Thursday, April 12, 2018

A State Police Whistleblower Tip To The Chairman Ma House Ways and Means Committee

Update April 13
I am convinced my fingerprint scanner problem is under serous investigations with a assortment of Ma agencies and political entities.    
Michael Mulligan <steamshovel2002@yahoo.com>
To:Jeffrey.sanchez@mahouse.gov
‎Apr‎ ‎12 at ‎10‎:‎10‎ ‎AM


Mr.. Sanchez 

I am the guy who gave the Boston Globe the first overtime tip that kicked off the current scandal.

So at the end of March, I got another tip from a state police officer. It concerned a broken fingerprint scanner at the Russell Ma Barrack. I schemed up a way for me to get arrested by state police, to get processed though the Russell barracks. I got arrested for trespassing at the Cobble Mountain reservoir for trespassing by the state police and two days later in court effectively got the charges thrown our of court.   

1) The Russell fingerprint scanner is horribly defective. The Springfield barracks scanner has the same problem. Out of about 60 scans of my fingers, only one finger print was properly scanned into the machine. I watched multitudes of computer warning windows pop-ups right before my eyes saying "caution the scan didn't capture the proper quality print". I watched a state police new hire get trained on how to use the "override" button.    

2)  A group of troopers refused to take fingerprints as protest, trying to get attention of upper management. I have no idea how many arrestees didn't get fingerprints. I heard, the troopers who staged this whistleblowers protest scheme finally got caught by upper management. They got a severe tongue lashing and some other kind of administrative actions, but the fingerprint scanner never got fixed. I suspect somebody is covering up for senior managers with this kind of discipline. The intimidation of troopers to raise problems to upper management is more of a issue to me than the defective scanner.   
3) These are computer and digitalized systems. You could easily get the scope of this problem by getting the state police to tell you how many times state wide, the fingerprint scanner's "override" push button has been used. A graph of the "override" button used and time. You could break it down to individual barracks level.

 4) My experience tells me this a contract, purchase, and vender fraud and corruption problem. They are trade kickbacks or favors for poor quality state police equipment. I suspect this is the tip of the iceberg. It is everywhere within the state police purchasing, contracting and vendor system. God only knows if this is everywhere within government.

5) I requested the state police revert to the ink and paper fingerprint method for all defective scanners state wide. I also requested the state police preserve all camera and voice recording during my arrest processing in the Russell barracks. I would like a copy of it.  

I never have any confidentiality or anonymity needs. But I will protect the whistleblower who contacted me. Would you pass this on to all the committee members and anyone else you see fit. I have made complaints to the state police themselves, hours with the IG and Internal Affairs. I just don't trust any of these guys. I will only think the system is dealing this with integrity if I see the fingerprint scanner issues in a major newspaper.

You or your investigators can call me anytime.

Sincerely,       

Mike Mulligan 
Hinsdale, NH 

Home: 16033368320
Cell: 16032094206 

PS-I got everything documented on my blog beginning at the middle of March.It is all is a bit wordy, but it helps me think.


  



March 25, 2018

Your Honor Respectfully,

I basically I made a AIRE like police complaint to the “MSP Citizen Response Report (POV)” in early 20017. It was a mass collection of police cruisers sitting in the breakdown lane  on I 91 abutting the Holyoke Mall. I am thinking eight or more police cruisers sitting in the breakdown lane on both sides. The area was dark and curvy. It was really a bad and unsafety area to be having this kind of thing. They had their flasher blinding us and not a civilian car to be seen with the police cruisers.
I thought it was a police quota type of deal. Maybe an overtime abuse type of thing. Later, I realize the state police were staging a fleet of police cruisers on I 91 nefarious purposes. They were looking into our cars without ethical probable cause. In mass quantities. I have an assortment of other issues on this to justify my position.

One of them being science. You do these mass state police stunts, then you measure the accident suppression results. I doubt the state police has any evidence this works at all over history. You and I know, the only way you can control the accident rate on an interstate like I91, is to drastically reduce the speed limit or redesign the road. Then enforce the speed limits. Everything else is for show or it inflate the image of the state police. This AIRE type thing was to make the state police feel better, not make the public safer.
Here is my bog posting on my early thinking. It kind of a scratch or note pad to help me think…a contemporaneous log book thing. I am a whistleblower…I have seen and reported a lot of corruption over the last few decades. To tell you the truth, everyone calls me nuts and hates my guts.
Massachusetts State Police In illegal Alien or Terrorism Alert On I-91?
https://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2017/02/massachusetts-state-police-in-illegal.html
Recently because of the state police corruption all around, I resubmitted that early 2017 complaint. I didn’t think the POV recorded my complaint and I called it a coverup. Last week I spoke to state inspector general and the Ma state police internal affairs (for about an hour) over this 2017 complaint. I emailed my coverup complaint to this very same agency. Towards the end of the week, is when the digital electronic fingerprint reader problem came to my attention (fell in my lap). I’ll bet you my fingerprint machine issue is a good one for the Ma IG.
 
