Junk Plant ANO Returns to Power Operation After Significant Feedwater Piping Replacement Job

update Nov 21

4% yesterday and 18% today...

***I wonder if they will come up to 100% quickly???

Junk Plant Hope Creek: Stupidly Damaged Fuel By Not Following Procedure

Update Nov 19

Basically, this is the kind of mistake you should take their license away from them for 6 months to a years.

***This can't come from a seasoned and well trained crew.  This is like getting into you car without keys. This is basically a very simple procedure. Basically up around 70% power, they drastically slowed down the increase in power to 100% and are required more reactor testing. This is so stupid, it has to go across all the crews. It was maliciously stupid....

November 14, 2018

EA-18-044 

(Here is the link) 08038    SUBJECT: HOPECREEK GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT AND EXERCISE OFENFORCEMENT DISCRETION 05000354/2018003

Inadequate Procedures for Fuel Conditioning Results in Multiple Fuel Leaks Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Reactor Safety – Barrier Integrity

 Green  NCV 05000354/2018003-03 Closed H.6 – Human Performance – Design Margins 71153 (a.1) The inspectors documented a self-revealing Green NCV of TS 6.8.1, Procedures and Programs, when PSEG did not maintain adequate procedures for fuel conditioning.  Specifically, PSEG’s procedure for selecting the appropriate fuel PCI rules, NF-AB-440, BWR Fuel Conditioning, did not provide adequate guidance for protection of the fuel during restart from the April 2018 refueling outage (RF21).  As a result, PSEG’s selection non-conservative PCI rules resulted in three PCI fuel leaks.  Description:  HCGS is currently in operating Cycle 22 with a modified control cell core design strategy.  During RF21, a large number of GE14 fuel assemblies were replaced with new GNF2 fuel assemblies.  Each of the four Group 10A banked position withdrawal sequence control cells are at the center of two twice-burned GE14 (new fuel in Cycle 20) fuel assemblies and two once-burned GNF2 (new fuel in operating Cycle 21) fuel assemblies that form a control cell.  During Cycle 21, prior to RF21, the GE14 fuel assemblies were in the second row from the periphery (lower power), or outer edge of the reactor core.  In RF21, some of these fuel assemblies were moved from the outer edge, inward toward the core center (higher power) into the cells surrounding the four Group 10A control cells.  This type of movement is known to create a configuration that may reduce margin to pellet-clad interation related failures….

Just remember, the NRC would not be so fixed on the recent spate of problem, if I didn't the  problems much earlier.

Review of Equipment Issues Associated with the ‘H’ SRV and SRV Discharge Line:

The inspectors performed an in-depth review of PSEG's evaluation and corrective actions associated with multiple equipment issues experienced on the ‘H’ main steam safety relief valve (SRV) and SRV discharge line.  Specifically:

1. ‘H’ SRV Main Seat Leakage August 2014 (NOTF 20659947; ACE 70168360) documented loud cyclic banging noises coming from the TORUS area.  PSEG determined that there was significant leakage past the ‘H’ SRV main seat due to the existence of cold spring in the tailpipe during installation of the valve (NOTF 20661387 and NCV 05000354/2014005-01);

2. ‘H’ SRV High Tailpipe Temperature April 2018 and May 2018 (NOTF 20789878, 20794091 and 20794237) documented that during down power for and the start up from RF21, the ‘H’ SRV tailpipe temperature spiked up to 220 degrees Fahrenheit which is indicative of potential SRV main and/or pilot valve leakage;

3. ‘H’ SRV Vacuum Breaker Failure April 2018 (NOTF 20792630 and ERE 70199676) documents that one of the ‘H’ SRV discharge line vacuum breakers (F037H) failed open due to a missing locknut and damage caused by high vibrations and poor maintenance practices from item #1 above; and,

4. ‘H’ SRV Pilot As-Found Lift Test Failures May 2018 (NOTF 20794371, 70200658, and LERs 05000354/2018-002-00 and -01) documented the ‘H’ SRV pilot as-found setpoint testing.  Eight of HCGS’s fourteen SRV pilots lifted high (above the 3 percent TS limit).  The ‘H’ SRV pilot was the only valve that lifted high on the first and second as-found lift testing (8.3 and 3.3 percent).  

[Note that the 2-stage SRVs, manufactured by Target Rock, of which HCGS has 13 2-stage and 1 3-stage SRVs, have been subject to setpoint drift, typically in the increased setpoint direction at a number of boiling water reactor nuclear power plants, and that the specific setpoint drift issue will be addressed by the unresolved item (URI) opened in NRC Inspection Report, URI 05000354/2018001-02, Concern Regarding As-Found Values for Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoints Exceed Technical Specification Allowable Limit.]

The inspectors reviewed associated documents and interviewed personnel to assess the adequacy of PSEG’s actions.  The inspectors also reviewed SRV main and pilot testing results, tailpipe temperature, main steam vibration records, and acoustic monitoring data.  The inspectors found the following issues during their review of the events listed above:

The inspectors found that PSEG had an extended timeline (6 months) and a lack of prioritization and ownership of the disassembly of the ‘H’ SRV pilot due to it lifting high twice (NOTF 20799218*).  Based on the inspector’s questions regarding timeliness, PSEG initiated a NOTF and actions to disassemble and inspect the pilot four months ahead of its original schedule.  As a result of the disassembly, PSEG’s determined that the pilot disc and valve body were severely steam cut and worn, with unknown impurities on the valve pilot disc.  PSEG initiated work group evaluation (WGE) 70200658 to evaluate these unexpected conditions;

WGE 70200658 was completed on September 21, 2018, for the ‘H’ SRV failed setpoint lift test high twice in which PSEG determined that the first high test lift was due to corrosion bonding, and the second high test lift was due to pilot valve wear between the disc and liner caused by steam cutting from a pilot leak during the last operating cycle.  PSEG’s WGE found that some of the unknown impurities were cobalt and nickel oxide due to the corrosion bonding experienced by the valve.  The WGE did not determine the source of the lead (Pb) in the impurities but pointed to the valve material test report that cites 0.5 percent of the total valve disc material being from ‘OTHER’ material.  The inspectors reviewed PSEG’s conclusion and discussed with PSEG on September 27, 2018, that the site is still awaiting feedback from the vendor and BWROG about the potential source of the lead in the impurities.


