Junk Plant Hope Creek: Chickens Coming Home To Roost On Their Poor Perfoming SRVs

Update

If the NRC were to order Hope Creek to shutdown to fix their damaged SRVs...I am sure you would never see another SRV failure LER. Or a drastic decline. It would do the same for all the plants with similar troubled valves. But the NRC's got absolutely no teeth. 

Remember, we are really talking about steam leaks across both seats. Once the steam leak begins it damages and more erodes the seat. It is call steam cutting the seat. Damaged valves then are more tremendously susceptible to a valve flying open and stuck open or struck shut. Especially when a plant is put under stress.        

Update

Last LER

During the twenty-first refueling outage (H1R21), all fourteen SRV pilot stage assemblies were removed for testing at an offsite facility. Between April 20 and May 11, 2018, HCGS received the test results for all fourteen of the SRV pilot valve assemblies. A total of eight of the fourteen SRV pilot stage assemblies experienced set-point drift outside of the TS 3.4.2.1 specified values. All of the valves failing to meet the limits were Target Rock Model 7567F two-stage SRVs.

Are the new three stage SRVs failing in masses in the below LER  

One before the last LER

 The station is planning the replacement of the currently installed Target Rock two-stage SRVs with three-stage SRVs that are expected to eliminate setpoint drift events exceeding +/-3% and improve SRV reliability. The replacement is expected to begin in the next planned refueling outage, H1 R21, in the spring of 2018, pending resolution of open technical items with the valve manufacturer. The replacement will take place over several outages in order to replace all fourteen SRVs.

On my call, the NRC forced Hope to admit these valves are up to the quality standards. 

 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS  

1. All 14 SRV pilot stage assemblies were removed and replaced with pre-tested, certified spare pilot valves (H1 R21).  

2. Evaluate options for the replacement of the currently installed Target Rock two-stage SRVs with a design that eliminates setpoint drift events exceeding +/-3% and improve SRV reliability. The replacement schedule will be developed after a suitable valve is identified. 

...I put a tremendous pressure on the NRC for them to get a handle on Hope's Creek Safety Relief Valves. I have always worried about the repeated and erratic valve failures and tech spec violations eventually transforming themselves into multiple valve failure. What we are seeing here is the proliferation of normalization of devience. We are seeing it right before our eyes in documents. And don't forget about the term of frog boiling.

Hope Creek and NRC  aren't required to report the temperature increases and leaking to the public.

I think these leaks and temperature increases are a common cause. This is like there is a manufacturing defect in a all the springs...this is what causing all the valve failure. A terror to the nuclear industry is when both emergency diesel generator's fail at the same time from a manufacturing defect in a identical component in a severe accident.    

Remember what happened at Pilgrim. They had similar SRV leaks and temperature rises. I complained about this. Then two valves failed in a severe blizzard and they got into a troublesome shutdown. This led to their shutdown.   

Now I am going to view the last SRV LERs. Did they put some new materials in the SRV that is causing the SRV failing in mass. It could be like test stand damage like pilgrim?  

• Seven of the fourteen SRV tailpipe temperatures experienced 30 degree F step increases, which can indicate potential SRV pilot leakage.
• over the last five operating cycles on average six SRV tailpipe temperatures experienced large temperature increases per cycle
• The inspectors also noted that the ‘H’ SRV tailpipe temperature was elevated prior to the most recent spring 2018 refueling outage and then again during reactor startup.

July 18, 2018

SUBJECT: HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000354/2018002

Elevated Main Steam SRV Tailpipe Temperatures The inspectors noted that since Hope Creek restarted from the refueling outage on May 10, 2018, seven of the fourteen SRV tailpipe temperatures experienced 30 degree F step increases, which can indicate potential SRV pilot leakage.  (‘H’ on May 10, ‘K’ on May 13, ‘D’ on May 15, ‘E’ on May 24, ‘P’ on May 29, ‘B’ on June 8, ‘F’ on June 19)  After the ‘P’ tailpipe temperature increased on May 29, the inspectors discussed the potential adverse trend with PSEG.  The inspectors also noted that, over the last five operating cycles on average six SRV tailpipe temperatures experienced large temperature increases per cycle.  PSEG initiated actions in NOTF 20796507 to address the potential adverse trend.  The inspectors also noted that the ‘H’ SRV tailpipe temperature was elevated prior to the most recent spring 2018 refueling outage and then again during reactor startup.  In response, PSEG staff suspected that main seat leakage may be occurring.  Based on a preliminary review of tailpipe temperatures changes during a planned down power in June 2018, PSEG concluded that the ‘H’ and ‘K’ SRV tailpipe temperatures likely exhibited signs of SRV main seat leakage.  PSEG engineering continues to review the SRV tailpipe temperatures and pressure trends for all fourteen SRVs.

The inspectors considered that the increase in documented NOTFs concerning FLEX and elevated SRV tailpipe temperatures since January 1, 2018, represented inspector identified emerging trends.    These examples also represented missed opportunities to effectively use all of the tools available in the CAP, including PSEG’s trending procedure, LS-AA-125-1005, which discusses the generation of notifications and the routine conduct of cognitive trend analyses. 

The inspectors evaluated all of the issues above in accordance with the guidance in IMC 0612, Appendix B, “Issue Screening,” and Appendix E, “Examples of Minor Issues,” and determined the issues were of minor significance because the inspectors did not identify any CAQ that were not appropriately corrected or scheduled for correction in a reasonable period of time as a result of the failure to implement the NOTF screening process appropriately.  Consequently, these issues were not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC’s enforcement policy.