My Met Tower Early 2013 Complaint to the NRC?

I was astonished why Pilgrim didn't write up a LER on every time both primary and secondary met towers were inop...especially if both are inop. I was asking the NRC the Cooper reports it, why are you allowing Pilgrim not to report it?

Bottom line, considering the political sensitivity of Pilgrim, I think the NRC and Pilgrim were burying the problem fearing it wouldn't reflect well on them to admit a possible meltdown evacuation would be severely impacted.    

Every time either a primary or secondary met tower goes inop...there should be a LER report on it.  

From: Mike Mulligan [steamshovel2002@gmail.com
Sent: Sunday, May 26, 2013 1:53 PM
To: Guzman, Richard

Subject: Pilgrim:Evacuation Plan Broken During Blizzard Nemo And Unenforced

By The NRC

Power Reactor Event Number: 49062 

Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: NATHAN L. BEGER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 05/23/2013
Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2013
Event Time: 10:19 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 

10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
Unit
SCRAM
Code
RX
CRIT
Initial
PWR Initial RX Mode
Current
PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text

TEMPORARY LOSS OF METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING SYSTEM DURING PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"At 1019 CDT, AC power was removed from the site meteorological monitoring system (MET) equipment for planned maintenance in order to remove abandoned equipment left in place since installing the new meteorological system in October 2012. Removing AC power was not expected to have an effect since all MET information would continue to be available due to an 8-hour battery backup system installed at the meteorological tower. However, when power was removed, all onsite meteorological data was lost to the control room via the Plant Management Information System (PMIS). PMIS is the only display of local direct meteorological conditions available. Subsequently, [Cooper Nuclear Station] CNS determined the interface between MET system and PMIS was not powered from the 8 hour MET battery backup system which accounted for the lost MET indication. CNS corrected the condition and restored meteorological data to the control room via the PMIS system at 1219 CDT.

"Site backup assessment capability relies on Meteorological model estimates from the National Weather Service out of Valley, Nebraska or on default values derived from historical local weather patterns. Since there was no direct information of site meteorological conditions during the period of lost power, CNS considered this to be a major loss of assessment capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

Mr Guzman,

So here is an official concern to the NRC by me. I not crazy!

With LER 2013-003-00 Entergy admits the the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data. Whatever that means? Was the spinning cups out in the weather frozen and iced over during blizzard Nemo or did the instruments fail because of the power failure? Was it just a data recording issue or did the site lose wind speed and direction indication in the control room or at the tech support center?

• Cover-Up: Public Notification And Radiation Evac Plan Broke During Accident

• http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2013/05/loss-of-off-site-power-events-dueto.Html

I am calling it, they lost wind speed and direction indication in the control room and the evacuation plan was severely impaired.

2013-003-00: "During the storm on February 8, meteorological instruments at PNPS recorded sustained wind speeds between 42 and 49 mph through 2338 hours at which time the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data until 1840 hours the following day. The wind direction was predominantly from the ocean toward the switchyard during the storm

Can I be clearer?  

So why didn’t Pilgrim during the Nemo Blizzard make an event report like the Cooper station?

• Cooper: "At 1019 CDT, AC power was removed from the site meteorological monitoring system (MET) equipment for planned maintenance in order to remove abandoned equipment left in place since installing the new meteorological system in October 2012

Why was there no “major loss of assessment capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)" like the Cooper station?

• Cooper: Since there was no direct information of site meteorological conditions during the period of lost power, CNS considered this to be a major loss of assessment capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

And it raises questions if this should have been reported in the emergency classification system such as a Unusual Event.

It is beyond utter incompetence and negligence with public reporting on plant events with Entergy and the NRC on this atrocious incomplete statement: "the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data". Entergy should have been forced to add a few sentences in the LER like, we still had wind speed and direction indication in the control room or this is how the site would have carried out the evacuation if we had become blind to knowing wind speed and direction.

Here again?  

Why didn’t Entergy carry fully out their licensing reporting responsibilities during Blizzard Nemo and why is the NRC negligent with enforcing their rules?

I see the meteorological instrumentation issue wasn’t

The NRC inspection reports are terribly incomplete. I discovered this in the NRC inspection report timeline...it was amazing they didn't comprehensively explain why the met towers didn't work in a emergency on the first inspection report.  

carried at all in your most recent inspection report. And the diesel smoke in the reactor building wasn’t covered in

 "This is so shoddy documentation reporting by both of you."-why did it take the NRC three years to comprehensively report on the met tower unreliability problems? 

the LER. This is so shoddy documentation reporting by both of you.

