Whistleblowing can be used as a potent creative tool to help your bureaucracy evolve towards a more enlightened organization.
Phone: 1-603-209-4206 steamshovel2002@yahoo.com
Note: I constantly update my articles.
Comments at the bottom of the article are always welcome!!!
Mike Mulligan, Hinsdale, NH
Aug 27 Back up to 100%. Is my power watch finished. Aug 24 87% Aug 23
GG up to 94%.
River Bend down to 77.
But ANO all up to 100%. Aug 22 I considered my watch on Grand Gulf over back on Aug 22. But they are down to 65% and River Bend is still at 70%. Such eradicate power operations... Aug 20 Well, Grand Gulf is finally at 100%. It sure took a long time to get there. River Bend is at 70%. It has been a long time since the board was all green for Entergy in region 4. Aug 16
GG 94% River Bend 70% Aug 15 Continuing capacity factor problems with Sothern's south-western fleet? GG 94% now River Bend 70% Update Aug 10
9%
They must have fixed something. Almost there.
Update Aug 9 68% Not good, a little back sliding The magnitude of this plant operating at less than 100% in the last few years is astonishing. These plants and components are not designed to be operated at less than 100%. They are supposed to zip up to 100% power. Here is a example of going off the well warn engineering component design path. What kind of surprises can expect with this Grand Gulf dad behavior?
That monitoring program identified pipe wall thinning of two elbows on Unit 3 in 1980 that were replaced. Monitoring performed in March 1982 on Unit 2 identified substantial erosion in the piping elbow that ruptured three months later. But the thinning was accepted because it was less than the company’s criterion for replacement. It’s not been determined whether prolonged operation at reduced power between March and June 1982 caused more rapid wear than anticipated or whether the ultrasonic inspection in March 1982 may have missed the thinnest wall thickness.
Aug 8 GG 79% Aug 5 GG 51% power ANO is going off my watch at 98% power. I won't rule out a trip on the final 2% POWER. Aug 4
GG 59% ANO 64% Aug 3
GG 58%
ANO 65%
Aug 2 Here we go again. Grand Gulf 58% ANO 64% Update Aug 1 Grand Gulf 27% ANO 64% originally posted on 7/12...reposted. July 31 Can you even believe this horror show in the deep summer season. It is a disgrace. Grand Gulf 27% ANO 64% July 30 Grand Gulf 76% ANO 64%
July 27 68% ANO 64 Their washing gads and U 235 of money down the toilet. July 26 Good news. They must have fixed something. Up to 58% power. ANO is still stuck at 65% percent power. I bet you that 50 day outage was much more than 50 million dollars. The length and cost of the outage is a statement on how far in the hole the NRC allowed this plant get. As far as these plants being not being fully prepared for full plant operations in the middle of the summer, this is a disgrace. July 25 Stuck at 24% power. One of the ANO plants has been stuck at 65% for two days. July 24 24% power July 23 Big progress, not. 27% power Update July 20 17% Power-highly abnormal startup. Update July 19 15% power today. These guys are getting deeper into poor performance. Update July 18
Stuck at 14% Update July 17 14% power and losing money badly!!! Update July 16 Took my advice a little. Must be on the turbine bypass. Been at about 16% all weekend. How can these guys even make money? During the last few years Grand Gulf has a horrifical capacity factor. Update July 13 Don't forget about Entergy-ANO's very troublesome startup from the their outage. This is a indication corporate Entergy is heavily wheezing over their nuclear financial pressures. Stuck at 3%. Am I a prophet or what? This plant should have been completely ready for startup. It wasn't. They weren't ready to begin pulling rods. Hanging around the low power levels is really unprofessional and unsafe. The plants weren't really designed for this. They are supposed to zip up deep into the power range. This increases the risk of a meltdown and the severely of the off site releases. ***1% Power Today.
Lets see if they are any better than their sister Plant ANO?
Owner of Iowa's lone nuclear plant plans to shutter it by 2020
NextEra Energy, owner of the Duane Arnold Energy Center, says it will retire Iowa's lone nuclear plant in late 2020, five years earlier than anticipated.
The Florida-based utility said Alliant Energy, the plant's largest power user, has agreed to pay NextEra $110 million to shorten its agreement to purchase power from Duane Arnold.
