Junk Plant FitzPatrick Has Massive Fuel Defects?

Update Aug 8

Did Rick get any information on the fuel failures? I actually don't think the administration is very pro nuclear. They will go around trying to get the nukies and utilities to support the administration,  but trump won't put any real skin in the game. The dems act like in ways with the anti nuclear groups, but really don't actively show skin deep support. 

U.S. Energy Secretary Rick Perry and Rep. John Katko (R-Camillus) toured the FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant in Oswego County Wednesday as part of his push to “make nuclear cool again.”

***Do we have a industry problem with fuel defects...

August 6, 2018

SUBJECT: JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/201800 

FitzPatrick Cycle 23 Fuel Defects

On November 5, 2017, Exelon identified a third fuel defect in the cycle 23 core that has resulted in full insertion of five control rods to date to mitigate the consequences of operating with defective fuel in the current fuel cycle.  Exelon initiated a root cause investigation under IR 4097375 that will not be complete until the defective fuel is cleaned and examined in detail following completion of the next refueling outage.

Is Junk Plant Palo Verde Operations Becoming More Erratic?

Update Aug 8

Pinnacle West probably got the ratepayers so pissed at them, everyone will vote for the referendum just to get even this corporation.   

By Patrick O'Grady  – Managing Editor, Phoenix Business Journal

Aug 8, 2018, 1:44am

Arizona Public Service Co. will get a hearing next month to address customer concerns the utility's recent rate hike was more than what was allowed.

An administrative law judge will hear complaints from APS customers on Sept. 25 that the utility is charging more than the average 4.5 percent approved last year by the Arizona Corporation Commission, according to the Arizona Republic.

Officials for the utility and its parent, Pinnacle West Capital Corp. (NYSE: PNW) say the bills and its recent revenue are in line with the rate plan that eventually was approved by the ACC.

Customers, led by local public relations professional and activist Stacey Champion, have questioned bills they say are significantly higher than what APS said. They have asked for a rehearing of the rate case.

APS for its part defends the rate case saying that the average bill would have people who might have saved money under the plan as well as people whose bills would be larger than the average.

The rate increase was said to raise residential customer bills $6 on average and began implementation of new time-of-use plans. Under the plans, rates would be significantly higher during peak hours, depending on the plan.

***Palo Verde is facing a permanent shutdown if the green energy referendum is passed this year. They won't be economical. I feel in recent years this 3 plant facility has been operating more erratically than from its history. They been down powered or shutdown outside of scheduling.   

August 6, 2018  

SUBJECT: PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION – NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000528/2018002, 05000529/2018002, AND 05000530/2018002
 

Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power.  On April 5, 2018, power was reduced to 40 percent as directed by Station Chemistry procedures to address sodium levels caused by leakage into the main condenser.  Unit 1 returned to full power on April 12, 2018, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
 Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power.  On May 23, 2018, the reactor tripped from full power when maintenance on the control element drive mechanism control system resulted in a dropped control rod.  The dropped control rod caused a valid reactor trip signal for low departure from nucleate boiling ratio.  Unit 2 restarted on May 25, 2018; however, a different control element drive mechanism control system problem occurred requiring power to be held at 10 percent for additional repairs.  Unit 2 returned to full power on May 27, 2018, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
 Unit 3 began the inspection period at rated thermal power.  Unit 3 shut down for a planned refueling outage from April 6 through May 4, 2018.  Unit 3 returned to full power on May 7, 2018.  On June 27, 2018, Unit 3 the steam generator 1 economizer valve failed (main feedwater regulating valve).  Operator performance issues in responding to this condition resulted in a main feedwater pump trip and reactor cutback, reactor trip caused by low steam generator water level, and a main steam isolation signal due to subsequent high steam generator water level.  Unit 1 remained shut down for repairs during the remainder of the inspection period.

Junk Plant Grand Gulf Restarted From 50 Day Outage...Lets Watch It Till 100% Power

Aug 27

Back up to 100%. Is my power watch finished.