A important broken tool like this for the troopers, it can devastatingly effect the moral of a group. If my bosses don’t care about my working environment, why should I. My aim to make a better working environment for the bottom level troopers. They have a very dangerous job. I just want best quality tools money can buy for the Ma troopers. This is how they serve the peoples of Massachusetts most efficiently and effectively. 
“Donald, (Me to Donald)

Just watch this. I am going to clean up state police bureaucracy. One the largest state police contractual kickback and corruption cases in the state history. I'd stood in front of a electronic state police fingerprint reader for about an hour yesterday. Remember, I have only ten fingers. I was in the Russell Barracks. They attempted to read my fingerprints some 60 times yesterday. They got maybe one high quality readable print into their system out of this mess. The rest were poor quality and unreadable. Extremely poor quality prints were stuffed into the state system through an override button. I’d seen the multitudes of caution windows right before my eyes   The machine was only successful and recorded readable and high quality fingerprints in less than 1% of the time. That is definitely not a 1% error rate??? 

I know the Springfield Barracks has the same problem. I suspect this is going throughout the state. I know multitudes of troopers protested about this shity component by not checking in or putting fingerprints into the system. The just didn't take any fingerprints during in-processing, which is strictly against police policy and ethics. The key phrase to ask, how many times state wide has the fingerprint reader override buttons been used in the last year?
I know senior management intimidated the lower lever troopers into not complaining...to protect the high level fraudulent contracting and the state police senior leadership... Basically the two troopers right in front of my eyes were knowingly, like a machine themselves…were cramming the unreadable fingerprints into the state police system though the override button. What is the extent cause and condition with this widespread lemon device? How long has this been going on. How many unreadable fingerprints are in the system. You could let a really bad guy through the grasp of the Ma state police or any police department in the nation. What does the state police use fingerprints for?
 
I got this all recorded. It is in their system. I am sure the new digital fingerprints machine records everything. The arrest processing area is all video cam'd up and bugged. Sometimes bad criminals say the most incriminating things in this processing area.”

Sincerely,

Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH
cell phone-16032094206

Wednesday, April 11, 2018

Relationship Between FitzPatrick's and Pilgrim's Junk SRVs

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2018-02: TESTING AND OPERATIONS-INDUCED DEGRADATION OF 3-STAGE TARGET ROCK SAFETY RELIEF VALVES

This is the most current description with Fitz's SRV problems. Oh hell, Fitz removed other experimental 3 stage valves. 
The licensee for Fitzpatrick removed two of its three Model 0867F 3-stage Target Rock SRVs in June and July of 2016.  One of these valves exhibited degradation similar to that seen at Pilgrim and Hatch, although the fretting wear in the main cylinder was not as severe.  The third 3-stage SRV was replaced in January 2017 and did not exhibit any degradation similar to Pilgrim and Hatch. All three 3-stage SRVs were replaced with 2-stage Target Rock SRVs. 
***The Fitzpatrick SRVs are identical to Pilgrims whether a 2 stage or 3 stage safety relief valves. Effectively the Fitzpatrick is now in the exact position as a Pilgrim was in 2011. They realize their 2 stage  valves are unreliable and prone to corrosion in delicate parts. They are planning to update the unreliable 2 stage to the 3 stage model. You get it, these plants first had 3 stage valves installed in them. The 3 stage became known as unreliable and leakage prone. The new efficient design became the 2 stage design. Post 2015 Pilgrim blizzard, Entergy decided the 3 stage was too dangerous to put back into the plant. Pilgrim has 2 stage valves in them now. I am going assume anyone reading my blog is stupid.  Yet Fitzpatrick is heading now for the experimental 3 stage that failed in Pilgrim, are too dangerous to be put back into their plant.

They are all nuts!!!