Alliant said it will partially replace the nuclear energy with wind energy from NextEra and expects new energy deals will save Iowa customers nearly $300 million over 21 years, even after the utility pays NextEra to end its contract early...
Hmmm, the Keene sentinel wouldn't let me place this on their site. We will see if I am right.
This is what I think is going on. The politicians have been massively underfunding the NHDOT for 50 year or more. The bridge department is a function of that. The rate of decline of these old bridge is intensifying, we can't even keep up with enough roads and bridges for our continued economy. So the bridge department was force to live with insufficient money. I know you guys didn't want to create any hardships to your neighbors and community. So in the name of doing good, you tried to stretch the old bridge resources thinking a big hunk of money would eventually come down the line. We put the bridge department in a impossibly position, we actually victimizes the actually bridge inspectors. I know there are employees all around jocking for jobs and promotions. I know there has been repeated mass layoffs at the NHDOT. It is insane how our politicians has treated the NHDOT. I know for a fact, politicians have traded bridges for political favors and money. The bridge inspection job had become really dirty and you were required to play if you wanted to keep your job. Man, would I like to talk to you. Can you give me a call? Call anytime.
How is this associated to the damaged baffle plate screws and with lower upper head bypass flow? ? The two plants with high levels of BFB degradation are Westinghouse reactors with a 4-loop design, operating in a downflow configuration with Type 347 stainless steel bolts. The NRC staff determined that plants with these characteristics are most susceptible to high levels of BFB degradation and identified a total of seven reactors in this group. Although the two plants that found extensive bolt degradation have taken corrective actions, including...
Table 1: Plants with Higher Susceptibility to Thermal Sleeve Flange Wear A.W. Vogtle 1 & 2 Maanshan 1 & 2 Ascó I & II McGuire 1 & 2 Braidwood 1 & 2 Millstone 3 Byron 1 & 2 Seabrook Callaway Sequoyah 1 & 2 Catawba 1 & 2 Shearon Harris Comanche Peak 1 & 2 Sizewell B Diablo Canyon 2 South Texas 1 & 2 Doel 4* Tihange 3* Hanbit 1 & 2 Watts Bar 1 & 2 Kori 2*, 3 & 4 Wolf Creek * T-hot but T-cold capable 2 T-Cold capable plants are essentially a hybrid of T-Hot and T-Cold with some head spray cooling nozzles plugged and some open (not quite T-Cold). In this configuration there is uncertainty as to whether the local jets will cause local flow conditions similar to T-Cold; therefore, these plants are conservatively assumed to have a higher susceptibility to thermal sleeve flange wear. NSAL-18-1 Page 7 of 10 Table 2: Plants with Lower Susceptibility to Thermal Sleeve Flange Wear Almaraz 1 & 2 Point Beach 1* & 2* Angra 1 Prairie Island 1* & 2* Beaver Valley 1 & 2 R.E. Ginna* D.C. Cook 1 & 2 Ringhals 2, 3 & 4 Diablo Canyon 1 Salem 1 & 2 Doel 1** & 2** Surry 1 & 2 Indian Point 2 & 3 Takahama 1 Mihama 1* Tihange 1 North Anna 1 & 2 Turkey Point 3 & 4 Ohi 1 & 2 * The indicated plants have 14x14 guide tubes with gaps between the guide funnel and upper guide tube that will limit flange wear and prevent flange separation. Therefore, the recommendations in this NSAL do not apply to these plants. ** The indicated plants have 14x14 guide tubes and gaps between the guide funnel and the upper guide tube which are nearly the same as the distance required for flange separation.
These kinds of things come from exceeding the plants useful life. Expect more of this in the future.
This might force utilities to prematurely replace their heads. This is going to be enormously costly both in money and employee doses.
When it comes to impairing capacity factor, these utilities guys would consume as much dose as needed without a conscience. If it comes to impairing profits, these guys will whine like little girls about consuming dose for their employees. In other words, their will defer maintenance and safety inspection because the radiation dose is too high for the risk.