Aug 24

87%

Aug 23

GG up to 94%.

River Bend down to 77.

But ANO all up to 100%.

Aug 22

I considered my watch on Grand Gulf over back on Aug 22. But they are down to 65% and River Bend is still at 70%. Such eradicate power operations... 

Aug 20

Well, Grand Gulf is finally at 100%. It sure took a long time to get there. River Bend is at 70%. It has been a long time since the board was all green for Entergy in region 4. 

Aug 16

GG 94%

River Bend 70%

Aug 15

Continuing capacity factor problems with Sothern's south-western fleet? 

GG 94%

now River Bend 70% 

Update Aug 10

9%

They must have fixed something. Almost there.  


Update Aug 9

68%

Not good, a little back sliding

The magnitude of this plant operating at less than 100% in the last few years is astonishing. These plants and components are not designed to be operated at less than 100%. They are supposed to zip up to 100% power.

Here is a example of going off the well warn engineering component design path. What kind of surprises can expect with this Grand Gulf dad behavior?  

Pipe Rupture at Surry Nuclear Plant Kills Four Workers

That monitoring program identified pipe wall thinning of two elbows on Unit 3 in 1980 that were replaced. Monitoring performed in March 1982 on Unit 2 identified substantial erosion in the piping elbow that ruptured three months later. But the thinning was accepted because it was less than the company’s criterion for replacement. It’s not been determined whether prolonged operation at reduced power between March and June 1982 caused more rapid wear than anticipated or whether the ultrasonic inspection in March 1982 may have missed the thinnest wall thickness.

Aug 8

GG 79%

Aug 5

GG 51% power

ANO is going off my watch at 98% power. I won't rule out a trip on the final 2% POWER. 

Aug 4

GG 59%

ANO 64%

Aug 3

GG 58%

ANO 65%


Aug 2

Here we go again. Grand Gulf 58%

ANO 64%

Update Aug 1

Grand Gulf 27%

ANO 64%

originally posted on 7/12...reposted. 

July 31

Can you even believe this horror show in the deep summer season. It is a disgrace. 

Grand Gulf 27%

ANO 64%

July 30

Grand Gulf 76%

ANO 64%


July 27

68%

ANO 64

Their washing gads and U 235 of money down the toilet.  

July 26

Good news. They must have fixed something. Up to 58% power. ANO is still stuck at 65% percent power. I bet you that 50 day outage was much more than 50 million dollars. The length and cost of the outage is a statement on how far in the hole the NRC allowed this plant get. As far as these plants being not being fully prepared for full plant operations in the middle of the summer, this is a disgrace.   

July 25

Stuck at 24% power. One of the ANO plants has been stuck at 65% for two days. 

July 24

24% power

July 23

Big progress, not. 27% power

Update July 20

17% Power-highly abnormal startup. 

Update July 19

15% power today. These guys are getting deeper into poor performance.  

Update July 18

Stuck at 14%

Update July 17

14% power and losing money badly!!!

Update July 16

Took my advice a little. Must be on the turbine bypass. Been at about 16% all weekend. How can these guys even make money? During the last few years Grand Gulf has a horrifical capacity factor.    

Update July 13

Don't forget about Entergy-ANO's very troublesome startup from the their outage. This is a indication corporate Entergy is heavily wheezing over their nuclear financial pressures.    

Stuck at 3%. Am I a prophet or what? This plant should have been completely ready for startup. It wasn't. They weren't ready to begin pulling rods. Hanging around the low power levels is really unprofessional and unsafe. The plants weren't really designed for this. They are supposed to zip up deep into the power range. This increases the risk of a meltdown and the severely of the off site releases.     

***1% Power Today.

Lets see if they are any better than their sister Plant ANO? 

Duane Arnold: Another One Bitting The Dust

Owner of Iowa's lone nuclear plant plans to shutter it by 2020

NextEra Energy, owner of the Duane Arnold Energy Center, says it will retire Iowa's lone nuclear plant in late 2020, five years earlier than anticipated.