Its all a charade.
Licensee Event Report 2018-003-00, Target Rock Relief Valve Pilot Assembly Failed As-Found Lift Test, a Condition Prohibited by Plant Technical Specifications

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The cause of the as-found initial lift pressure exceeding the TS tolerance limit for the pilot valve was determined To be corrosion bonding. The relief valve (SN· 1025) set point was below 1189.6 psig during subsequent lifts, which is within the allowable range. The performance exhibited by SN 1025 is consistent with corrosion bonding between the Stellite 21 disc and Stellite 6 seat. The corrosion bonding is a time dependent process that develops to varying levels of severity. The installed pilot valve assemblies have Stellite 68 discs with a platinum coating applied using the IBAD process. The objective of the change to the Stellite 68 platinum coated discs was to minimize corrosion bonding.
Come on, satellite 21, Stellite 6, Stellite 68 and platinum, all add on exotic materials chasing this mysterious  corrosion. One licensee says its because the materials on the disk and seat don’t have a oxidation coating them. They are installed as bright and shiny metals. These guys are all over the place. There is a agenda under it all. No manufacturer of valves will build these valves. There replacement.    
Remember in 2011 these guys installed the 3 stage SRVs. These new valves promptly began leaking within one month of first heatup. The unreliable valves dogged the plant until two valves were discovered non operable during a 2015 blizzard, scram and all lost of all offsite power. This event caused the plant to be declared the worst plant in the nation.

Fitzpatrick SRV Setpoint Testing: All But One Failed Testing Including The Experimental Valve

Reposted from 4/9

***The experimental 3 stage valve that failed testing, this exact designed valve is scheduled to replace the 2 stage valves next outage!!!!

Basically a total of ten Valves. Nine the 2 stage and one valve a experimental  3 stage valve.

Eight of the 2 stage valves failed their testing. These guys are notorious with failing their pressure setpoint testing. They are preparing to replace their 2 stage valve with the experimental 3 stage valve'

The only experimental 3 stage valve failed its setpoint testing.

They got to get rid of these dangerous valve across the industry. But nobody will supply these kinds of valves to the industry.


Background The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requires the reactor pressure vessel be protected from overpressure during upset conditions by self-actuated safety valves. As part of the nuclear pressure relief system, the size and number of SIRVs are selected such that peak pressure in the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) will not exceed the ASME Code limits.

The James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) used ten (10) two-stage and one (1) three-stage Target Rock Safety/Relief Valves (S/RV) [EIIS Identifier: SB] for emergency pressure relief during operating Cycle 22. These valves are located on the main steam lines between the reactor vessel, and the first isolation valve within the drywell. Each S/RV discharges steam through a discharge line to a point below the minimum water level in the suppression pool.

The pilots that are removed are sent to a vendor facility for testing, refurbishment, and certification. The test results for pilot assemblies removed in 2017, during Refueling Outage 22, identified ten (10) S/RV pilot assemblies that were out of allowable tolerance. Nine (9) of the pilots (all two-stage) lifted at greater than the allowable setpoint range, and one (three-stage) lifted at less than the allowable setpoint range.

In order to address the concerns with corrosion bonding, JAF will commence replacement of two-stage with three-stage Target Rock S/RVs in the next Refueling Outage (RO). Industry experience has shown that the three stage S/RVs are less susceptible to corrosion bonding. The design of the three-stage S/RVs produces a greater mechanical force on opening, resulting in a greater likelihood of overcoming any potential effects of corrosion bonding that might occur.

Event Description

As-Found testing was performed on all eleven main S/RV pilot assemblies removed in 2017, during R022. The testing was conducted by NWS Technologies. The TS setpoint for each S/RV is 1145 +1- 34.3. During the initial lift test, ten of the eleven pilot assemblies failed to open within the allowable range (1110.7 to 1179.3). Nine of the ten two-stage and the three-stage S/RV pilot failed high and low outside the allowable range, respectively. As-Found failed test results are tabulated below.

Palo Verde 1, 2 and 3: Why All The Shutdowns And Reduced Power Levels?

Ok, so when did this begin. This is a attack on the stock price of APS... Better yet, he is smart. He is attacking the financing of the single ideology with the utility sector. Then we have backlash from the Trump era.

