA. You people discount this, only consider a nuclear fatality. A nuclear accident with fatality is just marginally worst than a no fatality.

At Peach Bottom, it would destroy two plants because they are so close to each other even if the other one wasn't damaged. It would destroy the value of the largest utility in the USA. There would be massive investigations. What was once thought of as accepted behavior would be thought as gross negligence and a cover-up for decades. I am certain the investigation would rip the lid off the NRC and the whole industry...what other plants are threatened. Certainly the NRC losing their credibility and trust would be a accident in itself.

Remember, we have only had a meltdown in the pre internet period and pre social media interconnectivity period. TMI would be a drastically different accident in this social media and self publishing world....nobody could control the political fallout from this. It would cascade until the energy was spent. And Fukushima got us all teed up already....

Who knows what this stock and debt panic would do to the utilities in the outcome in the meltdown without fatality. That is 20% of our electricity, its a enormous amount of electricity and irreplaceable out for a decade or two. We'd have massive speculation, price spikes and shortages for a far as you can see. It would be disruptive to the whole nation. It would be disruptive to our political system. I am talking about a catastrophe of epic proportions for our electric system.

On a planetary level, the USA would be a nuclear technology disgrace...who knows how many plants would get kicked off the line. Our national stature and credibility would be threatened. Depending what they find under the sheets, we might even get a new president...it might just throw the election. You know everyone would play political football with this. Can you imagine the world we would live in if the antis had a current meltdown as ammo?  

Feb 17 (Reuters) - Vermont's Attorney General appealed on Saturday a federal judge's ruling that had prevented the state from shutting down its only nuclear power plant, escalating a two-year battle over state's rights and atomic energy.

Was that pretty neat yesterday in the 2.206 proceeding inviting all the NRC and Exelon employees to watch the Sunday CCN special about the NRC and VY...

Wasn't that neat when i said to them, "does anyone think this is a coincidence that I on am on a phone in my house and I got all you people in your offices listening to me today, and you got a CNN special about Vermont Yankee later this weekend. Does anyone not believe this was intentioned this way?

Then I give them my rendition of the Vermont Yankee problem..."it is excuses over and over again of the NRC and utilities with intentionally turning your heads away from immediately addressing and fixing known problems in the industry"...

NRC’s OIG: Confirmatory Action Letters

Feb 15: Yep, you got to wonder if the NRC OIG initiated the CAL investigation after reading my Casablanca-Palisades 2.206 on Feb 22, 2011... The NRC says the investigation started 9 months ago?

You notice I stayed with the themes of the Casablanca 2.206 on my newest 'Nothing Ever Matters-Palisades' 2.206.     

OIG-12-A-09 February 10, 2012

Audit of NRC’s Use of Confirmatory Action Letters

I think they got a lot of neat tools, but the NRC doesn't have the skills and training in order to properly and effectively use these neat tools. You catch the similarities with the OIG event reporting...mass confusion with contradictory NRC policies. Can you imagine all the confirmatory Actions letters awarded to Palisades and Entergy...and why are they so ineffective with getting a change of heart out of Entergy?  

Jan 10, 2012: Request Emergency Palisades Shutdown

"We are broadly worried about in 2009 over the Palisades security falsification, in the outcome of the violations...whether all the reports and employee cultural surveys with the assortment of NRC and Entergy processes over this very serious violation ever had any meaning at all. According to the Palisades Fukushima Emergency Power System DC short and plant trip, the most recent root cause Entergy admits there is deep and widespread safety cultural problems at the Palisades plant. I feel Palisades safety culture was in the pits in 2009 and before...and the cultural safety survey was a grand Entergy and NRC falsification. The NRC Alternate Dispute Resolution secession over this, the Confirmatory Order, the Entergy investigative reports and safety cultural survey, the willing acceptance of this insanity by the NRC and Entergy...the NRC created the inaccurate falsified impression to the outsiders that Entergy had discovered all the cultural safety problems and corrected them. Nothing could be farther from the truth, all these corporate and agency processes covered up and deepened, took the public’s eyes off fixing Entergy...where Entergy now is in much worst condition than they were then. I request independent outside investigation on this dangerous agency corruption before Palisades start-up."