The inspectors determined that there was insufficient information provided by PSEG in licensee event report (LER 2018-002) for the as-found testing results of the SRV pilots, specifically, no information on the ‘H’ SRV pilot lifting high twice was reported As a result, PSEG initiated NOTF 20799025* and took corrective actions (70201546) to change their process for LER reviews to include a technical validation team review prior to submittal to the NRC;

The inspectors found that PSEG’s procedure for SRV removal and installation, HC.MDCM.AB-0006, was not revised in accordance with their causal evaluation (70168360) to include a step to unpin the spring can after installation of the SRV.  PSEG initiated a NOTF with actions to revise the procedure and review all completed SRV work packages to ensure all pins were removed (NOTF 20801471*, 20803451*, and 70202115).  As a result, PSEG’s review found that three SRVs replaced in RF20 did not have any documentation that their spring cans had been unpinned.  PSEG has created actions to conduct follow-up inspection of these SRVs (‘J’, ‘K’, and ‘R’) during the next refueling outage;

19


The inspectors found that PSEG’s NOTF 20661387 and 70169063-0010 never validated a questionable spring can setting for the ‘H’ SRV due to a lack of understanding the issue.  Because of this, inspectors also questioned the validity of PSEG’s causal evaluation (70168360) conclusions based on the as-found cold spring being expected because of the piping configuration.  The inspectors determined that during the development of the evaluation, PSEG did not consult the appropriate resources knowledgeable in pipe stress analysis.  As a result, PSEG took action to validate that the spring can setting was correct and initiated NOTF 20803213* with a recommendation from engineering to review the causal evaluation’s conclusions based on the inspector’s questions and an independent engineering assessment.  As of September 12, 2018, this recommendation was not supported by PSEG because the condition on the ‘H’ SRV is no longer present and there is no perceived value in performing the action.  The inspectors noted that as of the end of this inspection period, PSEG initiated NOTF 20806034 on October 1, 2018, for degrading conditions associated with the ‘H’ SRV main seat leakage increasing from ~155 pound mass per hour (lbm/hr) to approximately 323 lbm/hr since H1R21 (June 2018), which is similar to the conditions that occurred on the ‘H’ SRV in August 2014, and were the subject of PSEG’s causal evaluation (70168360).

The inspectors found that PSEG’s WGE 70173184 had not determined a basis for what amount of displacement is considered unacceptable.  In addition, PSEG had not performed trending of SRV piping misalignments as discussed in the WGE for RF19 (2015) and RF20 (2016).  PSEG initiated NOTFs 20803211* and 20803212* to address the inspector’s concerns and plans to perform extent of condition reviews of all SRV main replacements over the last few outages.

The inspectors evaluated all of the issues above in accordance with the guidance in IMC 0612, Appendix B, “Issue Screening,” and Appendix E, “Examples of Minor Issues,” and determined the issues were of minor significance because the inspectors did not identify any condition adverse to quality that were not appropriately corrected or scheduled for correction in a reasonable period of time as a result of PSEG’s administrative delays, lack of prioritization, and insufficient information.  Consequently, these issues are not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC’s enforcement policy.

Junk Plant Palisades: More CRDMs Troubles

Nov 19.

Time to strap on your unqualified titanium gonad shields.


***Oct 20th troubles with CRDMs. Check out how expensive these two outages cost Entergy.

This are one of the three shutdown Entergy plants I have been watching. Basically not enough money to keep them running like a top and much weakened NRC. River Bend and Grand Goof.    

Leak being repaired at Palisades

By ALEXANDRA NEWMAN - HP Staff Writer
3 hrs ago

COVERT — A through-wall leak was found at Palisades nuclear power plant last Saturday during a visual inspection of the reactor head, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission reported Wednesday.

The NRC released a notification that the non-emergency leak was found on a reactor vessel head control rod drive nozzle. An NRC metallurgical specialist was on site inspecting Palisades’ reactor vessel assessment activities when the problem was identified.

The resident inspectors were onsite as well and were notified when the discovery was made.

In addition, Palisades found similar ultrasonic test characteristics in another nozzle while assessing the condition of other control rod drive nozzles, but this nozzle did not exhibit evidence of through-wall leakage.

Palisades will repair the problems before the plant restarts from the current refueling outage.

Last week, the plant officially began a scheduled $62 million refueling and maintenance outage. It is the first of two remaining at Palisades before the plant’s retirement in spring 2022.

Why Has Cooper Been Shutdown For So long.

Obviously they are in refueling outage. Sept 29 is when it shutdown. Forty six days so far?

Junk Plant Watts Bar Still A Very Troubled Plant

Remember this is the new massively non transparent NRC. Most plant this cycle get zero or one findings.

November 1, 2018

 SUBJECT: WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT – NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000390/2018003 AND 05000391/2018003 

 Dear Mr. Shea:
 On September 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2.  On October 24, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Tom Marshall and other members of your staff.  The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
 NRC inspectors documented four findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.   These findings involved violations of NRC requirements.  The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
 

Advice To House Majority Democrats: Need Emergency Hearings On "So Called" NRC Reform And Deregulation

Markey is long gone from the house. He was the prime mover with keeping the industry on its toes. The much younger generation has absolutely no interest in voting or nuclear power interest and their intentional lying. Who is going the take Markey's old position in the house The pro safety stalwarts are dead or dying off. Nuclear Energy is fading from our collective historic memory. 