The Florida-based utility said Alliant Energy, the plant's largest power user, has agreed to pay NextEra $110 million to shorten its agreement to purchase power from Duane Arnold.

Alliant said it will partially replace the nuclear energy with wind energy from NextEra and expects new energy deals will save Iowa customers nearly $300 million over 21 years, even after the utility pays NextEra to end its contract early...

What I Think Is Going On With The NHDOT

Hmmm, the Keene sentinel wouldn't let me place this on their site. We will see if I am right. 

This is what I think is going on. The politicians have been massively underfunding the NHDOT for 50 year or more. The bridge department is a function of that. The rate of decline of these old bridge is intensifying, we can't even keep up with enough roads and bridges for our continued economy. So the bridge department was force to live with insufficient money. I know you guys didn't want to create any hardships to your neighbors and community. So in the name of doing good, you tried to stretch the old bridge resources thinking a big hunk of money would eventually come down the line. We put the bridge department in a impossibly position, we actually victimizes the actually bridge inspectors. I know there are employees all around jocking for jobs and promotions. I know there has been repeated mass layoffs at the NHDOT. It is insane how our politicians has treated the NHDOT. I know for a fact, politicians have traded bridges for political favors and money. The bridge inspection job had become really dirty and you were required to play if you wanted to keep your job. Man, would I like to talk to you. Can you give me a call? Call anytime.  

Junk CDRMs: Massive Employee Radiation Dose and Might Have to Replace Heads?

How is this associated to the damaged baffle plate screws and with lower upper head bypass flow? 
?
The two plants with high levels of BFB degradation are Westinghouse reactors with a 4-loop design, operating in a downflow configuration with Type 347 stainless steel bolts.  The NRC staff determined that plants with these characteristics are most susceptible to high levels of BFB degradation and identified a total of seven reactors in this group.  Although the two plants that found extensive bolt degradation have taken corrective actions, including...

Table 1: Plants with Higher Susceptibility to Thermal Sleeve Flange Wear A.W. Vogtle 1 & 2 Maanshan 1 & 2 Ascó I & II McGuire 1 & 2 Braidwood 1 & 2 Millstone 3 Byron 1 & 2 Seabrook Callaway Sequoyah 1 & 2 Catawba 1 & 2 Shearon Harris Comanche Peak 1 & 2 Sizewell B Diablo Canyon 2 South Texas 1 & 2 Doel 4* Tihange 3* Hanbit 1 & 2 Watts Bar 1 & 2 Kori 2*, 3 & 4 Wolf Creek
* T-hot but T-cold capable
2 T-Cold capable plants are essentially a hybrid of T-Hot and T-Cold with some head spray cooling nozzles plugged and some open (not quite T-Cold).  In this configuration there is uncertainty as to whether the local jets will cause local flow conditions similar to T-Cold; therefore, these plants are conservatively assumed to have a higher susceptibility to thermal sleeve flange wear. 
NSAL-18-1 Page 7 of 10
Table 2: Plants with Lower Susceptibility to Thermal Sleeve Flange Wear Almaraz 1 & 2 Point Beach 1* & 2* Angra 1 Prairie Island 1* & 2* Beaver Valley 1 & 2 R.E. Ginna* D.C. Cook 1 & 2 Ringhals 2, 3 & 4 Diablo Canyon 1 Salem 1 & 2 Doel 1** & 2** Surry 1 & 2 Indian Point 2 & 3 Takahama 1 Mihama 1* Tihange 1 North Anna 1 & 2 Turkey Point 3 & 4 Ohi 1 & 2 * The indicated plants have 14x14 guide tubes with gaps between the guide funnel and upper guide tube that will limit flange wear and prevent flange separation.  Therefore, the recommendations in this NSAL do not apply to these plants. ** The indicated plants have 14x14 guide tubes and gaps between the guide funnel and the upper guide tube which are nearly the same as the distance required for flange separation.