Audit of NRC's Implementation of 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance OIG-11-A-08 March 23, 2011 "NRC Regulations and Guidance for Implementing Section 206 Are Contradictory and Unclear

Part 21 component defect reporting issues exist because NRC regulations and guidance for implementing Section 206 are contradictory and unclear. Specifically, NRC regulations and guidance for implementing Section 206 contain stipulations that have been interpreted as not requiring a report under Part 21 if an LER was not required. This interpretation seemingly contradicts Section 206, which requires reporting of component defects that could cause substantial safety hazards. Furthermore, applicable NRC reportability guidance is not utilized by some licensees and NRC staff, and NRC’s Baseline Inspection Program does not include requirements to inspect licensee reporting of Part 21 defects." Transcripts 2.206 Petition Review Board RE Palisades Nuclear Plant dated January 31, 2012
"And like I said, you know, we can -- all this survey -- cultural survey stuff, you know, words have meaning, and results having meaning and stuff. And that was inaccurate, that survey stuff was inaccurate. And it's a con job because, essentially, Entergy gets to hire their own people. And they probably tell the companies beforehand this is what we want, can you do it for us? And that's what they get.

You know, I don't know. Maybe the NRC ought to hire somebody independent or something like -- I don't know what the question is but, you know, that was -- we could have -- Entergy should have found the problem two years ago and they didn't.

The problem is they go through another ADR process. It began in 2010. It just came out as an enforcement finding with the employee that stormed out of the control room. Basically, the same thing is --another agreement. This thing isn't, you know --Entergy, you do it or stay shut down. This is another-- you know, a gentleman agreement, essentially -- I can't even say the word, confirmaternity [confirmatory action] letter, whatever you call it.
How many (confirmatory action letters) has Entergy had in the last few years --two or three at Palisades, and who knows what they've gotten over the fleet. I mean, how well does that work and stuff? So, you know, so another survey is going to be, done fleet-wide, more fleet training. These poor guys they're getting overwhelmed with all the fleet training on integrity and stuff. You know, it just bothers me that this thing wasn't prevented." US nuclear watchdog questions oversight of safety enforcement

By M. Alex Johnson, msnbc.com

The federal government's nuclear watchdog has faulted the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for failing to follow through on safety agreements with nuclear facilities, saying its system for tracking corrective action raises questions about its oversight of nuclear safety and security.

After an eight-month audit, the NRC's Office of Inspector General concluded last week that the commission has no centralized way to oversee or follow up on documents confirming that a nuclear facility has committed itself to address "significant concerns regarding health and safety, the environment, safeguards or security."

The documents — known as Confirmatory Action Letters, or CALs — are one of the last measures before the NRC cracks down with a stringent binding order like suspension or revocation of a nuclear plant's license.

Because CALs are reserved for a small number of potentially serious cases — 15 to 20 of the hundreds of incident reports the NRC issues each year, according to its records — effective oversight of the confirmation process is of "utmost importance," the inspector general said. But in some cases, the action letters are so poorly drafted that they don't even make it clear who the intended recipients are, the report asserts.

Bureaucracy to blame

The problem is one of red tape, not willful inaction or neglect, the report says. But the weaknesses — which include lack of consistent guidelines for regional NRC offices, regional offices' failure to comply with those guidelines and some offices' lack of any tracking system whatsoever — "degrade" the agency's accountability, it says.

 A spokesman for the NRC said the agency believes "the CAL process has been effective" and that it would have a formal reply "in the near future." In an informal meeting last month, the NRC generally agreed with the inspector general's recommendations to update its main enforcement manual, centralize tracking and submit to occasional audits of the action letter system, the report said.