And, we in a gigantic financial nuclear crisis. 

Basically, in the last three years, the NRC has drastically reduced industry's transparency and severely weaken regulation. As in all our agencies. 

As a first step, the House should force the NRC to put back on the internet the NRC's blog. They should allow outside people like me the ability to comment (and get a official response) on their old style blog and it would be retained in their system for posterity. This tool is very powerful.  This is contingent on the NRC would put on the blog a comprehensive list of current issues and restore transparency.

The Navy has on their "Navy Times" a similar government blog where the public can comment their newspaper and get a response from the Navy officials. It too has disappeared from the internet.  The New US agency social media like facebook and  twitter have been generally designed to push the Republican propaganda. They are really not adequate for accepting, recording and getting official's responses.   On the big picture, all the US government blogs mostly begun on the Obama, should be updated and restored to the Obama form.

Believe me, Democrats in power and heads of agencies and beyond hates these kinds of transparency and accountability...  

The Real Entergy Shows Its Ugly Head

Is this just training for Entergy? 

Entergy thinks we’re stupid

(Honestly, you are stupid.) 

Updated 7:28 AM; Posted 7:28 AM

 Entergy New Orleans CEO Charles Rice, at left in gray suit, listens as protesters oppose the $210 million gas-fired power plant that Entergy proposed for New Orleans East. The council approved the plant with a 6-1 vote after an hours-long hearing in March. (Kevin Litten, NOLA.com | The Times-Picayune) 

By Tim Morris, Columnist

timothy_morris@nola.com

Fining Entergy New Orleans just $5 million for seeking to subvert the democratic process, mislead the City Council and wage war on residents hardly seems adequate.

For starters, there is the question of whether a $5 million fine will get the attention, let alone change the behavior, of a company with annual revenues of $11 billion and literal power over 2.9 million utility customers in Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas.

And then there is the sheer hubris the company displayed in trying to rig a political process that was already so embarrassingly weighted in its favor that no self-respecting Las Vegas bookie would have taken odds against council approval of the company’s plans for a new gas-fired power plant in New Orleans East.

Taking council members at their word that the 6-1 vote for the plant last March was based on the testimony of “experts,” what advantage did Entergy gain by hiring actors to show up at hearings in matching orange T-shirts, carrying mass-produced signs and reading heartfelt pleas for jobs, power and an end to “cascading outages” from prepared scripts?

Was then-Entergy CEO Charles Rice really that obsessed with overwhelming and humiliating activists and concerned residents with a shock and awe campaign of paid protesters? Text messages and other previously private communications uncovered by an independent City Council investigation certainly suggest that.

"This is a war and we need all the foot shoulders [soldiers] we can muster," he says in a discussion of whether Entergy would be willing to pony up for more ersatz supporters.

It’s never a good look when the head of a major utility is caught equating what is supposed to be a fair and open democratic process with all-out warfare, especially when his side has actual nuclear power and the resistance is mostly worried about how a new plant will affect their property values, quality of life and their children’s health.

This is the worst use of political dirty tricks since Richard Nixon’s Committee to Re-Elect the President, CREEP, tried to bug the Democratic Party headquarters at the Watergate in the campaign against South Dakota Sen. George McGovern. The “third-rate burglary” eventually spawned an investigation that forced Nixon to resign from his second term in the face of impeachment.

Nixon, by the way, defeated McGovern in a historic landslide with the Democratic challenger winning only in Massachusetts and the District of Columbia while losing everywhere else, including his home state of South Dakota.

There has never been any evidence that any of Nixon’s subversive political knavery had much impact on the electoral outcome. But that’s what happens when the political process, which is supposed to be “war by other means,” is embraced as actual warfare.

Only in this case, the “foot shoulders” were more “Hogan’s Heroes” than “Saving Private Ryan.” Did anybody really think that hiring local actors to appear in public venues was going to escape detection?

At some point isn’t someone going to notice that a beer-drinking buddy who used to be laser-beam focused on playing a cadaver on “NCIS: New Orleans” was suddenly a rabid convert to extolling the virtues of a “safe, reliable gas-fired peaking power plant over the alternative of being 100 percent reliant on transmission during a storm."

They must have thought we were all that stupid.

And even as the City Council’s investigation uncovered damning communications between top Entergy executives, the company continued to claim it has been duped by the outside public relations firm it hired to sell the plant proposal. Investigators also complained that Entergy has been less than forthcoming in forking over information requested. Not exactly encouraging signs moving forward.

What we need is more lifetime voters, folks who make it habit to get to the polls — informed and engaged.

Rice abruptly stepped down as Entergy’s CEO in August to take on a new role in — I’m not making this up — the company’s legal department.

Perhaps he will get to review the resolutions passed last week by the City Council that could include that $5 million fine and other requirements meant to induce a “sea-change in the corporate culture” at Entergy New Orleans.

City Councilwoman Helena Moreno called the episode “just plain sad and disappointing" and lamented that Entergy had "lost sight of the company they’ve always claimed to be.”

NHDOT Are Scumbags

Update Nov 5

The Keene Sentinel and 99% of the mega rich newspapers owners are infected with the same philosophical mental model defect. Basically, me saying two plus two equals four. They would come back, I can't report that because you showed me no proof. The bankrupted black and white philosophy of them picking and choosing what is evidence and proof that is needed to report the truth to the best of their ability. They are too lazy to get off their fat asses to see something beyond the surface truth and their simpleton model of how the world in their heads works. Usually there is a agenda under this: I've got a keep my job and feed my family and the owners got to make the paper comport to their own monied ideology. More likely, I will never get advertising revenue if I tell what is really going on.    