Can anyone see the implications if he wins...
Billionaire Energy Speculator Tom Steyer Bankrolls Arizona Initiative That Would Close America’s Single Largest Source Of Clean Energy – OpEd
Tom Steyer, a billionaire energy speculator, is bank-rolling an Arizona ballot initiative that would prematurely close the state’s sole nuclear plant — which is also America’s largest single source of clean energy — and replace it with fossil fuels.
If Steyer’s ballot initiative succeeds, Palo Verde will close in 2024 instead of in 2044, according to its operator, Arizona Public Service (APS).
Steyer’s ballot proposal, which will be voted on this November, would require 50 percent of Arizona’s electricity to come from renewable sources like solar and wind — an increase from 13 percent today (over half of which is from hydro-electric dams).
The initiative excludes nuclear from the clean energy mandate even though the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change finds nuclear produces one-quarter of the emissions of solar.
If it passes, the initiative would only increase the share of the state’s electricity from clean energy sources by four percent. In 2017, Arizona generated 46 percent of its electricity from clean energy source — 79 percent of which came from Palo Verde.
In order to accommodate such a large increase in intermittent energy from solar and wind, APS would need to close Palo Verde and replace it with natural gas, APS says.
If Palo Verde is replaced entirely by natural gas, carbon emissions in Arizona would increase by the equivalent of adding 2.8 million cars to the road.
Steyer’s wealth derives heavily from his investments in fossil fuels and renewables. A colleague of Steyer’s told The New York Times in 2014 that Steyer’s firm was “like an anchor in the Indonesian coal industry… By drawing money to an overlooked sector, they helped expand the coal industry there.”

Hmm, energy mandates becoming popular and recent big decline in their stock price. Is Arizona going blue...

***Are there financial pressures affecting this gigantic nuclear plant? These guys capacity factor have been  jumping around a lot. I remember back in the early 2000s when management was stricken with a severe self inflected mental illness. Basically they believed in one of these fly by night management books...they slashed management and instituted massive budget cuts. The employees were totally disillusioned. This is the first recorded decline of a nuclear facility caused by a errant ideology.  After much delay, the NRC finally kicked some ass and brought the facility back under adult control.

Basically, faster, cheaper better...slash the so called useless levels of management to the bone...

Then the diesel generator issues today and back in the 2000s. In this facility, the DGs seemed to be the weak link with broad-based resource problems.
 Wiki:

Safety concerns

In an Arizona Republic article dated February 22, 2007, it was announced that the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) had decided to place Palo Verde into Category 4, making it one of the most closely monitored nuclear power plants in the United States. The decision was made after the INPO discovered that electrical relays in a diesel generator did not function during tests in July and September 2006.

The finding came as the "final straw" for INPO, after Palo Verde had several citations over safety concerns and violations over the preceding years, starting with the finding of a 'dry pipe' in the plant's emergency core-cooling system in 2004.[14]

During a March 24, 2009, public meeting, the NRC announced that it cleared the Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) and has returned Palo Verde to Column 1 on the NRC Action Matrix. The commission's letter stated that "The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has determined that the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station has made sufficient performance improvement that it can reduce its level of inspection oversight." "Performance at Palo Verde has improved substantially and we are adjusting our oversight accordingly. 
These gigantic facilities decline unseen by outsiders until component degradations and poor judgement begin to be seen by outsiders. So then the NRC and management gets their panties in a bunch... It maybe take mouths or even years before they get the facility under control. Even as the facility is flooded  with new resources, equipment problems and judgment show a terrible decline.

Tuesday, April 10, 2018

Junk Plant Vogtle 3&4: NRC Gives The All Clear Sign

Update:

That long line of zeros, you can thank my cat for it...

On Fully Qualified Engineers And No Counterfeit and Fraudulent Parts.

Willis, Dori

12:21 PM (26 minutes ago)
to me, Julie
Good morning Mr. Mulligan,

After evaluating the information you provided, we have determined that the NRC would need more specific information from you in order for the NRC to perform a review of your concern.  For example, please provide examples of specific safety-related items for Vogtle that you believe to be fraudulent.  If you have any additional information to provide, please email us at HQ_Allegations@nrc.gov within 10 days of the date of this email.  If no additional information is received, we will take no further action regarding this matter at this time.

Thank you,


Dori 0L. Willis222200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Senior Office Allegation 2
Allegation and Enforcement Team
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Dori.Willis@nrc.gov | 301-287-9423 (direct) / 1-800-368-5642 (toll-free)
*If this email contains sensitive allegation information, please delete when no longer needed.