Would you add this to the docket?

Sincerely,

Mike Mulligan

Hinsdale, NH

I Identified Pilgrim's Met Tower Problem to NRC

Updated 10/2

The NRC didn't pick it up on their own...I discovered it first and reported it to the NRC. 

Pilgrim and NRC Blew Accident Reportability Requirements In Blizzard!

Basically this was a addendum to my Safety Relief Valve 10 CFR 2.206.

Inspection finds broken backup tower

Plant uses meteorological data for emergencies

By Christine Legere
clegere@capecodonline.com
Posted Oct. 1, 2015 at 11:29 PM   

PLYMOUTH — If a radiation leak had occurred at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, on eight occasions over the last three years, operators would have been forced to rely on the National Weather Service in Taunton to provide the meteorological information needed to tell them which regions were in danger of contamination.

A routine check at the plant done in August turned up four negative findings. While all four were considered of low

I believe the finding should have been much higher.

1) Risk consist if the component fails and how it impact the accident.

2) The met tower questions the competence of Pilgrim to understand problems and fix them early, this competence issue with the met towers, it is more global site wide...constitutes large risk.

3) Entergy with global safety competency issues as in #2...a tiny  competency risk affecting a fleet of plants globally turns into a huge risk.

4) The NRC with global issues as in #2...a tiny global  risk associated with a regulator's competency across a fleet of 100 plants turns into a humongous risk.

Risk is multidimensional and the NRC treats it as a isolated issue...this is a feedback mechanism. The agency and public never sees the real risk, thus becomes a inappropriate feedback mechanism.  

safety significance, one of the more serious ones was related to plant security — something the Nuclear Regulatory Commission cannot publicly discuss — and the other was related to the plant's meteorological towers. Entergy, Pilgrim's owner-operator, was notified of the inspection results Thursday.

Pilgrim, which has already been downgraded to among the three worst performing reactors in the country, has two towers on the property: a 220-foot main tower and a 160-foot backup. Their purpose is to provide continuous readings on wind speed and direction, and air temperature. In December 2011, Entergy canceled preventative maintenance on the backup tower and it became nonfunctional, according to the NRC’s letter to Pilgrim’s owner-operator dated Thursday.

“As a result, on eight occasions between March 12, 2012 and Aug. 15, 2015, when the 220-foot primary meteorological tower was non-functional for various reasons, Pilgrim did not have instrumentation available on either tower for continuous readings,” the letter said.

NRC spokeswoman Diane Screnci said operators would have been forced to rely on the National Weather Service for data, should a radiological emergency have occurred.

In its finding, the NRC noted the lack of the backup tower resulted in a lack of assurance that Entergy could “protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency.”

This isn’t the first time Entergy has been cited for the broken backup tower. The NRC had first noted the tower’s status following a routine inspection in late 2013.

Right, I hammered on the NRC in early 2013 with the Met Tower.  

At the time, federal officials said the finding was rated as low in safety significance because nothing bad had happened as a result.

Pilgrim spokeswoman Lauren Burm on Thursday acknowledged the company’s lack of action. “The NRC accurately determined that the station response to restoration of back-up meteorological monitoring was not timely,” Burm wrote in an email. “Since the issuance of the finding, the completion of the new MET Tower is well underway. “In accordance with our emergency procedures, we utilized the National Weather Service as backup.”

Scenci said the August inspection was routine, something the NRC does every 18 months.

The NRC spokeswoman noted the results of that inspection were significant because they reinforced the NRC’s decision to place Pilgrim in the lowest performance category in which the agency allows plants to continue to operate. The only other plants in the category, which is for reactors with frequent violations of federal standards, are Entergy’s two reactors at its Arkansas location.

While Burm is not allowed to elaborate on the security infraction found in August, she did make a comment:

“For the identified security related issues, it was noted that we did not respond in a timely manner to an equipment performance issue of very low safety significance,” Burm wrote. “The NRC did conclude, however, that actions were in place to ensure the station remained secure. “

Another criticism in the report was the tendency of Pilgrim operators to close corrective action reports prior to specified corrective actions being completed.

