Mesothelioma In Nuclear Plants

I worked with Don Jadloski in the operations department for a decade. I was on his shift for the last years of his life (1992). We spend hours talking about our personal, family, exspeciually car problems on shift. Oh man, we'd talk on and on about car issue and the history of it. We talked on and on about the design of GM cars...I had a expensive one always in the shop.  

It started off as a pain in the back he couldn't get rid of. He went to one doctor after another but nobody could figure it out. He'd get colds much worst than normal and issues of lung infections. Then he got pneumonia. Then Mesothelioma... He always worried about it.

He worked at Oyster Creek when the plant was new. They were having main condenser tube leaks. Somebody came up with the bright idea of dumping asbestos in the inlet of the main condenser. Some of asbestos fibers would get sucked into the tiny holes and close off the leak. Most of the asbestos by the tons went into bay. He dumped tons of this stuff in a mixing tank over many years. It worked kinda good.

I visited him in the hospital in the last week of his life. He had one lung removed two years prior...he kinda thought it was caught. It was just wishful thinking. Then it got into the second one. It is like slowly drowning to death. It is a horrible horrible death. He had two beautiful daughters. He was so proud of them. They went through many boyfriends...they were beautiful. We worked together during the teenage years and marriage years. My kids were much younger. He told me pitifully, the girls always had the upper hand. Don told me his daughters were always in control of the boyfriends. It was total control. It was sickening how slavish the boys and would-be husbands were to his daughters. Both of them! Don smugly would declare, "the young men by the dozens didn't have any dignity at all?

Alabama judge awards $3.5 million in mesothelioma death case involving TVA plant 

By Lucy Berry | lberry@al.com The Huntsville Times
 
on October 06, 2015 at 6:21 PM, updated October 06, 2015 at 6:27 PM
 
The family of a Florence woman who died in 2013 from the lung disease mesothelioma will receive a $3.5 million award for her pain and suffering and medical expenses.

U.S. District Judge Lynwood Smith. (File)

 

Court records dating back to 2012 show Barbara Bobo inhaled secondhand asbestos fibers while laundering her husband's work clothes for more than two decades. Bobo's husband, James, did clean-up work for a period of time after asbestos insulation was installed at the Athens-based Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, which is owned and operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority.
 
James Bobo, who began working for the plant in 1975, died of asbestos-induced lung cancer in 1997. His wife was diagnosed with malignant pleural mesothelioma, a rare lung cancer caused by asbestos exposure, in November 2011.
 
Judge Lynwood Smith of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama last week issued a judgment in favor of Melissa Ann Bobo and Shannon Jean Bobo Cox, Bobo's daughters and the co-personal representatives of her estate.
 
Dallas attorney Jay Stuemke, of Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartlett, PC, said Smith found Browns Ferry violated worker safety regulations set by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), as well as its own safeguards.
 
"This didn't have to happen," said Stuemke, who represents the family. "If the TVA had simply followed the law and its own guidelines, these two people might still be alive."
 
TVA spokeswoman Kristine Shattuck-Cooper said in an emailed statement the corporation is reviewing the Court's opinion and evaluating its options.
 
Bobo underwent surgery after her 2011 diagnosis to remove the lining in her affected lung. She also received chemotherapy treatments, which Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartlett, PC, said were painful and resulted in adverse side effects.
 
Court documents say Bobo, who was never an employee or contractor of TVA and was never physically inside the plant, would shake out her husband's work clothes in her home washroom, causing dust to disperse into the air. She would clean the floors of the washroom with a broom and dustpan, creating airborne dust she breathed.
 
A February filing said Bobo also had non-occupational exposure to asbestos from 1965-1975 when her husband worked as a machine operator for the Alabama Wire Plant in Florence. Additionally, she was exposed to asbestos during her years working as a beautician in Florence.

 

 

The End Of TMI?