Subject: Thermal Sleeve Flange Wear Leads to Stuck Control Rod Number: NSAL-18-1 Basic Component: Thermal Sleeve in CRDM Reactor Head Penetration Date: July 9, 2018 Substantial Safety Hazard or Failure to Comply Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(a) Transfer of Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(b) Advisory Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(2) Yes No N/A
SUMMARY In accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, Westinghouse reported an issue associated with thermal sleeve wear as a potential defect in May 2018 [1]. This NSAL provides details on the thermal sleeve flange issue to provide affected licensees a basis for operation and inspection recommendations. Operating experience (OE) has shown that for Westinghouse nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) plants that have thermal sleeves in the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) penetration tubes, the wear of the thermal sleeve flange against the tube could have potential consequences that were not previously considered. Recently, during a startup following a refueling outage at an Électricité de France (EdF) plant, Belleville Unit 2, a flange remnant from a separated thermal sleeve became cocked and interfered with control rod movement. The previous safety evaluations of separated sleeves and flanges, in topical report PWROG-16003-P [2] and Technical Bulletin TB-07-2, Revision 3 [3] considered this interference to be unlikely based on the information that was available at that time. Consequently, it was concluded that a stuck control rod was unlikely. Considering the new OE from EdF [4], and the design similarities between the Belleville Unit 2 thermal sleeves and those used in Westinghouse NSSS plants and replacement reactor vessel heads, the inspection recommendations for thermal sleeve flanges in TB-07-2, Revision 3 may be insufficient. While there have been no reported events of control rods failing to insert into the core when required, Westinghouse reported this issue to the NRC under 10 CFR Part 21 because it had the potential to create a substantial safety hazard.
If the NRC were to order Hope Creek to shutdown to fix their damaged SRVs...I am sure you would never see another SRV failure LER. Or a drastic decline. It would do the same for all the plants with similar troubled valves. But the NRC's got absolutely no teeth. Remember, we are really talking about steam leaks across both seats. Once the steam leak begins it damages and more erodes the seat. It is call steam cutting the seat. Damaged valves then are more tremendously susceptible to a valve flying open and stuck open or struck shut. Especially when a plant is put under stress.
Update
Last LER
During the twenty-first refueling outage (H1R21), all fourteen SRV pilot stage assemblies were removed for testing at an offsite facility. Between April 20 and May 11, 2018, HCGS received the test results for all fourteen of the SRV pilot valve assemblies. A total of eight of the fourteen SRV pilot stage assemblies experienced set-point drift outside of the TS 3.4.2.1 specified values. All of the valves failing to meet the limits were Target Rock Model 7567F two-stage SRVs.
Are the new three stage SRVs failing in masses in the below LER
One before the last LER
The station is planning the replacement of the currently installed Target Rock two-stage SRVs with three-stage SRVs that are expected to eliminate setpoint drift events exceeding +/-3% and improve SRV reliability. The replacement is expected to begin in the next planned refueling outage, H1 R21, in the spring of 2018, pending resolution of open technical items with the valve manufacturer. The replacement will take place over several outages in order to replace all fourteen SRVs.
On my call, the NRC forced Hope to admit these valves are up to the quality standards.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
1. All 14 SRV pilot stage assemblies were removed and replaced with pre-tested, certified spare pilot valves (H1 R21).
2. Evaluate options for the replacement of the currently installed Target Rock two-stage SRVs with a design that eliminates setpoint drift events exceeding +/-3% and improve SRV reliability. The replacement schedule will be developed after a suitable valve is identified.
...I put a tremendous pressure on the NRC for them to get a handle on Hope's Creek Safety Relief Valves. I have always worried about the repeated and erratic valve failures and tech spec violations eventually transforming themselves into multiple valve failure. What we are seeing here is the proliferation of normalization of devience. We are seeing it right before our eyes in documents. And don't forget about the term of frog boiling.
Hope Creek and NRC aren't required to report the temperature increases and leaking to the public.
I think these leaks and temperature increases are a common cause. This is like there is a manufacturing defect in a all the springs...this is what causing all the valve failure. A terror to the nuclear industry is when both emergency diesel generator's fail at the same time from a manufacturing defect in a identical component in a severe accident.
Remember what happened at Pilgrim. They had similar SRV leaks and temperature rises. I complained about this. Then two valves failed in a severe blizzard and they got into a troublesome shutdown. This led to their shutdown.
Now I am going to view the last SRV LERs. Did they put some new materials in the SRV that is causing the SRV failing in mass. It could be like test stand damage like pilgrim?