***Why can't the Keene Sentinel connect the dots? I hear rumors they are shutting down. Most of their facility, including the front desk, are a shithole. 

I think this state wide NHDOT inspections on Truss bridges comes out of my activities with the Brattleboro/Hinsdale route 119 bridge. I have been accusing the state of doing fraudulent bridge inspection based on politics and favors beginning in 2011. I have been saying for many years now the conditions of the bridges are a lot worst than the bridge NHDOT inspections. This year it went from a perfectly safe bridge to a red listed bridge needing a special inspection every 6 months. From a normal five year bridge inspection schedule to a once every 6 months inspection. The next inspection grade down is a shutdown. For years now, I have been picturing up the horrible conditions of my bridges. The facts on the ground here is the state has no engineering mechanism to predict the decline with this ancient bridge. This is what was proven in Hinsdale this year.

(added)
The rub here, with the skimpy state inspections, they don't collect enough data points to truly understand the accurate condition of the bridge inspection and be able to anticipate the material degradations. Fixated on the black and white engineering philosophy of facts and evidence. Can't image what information is missing from your skimpy inspections process. As I've said for years, their inspection presses are made flawed for political considerations, but they think their processes are dead on accurate. Honestly, the only people allowed to inspect the bridges should be highly educated and trained state employees. The state should have total control of these employees and they not be loyal be loyal to any other interest. But this is the NH advantage? Hate governed and barely fund the NH agencies. I don't trust the  bridge inspection contractor. As I said before, the non government bridge inspection contractor is only answerable to money and profits...         

The new bridge's price is somewhere near $60 Million dollars...

There is a high probability 

Nov 4

Lane closures slated on Charlestown bridge

By Sentinel Staff

12 hrs ago

Top of Form

Bottom of Form

CHARLESTOWN — Motorists who travel the bridge that carries Route 11 across the Connecticut River between Charlestown and Springfield, Vt., can expect up to five days of lane closures starting Monday, the N.H. Department of Transportation has announced.

The closures are to allow for what the department describes in a news release as an “in-depth inspection” of the span. The inspection is part of a statewide effort to assess the condition of New Hampshire’s truss bridges, according to the state transportation department.

The closures will be in effect daily as needed, 7:30 a.m. to 4 p.m., as weather allows.

Drivers will be alerted to the lane closures by people with flags as well as by warning signs, and they’re encouraged to use other routes if possible due to the resulting delays.

Junk Plant Grand Gulf: Isn't It About Time For A Scram Or a Prolonged And Deep Downpower?

Update Nov 7

Well, River Bend and Grand Goof are back a 100%. I still feel Grand Gulf is heading to a big fall. This round of erratic ops was just a warning.

But ANO unit 2 is still in a huge unexpected feedwater leak outage...

Entergy plants.

Update Nov 6

Grand Gulf 85%

The good news, River Bend is back to 100% power and Entergy always had plentiful nuclear engineering positions.

Update Nov 5

Grand Gulf is down to 92% power today.

Nov 2 62 % power
Nov 3 62
Nov 4 93
Nov 5 92

I would consider this a pretty large down power event. There is a slight chance this a adjusting control roads.

River Bend has had pretty erratic power operations this past week or so too.

What is going in at Energy's in region 4?

***River Bend has been erratically up and down in power for the last 5 days. Big moves.

US Terrorism Against Leftist Top Leadeship

Update

See, took the Saudi story right off the air?

***I think we got it all wrong. This US terrorism is a distraction from the Saudi murder with the Washington Post reportor. Factions within the Trump administration or our Defense establishment wanted to buy time to come up with a acceptable coverup story. They might cave to profond troubles with defense contracts and the Saudis being isolaled from the world.

ANO 2: What The Hell Is Going On With Their 9/16 Feedwater Leak

So they immediately scrammed or shutdown. This is a drastic example of how much deregulation has been going on with the NRC. Where is the event report on feedwater leak or on the shutdown or scram. This would have been required in the Obama years.

They scrammed or shutdown on Sept 16, 2018 and it is now Oct 25...that is 39 days. I wonder where the leak was located?  The feedwater pressure is up to 1000 psi and around 600 degrees. If the leak was in the primary containment, it would be a more of a safety concern. It certainly is a employee safety concern.

This sounds like many feet of feedwater pipe is being replace...

A leak in the feedwater system can emediately fill up a room with steam. This kind of leak has killed 4 people I believe the Surry plant. It wrecks havoc with creating shorts and equipment problems throughout the plant.  

Dead Ender Palisades: Losing NRC Faith in Science and Engineering over CDRM Leaks

This is what a plant looks like at end of life, when they are starving funding to the plant. Lot of equipment troubles showing up and losing employees prodigiously. What do we have about 10 plants in this condition is the USA? A big accident waiting to happen killing the rest of the industry.

Didn't they put in new CDRMs due to continuous leaks in around 2015. Check out my comments on this. Check out my comments below the article? Once President Trump came into power the NRC shutdown the "NRC's Blog". So they replace all but eight CRDMs in 2015. A CRDM replacement job is tremendously expensive and the radiation dose for the employees. Don't get me talking about titanium gonads protection for this job. Is the leak in the eight not replaced CRDMs in 2015...the the titanium gonad outage...or the rest of the CRDMs that were replaced. Is it a new CRDM or a old CRDMs. Basically the design of the reactor and the associated CRDMs was defective from day one of plant operation. It is a very old reactor. Palisades has the worst CRDM leak rate in the industry.         