Is the end of Three Mile Island near? (YDR opinion)

York Daily Record editorial

Updated:   10/06/2015 08:41:25 AM EDT

The future of Three Mile Island is uncertain

after the nuclear plant failed to secure a contract to sell power to the regional grid in 2018-2019. (Jason Plotkin — Daily Record/Sunday News)

In York County, we have a love-hate relationship with Three Mile Island. Let's start with the downsides:
We hate TMI because 1979.
The partial meltdown remains the worst nuclear accident in United States history. The incident panicked our community and forever colored Americans' perceptions of our region.
We suffered the fear and worry over the possible long-term effects of the meltdown.
And we still worry every time the nuclear power plant is cited for a safety violation or an equipment malfunction — or a fire, as occurred at the plant this week. It's not the kind of history you want in your community.
We love TMI because jobs.
Emissions-free electricity.
Reliable power.
It's comforting to know the plant is there to provide energy during peak power consumption times — scorching summer days, Arctic blasts.
But the plant's future seems uncertain.
This summer, for the first time in its four-decade history, TMI failed to get a contract to sell a year's worth of electricity — from June 1, 2018 to May 31, 2019.
Without that contract, there is no guarantee that PJM Interconnection — operator of the regional power grid — will buy any of the plant's power.
TMI and other U.S. nuclear plants are facing intense competition from natural-gas-fired power plants. The price of gas is low — thanks, in part, to the fracking revolution that has been such an economic boon to Pennsylvania. The number of gas-fired plants has mushroomed.
What does that mean for TMI's future?
It's not yet clear. The plant's owner, Exelon, recently closed two nuke plants, and it said it might close two Illinois plants that also failed to get contracts. Company officials said they're evaluating TMI, and profitability is a key component of that analysis. But there are no immediate plans to shutter the plant.
It leaves our community with an interesting conundrum. As much of a worrisome thorn in our side the plant has been since the accident, it does provide significant benefits.
It's an important part of our region's economy, and it's a major source of emissions-free power.
It seems ironic that at a time when carbon-emissions-fueled climate change is threatening the globe, economics are threatening one of the most potent and cleanest sources of electricity.
Old King Coal still rules when it comes to power production in the U.S. It's the source of 39 percent of our electricity. It's a cheap but dirty source of power.
Natural gas is No. 2 at 27 percent, followed by nukes at 19 percent.
Natural gas is cleaner than coal, but it still contributes significantly to global warming.
Can we afford to lose functional nuclear power plants?
Granted, they present serious waste-disposal issues — as spent fuel rods pile up at plant sites, and no progress has been made on a national storage facility. A closure of TMI, Peach Bottom and other nuclear plants would likely be cheered by some activists.
But it would seem foolish to shut them down until renewable, clean sources of power such as hydro, wind and other forms can carry more of the load.
In the end, economics will likely dictate the future of TMI and other plants. But power companies and government policy makers must also consider the climate-change implications.
TMI, York County hates what happened in 1979. But it would also hate to see you go — too soon.

TMI Is Junk: Fire Alert!

 I count a least two overload current protection devices that failed to operate properly. What is the extent on condition, cause with all current protection devices at TMI and Exelon nuclear? A protection device had to trip the bus?

Like to see the maintenance on the motor/breaker.

 

ALERT DECLARATION DUE TO FIRE IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING "At 2115 [EDT] on 10/05/15, an Alert was declared due to a fire in the Auxiliary building affecting DC-P-1A [Decay closed cooling pump 1A] and A-Train safety equipment. The fire is out." The licensee reported the fire was extinguished at approximately 2201 EDT. The fire did not hamper operations personnel responding to the fire. Offsite fire assistance was requested. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. The licensee notified the York Haven Power Station, PEMA (Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency), and the counties of Cumberland, Lebanon, Lancaster, York, and Dauphin. Notified DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, DHS NICC, EPA EOC, FEMA NWC (via email), FDA EOC (via email) and Nuclear SSA (via email). * * * UPDATE AT 0015 EDT ON 10/06/15 FROM JAMES CREIGHTON TO S. SANDIN * * * The licensee is terminating the Alert at 0009 EDT on 10/06/15 based on the following: "At 2115 [EDT] on 10/05/15, an Alert (HA3) was declared due to a fire in the Decay Closed Cooling Water Pump '1A' motor and breaker. The fire was extinguished at 2201 [EDT]. "Following inspection by electrical maintenance the 'P' 480V bus was re-energized at 2305 [EDT] and restoration of previously running loads is in progress. "Station (TMI) is in a 72-hour LCO for repairs to the Decay Closed Cooling Water Pump '1A' (DC-P-1A). "TMI (Three Mile Island) is terminating the event based upon the above information." The licensee notified the York Haven Power Station, PEMA (Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency), and the counties of Cumberland, Lebanon, Lancaster, York, and Dauphin. The licensee will issue a press release. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Bickett), NRR (Howe) and IRD (Gott). Notified DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, DHS NICC, EPA EOC, FEMA NWC (via email), FDA EOC (via email) and Nuclear SSA (via email).

