New NRC Inspection report: "the licensee identified new tube degradation mechanisms and implemented adequate extent of condition...Just think of the number deviances a end of life plant builds upon by the time of death. How about a host of plants like this. Steam Generators should be kept in new pristine conditions.
Palisades was commissioned in 1971. They replaced their defective SGs “21” years later in 1992. From 1992 to today is 24 years. It is clear as a bell they should be replaced.
Remember these guys are mostly behind
feet of concrete most of their lives. They are in a self-created high radiation
level. It is not like you could dissemble the SG and closely inspect the
cracked tubes. Then replace the tubes at will. Right, we are really talking about an
experiment here.
Right, if they had to replaced the SGs, they would shutdown the plant before they spent that kind of money.
I think we are heading for a tube break
or worst. You get in a serious accident putting tremendous stress on the 40%
cracked tubes and they would burst. Maybe more than one would burst. In the scheme
of the condition of our nation, outsiders would consider it a core meltdown. For
the industry in its fragile condition, it would be marginally less worse than
Fukushima. It would turn into media circus. Remember the black hole organizations
and governments surrounding the lead in the water in Flint Michigan. Basically the
organization have so much corrupt power they can control all the information on
the development of the issues. Basically we have all turned into unthinking
slaves of the system. Is the nuclear industry like the walking dead government organizations surrounding Flint Michigan. You get it, basically infinite and unobtainable triplicate proof a danger point is approaching is needed for action. But no matter if damaged or dead children show up, it never enough proof lead is there and dangerous. It is a government and the population at large, who is too insecure and intimidated to act to protect themselves.
***Over time, these cracks can be expected
to become more and more extensive, necessitating more extensive inspections of
the lower tubesheet region and more extensive tube plugging or repairs.
Increasing the number of SG tubes plugged reduces the heat removal capability
of the SGs, resulting in the potential for shortening the useful lifetime of the
SGs.
This LAR is about lengthening the life
of the steam generator, not increasing safety with the plant.
***The cracked and broken reactor coolant pump blades, I still worry about. It is all NOD.
You get the gist of Flint Michigan and our rich elites: the governments walk around in a severely wounded condition.They are too terrified of the elites to acts. Like I have been saying for years, the rich elites are increasing regulating the NRC inspectors through the campaign contributions congress....basically self regulation for the bad actors.
Just think about in recent years how many botched CDRMs jobs there has been at this plant. I am telling in our national condition, I wouldn't trust any engineering evaluation.
***The cracked and broken reactor coolant pump blades, I still worry about. It is all NOD.
You get the gist of Flint Michigan and our rich elites: the governments walk around in a severely wounded condition.They are too terrified of the elites to acts. Like I have been saying for years, the rich elites are increasing regulating the NRC inspectors through the campaign contributions congress....basically self regulation for the bad actors.
Just think about in recent years how many botched CDRMs jobs there has been at this plant. I am telling in our national condition, I wouldn't trust any engineering evaluation.
The industry need for steam generator (SG) alternate repair criteria (ARC) license amendments, for plants with Alloy 600TI tubing, started with the initial findings at Catawba Unit 2, in the fall of 2004. Other nuclear plants with Alloy 600TI tubing had found crack-like indications in tubes within the tubesheet as well. Most of the indications were found in the tack expansion region near the tube-end welds and were a mixture of axial and circumferential primary water stress corrosion cracking. Over time, these cracks can be expected to become more and more extensive, necessitating more extensive inspections of the lower tubesheet region and more extensive tube plugging or repairs. Increasing the number of SG tubes plugged reduces the heat removal capability of the SGs, resulting in the potential for shortening the useful lifetime of the SGs. To avoid these impacts, the affected licensees and their contractor, Westinghouse, developed proposed alternative inspection and repair criteria applicable to the tubes in the lowermost region of the tubesheets. These criteria, for CE SGs, are referred to as the C* criteria. The C* distance is the minimum engagement distance between the tube and tubesheet, measured downward from the top of the tubesheet (TIS), that is proposed as needed to ensure the structural and leakage integrity of the TTS joints. The proposed C* alternate repair criteria would exclude the portions of tubing below the C* distance from inspection and plugging requirements, on the basis that flaws below the C* distance are not detrimental to the structural and leakage integrity of the TIS joints.Requests for permanent ARC amendments were proposed for a number of plants as early as 2005. PNP was part of this population, receiving an ARC amendment for the hot leg portion of the SG tubesheet on May 31,2007 (Reference 4). Subsequently, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, or the Commission) staff identified a number of issues, associated with H*…***Add a SG tube inspection provision in TS 5.5.S that is applicable when the alternate repair criteria, proposed above, is implemented. This complements the proposed cold leg ARC by expanding the inspection population to 100% of the cold leg inservice tubes while limiting the inspection depth to the C* length of 12.5 inches below the bottom of the cold-leg expansion transition or top of the cold-leg tubesheet, whichever is lower.***Add a SG tube inspection reporting requirement to TS 5.6.S for tube slippage monitoring, discovery, and corrective actions. This will provide defense in depth by continued monitoring to ensure that SG tube slippage is not occurring, as predicted by the C* analyses. Then, if unexpected slippage is discovered, the requirement ensures that a proper evaluation of the occurrence and corrective actions are taken.
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