From: Mike Mulligan [mailto:steamshovel2002@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2018 3:41 PM
To: Crutchley, Julie <Julie.Crutchley@nrc.gov>
Cc: Bernal-Taylor, Sara <Sara.Bernal-Taylor@nrc.gov>; Hawkins, Sarenee <Sarenee.Hawkins@nrc.gov>; Meighan, Sean <Sean.Meighan@nrc.gov>; Opara, Stella <Stella.Opara@nrc.gov>; Willis, Dori <Dori.Willis@nrc.gov>
Subject: [External_Sender] Re: Concerns Regarding Westinghouse and Vogtle Units 3 and 4 (Allegation NRO-2017-A-0015

Monday, April 09, 2018

Give Nukes A Autopsy: Who First thought of this?

Update

***Yep, me. Got a answer from the NRC over my 2.206.

Generally, both the nukes and antis never give credit to me over my work. These college boys can't imagine a non college guy like me could be smarter than them.     
Give Oyster Creek an autopsy before decommissioning: Tauro

As the country’s nuclear fleet gradually retires, the next task for the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission will evolve from overseeing the operation of atomic plants to decommissioning, taking them apart piece by radioactive piece and figuring out what to do with millions of pounds of highly radioactive waste.
When the Oyster Creek nuclear plant in Lacey closes in October, an autopsy of metal components and safety structures would provide federal regulators with a wealth of scientific data on exactly what happens to steel after being blasted for half a century with high levels of radiation.
That scientific data could provide valuable information on safety margins and potential hazards for 21 similarly designed and ageing General Electric reactors that are still operating in the country. 

Oyster Creek is the world’s oldest operating Fukushima-style nuclear reactor, a GE Mark 1 boiling water reactor, where safety systems and structures failed to prevent three reactor meltdowns and released massive radioactivity in Japan following the March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami. 
A series of unplanned shutdowns in recent years at Oyster Creek were routinely attributed to metal fatigue. The company announced in March that Oyster Creek would close in October, 14 months ahead of schedule. A coalition of citizens and environmental groups brought to light serious metal fatigue and corrosion at the plant during a relicensing battle a decade ago. That battle resulted in increased safety and ultrasonic monitoring at the plant.
The information on metal and safety structure wear-and-tear would be particularly useful for plants of similar-Fukushima design such as Pennsylvania’s Peach Bottom reactor, whose operators have applied for an extension to run for 80 years. 
Surprisingly few material samples have been taken from decommissioned nuclear plants nationwide. NRC personnel have cited a dearth of scientific information on aging from the limited number of decommissioned plants, and the failure to harvest material samples. Ten U.S. commercial reactors have completed decommissioning with another 19 units in the process. An NRC presentation named Oyster Creek as a candidate for harvesting material samples since it is the oldest commercial nuclear plant still operating in the country.

Clean Water Action NJ, the state’s largest environmental organization, and GRAMMES (Grandmothers, Mothers, and More for Energy Safety) have joined Beyond Nuclear, a leading anti-nuclear advocacy and environmental group based in Tacoma Park, Maryland, in calling for an autopsy of the Oyster Creek plant. The groups are demanding that the NRC publicly provide a strategic approach to obtain component-aging information from materials harvested from Oyster Creek.

State regulators and elected officials should join that call because what happens to those metal components is a life-or-death question for those living in communities near aging, brittle, corroding nukes. New Jersey has three more aging nuclear reactors being operated at Lower Alloways Creek by PSE&G and Exelon, Oyster Creek’s owner. Plant owners have been busy in Trenton lately begging the state Legislature for up to $300 million a year in ratepayer subsidies to reportedly maintain their 18 percent profit margins. An upcoming vote is expected Thursday in the Senate and Assembly.

State regulators and elected officials will have the opportunity to speak for public safety Tuesday at the NRC’s annual safety assessment hearing at the Holiday Inn on Route 72 West in Manahawkin. The public is encouraged to attend and ask questions.

Janet Tauro is New Jersey board chair of Clean Water Action.

Summer Nuclear Plants: Indications Of Massive Corrruption With Inviromental Requirements


Remember, the NRC just samples environmental qualification issues like this. By no means it is a full count with similar issues. The industry knows the NRC doesn't have the deep resources in order to catch them at everything...