Burm said Entergy was taking the inspectors’ findings very seriously. “Pilgrim has modified our already comprehensive and significant site-wide program to address the gaps in our Corrective Action Program that are noted in this latest report,” she wrote. “Safety and quality performance are the first and foremost goals for each employee every day.”

Entergy is currently calculating the cost of the upgrades and inspections that will be required for the Pilgrim plant to move up from its position at the bottom of the performance list. Burm recently said that if the corporation finds the cost of making the improvements exceeds the value of the plant, it may consider permanently shutting Pilgrim down.

Entergy has 30 days to respond to the NRC’s latest inspection report.

— Follow Christine Legere on Twitter: @ClegereCCT.

By Christine Legere
clegere@capecodonline.com

capecodtimes.com

By Christine Legere
clegere@capecodonline.com

Posted Oct. 1, 2015 at 11:29 PM    

 

Hurricane Joaquin: South Carolina Nuclear Plant Flooding Threat

10/6 update

18 dams have failed so far. All rather small ones.

Update 10/5: It is good news we don't have any South Carolina nuke plant event reports this morning. It is a once every thousand year precipitation event.  

*** I’ve been told to ask this question: imagine the mixture of known hot shorts and bum flooding plans and components not occurring to licensing? 

It is highly doubtful Joaquin can strike South Carolina. But the cat 4 hurricane is going to pump unprecedented tropical ocean moisture into south Carolina. Up to 20 inches of water in a very short time.

If I were a nuclear plant in the vicinity of North Carolina, I'd be checking the precipitation licensing bases.

I am surprised the NRC hasn't got a blog web up on Hurricane Joaquin...



The Weather Channel:

South Carolina

Governor Nikki Haley declared a state of emergency Thursday evening in advance of any potential impacts from Hurricane Joaquin and flooding from a separate weather system.

In an Area Forecast Discussion released Thursday afternoon, the National Weather Service's Greenville-Spartanburg office warned residents of a, "Historic ... potentially life-threatening rainfall event expected this weekend" for northern South Carolina.

South Carolina's Emergency Management Division said in a Thursday release that residents should review emergency plans and prepare to take further action if the storm threatens the Palmetto State.

“Even if Hurricane Joaquin heads out to sea, the entire state could experience significant flooding from heavy rains that are predicted,” SCEMD Director Kim Stenson said in the release. “We’ve already seen flooding in many parts of South Carolina, these storm systems could make conditions worse.” 

One person was killed Thursday morning in Spartanburg, South Carolina, after several cars were submerged in floodwaters underneath a bridge.

VC Summers: Broad River, Monticello reservoir

HB Robison: Lake Robinson

Oconee:  Lake Keowee and Keowee River

"The maximum amount of precipitation expected would be 46.6 inches of rain over a 72-hour period, according to the report" to burst upstream dams and meltdown the plant.

Catawba: Catawba Reservoir and River

Vogtle: Savannah River.  

Pilgrim and NRC Blew Accident Reportability Requirements In Blizzard!

Updated Oct 1 2015

This is one of the clear examples where the failures of the OIG can be seen. Mr Guzman told me my meteorological problems at pilgrim were referred(May 2013)to the OIG. The OIG doesn't have a 

(2013)"Mr Guzman: So here is an official concern to the NRC by me. I am not crazy (On adams in 2013)!" 

transparent process with publicly documenting all referrals...they find it convenient to not disclose why they didn't accept or decline a referral. The open process holds the OIG accountable to the public. Who is the OIG of the OIG? 

I can make the case whistle-blower confidentiality and anonymity is nothing but a invention/tool...protection of the agency and nuclear industry.   

Does the OIG serve the greater public or just the congress? Are they just a corrupt arm of congress and political mega contribution to the politicians?

Just saying, as I laid it clearly out on this entry...if the OIG would have discussed the meteorological problem with me I would have told them Pilgrim and the NRC are overwhelmed with problems and are in a dire state of technical confusion. If the OIG was competent, they would have agreed with me. 

I was trying to save the Pilgrim Plant in 2013. 

They would have opened up a much wider investigation...they would have seen what was going on at the plant bringing us to today. They would have immediately demanded swift changes at pilgrim and the region 1. Ninety nine percent of the current problems at Pilgrim and the NRC would have been cut off at the 2013 early stage...

