Junk Plant River Bend controlled Vessel Level Professionally

Just saying, they started up without fully understanding and fixing the switchyard.

I am happy to see they controlled the reactor level professionally.

Lot of scrams and problems nationally with switch-yards.

I wonder if this well controlled vessel was a function of dumping the feed system, becoming isolated behind MSIVs and using the SRVs to cool the core.    

Automatic Reactor Scram Due toPartial Loss of Offsite Power Caused by Fault in Local 230kV Switchyard
Licensee Event Report 50-458 / 2015-009-00
On November 27, 2015, at 4:31 a.m. CST, with the plant operating at 100 percent power, an automatic reactor scram occurred following the loss of power to both divisions of the reactor protection system (RPS). This condition resulted from a single-phase fault in the local 230kV switchyard. The initial response of the protective relays for the switchyard caused the breakers connected to the north 230kV bus in the switchyard to trip. The fault caused a voltage transient on the in-plant switchgear sufficient to trip the scram relays in the Division 2 RPS, resulting in a half-scram. The action of the protective relays continued, eventually causing the de-energization of reserve station service line no. 1. This lead to the loss of Division 1 RPS and a full reactor scram. The Division 1 and 3 emergency diesel generators started as designed to restore power to their respective safety-related onsite electrical distribution subsystems. Both trains of the standby gas treatment system started, and the primary containment isolation system logic responded as designed. No safety-related systems were out of service at the time of the scram, and reactor pressure and water level were promptly stabilized. All reactor control rods inserted properly. Multiple actuations of the main steam safety-

Seems there was abnormal operation of SRVS. These are rather delicate devices. Will there be future problems with the SRVs: leaking and misoperation. 

relief valves (SRVs) occurred during the event. The nuclear steam supply system vendor reported this action was likely due to a localized pressure transient in the SkV instrumentation lines. SRV tailpipe temperature recorders indicated that all valves re-seated correctly following the initial transient. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an automatic actuation of the reactor protection system, the primary containment isolation logic, and the Division 1 and 3 emergency diesel generators. The root cause of this event remains under investigation. The results of that evaluation will be provided in a supplement to this report.