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51457
Facility: GRAND GULF Region: 4 State: MS Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: BRANDON STARNES HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA	Notification Date: 10/06/2015 Notification Time: 17:56 [ET] Event Date: 10/06/2015 Event Time: 13:30 [CDT] Last Update Date: 10/06/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION	Person (Organization): NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)

Is the end of Three Mile Island near?

Two fires?

DAUPHIN COUNTY, Pa. —A spokesman for Three Mile Island in Dauphin County says an electrical short on a motor caused a brief fire at Three Mile Island on Monday night.

"The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is continuing to follow up on the “Alert” declared just after 9 last night at the Three Mile Island 1 nuclear power plant. (An “Alert” is the second-lowest of four levels of emergency classification used by the NRC.) The “Alert” was declared in response to a fire in a pump that is part of a system would be used to help remove decay, or residual, heat following a reactor shutdown. The pump’s motor and electrical breaker were affected.

Does this mean really two fires. Did the switchgear fire alarm go off and did the fire extinguisher system activate?

The pump’s motor and electrical breaker were affected.

Weren't they just talking about permanently shutting this guy down?

It is safety related having a fire at a nuclear plant and getting into a alert.

This is a official NRC strategy ...why do they neglect to identify the specific component and system of the failed component. This all is called official NRC protection of the nuclear industry. How do you protect the nuclear industry, is not having incidences like this. Shielding them from accountability is making it worst. Of course, the newspaper might just not be reporting it.

Hmm, are they up at power or in a outage? They are at 100% power?

Small fire at pump at Three Mile Island nuclear plant

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission said Tuesday it was continuing to follow up on the event.

An alert was declared at the plant. That is the second lowest of four levels of emergency classifications used by the agency.

There were no injuries or off-site impacts, though the Londonderry Fire Company was called to the scene, but not needed.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission spokesman Neil Sheehan said one of the agency’s resident inspectors responded to the plant and performed an independent assessment of operator actions, equipment response and any damage. “No immediate performance deficiencies were identified,” Sheehan said.

The agency will now follow up on the company’s review of what caused the fire and repairs.

The portion of the decay heat removal system affected by the fire remains out of service, pending repair work.

The pump that caught fire is part of the system that circulates water to cool plant equipment. The pump’s motor and electrical breaker were affected. Exelon, the plant’s owner, said the motor on the pump overheated.

The Braidwood Junk Nuclear Plants

This is a symbol of bad testing, maintenance and management across the board. Having the both the operating start-up feedwater pump and its backup fail within a period of time is unprofessional nuclear wise. It is horrible to test both Aux feedwater pumps. It is unprofessional to allow the SG level to get so low. The steam dumps operated and got a reactor scram...insufficient training is severely implicated.

The plant was wildly spinning out of control this shutdown...

So what is going to happen when fuel damage is threaten...the training is going to fail and a host of pumps are going to trip on over current and over heating bearing?

Does Braidwood have a maintenance department? Do they got any federal oversight...

***at approximately 15% power, operators attempted to start the Start Up Feedwater (SFWP) pump and the pump immediately tripped on Phase A Overcurrent.

***2A MDFWP was manually secured due to pump inboard journal bearing temperature exceeding its [200 Degree-F] operating limit. At 0105 [CDT] an anticipated automatic Auxiliary Feedwater actuation signal was generated on low Steam Generator level (36.3%) and both the 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater pumps (AFP) auto-started.

Wait a minute, the start feeedwater pump and then the humongous #2 motor driven feedwater pump? My bad.
Was feed water regulating valves were on service? Some aren't designed for the dynamic condition of withdrawing steam and high decay heat load. Thus the word start-up feedwater pump and start up feedwater regulating valves. I don't see feed water start-up and shutdown word in there?  