Nov 25, 2013: "Come on, Entergy Pilgrim is overwhelmed, as they are informing the NRC that they don’t have enough people to do the SRV LER" 

This just backs up my my long stated beliefs, as operability of Vermont Yankee was collapsing...the NRC turned off the oversight of Pilgrim. The agency felt Entergy was especially vulnerable over the closure of VY...they stopped enforcing regulations on Pilgrim trying to protect Entergy and the other big nuclear utilities.   

Guzman, Richard May 29, 2013 (1 day ago) to me Mr. Mulligan,  The purpose of this message is to acknowledge receipt of your e-mail correspondence below. As you requested, your message has been added to ADAMS and made publicly available. Your concerns have also been forwarded to the Office of Investigations and the Region I Office for consideration.  Sincerely,  Rich Guzman Sr. Project Manager NRR/DORL US NRC 301-415-1030 Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov

Reposted originally from May 2013

So the met tower asperator fan wasn't redundant and neither is the National Weather Service? 

“An element of the NRC’s Safety Philosophy that employs successive compensatory measures to prevent accidents or lessens the effects of damage if a malfunction or accident occurs at a nuclear facility. The NRC’s Safety Philosophy ensures that the public is adequately protected and that emergency plans surrounding a nuclear facility are well conceived and will work. Moreover, the philosophy ensures that safety will not be wholly dependent on any single element of the design, construction, maintenance, or operation of a nuclear facility.”

Nov 25:

Come on, Entergy Pilgrim is overwhelmed, as they are informing the NRC that they don’t have enough people to do the SRV LER...so the NRC is handling them with kid gloves.

Just saying, I called the Pilgrim NRC today. Thee resident had no idea wth the quality of the data with the national weather service. He had no record or analysis of the reliability of the NWS. Had no idea of the input of say the wind direction or speed...had no idea if the inputs or anything else had a back up power supply. He said it was the responsibility of Entergy to know that as they are paying for that service.

Well I said, what if we had a release and the Met didn’t work again.  Imagine if Pilgrim, the NRC and the national weather service bugled the evacuation data...can you imagine the public debate our nation would have over that for the next year?

The senior had no idea what caused the failure...he said their Region I or something  rad inspector came onto the site and did the inspection. He didn't do it.

He said Pilgrim would have been able to use the National Weather Service during and after Blizzard Nemo???

The inspection was really skimpy...

"...was out of service from February through March of this year because of impacts from the February bliz­zar..."

I wonder if the stop maintenance on the second Met tower and Entergy shutting it down is a cost saving measure?

I think the biggest violation is Entergy and the NRC didn't promptly notify the public?

Here below is my May 17, 2013 note that is on the NRC web site. So it's the fan motor. With the goings on with the employees cuts and the big mouth of the Union president....do they think somebody is talking to me?

May 17, 2013:

Pilgrim Cover-Up: Public Notification And Radiation Evac Plan Broke During Accident

May 28, 2013:

Mr Guzman,

So here is an official concern to the NRC by me. I am not crazy!

In LER 2013-003-00 Entergy admits the met instrumentation stopped recording data. Whatever that means? Was the spinning cups out in the weather frozen and iced over during blizzard Nemo or did the instruments fail because of the power failure? Was it just a data recording issue or did the site lose wind speed and direction indication in the control room or at the tech support center?

Cover-Up: Public Notification And RadiationEvac Plan Broke During Accident

I am calling it, they lost wind speed and direction indication in the control room and the evacuation plan was severely impaired.

Pilgrim LER 2013-003-00: "During the storm on February 8, meteorological instruments at PNPS recorded sustained wind speeds between 42 and 49 mph through 2338 hours at which time the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data until 1840 hours the following day. The wind direction was predominantly from the ocean toward the switchyard during the storm.

During Nemo Blizzard why didn’t Pilgrim make an event report like the Cooper station on 05/23/2013?

"At 1019 CDT, AC power was removed from the site meteorological monitoring system (MET) equipment for planned maintenance in order to remove abandoned equipment left in place since installing the new meteorological system in October 2012..."

Why was there no “major loss of assessment capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)" like the Cooper station?

"Since there was no direct information of site meteorological conditions during the period of lost power, CNS considered this to be a major loss of assessment capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

And it raises questions if this should have been reported in the emergency classification system such as a Unusual Event?

It raises issues if the Met instrumentation has failed in other power failures, blizzards and weather conditions and not reported as required?