These kinds of things come from exceeding the plants useful life. Expect more of this in the future.  

This might force utilities to prematurely replace their heads. This is going to be enormously costly both in money and employee doses. 

When it comes to impairing capacity factor, these utilities guys would consume as much dose as needed without a conscience. If it comes to impairing profits, these guys will whine like little girls about consuming dose for their employees. In other words, their will defer maintenance and safety inspection because the radiation dose is too high for the risk.    

Subject: Thermal Sleeve Flange Wear Leads to Stuck Control Rod Number: NSAL-18-1 Basic Component: Thermal Sleeve in CRDM Reactor Head Penetration Date: July 9, 2018
Substantial Safety Hazard or Failure to Comply Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(a) Transfer of Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(b) Advisory Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(2)
Yes  No   N/A  

SUMMARY In accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, Westinghouse reported an issue associated with thermal sleeve wear as a potential defect in May 2018 [1].  This NSAL provides details on the thermal sleeve flange issue to provide affected licensees a basis for operation and inspection recommendations. Operating experience (OE) has shown that for Westinghouse nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) plants that have thermal sleeves in the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) penetration tubes, the wear of the thermal sleeve flange against the tube could have potential consequences that were not previously considered.  Recently, during a startup following a refueling outage at an Électricité de France (EdF) plant, Belleville Unit 2, a flange remnant from a separated thermal sleeve became cocked and interfered with control rod movement.  The previous safety evaluations of separated sleeves and flanges, in topical report PWROG-16003-P [2] and Technical Bulletin TB-07-2, Revision 3 [3] considered this interference to be unlikely based on the information that was available at that time.  Consequently, it was concluded that a stuck control rod was unlikely.  Considering the new OE from EdF [4], and the design similarities between the Belleville Unit 2 thermal sleeves and those used in Westinghouse NSSS plants and replacement reactor vessel heads, the inspection recommendations for thermal sleeve flanges in TB-07-2, Revision 3 may be insufficient.  While there have been no reported events of control rods failing to insert into the core when required, Westinghouse reported this issue to the NRC under 10 CFR Part 21 because it had the potential to create a substantial safety hazard.  

Junk Plant Hope Creek: Chickens Coming Home To Roost On Their Poor Perfoming SRVs

Update

If the NRC were to order Hope Creek to shutdown to fix their damaged SRVs...I am sure you would never see another SRV failure LER. Or a drastic decline. It would do the same for all the plants with similar troubled valves. But the NRC's got absolutely no teeth. 

Remember, we are really talking about steam leaks across both seats. Once the steam leak begins it damages and more erodes the seat. It is call steam cutting the seat. Damaged valves then are more tremendously susceptible to a valve flying open and stuck open or struck shut. Especially when a plant is put under stress.        

Update

Last LER

During the twenty-first refueling outage (H1R21), all fourteen SRV pilot stage assemblies were removed for testing at an offsite facility. Between April 20 and May 11, 2018, HCGS received the test results for all fourteen of the SRV pilot valve assemblies. A total of eight of the fourteen SRV pilot stage assemblies experienced set-point drift outside of the TS 3.4.2.1 specified values. All of the valves failing to meet the limits were Target Rock Model 7567F two-stage SRVs.

Are the new three stage SRVs failing in masses in the below LER  

One before the last LER

 The station is planning the replacement of the currently installed Target Rock two-stage SRVs with three-stage SRVs that are expected to eliminate setpoint drift events exceeding +/-3% and improve SRV reliability. The replacement is expected to begin in the next planned refueling outage, H1 R21, in the spring of 2018, pending resolution of open technical items with the valve manufacturer. The replacement will take place over several outages in order to replace all fourteen SRVs.

On my call, the NRC forced Hope to admit these valves are up to the quality standards. 