 

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51450
Facility: BRAIDWOOD Region: 3 State: IL Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: LINDSAY GREEN HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO	Notification Date: 10/05/2015 Notification Time: 08:41 [ET] Event Date: 10/05/2015 Event Time: 01:05 [CDT] Last Update Date: 10/05/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): STEVE ORTH (R3DO)

 

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	N	0	Hot Standby	0	Hot Standby

Event Text

SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATIONS "Braidwood Unit 2 was performing a planned plant shutdown for refueling outage A2R18. In accordance with plant shutdown procedures while in Mode 1 (Power Operations) at approximately 15% power, operators attempted to start the Start Up Feedwater (SFWP) pump and the pump immediately tripped on Phase A Overcurrent. The 2A Motor Driven Feedwater pump (MDFWP) was manually started to maintain Steam Generator Water Level during the shutdown and subsequent plant cooldown. While in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) at [550 Degree-F], the 2A MDFWP was manually secured due to pump inboard journal bearing temperature exceeding its [200 Degree-F] operating limit. At 0105 [CDT] an anticipated automatic Auxiliary Feedwater actuation signal was generated on low Steam Generator level (36.3%) and both the 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater pumps (AFP) auto-started. Also at 0105 [CDT] a Reactor Protection System (RPS) Reactor trip signal was received due to low Steam Generator level (36.3%) with the reactor not critical. Both Auxiliary Feedwater trains operated as designed with the Main Steam Dumps in service and the Main Condenser providing the heat sink. "All systems operated as designed with the exception of the SFWP and the MDFWP described above. "The plant is currently stable in Mode 5 with both AFPs secured. "This report is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for automatic actuation of the (1) RPS Reactor Trip with the reactor not critical and (6) Auxiliary Feedwater System, 8 hour notification." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Entergy Got To Do Something?

NEW ORLEANS, Oct. 5, 2015 /PRNewswire/ -- Entergy Corporation (NYSE: ETR) announced that Mark Savoff, executive vice president and chief operating officer and Jeff Forbes, executive vice president and chief nuclear officer, plan to retire, effective first quarter 2016. Both leaders will transition to an advisory role beginning Nov. 1 until their effective retirement dates. Tim Mitchell, a 26-year Entergy nuclear veteran, has been named acting chief nuclear officer for the fleet, effective Nov. 1.

In an organizational change, the chief nuclear officer will report directly to Entergy Chairman and CEO Leo Denault. To fill the CNO role, Entergy will conduct an external candidate search including consideration of Mitchell....

Entergy's Waterford Plant In Trouble With Their Emergency Feedwater System.

Originally posted on 8/10...

Docket No. 50-382

July 30, 2015 SUBJECT: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION,UNIT 3 – NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2015002

The Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On April 17, 2015, the licensee lowered power to 70 percent due to a level switch failure on the low pressure feedwater heater 5C. Following repairs, the licensee raised power to 100 percent on April 20, 2015. On June 3, 2015, the control room operators manually tripped the reactor due to the automatic isolation of feedwater heater 2C and subsequent trip of main feedwater pump A. Following repairs to the feedwater heater 2C normal level control valve, the licensee restarted the reactor on June 6, 2015, and achieved 100 percent power on June 8, 2015. The licensee shutdown the reactor on June 23, 2015, to address a steam leak on an isolation valve that was downstream of a main feedwater regulating valve. The licensee restarted the reactor on June 24, 2015, and achieved 100 percent power on June 25, 2015. The unit maintained 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Why does Entergy's Louisiana nuclear plants have so many issues with emergency and normal reactor cooling feedwater feed? Why all the problems with feed water pump trips.     

Loss of Feed water pump...I called it sabotage?  

I can't begin to tell you how bad this is. It indicates the plant is effectively out of control. A component failure occurs, then a important safety system such as the emergency feed water system is found to be broken. It is really bad when two components show up broken in the same plant event.

So there were never any pre operational testing of the emergency feedwater system...this system had been inop from first start-up.