Seven of the fourteen SRV tailpipe temperatures experienced 30 degree F step increases, which can indicate potential SRV pilot leakage.
over the last five operating cycles on average six SRV tailpipe temperatures experienced large temperature increases per cycle
The inspectors also noted that the ‘H’ SRV tailpipe temperature was elevated prior to the most recent spring 2018 refueling outage and then again during reactor startup.
Elevated Main Steam SRV Tailpipe Temperatures The inspectors noted that since Hope Creek restarted from the refueling outage on May 10, 2018, seven of the fourteen SRV tailpipe temperatures experienced 30 degree F step increases, which can indicate potential SRV pilot leakage. (‘H’ on May 10, ‘K’ on May 13, ‘D’ on May 15, ‘E’ on May 24, ‘P’ on May 29, ‘B’ on June 8, ‘F’ on June 19) After the ‘P’ tailpipe temperature increased on May 29, the inspectors discussed the potential adverse trend with PSEG. The inspectors also noted that, over the last five operating cycles on average six SRV tailpipe temperatures experienced large temperature increases per cycle. PSEG initiated actions in NOTF 20796507 to address the potential adverse trend. The inspectors also noted that the ‘H’ SRV tailpipe temperature was elevated prior to the most recent spring 2018 refueling outage and then again during reactor startup. In response, PSEG staff suspected that main seat leakage may be occurring. Based on a preliminary review of tailpipe temperatures changes during a planned down power in June 2018, PSEG concluded that the ‘H’ and ‘K’ SRV tailpipe temperatures likely exhibited signs of SRV main seat leakage. PSEG engineering continues to review the SRV tailpipe temperatures and pressure trends for all fourteen SRVs.
The inspectors considered that the increase in documented NOTFs concerning FLEX and elevated SRV tailpipe temperatures since January 1, 2018, represented inspector identified emerging trends. These examples also represented missed opportunities to effectively use all of the tools available in the CAP, including PSEG’s trending procedure, LS-AA-125-1005, which discusses the generation of notifications and the routine conduct of cognitive trend analyses.
The inspectors evaluated all of the issues above in accordance with the guidance in IMC 0612, Appendix B, “Issue Screening,” and Appendix E, “Examples of Minor Issues,” and determined the issues were of minor significance because the inspectors did not identify any CAQ that were not appropriately corrected or scheduled for correction in a reasonable period of time as a result of the failure to implement the NOTF screening process appropriately. Consequently, these issues were not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC’s enforcement policy.
These guys have repeatedly put different exotic coating on these valve over the past decade. Platinum was just the latest coating that emediately failed upon first use. So now they experimented on the failed platinum coating by doing some kind of new surface preparation. So now the original platinum failed, then the platinum and new surface preparation emediately failed in a worst way (platinum anti-corrosion coatings flaking off). It happens all the time with the new coating failing worst than the last coating or fix. In my old days, you never did any experimentations in a commercial nuclear plant. You would comprehensively test the coating, material and component in a laboratory under the same or worst condition (environment)the material was going into the plant. And there would be hell to pay by the NRC if any surprises showed up in plant after the stringent laboratory testing.
10 CFR 50.73 The enclosed Licensee Event Report provides details of the inoperability of three Main Steam Relief Valves for longer than allowed by plant Technical Specifications. The Tennessee Valley Authority is submitting this report in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications
On May 17, 2018, the Tennessee Valley Authority was presented with as-found testing results indicating that three of the thirteen Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs) from Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3, were outside the +/- 3 percent setpoint band required for their operability. Troubleshooting determined that the three MSRV discs failed by corrosion bonding to their valve seats. The valve discs were previously platinum coated to prevent this, and this was the first Unit 3 MSRV service interval to implement an improved surface treatment to prevent coating delamination. These three MS RVs were found to have been inoperable for an indeterminate period of time between March 26, 2016, and February 17, 2018, which is longer than permitted by Technical Specifications (TS). The affected valves remained capable of maintaining reactor pressure within American Society of Mechanical Engineers code limits. Additionally, the valves' ability to open under remote-manual operation, activation through the Automatic Depressurization System, or MSRV Automatic Actuation Logics were not affected. The valves remained capable of performing their required safety function. The valves failed to open within their TS required limits due to the valve discs corrosion bonding to their seats, as a result of their platinum anti-corrosion coatings flaking off. The immediate corrective action was to replace all thirteen of the Unit 3 MSRV pilot valves with refurbished valves during the Unit 3 Refueling Outage 18. The corrective action was to ensure pilot discs are prepared for platinum coating in accordance with the revised procedure which requires nitrogen pressure testing to verify valve seal functionality prior to coating. NRC
He is the lead engineer over the new bridge building project. I am confused as hell why the gov's office wants me to talked to him. How is he involved with bridge inspection office? I argued that to the governor's aid. The governor's office told me to call Mr Lyford about a week ago and before the inspection report came out. I got around to call him yesterday and sent him this email. His secretary answered the call. She said he was in a meeting.