An Inspector’s Perspective On the Control Rod Drive Mechanism Housing Flaws At Palisades 

Palisades maintenance outage underway

· By JIM DALGLEISH - Assistant Local News Editor
· 2 hrs ago

COVERT — The Palisades nuclear power plant is starting its second week of a repair outage, which comes in advance of a planned refueling outage, the plant and federal regulators reported.

Plant spokesman Nick Culp said Friday that operators shut down the reactor Oct. 13 for planned work on a degrading control rod drive seal.

However, “during the scheduled maintenance, an internal transformer fault occurred, resulting in the loss of power supply to several components,” Culp said. “At all times, the plant remained in a safe and stable condition. Palisades employees are working to replace the transformer. (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) inspectors were made aware of the planned shutdown and have been kept informed throughout.”

The NRC on Friday reported that the step-down transformer failed as crews tried to restart the reactor after the drive seal repair.

For proprietary reasons, Culp said, plant owner Entergy does not divulge when the plant will restart or if managers will roll the current outage into the refuelling outage. It will not say when the refuelling outage was to start.

“This maintenance project comes after 198 days of continuous safe operation and is reflective of our ongoing commitment to running the plant well,” Culp said in a statement. “... During the coming outage, Entergy will invest tens of millions of dollars in the plant’s safe and reliable operations.”

The fall refueling outage will be one of the last two before the plant shuts down in 2022, Culp said. 

Flooding Upstream Of The South Texas Nuclear Project, What Rivers?

Update

The site is not under a threat. 

***Hmm, Llano River and Colorado River. Plant is just south west of Houston on the coast. Central Texas is being inundated with precipitation. 

Brunswick Still Has flooding Issues Post Fukushima Retrofit

This is what I sent the NRC on Sept 12. Remember hurricane Florence petered out to a below Cat 1 hurricane as it hit landfall. A true cat 4 or 5 would have been devastating. 

Again, was the Fukushima lessen learned comprehensive at Brunswick? Does this prove it wasn't. These are all really smart people, maybe there is fraud and corruption.

Usually this would flip into a special inspection. But now the new NRC has a intermediate step favoring the licensees and the industry...meaning less special inspection. There is no doubt in recent years the NRC has had a lot less special inspection...   

Wednesday, September 12, 2018

NOAA Says The Two Plant Brunswick Nuclear Plant Are Heading For a Meltdown in a Cat 4 Hurricane

Still working on this

Cat 4 Hurricane Hugo had a storm surge of 18 feet in North Carolina. I don't know if it was in the high or low end of a Cat 4 hurricane? Remember Florence is 21 feet about sea level. You know, what is your definition sea level? There is many of them. I got my measurement of Brunswick's above sea-level height of 21 feet from google earth. I kinda thought over topping the Brunswick's site was not probable in a Cat 4 or 5 hurricane. I did not believe these plants could be constructed so closes to sea-level. I figured these plants could easily survive high in the Cat 5 level. I now know it is probable ocean overtopping the site in a cat 4 or 5 is a certainty. I totally believe the NOAA's cat 4 or 5 storm surge calculations. Remember the hurricane ocean over topping is 3 feet at Brunswick per NOAA.

I am shocked at this latitude this plant is so poorly situated. I suspect more plants are in the same situation.

Now I consider it a high probability there will be a guaranteed of meltdown at Brunswick in a cat 4 or 5 hurricane. This is our Fukushima. Are the reactor building, turbine building, diesel generator rooms or the switchyard are not designed for a 6 feet or more ocean over-topping of their site. Can the flex system over come this kind of defect with a 6 feet or more over-topping of their site. In the best of any ones computer models, they is just too much uncertainty.

I think the turbine building and reactor building would quickly fill up with ocean water rendering all ECCS inoperable. I think the ECCS safety busses are on the ground floor. They would become inoperable. As far as the diesel generators, they are probrably on the ground floor. Certainly the diesel generator's local breakers are on the ground floor. There is your blackout where the flex system being useless too. You going to helicopter a flex system big DG or pump into 6 feet of water?

I make the case in climate change, these big hurricanes will be much more probable.

Questions

1) Is it in plant licensing all US are nuclear plant are supposed to survive all cat 4 and 5 Hurricanes without a meltdown?

2) Think about the movement and safety of operators on site in a over-topping conditions. There would be no movement.

3) Would the hardened vent be usable or accessible?

I request a emergency investigation on this Hurricane ocean surge issue on a Cat 4 and 5 levels at Brunswick. Can this plant survive a Cat 4 or 5 hurricane without a meltdown? Is there a extremely high likelihood these plants would not meltdown? Actually, if a plant can't survive a Cat 4 or 5 hurricane without meltdown, these plants should be emediately shutdown in the greater interest of the USA?

I am considering a 2,206?

Sincerely,

Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH

Cell: 1603 209-4206
steamshovel2002@ yahoo.com         

I guess the NRC has flooding issues with Brunswick post Hurricane Michael? 

From: Guill, Paul F <Paul.Guill@duke-energy.com> Sent: Wednesday, September 26, 2018 1:13 PM To: Vega, Frankie Subject: [External_Sender] RE: Brunswick Flooding MSA review
Frankie;

The clarification information requested is provided below in red. Let me know if need any additional information to support your review. Again, thanks for your patience 

From: Vega, Frankie [mailto:Frankie.Vega@nrc.gov]  Sent: Monday, September 24, 2018 1:04 PM To: Guill, Paul F <Paul.Guill@duke-energy.com> Subject: RE: Brunswick Flooding MSA review

*** Exercise caution. This is an EXTERNAL email. DO NOT open attachments or click links from unknown senders or unexpected email. ***  Hello Mr. Guill;

Just a quick follow-up with my request below. I know that you guys are still dealing with the aftermath of the hurricane so I understand if the responses are not yet ready.