I think 10% to 15% of domestic nuclear industry fleet capacity factor is illegitimate. We would have between 10% to 15% less capacity if the licensees were forced to follow all the rules and tell the truth. There is widespread blatant dishonesty and blatant rules violations that supports up to 15% of our domestic nuclear plant average fleets capacity factor. This is a tremendous amount of money.   

Licensee Event Report (LER) 2015-004-00, Emergency Feedwater System Flow Oscillations and LER 2015-005-00, Manual Reactor Trip due to Low Steam Generator Levels Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3)

The safety function of the EFW system is to provide sufficient supply of cooling water to one or both SGs for the removal of decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) [AB] in response to any event causing low SG level coincident with the absence of a low pressure trip.

On June 3, 2015, at 1707, following a manual reactor scram [RCT] from 100% power, an Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal (EFAS) [JE] was automatically actuated to both Steam Generators (SGs). Following flow initiation, the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) [BA] Backup Flow Control Valves (BFCVs) [FCV] for both trains exhibited wide, frequent oscillations. The Primary Flow Control Valves (PFCVs) [FCV] operated correctly in automatic. To prevent further oscillations, operators took manual control of both trains of EFW in accordance with station procedures and stabilized flow. Both channels of EFAS flow control logic [JB] and both trains of EFW BFCVs were subsequently declared INOPERABLE and Technical Specifications (TSs) 3.3.2.b and 3.7.1.2.d were entered, respectively. The EFW system functioned adequately to fill the SGs and maintain the specified safety function (Reactor Coolant System Heat Removal).

The air operated EFW valves are provided with nitrogen backup from dedicated accumulators [ACC] which are only used during a loss of the instrument air (IA) system [LD]. These nitrogen accumulators also supply backup nitrogen to the Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) [V]. Follow up analysis has determined that the identified valve cycling would have exceeded the assumed nitrogen consumption rate and, without operator intervention, would have exhausted the accumulators prior to the credited 10 hour analyzed mission time. The specified safety functions of both trains of EFW and both ADVs would not have been fulfilled.

Investigation into this event revealed that the components comprising the EFW flow control system were not configured to appropriately respond to the changes observed in the system operating parameters and that periodic testing to confirm the stability of the BFCVs in the automatic flow control mode had not been performed. It is therefore reasonable to assume that this condition has likely existed within 3 years of the time of discovery.

Compensatory measures have been put in place to station a dedicated operator to control the EFW BFCVs in manual following a reactor trip to establish and maintain the SG level in accordance with emergency operating procedures. This action will protect the associated nitrogen accumulators from depletion due to the excessive cycling of the BFCVs during an EFW actuation. Crediting the established compensatory measures, the EFW and ADVs are capable of performing their specified safety functions for the evaluated mission times.

The air operated EFW valves are provided with nitrogen backup from dedicated accumulators [ACC] which are only used during a loss of the instrument air (IA) system [LD]. These nitrogen accumulators also supply backup nitrogen to the Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) [V]. Follow up analysis has determined that the identified valve cycling would have exceeded the assumed nitrogen consumption rate and, without operator intervention, would have exhausted the accumulators prior to the credited 10 hour analyzed mission time.

One contributing cause of this event was that there is no periodic testing that confirms the stability of the BFCVs in the automatic flow control mode. No startup test exists where the system was allowed to shift the BFCVs to the flow control mode and control in this mode.

Waterford's Mike Mulligan Special NRC inspection Didn't Work?

Update 10/5

It is amazing how little the Louisiana media covers their nuclear power plants.  

The basic theme, why can't they always have a clean scram without complications? That is called safe.

Aug 10: Entergy's Waterford Plant In Trouble With Their Emergency Feedwater System

***I vociferously advocated...made a complaint... to the NRC, because of the additional employee needed to control SG water level and the backup feedwater control valve being outside licensing, they needed a license amendment request. The need public disclosure with this.

The NRC said because of compensatory action of calling the employee to the control room to just operate the BFCV the LAR wasn't needed 

So how did the compensatory action work for you?

You catch on a absolutely disgusting level the NRC allowed/allows the plants to continue operating with their feedwater system being outside licensing in Waterford and River Bend?   