And service or shelf life. How often do you change your plugs?
“Failure to Justify Activation Energy for Valcor SOV (XVX06050A)” Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect
Report Section
Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000395/2018010-01 Closed
None 71111.21N-Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs) Introduction:  The NRC identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.49 (e)(5) when the licensee failed to justify the basis for the activation energy used for Valcor solenoid operated valve (SOV) XVX06050A in accordance with Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.89 Section C.5.c. Description:  The qualification of the Valcor SOVs, completed in 1979, used the 10ºC rule to determine the accelerated aging rate, which was equivalent to a 0.831 eV activation energy derived for Valcor’s ethylene propylene rubber (EPR).  The inspectors determined that 0.831 eV for EPR, although realistic, it was not the most limiting identified for EPR.  Valcor originally qualified the SOVs for 40 years at 120ºF, however many of the valves are normally energized and will see temperatures exceeding 120ºF.  The SOV, XVX06050A, is a normally energized open valve that de-energizes to close on a containment isolation phase ‘A’ signal and opened post-accident for hydrogen analyzing in the reactor building.  In 1988, Impell Corporation, the licensee’s contractor, reanalyzed the qualification and determined that DuPont Tefzel insulation was the most limiting component instead of EPR and that a 50% loss of tensile strength was the limiting failure mechanism at 0.95 eV activation energy.  To extrapolate a new activation energy, Impell estimated data points from a rudimentary log life plot that did not have any actual test data points.  Impell obtained the plots from a DuPont Tefzel design handbook which also contained the log life plot for the elongation to break failure parameter of Tefzel, which appeared more limiting than tensile strength.  Because the new activation energy extrapolation did not use actual test data, the extrapolation of that data was less limiting than the original qualification activation energy, and the elongation to break failure parameter was not evaluated, the team determined the new activation energy was not justified.

FSAR Section 3.11.2.1.3 stated that the environmental qualification of Class 1E equipment is in conformance with RG 1.89, Rev. 1.  Section C.5.c of the RG stated that “the aging acceleration rate and activation energies used during qualification testing and the basis upon which the rate and activation energy were established should be defined, justified, and documented.”  The licensee did not find the original qualification activation energy to be in error or non-conservative.  The licensee chose to develop an activation energy from less limiting log life plots, which was non-conservative.  In addition, without actual data for the log life plots, the licensee was unable to demonstrate acceptable margins for uncertainty.  The team determined that the valve would have exceeded its qualification based on the original qualification and unjustified use of the new activation energy. 

Corrective Actions:  On February 19, 2018, the licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 18-00754 and performed an immediate determination of operability to verify that the valve could still perform its intended safety function.

Corrective Action Reference:  CR 18-00754


6 Enclosure
Performance Assessment:  The failure to justify the basis upon which the activation energy of Valcor SOV XVX06050A was established in accordance with RG 1.89 Section C.5.c was a performance deficiency (PD).  The PD was determined to be more than minor because it adversely affected the SSC and Barrier Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events.  Specifically, the failure to justify the activation energy used for Tefzel adversely affected the reliability of the solenoid to maintain its qualification over the entire 40 year qualified life of the plant.  The team used inspection manual chapter (IMC) 0609, Att. 4, “Initial Characterization of Findings,” issued December 7, 2016, for barriers, and IMC 0609, App. A, “The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power,” issued June 19, 2012, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal components and did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment.  Since the underlying cause of the issue occurred in 1988, the team determined that no crosscutting aspect was applicable because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance. Enforcement:  Title 10 CFR 50.49 (e)(5) states “Equipment qualified by test must be preconditioned by natural or artificial (accelerated) aging to its end-of-installed life condition. Consideration must be given to all significant types of degradation which can have an effect on the functional capability of the equipment.  If preconditioning to an end-of-installed life condition is not practicable, the equipment may be preconditioned to a shorter designated life. The equipment must be replaced or refurbished at the end of this designated life unless ongoing qualification demonstrates that the item has additional life.”  Contrary to the above, since August 30, 1988, the licensee failed to age Valcor SOV XVX06050A to its end of life condition and to replace the equipment at the end of its designated life.  This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

“Failure to Verify the Seismic Qualification of Valcor Solenoid Operated Valve XVX06050A” Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000395/2018010-02 Closed None 71111.21N-Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs) Introduction:  The NRC identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control,” when the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of design for the seismic qualification of valve XVX06050A in accordance with IEEE 344-1971. Description:  Calculation VCS-0423-DC-1, “Valcor Voltage and Current Reducing Resistors,” Rev. 0, dated September 10, 1981, located in Tab E1 of EQDP-H-VO4-V01 for solenoid operated valve XVX06050A, indicated a 300 ohm resistor was in series with the valve and that it reduced the voltage in the coil to approximately 32VDC at minimum conditions.  The team questioned if the valve was seismically qualified at the lower voltage since the seismic qualification in test report QR 52600-515, Section 4.2.5, “Seismic Vibrations,” stated that it was performed at 108VAC.  The team noted that the Valcor SOV was not installed in the same configuration that it was seismically qualified.  The failure to ensure the valve was seismically qualified, as configured, did not ensure that damage would not occur during a seismic event.  FSAR Section 3.10 stated that seismic qualification must be done in