Thanks

Frankie 

From: Vega, Frankie  Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2018 2:25 PM To: 'Guill, Paul F' <Paul.Guill@duke-energy.com> Subject: RE: Brunswick Flooding MSA review

Hello Mr. Guill;

In addition to the documents already provided I would need the following clarification information in order to complete my review:

Flooding MSA Section 3.5.1 states the following: While most safety-related structures have finished floor elevations above 22 feet NGVD29, the Reactor Building has two access openings at 20 feet NGVD29: the equipment access airlock (i.e., railroad airlock) and the personnel airlock. Leakage past these doors is intercepted by floor drains and routed to sump areas on the -17 feet level of the Reactor Building. The minimal water intrusion spread over the large area of the Reactor Building would not challenge any plant equipment relied upon for the FLEX strategy. In order to confirm that no key FLEX equipment is impacted by the LIP, can you please provide additional information regarding in-leakage water quantities and expected flood water depths at the -17 feet level.

DUKE RESPONSE: In-leakage is conservatively determined to be 30 gpm for 6.3 hours from Reactor Building Doors D-2 and D-3 (closed). This leakage would migrate to the -17 ft elevation and be distributed over an area of about 140 ft by 40 ft and would result in approximately 3.25 in. (0.3 ft) of water on the -17 ft elevation floor. The RCIC pump, located in the S. RHR Room, is relied upon for the FLEX strategy and is located on raised pedestal 2 ft-8 in above the floor. Instruments on the bottom row of instrument racks are located at least 12.9 in above the floor resulting an APM of 0.8 ft. 

Also, water levels are expected to reach 26 feet NGVD29 or above at the reactor building due to the combined effects storm surge. These levels are well above the access openings for the reactor building airlock doors referenced above. It appears that the MSA doesn’t address the potential water leakage through these doors due to storm surge water levels. In order to confirm that no key FLEX equipment is impacted by the storm surge, please provide additional information regarding expected in-leakage water quantities and expected flood water depths at the -17 feet level.

DUKE RESPONSE: In the Combined Effects Storm Surge event, temporary passive barriers are to be installed interior to the reactor airlock doors D-2 and D-3 with triggers for actions as per BSEP Administrative Instruction 0AI-68. There is no in-leakage past these barriers and therefore in-leakage calculations are not performed for these locations. Modifications to these barriers are required to raise the top elevation from 26 ft to 27.5 ft NGVD29, which presents a minimum of 0.8 ft of margin at these barriers.

No formal responses are needed at this moment so replying to this email or placing the information in the electronic reading room (ERR) would work for me. If you have questions or need clarification on the questions above, please let me know. 

I will be out of the office starting tomorrow until August 28 so no rush on this response. My replacement during my time-off would be Joe Sebrosky (Joseph.Sebrosky@nrc.gov). Joe is not familiar with Brunswick’s flooding MSA so no need to forward him the response to the questions.

Thanks

Frankie

From: Vega, Frankie  Sent: Wednesday, August 08, 2018 3:44 PM To: Guill, Paul F <Paul.Guill@duke-energy.com> Subject: Brunswick Flooding MSA review

Mr. Guill;

Hope you’re doing well. I’m currently reviewing the Brunswick MSA submittal and in order to complete the review I would need to have the following references from the MSA submittal available in the electronic reading room (ERR):

11. BSEP Procedure, Abnormal Operating Procedure 0AOP-13.0, Operation during Hurricane, Flood Conditions, Tornado, or Earthquake, Revision 67. 14. BSEP Calculation BNP-14-009, Combined Effects Flood Evaluation, Revision 1. 22. BSEP Engineering Change, EC 287907, Fukushima 2.3 Flooding Inspection Documentation – BNP, Attachment Z01, Flood Protection Walkdown Final Report for BNP Nuclear Plant Site, Revision 3. 30. BSEP Drawing F-02277, Diesel Generator Building Floor & Wall Sleeves, Revision 32.
3
33. BSEP Calculation BNP-17-001, Evaluation of Brunswick Plant Local Intense Precipitation along FLEX Deployment Path, Revision 0. 34. BSEP Drawing F-11018, Reactor Building – Unit 1 Equipment Foundations at El. (-)17’-4, Revision 3. 35. BSEP Drawing F-01118, Reactor Building – Unit 2 Equipment Foundations at El. (-)17’-4, Revision 5.

I have access to the CERTREC IMS ERR so if you are using that ERR we should be good. At this moment I’m the only NRC staff member that needs access to the documents referenced above.

Thanks 

Frankie G. Vega, P.E. Project Manager NRR/DLP/PBMB 301-415-1617 Location: O-12F0

This e-mail guy is the first one about hurricane flooding post Hurricane Florence. It is dated Oct 27, 2018. Hurricane Florence hit landfall on Sept 14 2018

September 27, 2018 Serial: RA-18-0144
 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:  Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
 Subject: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 NRC Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324 Response to March 12, 2012, Request for Information Enclosure 2, Recommendation 2.1, Flooding, Required Response 3, Flooding Focused Evaluation Summary Report References: 1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12053A340
 2. NRC Letter, Supplemental Information Related to Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Flooding Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima.Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 1, 2013, ADAMS Accession Number ML13044A561 3. BSEP Letter, Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, Response to NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 11, 2015, ADAMS Accession Number ML15079A385
 4. NRC Staff Requirements Memoranda to COMSECY-14-0037, Integration of Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events and the Reevaluation of Flooding Hazards, dated March 30, 2015, ADAMS Accession Number ML15089A236
 5. NRC Letter, Coordination of Requests for Information Regarding Flooding Hazard Reevaluations and Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events, dated September 1, 2015, ADAMS Accession Number ML15174A257
 6. Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Report, NEI 16-05, Revision 1, External Flooding Assessment Guidelines, dated June 2016, ADAMS Accession Number ML16165A178
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 of 4

7. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, JLD-ISG-2016-01, Revision 0, Guidance for Activities Related to Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1, Flood Hazard Reevaluation; Focused Evaluation and Integrated Assessment, dated July 11, 2016, ADAMS Accession Number ML16162A301
 8. NRC Letter, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Interim Staff Response to Reevaluated Flood Hazards Submitted In Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Information Request - Flood-Causing Mechanism Reevaluation (CAC Nos. MF6104 and MF6105), dated March 16, 2017, ADAMS Accession Number ML17072A364
 9. NRC Letter, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report for the Audit of Duke Energy Progress Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report Submittal Related to the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1-Flooding for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, (CAC Nos. MF6104 and MF6105; EPID L-2015-JLD-007 and EPID L-2015-JLD-008), dated November 15, 2017, ADAMS Accession Number ML17271A248
 10. NRC Letter, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 and 2 - Staff Assessment of Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Information Request Flood-Causing Mechanism Reevaluation (EPID Nos. 000495/05000325/L-2015-JLD-0007 and 000495/05000324/L2015-JLD-0008), dated April 16, 2018, ADAMS Accession No. ML18089A055

Ladies and Gentlemen:
On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference 1 to request information associated with Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.1 for Flooding. One of the required responses in Reference 1 directed licensees to submit a Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report (FHRR). On March 1, 2013, the NRC issued Reference 2 to provide supplemental information to the request. The FHRR for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Units 1 and 2, was submitted on March 11, 2015 (i.e., Reference 3).
 Following the Commission's directive to NRC Staff (i.e., Reference 4), the NRC issued a letter to industry (i.e., Reference 5) indicating that guidance is being prepared to replace existing instructions and provide for a "graded approach to flooding reevaluations and provide for more focused evaluations of local intense precipitation and available physical margin in lieu of proceeding to an integrated assessment."
 Guidance for performing flooding reevaluations is contained in Reference 6, which has been endorsed by the NRC in Reference 7. Reference 6 indicates that each flood-causing mechanism that is not bounded by the design basis flood (i.e., using only stillwater and/or wind-wave run-up levels) shall follow one of the following five assessment paths:
 Path 1: Demonstrate Flood Mechanism is Bounded Path 2: Demonstrate Effective Flood Protection Path 3: Demonstrate a Feasible Response to Local Intense Precipitation (LIP) Path 4: Demonstrate Effective Mitigation Path 5: Scenario Based Approach

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 of 4
Non-bounded flood-causing mechanisms in Paths 1, 2, or 3 require a Focused Evaluation to complete the actions related to external flooding required by Reference 1. Mechanisms in Paths 4 or 5 require an Integrated Assessment. The enclosure to this letter provides the Flooding Focused Evaluation Summary for BSEP.
The flooding analysis described in References 8, 9 and 10 was utilized as an input to this Flooding Focused Evaluation. The Flooding Focused Evaluation reaffirms that BSEP has reliable, passive protection of key structures, systems, and components (SSCs) to maintain key safety functions (KSFs).
The Flooding Focused Evaluation follows Path 2 of Reference 6 and utilized Appendices B and C of Reference 6 for guidance on evaluating the site protection features. This submittal completes the actions related to external flooding required by Reference 1.
The purpose of this letter is to provide the BSEP, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Flooding Focused Evaluation Summary Report. Enclosure 1 provides the report.
This letter contains new regulatory commitments. Enclosure 2 provides a list of these commitments.
If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Lee Grzeck, Manager- Regulatory Affairs, at (910) 832-2487.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on September 27, 2018.
s~
William R. Gideon
Enclosure 1: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Flooding Focused Evaluation Summary Report
Enclosure 2: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Flooding Focused Evaluation Summary Report, Regulatory Commitments

Junk Plant Hatch Safety Relief Valves: Why Did They Cancel Extending The Testing Frequency?

Update Oct 16: (made wording better) 

???

Thinking of a 2.206. 

Technical Letter Report
 

Three-Stage Target Rock Safety Relief Valve Performance and Reliability in Long-Term Station Blackout Accident Scenario for State of the Art Reactor Consequence (SOARCA) Program 

As mentioned above, in a LTSBO for a BWR 4 with Mark I containment, SRVs are assumed operable at the start of the event to provide RCS over-pressure control.  Analyses have shown [1] that, in the first ten hours of this transient, the SRVs will cycle open and closed approximately 440 times.  During each cycle, the valves open approximately every 45 seconds, and remain open for approximately four to six seconds.  After ten hours of the LTSBO, thermal hydraulic calculations show that the heat removal capacity of the wetwell is effectively exhausted (since the residual heat removal system is unavailable), and RCS temperature will rise.  RCS pressure will also continue to increase, resulting in additional open demands on the SRVs with increasing steam temperature.

An alternative basis for the SRV stochastic failure probability is proposed.  An industry representative has stated that the valve manufacturer warrants the valves for hundreds o

cycles at operating temperature and pressure conditions.  Note that these conditions are to be expected throughout the initial time period of a LTSBO, up to approximately 10 hours during which the valve will be demanded to cycle approximately 400 times.  The valve manufacturer has stated that laboratory tests have been performed to substantiate the conditions included in the valve warranty, i.e. that the valve can reliably open and close for hundreds of cycles.  The industry representative also stated that fossil-fuel plant experience with the same types of valves can be used to validate these assertions.