Licensee Event Report (LER) 2015-004-00

Investigation has revealed that the components comprising the EFW flow control system were not configured to appropriately respond to the changes observed in the system operating parameters. Both EFW BFCVs cycled more than assumed in the nitrogen accumulator sizing calculation. The excessive cycling has the potential for exhausting the accumulators that power the ADVs and the EFW valves prior to their 10 hour analyzed mission time in the event of a loss of IA. Periodic testing to confirm the stability of the BFCVs in the automatic flow control mode has not been performed. It was concluded that it is likely that the EFW FCVs and the ADVs have been inoperable for the time in which the reactor operated in the modes requiring applicability during the three year time period leading up to this event.

You need the operator to be on station within seconds... 

Operations has issued a standing order to implement a manual compensatory action for this condition. This requires that an additional operator to be stationed to operate the BFCVs in manual following a reactor trip to establish and maintain the SG water level in accordance with emergency procedures.

***Hmm, so a feed pump caused a plant trip on June 3, then another feedwater pump trip during shortly after the scram on 10/3…

River Bend had tons of feedwater pump trips leading to a special inspection.

Why is Waterford having so many feedwater pump trips.

“Employee Sabotage: Knocking Off Line The Waterford Nuclear Plant?”

Maybe the question is, we need a feedwater pump trip special inspection at Waterford...

***My bad, the Mike Mulligan special inspection occurred at River Bend, not Waterford.  

I know what happened, the NRC didn't force Waterford before restart to fix their tremendously leaking feedwater regulation valves. They are afraid to inconvenience a terribly operating plant.

Like how effective is the Mike Mulligan Waterford Special inspection. Looks like it tripped on a runaway reactor vessel level.

The problem is, you tweek the components and procedures...how do you know it all worked? You start the plant up and trip it. If something doesn't work, you tweek and test it again. It is a testing régime until it is fixed.

The guys are having a lot of plant trips...indicator of general incompetence.

If reflects on the NRC in they don't make these guys fix the plant right the first time...    

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51447
Facility: WATERFORD Region: 4 State: LA Unit: [3] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [3] CE NRC Notified By: LEIA MILSTER HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN	Notification Date: 10/04/2015 Notification Time: 03:51 [ET] Event Date: 10/03/2015 Event Time: 23:07 [CDT] Last Update Date: 10/04/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
3	A/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP "At 2307 CDT Waterford 3 experienced an automatic reactor trip and all Control Element Assemblies (CEAs) inserted into the core. The cause of the automatic reactor trip is currently under investigation. "The plant is currently in Mode 3 [Hot Standby] and stable with Main Feedwater feeding and maintaining both Steam Generators. Main Feedwater Pump 'A' tripped subsequent to the reactor trip. Emergency Feedwater actuated following the plant trip as expected, but was not required to maintain Steam Generator level. "The plant entered the Emergency Operating Procedure for an uncomplicated reactor trip and has now transitioned to the normal operating shutdown procedure." Unit 3 is in a normal post trip electrical lineup. The Main Condenser is in-service removing decay heat.. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51448
Facility: MILLSTONE Region: 1 State: CT Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3

My Met Tower Early 2013 Complaint to the NRC?

I was astonished why Pilgrim didn't write up a LER on every time both primary and secondary met towers were inop...especially if both are inop. I was asking the NRC the Cooper reports it, why are you allowing Pilgrim not to report it?

Bottom line, considering the political sensitivity of Pilgrim, I think the NRC and Pilgrim were burying the problem fearing it wouldn't reflect well on them to admit a possible meltdown evacuation would be severely impacted.    

Every time either a primary or secondary met tower goes inop...there should be a LER report on it.  