It is beyond utter incompetence and negligence with public reporting on plant events with Entergy and the NRC...this atrociously incomplete statement: "the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data". Entergy should have been forced to add a few sentences like; we still had wind speed and direction indication in the control room or this is how the site would have carried out the evacuation if we had became blind to knowing wind speed and direction.

So why didn’t Entergy fully carry out their licensing reporting responsibilities during Blizzard Nemo and why is the NRC negligent with enforcing their rules?

I see the meteorological instrumentation issue wasn’t carried at all in your most recent inspection report. And the diesel smoke in the reactor building wasn’t covered in the LER. This is so shoddy documentation reporting by both of you.

Would you add this to the docket?

Sincerely,

Mike Mulligan

Hinsdale, NH

Nov 22:

Between Seabrook and Pilgrim, we sense a unannounced change of NRC policies or philosophy with shifting more to unsited violations from sited violation. I had one senior resident inspector bitching to me yesterday about this. It is a pain in the ass with sited violation for the inspector as well as the licence.

They don't care what their employees are put thought. Can you imagine the trauma of a event where they are requiring a community evacuation. Now you got a added complexity of calling the national weather service. Come on. Then as in Blizzard Nemo with widespread knocked down trees and power outages...I bet contact with the weather service was unpredictable and unreliable.

 Pilgrim plant cited for federal violation

 The meteorological towers are required under the plant’s emergency-response plan. According to the NRC report, the towers “provide data on the wind speed, wind direction, air temperature and delta air tem­perature to perform off-site dose assessment during a radio­logical emergency condition.” 

Sheehan said “both have been out of service for several peri­ods of time.” 

Entergy stopped performing preventative maintenance on one of the towers in late 2011. It then stopped functioning. The main tower, too, was out of service from March 2012 to July 2012 because of a broken aspirator fan; February through March of this year because of impacts from the February bliz­zard; and then again April 26 through 30.

Sinclair said plant operators still had access to meteorologi­cal information. “The National Weather Service was always available to provide the neces­sary data,”Sinclair said.

Nov 21:

Not many people is the USA would be able to catch this kind of error with Entergy and the NRC like I did. So I made them fess up!

The below inspection report is from the Professional Reactor Operator Society. It hasn't come out on the NRC's Adams site yet. I am holding by breath till then.

Think about it, On Aug 27, 2013 Entergy disclosed they were shutting down Vermont Yankee...

I am just perplexed with why the NRC didn't catch it when it first showed up...

The NRC should disclose in the inspection report that a outsider caught and made the NRC confront this...cause it now looks the agency caught it on their own. That's fraud! And they should use my name.

SUBJECT:PILGRIM – NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT -November 20, 2013

Green. A violation of 10 CFR Part 50.54(q)(2) because Entergy did not ensure that the Pilgrim Emergency Plan met the planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b). Specifically, on various occasions in 2012 and 2013, Pilgrim failed to maintain both meteorological towers as necessary to support emergency response. As of the date of this inspection, the 220’ meteorological tower was functional and the National Weather Service is still available as an alternate data source.

The inspectors determined that failure to maintain the 160’ and 220’ meteorological towers resulting in both towers being out of service concurrently for three separate periods in 2012 and 2013 was a performance deficiency that was within Entergy’s ability to foresee and correct. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the facilities and equipment attribute of the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency.

This finding has a cross- cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program, because Pilgrim did not take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues and trends in a timely manner. Specifically, the station did not take timely corrective actions to correct deficiencies associated with both meteorological towers resulting in both towers being simultaneously non-functional on multiple occasions.

Wrote this below on May 17, 2013...

Cover-Up: Public Notification and Radiation Evac Plan Broke During Accident.

The below I post on 6/22/13.

I believe that the plant trip and lost of site power was a extremely complicated 24 hours. I don't think they seen the lost of Met Tower for many hours after the trip. Maybe it was so complex they just missed calling the Met Tower inop.

And that is the rub, the public has no idea with how busy the crew was in the first 24 hours or so.

Originally published on 6/26/2013...

So why couldn't the NRC make a quick presumptive statement...we found merit with your concern or the agency found no merit. But the results will be in some future inspection...

It is a common tactic for the agency to stick it in a OIG or enforcement process where the results won't be seen for two years or so. This generally is the function of the enforcement and OIG investigation...to stick the violation into a prolonged investigation process so the violation emerges when the iron is not hot.