"Collaspe of the Brattleboro-Hinsdale Bridge: Coverup in Gov Sununu's Office"
As you can see in my recent photograph on the Anna Hunt Marsh Bridge (east footing), the rocker or roller bearing is resting against the bridge footing. The bearing is completely obstructed and non functional.
How come the Hoyle Tanner inspectors didn't describe this? Obliviously the footing was constructed in the wrong place. Well, rather the new footing.
The degradation of this bridge from the last inspection (fair) to this inspection (poor) is startling. It went from fair to poor in about two years. That would be my proof of bridge inspection falsifications. I figure the new bridge will not be opened for five or six years. Base on this rate of degradation, it going to be three grades below poor when the new bride is operation.
There is just too much uncertainty going on here and you guys know it.
I have been a advocate on the dangerousness of this bridge for many years.
Update July 25 It the below post, I meant the moveable bearings, not the fixed bearings. But they are both non functional. Update July 24
The inspection was incomplete. Why wasn't it mentioned in the new inspection report the new concrete footing was obstructing the fixed bearings as seen in my photograph? They are non functional. Is Hoyle,Tanner covering up for the NHDOT's screwups?
Anna Hunt Marsh Bridge NH Route 119 over the Connecticut River NHDOT Bridge No. 041/040 Hinsdale, NH Prepared for The Department of Transportation July 2018
Item 59.7 Bearings:
The bearings are considered to be in satisfactory to poor condition. The expansion and fixed shoes exhibit paint system failure with moderate to heavy rusting. There is heavy rusting with laminar corrosion at exterior of the pin and bearing saddle interface. The expansion bearing roller guides are not plumb. The north truss expansion bearing exterior rollers have rotated in the contraction direction beyond their limit and appear to be frozen based on the amount of surface rust and accumulated debris. The south truss expansion bearing exterior rollers have also rotated in the contraction direction but to a lesser degree and also appear to be frozen based on the amount of surface rust and accumulated debris. Refer to Appendix A for representative condition photographs.
Originally posted 7/16/2019...reposted. Update July 17 So yesterday Mr Young (gov's office) said he would call me right back. He was going to get me the telephone number to the right person in the NHDOT bridge inspection department. It has been 24 hours. I think he tripped into a situation a lot more complicated than he could imagine.
Update Just imagine if Gov. Sununu fired for cause a bunch of NHDOT inspectors and mangers? This scandal would just explode. NH is a extremely weak governor system. The governor is mostly powerless. I doubt the governor has the power to fire anyone except his staff? Has anyone asked why this bridge wasn't on the NH red list. This is how they apportion bridge funding to communities mostly. They were falsifying inspection. So mike, why didn't it get on the red list. Because they would have no bases that any changes occurred. It would illuminate their systemic bridge inspections falsification game. Just like today, if they shutdown the bridge. I could ask the NHDOT what changes occurred on this new inspection compared to the last inspection. They-we wouldn't find any significant changes from the last inspection. The game would be up!!!
...Mr Young gave me a phone call this morning. He is in Gov. Sununu office. He seemed irritated with me. He wanted me to cold call somebody in the NHDOT bridge building office, he wasn't associated with the bridge inspection department on Friday. I told him is he sending me on a witch hunt. He had a hard time understanding the bridge building department won't much be involved in the bridge inspection bureaucracy. I asked him if he called the "so called" bridge building guy to set the stage for me. I said, I know these guys. They are going to think of me as a nut case or crazy ass blogger. The will just blow me off the crazy talk. I am going to tell him some of his inspections are being falsified. He is shut up like a clam. He told he is going to figure this out...he will give the bridge building guy a phone call. I'll get you a number to call. That was around 9am. It now about 2pm. I'll bet after a few calls he found a manager associated with our bride. I'll bet the bridge inspection guy is giving him a little education on the design of our bridge and updating new events.