From: Mike Mulligan [steamshovel2002@gmail.com
Sent: Sunday, May 26, 2013 1:53 PM
To: Guzman, Richard

Subject: Pilgrim:Evacuation Plan Broken During Blizzard Nemo And Unenforced

By The NRC

Power Reactor Event Number: 49062 

Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: NATHAN L. BEGER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 05/23/2013
Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2013
Event Time: 10:19 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 

10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
Unit
SCRAM
Code
RX
CRIT
Initial
PWR Initial RX Mode
Current
PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text

TEMPORARY LOSS OF METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING SYSTEM DURING PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"At 1019 CDT, AC power was removed from the site meteorological monitoring system (MET) equipment for planned maintenance in order to remove abandoned equipment left in place since installing the new meteorological system in October 2012. Removing AC power was not expected to have an effect since all MET information would continue to be available due to an 8-hour battery backup system installed at the meteorological tower. However, when power was removed, all onsite meteorological data was lost to the control room via the Plant Management Information System (PMIS). PMIS is the only display of local direct meteorological conditions available. Subsequently, [Cooper Nuclear Station] CNS determined the interface between MET system and PMIS was not powered from the 8 hour MET battery backup system which accounted for the lost MET indication. CNS corrected the condition and restored meteorological data to the control room via the PMIS system at 1219 CDT.

"Site backup assessment capability relies on Meteorological model estimates from the National Weather Service out of Valley, Nebraska or on default values derived from historical local weather patterns. Since there was no direct information of site meteorological conditions during the period of lost power, CNS considered this to be a major loss of assessment capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

Mr Guzman,

So here is an official concern to the NRC by me. I not crazy!

With LER 2013-003-00 Entergy admits the the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data. Whatever that means? Was the spinning cups out in the weather frozen and iced over during blizzard Nemo or did the instruments fail because of the power failure? Was it just a data recording issue or did the site lose wind speed and direction indication in the control room or at the tech support center?

• Cover-Up: Public Notification And Radiation Evac Plan Broke During Accident

• http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2013/05/loss-of-off-site-power-events-dueto.Html

I am calling it, they lost wind speed and direction indication in the control room and the evacuation plan was severely impaired.

2013-003-00: "During the storm on February 8, meteorological instruments at PNPS recorded sustained wind speeds between 42 and 49 mph through 2338 hours at which time the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data until 1840 hours the following day. The wind direction was predominantly from the ocean toward the switchyard during the storm

Can I be clearer?  

So why didn’t Pilgrim during the Nemo Blizzard make an event report like the Cooper station?

• Cooper: "At 1019 CDT, AC power was removed from the site meteorological monitoring system (MET) equipment for planned maintenance in order to remove abandoned equipment left in place since installing the new meteorological system in October 2012

Why was there no “major loss of assessment capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)" like the Cooper station?

• Cooper: Since there was no direct information of site meteorological conditions during the period of lost power, CNS considered this to be a major loss of assessment capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

And it raises questions if this should have been reported in the emergency classification system such as a Unusual Event.

It is beyond utter incompetence and negligence with public reporting on plant events with Entergy and the NRC on this atrocious incomplete statement: "the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data". Entergy should have been forced to add a few sentences in the LER like, we still had wind speed and direction indication in the control room or this is how the site would have carried out the evacuation if we had become blind to knowing wind speed and direction.

Here again?  

Why didn’t Entergy carry fully out their licensing reporting responsibilities during Blizzard Nemo and why is the NRC negligent with enforcing their rules?

I see the meteorological instrumentation issue wasn’t

The NRC inspection reports are terribly incomplete. I discovered this in the NRC inspection report timeline...it was amazing they didn't comprehensively explain why the met towers didn't work in a emergency on the first inspection report.  

carried at all in your most recent inspection report. And the diesel smoke in the reactor building wasn’t covered in

 "This is so shoddy documentation reporting by both of you."-why did it take the NRC three years to comprehensively report on the met tower unreliability problems? 

the LER. This is so shoddy documentation reporting by both of you.

Would you add this to the docket?

Sincerely,

Mike Mulligan

Hinsdale, NH

I Identified Pilgrim's Met Tower Problem to NRC

Updated 10/2

The NRC didn't pick it up on their own...I discovered it first and reported it to the NRC. 

Pilgrim and NRC Blew Accident Reportability Requirements In Blizzard!

Basically this was a addendum to my Safety Relief Valve 10 CFR 2.206.

Inspection finds broken backup tower

Plant uses meteorological data for emergencies

By Christine Legere
clegere@capecodonline.com
Posted Oct. 1, 2015 at 11:29 PM   

PLYMOUTH — If a radiation leak had occurred at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, on eight occasions over the last three years, operators would have been forced to rely on the National Weather Service in Taunton to provide the meteorological information needed to tell them which regions were in danger of contamination.