And that is the exact function of the OIG and enforcement... a huge delay tool that makes most violations obsolete and meaningless to a utility. I think actually this is a utility campaign contribution  process.

So the NRC and the Pilgrim are having a huge controversy with the Pilgrim Board of Selectman...the NRC says they have been abused at a recent meeting and they will never give another selectman meeting again. So the NRC is burying my complaint...hoping to get by this controversy.

....

They made a report on the JIC (Joint Information Center) to the Feds but not on the Meteorological instrumentation...so why wasn't the Met tower supplied by batteries or a back up power? Why wasn't the JIC on a back up power source?

This is how Entergy does emergency response in Guatemala?

"On Monday, February 11, 2013 at 1435 EST with Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) at 0% core thermal power, the Joint Information Center (JIC) was determined to be unavailable and was declared non-operational. [Power was lost] to the facility [due] to winter storm Nemo. This facility serves as the Joint Information Center for Entergy, State, and Federal organizations during an emergency response.

"Existing emergency procedures direct the responsible Emergency Plant Manager to relocate the JIC staff to the designated alternate location (Bridgewater State University) as required. It has been confirmed that the alternate location is available for use.

"The Emergency Response Organization has been informed to establish the JIC at the Moakley Center at Bridgewater State University in the event of a declared emergency classification requiring activation of this Emergency Response Facility.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

"This eight-hour notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency offsite response facility.

May 32: So here is my letter off the NRC web site!...they put it up!

Generally I don't get any acknowledgement with a concern as this...but I made a stink and called his boss.

Guzman, Richard	May 29 (1 day ago)
to me

Mr. Mulligan,

The purpose of this message is to acknowledge receipt of your e-mail correspondence below. As you requested, your message has been added to ADAMS and made publicly available. Your concerns have also been forwarded to the Office of Investigations and the Region I Office for consideration.

Sincerely,

Rich Guzman

Sr. Project Manager

NRR/DORL

US NRC

301-415-1030

Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov

Strange:  

May 26 (2 days ago)
Guzman, Richard
to me

I am out of the office from 5/24 to 5/28 and will return on 5/29. For urgent matters, please contact Mr. James Kim, at 301-415-4125.
….

May 26 (2 days ago)
Kim, James
to me

I am currently out of the office and I will return on May 29, 2013. For urgent matters regarding Catawba or McGuire Power Station, please contact the Backup PM, John Boska, at (301) 415-2901 or Branch Chief, Robert Pascarelli at (301) 415-6603.

Thanks,

Jim Kim

 

Power Reactor	Event Number: 49062
Facility: COOPER Region: 4 State: NE Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4 NRC Notified By: NATHAN L. BEGER HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL	Notification Date: 05/23/2013 Notification Time: 15:45 [ET] Event Date: 05/23/2013 Event Time: 10:19 [CDT] Last Update Date: 05/23/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE	Person (Organization): NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

TEMPORARY LOSS OF METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING SYSTEM DURING PLANNED MAINTENANCE "At 1019 CDT, AC power was removed from the site meteorological monitoring system (MET) equipment for planned maintenance in order to remove abandoned equipment left in place since installing the new meteorological system in October 2012. Removing AC power was not expected to have an effect since all MET information would continue to be available due to an 8-hour battery backup system installed at the meteorological tower. However, when power was removed, all onsite meteorological data was lost to the control room via the Plant Management Information System (PMIS). PMIS is the only display of local direct meteorological conditions available. Subsequently, [Cooper Nuclear Station] CNS determined the interface between MET system and PMIS was not powered from the 8 hour MET battery backup system which accounted for the lost MET indication. CNS corrected the condition and restored meteorological data to the control room via the PMIS system at 1219 CDT. "Site backup assessment capability relies on Meteorological model estimates from the National Weather Service out of Valley, Nebraska or on default values derived from historical local weather patterns. Since there was no direct information of site meteorological conditions during the period of lost power, CNS considered this to be a major loss of assessment capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)." The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

May 17, 2013:

Pilgrim Cover-Up: Public Notification And Radiation Evac Plan Broke During Accident

May 28, 2013:

Mr Guzman,

So here is an official concern to the NRC by me. I am not crazy!

In LER 2013-003-00 Entergy admits the met instrumentation stopped recording data. Whatever that means? Was the spinning cups out in the weather frozen and iced over during blizzard Nemo or did the instruments fail because of the power failure? Was it just a data recording issue or did the site lose wind speed and direction indication in the control room or at the tech support center?