 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS  

1. All 14 SRV pilot stage assemblies were removed and replaced with pre-tested, certified spare pilot valves (H1 R21).  

2. Evaluate options for the replacement of the currently installed Target Rock two-stage SRVs with a design that eliminates setpoint drift events exceeding +/-3% and improve SRV reliability. The replacement schedule will be developed after a suitable valve is identified. 

...I put a tremendous pressure on the NRC for them to get a handle on Hope's Creek Safety Relief Valves. I have always worried about the repeated and erratic valve failures and tech spec violations eventually transforming themselves into multiple valve failure. What we are seeing here is the proliferation of normalization of devience. We are seeing it right before our eyes in documents. And don't forget about the term of frog boiling.

Hope Creek and NRC  aren't required to report the temperature increases and leaking to the public.

I think these leaks and temperature increases are a common cause. This is like there is a manufacturing defect in a all the springs...this is what causing all the valve failure. A terror to the nuclear industry is when both emergency diesel generator's fail at the same time from a manufacturing defect in a identical component in a severe accident.    

Remember what happened at Pilgrim. They had similar SRV leaks and temperature rises. I complained about this. Then two valves failed in a severe blizzard and they got into a troublesome shutdown. This led to their shutdown.   

Now I am going to view the last SRV LERs. Did they put some new materials in the SRV that is causing the SRV failing in mass. It could be like test stand damage like pilgrim?  

• Seven of the fourteen SRV tailpipe temperatures experienced 30 degree F step increases, which can indicate potential SRV pilot leakage.
• over the last five operating cycles on average six SRV tailpipe temperatures experienced large temperature increases per cycle
• The inspectors also noted that the ‘H’ SRV tailpipe temperature was elevated prior to the most recent spring 2018 refueling outage and then again during reactor startup.

July 18, 2018

SUBJECT: HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000354/2018002

Elevated Main Steam SRV Tailpipe Temperatures The inspectors noted that since Hope Creek restarted from the refueling outage on May 10, 2018, seven of the fourteen SRV tailpipe temperatures experienced 30 degree F step increases, which can indicate potential SRV pilot leakage.  (‘H’ on May 10, ‘K’ on May 13, ‘D’ on May 15, ‘E’ on May 24, ‘P’ on May 29, ‘B’ on June 8, ‘F’ on June 19)  After the ‘P’ tailpipe temperature increased on May 29, the inspectors discussed the potential adverse trend with PSEG.  The inspectors also noted that, over the last five operating cycles on average six SRV tailpipe temperatures experienced large temperature increases per cycle.  PSEG initiated actions in NOTF 20796507 to address the potential adverse trend.  The inspectors also noted that the ‘H’ SRV tailpipe temperature was elevated prior to the most recent spring 2018 refueling outage and then again during reactor startup.  In response, PSEG staff suspected that main seat leakage may be occurring.  Based on a preliminary review of tailpipe temperatures changes during a planned down power in June 2018, PSEG concluded that the ‘H’ and ‘K’ SRV tailpipe temperatures likely exhibited signs of SRV main seat leakage.  PSEG engineering continues to review the SRV tailpipe temperatures and pressure trends for all fourteen SRVs.

The inspectors considered that the increase in documented NOTFs concerning FLEX and elevated SRV tailpipe temperatures since January 1, 2018, represented inspector identified emerging trends.    These examples also represented missed opportunities to effectively use all of the tools available in the CAP, including PSEG’s trending procedure, LS-AA-125-1005, which discusses the generation of notifications and the routine conduct of cognitive trend analyses. 

The inspectors evaluated all of the issues above in accordance with the guidance in IMC 0612, Appendix B, “Issue Screening,” and Appendix E, “Examples of Minor Issues,” and determined the issues were of minor significance because the inspectors did not identify any CAQ that were not appropriately corrected or scheduled for correction in a reasonable period of time as a result of the failure to implement the NOTF screening process appropriately.  Consequently, these issues were not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC’s enforcement policy.