A routine check at the plant done in August turned up four negative findings. While all four were considered of low

I believe the finding should have been much higher.

1) Risk consist if the component fails and how it impact the accident.

2) The met tower questions the competence of Pilgrim to understand problems and fix them early, this competence issue with the met towers, it is more global site wide...constitutes large risk.

3) Entergy with global safety competency issues as in #2...a tiny  competency risk affecting a fleet of plants globally turns into a huge risk.

4) The NRC with global issues as in #2...a tiny global  risk associated with a regulator's competency across a fleet of 100 plants turns into a humongous risk.

Risk is multidimensional and the NRC treats it as a isolated issue...this is a feedback mechanism. The agency and public never sees the real risk, thus becomes a inappropriate feedback mechanism.  

safety significance, one of the more serious ones was related to plant security — something the Nuclear Regulatory Commission cannot publicly discuss — and the other was related to the plant's meteorological towers. Entergy, Pilgrim's owner-operator, was notified of the inspection results Thursday.

Pilgrim, which has already been downgraded to among the three worst performing reactors in the country, has two towers on the property: a 220-foot main tower and a 160-foot backup. Their purpose is to provide continuous readings on wind speed and direction, and air temperature. In December 2011, Entergy canceled preventative maintenance on the backup tower and it became nonfunctional, according to the NRC’s letter to Pilgrim’s owner-operator dated Thursday.

“As a result, on eight occasions between March 12, 2012 and Aug. 15, 2015, when the 220-foot primary meteorological tower was non-functional for various reasons, Pilgrim did not have instrumentation available on either tower for continuous readings,” the letter said.

NRC spokeswoman Diane Screnci said operators would have been forced to rely on the National Weather Service for data, should a radiological emergency have occurred.

In its finding, the NRC noted the lack of the backup tower resulted in a lack of assurance that Entergy could “protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency.”

This isn’t the first time Entergy has been cited for the broken backup tower. The NRC had first noted the tower’s status following a routine inspection in late 2013.

Right, I hammered on the NRC in early 2013 with the Met Tower.  

At the time, federal officials said the finding was rated as low in safety significance because nothing bad had happened as a result.

Pilgrim spokeswoman Lauren Burm on Thursday acknowledged the company’s lack of action. “The NRC accurately determined that the station response to restoration of back-up meteorological monitoring was not timely,” Burm wrote in an email. “Since the issuance of the finding, the completion of the new MET Tower is well underway. “In accordance with our emergency procedures, we utilized the National Weather Service as backup.”

Scenci said the August inspection was routine, something the NRC does every 18 months.

The NRC spokeswoman noted the results of that inspection were significant because they reinforced the NRC’s decision to place Pilgrim in the lowest performance category in which the agency allows plants to continue to operate. The only other plants in the category, which is for reactors with frequent violations of federal standards, are Entergy’s two reactors at its Arkansas location.

While Burm is not allowed to elaborate on the security infraction found in August, she did make a comment:

“For the identified security related issues, it was noted that we did not respond in a timely manner to an equipment performance issue of very low safety significance,” Burm wrote. “The NRC did conclude, however, that actions were in place to ensure the station remained secure. “

Another criticism in the report was the tendency of Pilgrim operators to close corrective action reports prior to specified corrective actions being completed.

Burm said Entergy was taking the inspectors’ findings very seriously. “Pilgrim has modified our already comprehensive and significant site-wide program to address the gaps in our Corrective Action Program that are noted in this latest report,” she wrote. “Safety and quality performance are the first and foremost goals for each employee every day.”

Entergy is currently calculating the cost of the upgrades and inspections that will be required for the Pilgrim plant to move up from its position at the bottom of the performance list. Burm recently said that if the corporation finds the cost of making the improvements exceeds the value of the plant, it may consider permanently shutting Pilgrim down.

Entergy has 30 days to respond to the NRC’s latest inspection report.

— Follow Christine Legere on Twitter: @ClegereCCT.

By Christine Legere
clegere@capecodonline.com

capecodtimes.com

By Christine Legere
clegere@capecodonline.com

Posted Oct. 1, 2015 at 11:29 PM