*** It is ridiculous Hatch would even think of extending their SRV testing interval on their very troublesome and unreliable SRVs going back a decade or more. They switched back and forth between stage 2 and 3 so many times I can keep up. They are a lemon designed valve and they should be replaced.

What a "crock of shit" with the drywell ventilation air blowing on the SRVs. This is probrably the third roll out of the 3 stage SRVs. The first two they had withdraw the valves from the plant due to being defective. They replaced the 2 stage with the 3 stage because of set point drift and leakage. No LERs in the past indicating ventilation air damaging on the valves in both plants. These excuses are highly suspect. At best, with this kind of unexpected failure, you can make the case the 3 stage is a too delicate a valve for the normal and emergency operation of the plant.

On the positive side, setpoint drift failures are a lot less in both plants since they installed all the 3 stage valves. The rub is, these valves haven't been in the plant for very long time. Very little aging in these young valves. By the way, the 3 stage valves aren't new valves. They are refurbished and have so called updated components in the valves. I suspect when these valves have been in the plant for two or more cycle they will fail at much higher rates.  

This LER below is probably the reason for canceling the testing extension.

The new SRV LER on unit 1 troubles was caused by ventilation air on the SRV causing abutment issues.  

Safety Relief Valves' As Found Settings Resulted in Not Meeting Tech Spec Surveillance Criteria

On June 20, 2018, Unit 1 was at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) when "as-found" testing results of the 3-stage main steam safety relief valves (SRVs) indicated two of the eleven Unit 1 SRVs had experienced a setpoint drift during the previous operating cycle which resulted in their failure to meet the Technical Specification (TS) opening setpoint pressure of 1150 +/34.5 psig as required by TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.4.3.1. The test results showed that the two SRVs were slightly out of spec tow due to setpoint drift.
The SRV pilots were disassembled and inspected to investigate the reason for the setpoint drift. Based on inspection results, the drift in setpoint was due to low abutment gap and low abutment pressure. Due to their location, drywall ventilation blowing on these two safety relief valves caused them to undergo a cyclic heating and cooling every 12 hours during the Unit's 2-year operating cycle. These temperature gradients across the valve internals caused a relaxation of the setpoint spring and bellows assembly.
NRC...

The below LER is in unit 2. It came out last year...it is their newest LER on SRV issues. It is way suspicious abutment issues are in both plants. Abutment issues are happening all over the industry beginning at Pilgrim and so called test stand damage. So loose manufacturing tolerances are behind this plant's the SRV abutment problem, but different than unit 1. So the strategy is to come up with a new failure mechanism every time they have tech spec SRV drift point test failing. All the NRC cares about is if they find the cause of the failure and it isn't repeated in the future. That is way they come up with a new angle every time they fail a tech spec lift test in the abutment issues. The go shopping for a new failure mechanism every time they submit a LER. I doubt the NRC inspectors have the time to verify deeply the failure. I am sure management just tell the local inspectors to just trust the licensee. I am sure the licensee knows how to game the system of trust thus the shifting failure mechanism to minimize a deeper investigation.     

I am appalled Hatch and the NRC tolerate the "most likely" acceptable standard for failure mechanisms for Unit 2. The cause of the defect and its fix is suppose to be bullet proof. It should have gone though a comprehensive engineering evaluation on the cause and then put them on a testing stand to beat the crap out of the valves in its supposed environment. If new issues are discovered on the testing stand, then a redesign of the defective and poorly engineered component happens. Then back to the stand. And do this over and over again until the design is perfect. 

(Updated) Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant license Event Report 2017-(){)4-()() Safety Relief Valves' As Found Settings Resulted in Not Meeting Tech Spec Surveillance Criteria

On June 30 2017, with Unit 2 at 100 percent rated thermal power {RTP), "as-found" testing of the 3-stage main steam safety relief valves (SRVs) (EBS Code RV) showed that two of the eleven main steam SRVs that were tested had experienced a drift in pressure lilt setpoint during the previous operating cycle such that the allowable technical specification (TS) surveillance requirement (SR) 3.4.3.1 limit of 1150 +/-34.5 psig had been exceeded. Below is a table illustrating the Unit 2 SRVs that failed as found testing results alter being removed tom service during the Spring 2017 refueling outage. 

MPL 2821-F013C 2821-F013E 
Event cause Analysis 
Drift -39 psig -49 psig 

The SRV pilots were disassembled and inspected while investigating the reason for the drift It was found that the abutment gap closed prematurely during testing using a linear variable differential transformer to measure pilot stroke distance. The pre-mature abutment gap closure is most likely due to loose manufacturing tolerances leading to SRV setpoint drift. 

Something to do with the BWR SRV owners group formed on investigating the poor quality of the SRVS?  

October 15, 2018

SUBJECT: EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE RR-V-12 REGARDING MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE TESTING (EPID L-2018-LLR-0054)

Dear Ms. Gayheart 

By letter dated April 9, 2018 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 18099A146), the Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC or licensee) submitted an alternative request for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The proposed alternative RR-V-12 would extend the frequency for testing all main steam safety relief valves for each unit from once every 5 years to once every 3 refueling cycles (i.e., 6 years), as allowed by American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Case OMN-17. Subsequently, by letter dated July 18, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 18199A588), SNC withdrew the alternative request. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff had recently approved the code case for unconditional use in Regulatory Guide 1.192. 

The purpose of this letter is to advise you that the NRC has received your request to withdraw the application dated April 9, 2018, and upon receiving the withdrawal letter, the NRC staff ceased its review of the above-cited application. 

If you have any questions regarding this matter, I may be reached at 301-415-4032 or via email at Randy.Hall@nrc.gov.
Docket Nos.: 50-321 and...