Michael Mulligan <steamshovel2002@yahoo.com> To:preston.young@nh.gov Jul 15 at 12:16 PM
Mr. Young,
I see you and your associates first emailed me with a program who could erase your email and all my return linked emails. You didn't get them all yet. Now the governor's office is implicated in a coverup. It is now time to get the lawyers involved. You are a amateur...all rank amateurs.
God help Gov. Sununu if there becomes a mass casualty event for the Brattleboro-Hinsdale bridge.
Hoyle Tanner is the firm who did the bridge inspections and I talked to them on the bridge.
Michael Mulligan <steamshovel2002@yahoo.com>
To:mlow@hoyletanner.com
Jul 15 at 10:15 AM
Dear Sir,
My hobby for years was to replace this bridge(s). I was the spark who created the community rebellion that created the replacement project. I know you guys recently completely the NHDOT five year inspection associates with these bridges. Hopefully it is last. I know NHDOT is one of the most corrupt state agencies in the nation. Their bridge inspection agency is really bad. I have proof of this. These guys have been serially falsifying bridge inspections for years.
I overheard your employee talking about the conditions under the deck. I got pictures of that too. Basically that area is horrendously rotted out, unsafe and needing maybe a year shutdown for a rehab job. We are facing a shutdown of the bridge even as the new construction project is building up steam. I believe the bridge now is unsafe and needs to be shutdown. It certainly is going to collapse before the new bridge is open. The state has been subtilty gaming bridge inspection for political reasons and favors for decades.
I have specific issues with the moving and stationary barings… the rocker and roller baring. The stationary bearings have way more corrosion damage than admitted in any NHDOT inspection report. I'd seen it close up with my own eyes and camera. Did you know the Brattleboro bridge is grossly out of plumb? It tilts toward the downriver side. Is this in your inspection report?
There is a really thick plate guiding the gigantic truss into the bearing, then to footing truss bracket, that is terribly bent. With all that corrosion and metal rot, you have no idea of the operability with the stationary bearing. The same happy-land identical inspection wording of basically "heavy rust and leaks" is seen in inspection reports for decades on end. They are gaming inspections reports for a unseen agenda. I hope your company is not going to be involve with a mass causality event in the near future? We got a 1.5 million cars per year going across the bridges. Is this condition going to be accuracy represented in your current inspection report to the state? It never has been accurately represented in any NHDOT inspection report. The 1920 era bridge in the early years was severely damage in a catastrophic flooding event.
This is an example of how pathetic and dangerous the NHDOT is. They rehabbed the fragile footing years ago with new concrete. This is the long bridge abutting Brattleboro, east side. They placed the concrete footing touching the roller or rocker bearings. The roller or rocker bearings has been blocked with the footing for decades. The footing made this safety device to non functioning for DECADES. There is nothing relieving the typical bridge stresses including thermal expansion and contraction. The thermal expansion joint seen from the roadway which gives some leeway between the footing and bridge...it is just for show. I actually see damage with the footing from the bride expansion and contraction. It is a disgrace. Are true and actual condition with these bearing going to be accurately represented in your inspection report? The NHDOT has been falsifying their inspections report on these bearings for years. Remember I got pictures of it.
Believe me, don't bury this email in you system. I am a season whistleblower dealing with hundreds of million dollar cases over many years. Show this to your higher ups. Do not cover your asses. Please do not be implicated in a coverup. I know federal funding is involved with NHDOT bridge inspections. I know the Governor's office is reluctantly in investigation my allegations. I am going after the NHDOT and its bridge inspection department. I am sure your employees felt the severe bridge vibrations and swaying from their cherry picker inspecting the highest reach of these gigantic truss.
Here below is my blog. This email is going to be posted on it. I wrote most of my posts towards the end of July (pictures). I am open to talk with anyone. If you google Mike Mulligan, Brattleboro-Hinsdale bridge or something similar and Mike Mulligan, Brattleboro Reformer you will see how long I've been involved. I got all of my heart into saving lives. My community and beyond expects a completely accurate and comprehensive representation on the abysmal conditions of the bridge. I better not see you cutting and pasting words and phrases from any past falsified inspection reports because everyone else does it to compete. That is a new beginning!!!