Junk Plant Browns Ferry SRVs: Where Has Science And Engineering Gone In These Plants

These guys have repeatedly put different exotic coating on these valve over the past decade. Platinum was just the latest coating that emediately failed upon first use. So now they experimented on the failed platinum coating by doing some kind of new surface preparation. So now the original platinum failed, then the platinum and new surface preparation emediately failed in a worst way (platinum anti-corrosion coatings flaking off). It happens all the time with the new coating failing worst than the last coating or fix. 

In my old days, you never did any experimentations in a commercial nuclear plant. You would comprehensively test the coating, material and component in a laboratory under the same or worst condition (environment)the material was going into the plant. And there would be hell to pay by the NRC if any surprises showed up in plant after the stringent laboratory testing.              

Licensee Event Report 50-296/2018-004-00 

10 CFR 50.73
The enclosed Licensee Event Report provides details of the inoperability of three Main Steam Relief Valves for longer than allowed by plant Technical Specifications. The Tennessee Valley Authority is submitting this report in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications

On May 17, 2018, the Tennessee Valley Authority was presented with as-found testing results indicating that three of the thirteen Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs) from Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3, were outside the +/- 3 percent setpoint band required for their operability. Troubleshooting determined that the three MSRV discs failed by corrosion bonding to their valve seats. The valve discs were previously platinum coated to prevent this, and this was the first Unit 3 MSRV service interval to implement an improved surface treatment to prevent coating delamination.
These three MS RVs were found to have been inoperable for an indeterminate period of time between March 26, 2016, and February 17, 2018, which is longer than permitted by Technical Specifications (TS). The affected valves remained capable of maintaining reactor pressure within American Society of Mechanical Engineers code limits. Additionally, the valves' ability to open under remote-manual operation, activation through the Automatic Depressurization System, or MSRV Automatic Actuation Logics were not affected. The valves remained capable of performing their required safety function.
The valves failed to open within their TS required limits due to the valve discs corrosion bonding to their seats, as a result of their platinum anti-corrosion coatings flaking off. The immediate corrective action was to replace all thirteen of the Unit 3 MSRV pilot valves with refurbished valves during the Unit 3 Refueling Outage 18. The corrective action was to ensure pilot discs are prepared for platinum coating in accordance with the revised procedure which requires nitrogen pressure testing to verify valve seal functionality prior to coating.
NRC

The Governor's Office Asked Me To Call Mr. Lyford's (NHDOT) Office

He is the lead engineer over the new bridge building project. I am confused as hell why the gov's office wants me to talked to him. How is he involved with bridge inspection office? I argued that to the governor's aid. 

The governor's office told me to call Mr Lyford about a week ago and before the inspection report came out. I got around to call him yesterday and sent him this email. His secretary answered the call. She said he was in a meeting.  

Michael Mulligan <steamshovel2002@yahoo.com>

To:donald.lyford@dot.nh.gov

Cc:Robert.Landry@dot.nh.gov

‎Jul‎ ‎24 at ‎2‎:‎09‎ ‎PM

2018 Routine/Fracture Critical Member Inspection Report

The Popperville Town Hall

The Popperville Town Hall How to blow the whistle.

"Collaspe of the Brattleboro-Hinsdale Bridge: Coverup in Gov Sununu's Office"

As you can see in my recent photograph on the Anna Hunt Marsh Bridge (east footing), the rocker or roller bearing is resting against the bridge footing. The bearing is completely obstructed and non functional.

How come the Hoyle Tanner inspectors didn't describe this? Obliviously the footing was constructed in the wrong place. Well, rather the new footing. 

The degradation of this bridge from the last inspection (fair) to this inspection (poor) is startling. It went from fair to poor in about two years. That would be my proof of bridge inspection falsifications.  I figure the new bridge will not be opened for five or six years. Base on this rate of degradation, it going to be three grades below poor when the new bride is operation.

There is just too much uncertainty going on here and you guys know it. 

I have been a advocate on the dangerousness of this bridge for many years. 

Sincerely,

Mike Mulligan 

Hinsdale, NH

16032094206