7 Enclosure
accordance with IEEE 344-1971.  Section 3.2.2.2 of IEEE 344-1971 states the device being tested should demonstrate its ability to perform its intended safety function and sufficient monitoring equipment should be used to evaluate its performance.  The team determined that the licensee did not demonstrate the seismic qualification of valve XVX06050A in its current plant configuration at reduced voltage.

Corrective Actions:  On February 15, 2018, the licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 18-00686 and performed an immediate determination of operability to verify that the valve could still perform its intended safety function.

Corrective Action Reference: CR 18-00686

Performance Assessment:  The licensee’s failure to verify the adequacy of the seismic design and qualification of valve XVX06050A in accordance with IEEE 344-1971 was a performance deficiency (PD).  The PD was determined to be more than minor because it adversely affected the Design Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events.  Specifically, the failure to verify the adequacy of design for seismic qualification of the valve resulted in the valve being installed in an unqualified configuration.  The team used inspection manual chapter (IMC) 0609, Att. 4, “Initial Characterization of Findings,” issued December 7, 2016, for barriers, and IMC 0609, App. A, “The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power,” issued June 19, 2012, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal components and did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment.  Since the underlying cause of the issue occurred on August 30, 1988, the team determined that no crosscutting aspect was applicable because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
 Enforcement:  Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III “Design Control,” requires, in part, that “The design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program.”  Contrary to the above, since August 30, 1988, the licensee failed to verify valve XVX06050A was seismically qualified in its current configuration in accordance with IEEE 344-1971.  This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

“Inadequate Radiation Harsh Environmental Qualification of Reactor Building Spray Pump A” Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000395/2018010-03 Closed None 71111.21N-Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs) Introduction:  The NRC identified a Green Finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50.49 (e)(4) when the licensee failed to verify that RB spray pump A could perform its function under the radiation conditions expected during an accident in accordance with Section 2.1(3)(a) of NUREG 588.


8 Enclosure
Description:  During the review of EQDP-H-MO1-G03 for RB spray Pump A, the team noted that the pump was qualified for a maximum harsh environment of 1x106 radiation absorbed dose (rad);  however, the total integrated dose (TID) was expected to be greater than 6.1x106 rad TID over its 40 year life.  Tab F1 of the EQDP, containing the equipment qualification report of the motors dated June 1977, stated that the maximum integrated radiation dose justified by the report over the 40 year operating life of the motor was 1x106 rads.  The EQDP stated that component data shows that “all components are suitable for the rated 1x106 rads integrated dose with the exception of (a) unfilled polyester resin and (b) the Dacron felt. In all cases, the polyester resins are filled to various degrees with glass or similar products. Such filling of the resin results in a significant increase in the radiation resistance of the combination -- as high as 9x108 rads. The Dacron felt by itself, at a threshold resistance of 8.6x105 rads, approaches the required radiation resistance but the felt is designed to be saturated with the impregnating epoxy resin and occurs only in this state. No specific data is available on the radiation resistance of the combination (Dacron filled epoxy), but the evidence indicates that the combination will exceed the required 1x106 rads.”  The team noted that the expected TID dose over the 40 year life of the RB spray pump A motor exceeded the original qualification provided in this test report. In order to ensure the pump was qualified for its radiation environment, the licensee had Impell Corporation perform Calculation 0980-036-030, “Qualified Radiation Levels for GE Motors,” Rev. 0, in August 31, 1988, which concluded that the motor was qualified for 1.5x107 rads.  The re-analysis was not based on partial type testing of the motor or a similar motor in accordance with NUREG-0588, but only reinterpreted the same material information previously provided by GE.  The team noted that the reanalysis made different assumptions than GE did on the material characteristics of an unknown polyester resin fill material and Dacron felt.  For the polyester resin, Impell could not determine what the fill material was or how much fill was used, but determined that it had a higher radiation resistance.  For the Dacron felt, Impell assumed that the Dacron would not be a weak link in radiation resistance because of the epoxy.  These assumptions were used to justify increasing the radiation qualification of the RB spray pump motor.  The team determined that the original qualification of 1x106 rads was appropriate and was not proven to be inadequate by Impell because of the uncertainties documented by GE, and the lack of actual type testing information for the motor to support the Impell assumptions. FSAR Section 3.11.2 states that the licensee is committed to NUREG 588 Category II requirements.  Section 2.1.2 of NUREG 588 states “The choice of the methods selected is largely a matter of technical judgment and availability of information that supports the conclusions reached.  Experience has shown that qualification of equipment subjected to an accident environment without test data is not adequate to demonstrate functional operability. In general, the staff will not accept analysis in lieu of test data unless (a) testing of the component is impractical due to size limitations, and (b) partial type test data is provided to support the analytical assumptions and conclusions reached.”  Section 2.1(3)(a) of NUREG 588 states “Equipment that must function in order to mitigate any accident should be qualified by test to demonstrate its operability for the time required in the environmental conditions resulting from that accident.”  The team determined that the basis for raising the radiation qualification was not justified and that the qualification test report did not demonstrate that RB spray pump A was qualified over its 40 year operating life. Corrective Actions: On February 16, 2018, the licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 18-00707 and performed an immediate determination of operability to verify that the pump could still perform its intended safety function.