Unbelievably skimpy NHDOT inspection reports and this makes the inspections report horrendously vulnerable to bridge inspection fraud and falsifications. The skimpiness, shallowness and inaccurate framework of the inspection reports was an intentional tool by the NHDOT to create bridge inspection systemic fraud and falsification towards a aim of political corruption.
BEARINGS WITH TRUSS PIN AT EAST ABUTMENT BOTTOM PLATES HOLED AT NORTHEAST ROLLER BEARING, REPAIRED AND PAINTED. PLATES BETWEEN ROLLER BEARING PIN AND TOP CHORD END DIAGONAL RUSTED WITH HEAVY SECTION LOSS AT NORTHEAST, CLEANED AND PAINTED. MODERATE RUST AT BEARINGS.
Fixed Bearing
FIXED PIN BEARINGS AT WEST ABUTMENT MODERATE RUST AND SCALE AT INTERIORS
Michael Mulligan <steamshovel2002@yahoo.com>
To:preston.young@nh.gov
Sincerely,
Mike Mulligan (aka bridge angel)
5 Wood Lane
Hinsdale, NH
16032094206 (cell)
Hinsdale, NH
Hoyle Tanner is the company who inspected our bridges. I am a little bit out of the box with contacting the bridge inspection company on a inspection report that hasn't come out yet. One can only imagine how traumatic this note could be for a company and it political ramification.
Hoyle Tanner is the company who inspected our bridges
Michael Mulligan <steamshovel2002@yahoo.com>
To:mlow@hoyletanner.com
Jul 15 at 10:15 AM
Dear Sir,
My hobby for years was to replace this bridge(s). I was the spark who created the community rebellion that created the replacement project. I know you guys recently completely the NHDOT five year inspection associates with these bridges. Hopefully it is last. I know NHDOT is one of the most corrupt state agencies in the nation. Their bridge inspection agency is really bad. I have proof of this. These guys have been serially falsifying bridge inspections for years.
I overheard your employee talking about the conditions under the deck. I got pictures of that too. Basically that area is horrendously rotted out, unsafe and needing maybe a year shutdown for a rehab job. We are facing a shutdown of the bridge even as the new construction project is building up steam. I believe the bridge now is unsafe and needs to be shutdown. It certainly is going to collapse before the new bridge is open. The state has been subtilty gaming bridge inspection for political reasons and favors for decades.
I have specific issues with the moving and stationary barings… the rocker and roller baring. The stationary bearings have way more corrosion damage than admitted in any NHDOT inspection report. I'd seen it close up with my own eyes and camera. Did you know the Brattleboro bridge is grossly out of plumb? It tilts toward the downriver side. Is this in your inspection report?
There is a really thick plate guiding the gigantic truss into the bearing, then to footing truss bracket, that is terribly bent. With all that corrosion and metal rot, you have no idea of the operability with the stationary bearing. The same happy-land identical inspection wording of basically "heavy rust and leaks" is seen in inspection reports for decades on end. They are gaming inspections reports for a unseen agenda. I hope your company is not going to be involve with a mass causality event in the near future? We got a 1.5 million cars per year going across the bridges. Is this condition going to be accuracy represented in your current inspection report to the state? It never has been accurately represented in any NHDOT inspection reportThe 1920 era bridge in the early years was severely damage in a catastrophic flooding event.
This is an example of how pathetic and dangerous the NHDOT is. They rehabbed the fragile footing years ago with new concrete. This is the long bridge abutting Brattleboro, east side. They placed the concrete footing touching the roller or rocker bearings. The roller or rocker bearings has been blocked with the footing for decades. The footing made this safety device to non functioning for DECADES. There is nothing relieving the typical bridge stresses including thermal expansion and contraction. The thermal expansion joint seen from the roadway which gives some leeway between the footing and bridge...it is just for show. I actually see damage with the footing from the bride expansion and contraction. It is a disgrace. Are true and actual condition with these bearing going to be accurately represented in your inspection report? The NHDOT has been falsifying their inspections report on these bearings for years. Remember I got pictures of it.
Believe me, don't bury this email in you system. I am a season whistleblower dealing with hundreds of million dollar cases over many years. Show this to your higher ups. Do not cover your asses. Please do not be implicated in a coverup. I know federal funding is involved with NHDOT bridge inspections. I know the Governor's office is reluctantly in investigation my allegations. I am going after the NHDOT and its bridge inspection department. I am sure your employees felt the severe bridge vibrations and swaying from their cherry picker inspecting the highest reach of these gigantic truss.