Cover-Up: Public Notification And Radiation Evac Plan Broke During Accident

I am calling it, they lost wind speed and direction indication in the control room and the evacuation plan was severely impaired.

Pilgrim LER 2013-003-00: "During the storm on February 8, meteorological instruments at PNPS recorded sustained wind speeds between 42 and 49 mph through 2338 hours at which time the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data until 1840 hours the following day. The wind direction was predominantly from the ocean toward the switchyard during the storm.

During Nemo Blizzard, why didn’t Pilgrim make an event report like the Cooper station on 05/23/2013?

"At 1019 CDT, AC power was removed from the site meteorological monitoring system (MET) equipment for planned maintenance in order to remove abandoned equipment left in place since installing the new meteorological system in October 2012..."

Why was there no “major loss of assessment capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)" like the Cooper station?

"Since there was no direct information of site meteorological conditions during the period of lost power, CNS considered this to be a major loss of assessment capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

And it raises questions if this should have been reported in the emergency classification system such as a Unusual Event?

It raises issues if the Met instrumentation has failed in other power failures, blizzards and weather conditions and not reported as required?

It is beyond utter incompetence and negligence with public reporting on plant events with Entergy and the NRC...this atrociously incomplete statement: "the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data". Entergy should have been forced to add a few sentences like; we still had wind speed and direction indication in the control room or this is how the site would have carried out the evacuation if we had became blind to knowing wind speed and direction.

So why didn’t Entergy fully carry out their licensing reporting responsibilities during Blizzard Nemo and why is the NRC negligent with enforcing their rules?

I see the meteorological instrumentation issue wasn’t carried at all in your most recent inspection report. And the diesel smoke in the reactor building wasn’t covered in the LER. This is so shoddy documentation reporting by both of you.

Would you add this to the docket?

Sincerely,

Mike Mulligan

Hinsdale, NH

Did The NRC Streamline Their Organization For Guys Like Me Too?

Did The NRC Streamline Their Organization For Guys Like Me Too?

NRC Announces Management Changes, Streamlining

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission today announced senior personnel changes that help streamline agency management and broaden the scope and diversity of its leadership at the top as the agency works to reduce its size in the coming years.

The most senior changes – which required Commission approval and will occur in early November – include:

Deputy Executive Director for Material, Waste, Research, State, Tribal and Compliance Programs Mike Weber will become director of the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research;

Jennifer Uhle, currently deputy director for engineering in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, will become director of the Office of New Reactors;

Director of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Catherine Haney will become the Region II regional administrator in January, succeeding Victor McCree, who just assumed the agency’s most senior career position, Executive Director for Operations (EDO).

In addition, the position vacated by Weber will absorb new corporate management responsibilities and be known as the Deputy EDO for Materials, Waste, Research, State, Tribal, Compliance Administration and Human Capital (DEDM), effectively reducing one deputy EDO position and moving the Office of Administration and the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer under the newly titled post. Darren Ash, the current deputy EDO for corporate management, remains as the agency’s Chief Information Officer and the Office of Information Services is renamed the Office of the Chief Information Officer.

Future announcements will focus on additional steps to fill vacancies created by personnel movements and enhance succession planning.

“Our agency faces the challenge of reducing our size, becoming more efficient and delivering more value for the money,” said NRC Chairman Stephen G. Burns. “The steps announced today will put in place a management structure well suited to ensuring we accomplish our mission of protecting people and the environment even as we reduce our size and budget.”

“In my discussion with the Chairman and Commissioners, I recommended changes to a number of senior executive positions as well as a change in the organizational structure of the Office of the EDO,” said McCree. “The recommendations were inspired by a desire to support agency streamlining…

NRC’s Alternate Disputed Resolution

Have we ever had a "independent" investigation on the NRC's ADS?
 
Does the NRC's and licensees arbitrators "split the baby" in order to drum up the arbitrator business? 

Brutalized Behind Bars in New York State

"State corrections officials moved to fire the officer. But the politically powerful union exercised a contract provision that puts disciplinary cases like this one before an arbitrator who is jointly chosen by the union and the corrections department. Arbitrators often end up “splitting the baby” to keep both sides satisfied and ensure they are chosen for future cases. Even when compelling evidence warrants dismissal, officers often get off with less."

Alternative Dispute Resolution in the NRC's Enforcement Program