Here below is my blog. This email is going to be posted on it. I wrote most of my posts towards the end of July (pictures). I am open to talk with anyone. If you google Mike Mulligan, Brattleboro-Hinsdale bridge or something similar and Mike Mulligan, Brattleboro Reformer you will see how long I've been involved. I got all of my heart into saving lives. My community and beyond expects a completely accurate and comprehensive representation on the abysmal conditions of the bridge. I better not see you cutting and pasting words and phrases from any past falsified inspection reports because everyone else does it to compete. That is a new beginning!!!
NESTED ROLLER BEARINGS WITH TRUSS PIN AT EAST ABUTMENT BOTTOM PLATES HOLED AT NORTHEAST ROLLER BEARING, REPAIRED AND PAINTED. PLATES BETWEEN ROLLER BEARING PIN AND TOP CHORD END DIAGONAL RUSTED WITH HEAVY SECTION LOSS AT NORTHEAST, CLEANED AND PAINTED. MODERATE RUST AT BEARINGS.
Fixed Bearing
FIXED PIN BEARINGS AT WEST ABUTMENT MODERATE RUST AND SCALE AT INTERIORS
A bridge bearing is a component of a bridge which typically provides a resting surface between bridge piers and the bridge deck. The purpose of a bearing is to allow controlled movement and thereby reduce the stresses involved. Movement could be thermal expansion or contraction, or movement from other sources such as seismic activity. There are several different types of bridge bearings which are used depending on a number of different factors including the bridge span. The oldest form of bridge bearing is simply two plates resting on top of each other. A common form of modern bridge bearing is the elastomeric bridge bearing. Another type of bridge bearing is the mechanical bridge bearing. There are several types of mechanical bridge bearing, such as the pinned bearing, which in turn includes specific types such as the rocker bearing, and the roller bearing. Another type of mechanical bearing is the fixed bearing, which allows rotation, but not other forms of movement...
That report on New bridge designs, where we got the bridge inspection report yesterday, the contractor that did that job was funded by NH, Vt and mostly federal funding. I am certain enormous amounts of federal funding are involved with NH bridge inspections. I doubt actually highly trained and educated federal bridge inspectors ever touched our bridges. Can you even imagine the political controversy developed between contradictory bridge inspections between the Feds and state? These guys protect each other asses by the feds not getting involved with bridge inspections. Like I asked, who oversees the overseers? Basically the feds roll out the bridge inspection codes, rules and funding without ever inspecting if the money was spent wisely and everything is up to federal bridge codes. I doubt it is required that the states followed the US bridge codes and inspection rules. NH bridge inspection rules must be pitiful? I doubt a state inspector falsifying a bridge inspection report is even illegal both in the state and federal laws. More worrisome, I doubt the actual NH bridge inspectors have the intense training and higher education needed for the job other than high school...little bridge inspector professionalism and a intense need to feed their families with their pitiful wages they make . Where do this bridge inspectors come from? Probably heavy equipment operators and essentially highway ditch diggers. I really don't mean to demean these good and loyal employees, I am just trying to make a point about the system.
What I am certain is these bridges' won't last another five years until the new bridges' are opened, as I wrote to Mr Broodey. What has changed in the last few years is the traffic rate going across the bridges? The "Runnings" store, much like a high end Walmart has recently opened. Traffic (vehicles per day) rate across those bridges has drastically increased, including all the cars who go to the Runnings store. A lot of big tractor trailers loaded to the gills had to go over these bridges with these new consumer and recreational products. The biggest bridge traffic rate concern of mine, is the unprecedented economic growth we are now seeing throughout the country and my surroundings. Unprecedented! Does anyone anticipate what the traffic (vpd) rate would look like in the near future with the upcoming booming economic growth years? How big will the boom be? Will the burdens of the drastic increase with the "vehicles per day" rate crossing these bridges, be the straw that broke bridges'/camel's back.
What is really needed is a drastic reform with NHDOT's bridge inspector department. These guys are living in the stone age. The state really has to jack up the professionalism and transparency on this very important NHDOT department.
I giving Gov Sununu the opportunity to get ahead of the trend?