9 Enclosure
Corrective Action Reference: CR 18-00707 Performance Assessment:  The licensee’s failure to justify that RB spray pump ‘A’ could perform its function under the radiation conditions expected during an accident in accordance with Section 2.1(3)(a) of NUREG 588 was a PD.  The PD was determined to be more than minor because it adversely affected the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events.  Specifically, the failure to qualify the pump to expected radiation conditions adversely affects the pump’s capability to perform its intended safety function during a design basis accident.  The team used inspection manual chapter (IMC) 0609, Att. 4, “Initial Characterization of Findings,” issued December 7, 2016, for mitigating systems, and IMC 0609, App. A, “The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power,” issued June 19, 2012, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the qualification of a mitigating structure, system, and component (SSC), and the SSC maintained its operability.  Since the underlying cause of the issue occurred on August 31, 1988, the team determined that no crosscutting aspect was applicable because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance. Enforcement:  Title 10 CFR 50.49 (e)(4) requires, in part, that the electric equipment qualification program must include and be based on radiation, and the radiation environment must be based on the type of radiation, the total dose expected during normal operation over the installed life of the equipment, and the radiation environment associated with the most severe design basis accident during or following which the equipment is required to remain functional, including the radiation resulting from recirculating fluids for equipment located near the recirculating lines and including dose-rate effects.  Contrary to the above, since August 31, 1988, the licensee failed to qualify RB spray pump ‘A’ to the total dose expected during normal operation over the installed life of the pump and during the most severe DBA.  This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Unresolved Item (Open)
“Unjustified Qualified Life for ASCO Valves” URI 05000395/2018010-04
71111.21N-Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs) Description:  The NRC opened a Unresolved Item (URI) to determine if a performance deficiency was more than minor.  In 1993, the licensee’s contractor, Impell Corporation, reanalyzed the qualified life established by ASCO qualification report AQR-67368 and a field notification from ASCO dated 10/27/1989.  Impell erroneously used the heat rise temperatures from the field notification for both the AQR-67368 test samples accelerated aging temperature and the actual service temperatures in various plant locations.  Replacing the actual test specimen’s documented accelerated aging temperature with an assumed temperature was not justified.  As a result, when using the actual temperature identified in the qualification report, many of these solenoids are currently beyond their qualified lives.  

The licensee provided an alternate heat rise test report less limiting than the ASCO testing to justify that the ASCO valves were within their service lives, report 8058-001-2000-RA-0001R00, Environmental Qualification Temperature Test of ASCO 206 and NP Series Solenoid Valves, dated June 2000.  The team’s evaluation must determine whether the alternate report is applicable to the licensee, and, if so, whether the test report indicated that the ASCO testing was invalid to conclude that the valves are currently within their qualified lives.



10 Enclosure
NUREG-0588 Section 4(6) and Regulatory Guide 1.89, Rev. 1, Regulatory Position 5.c, required, in part, that the aging acceleration rate and the basis upon which it was established be described, documented, and justified.  The team determined that the failure to justify the aging acceleration rate was a performance deficiency.  However, a review of the additional information is warranted to determine if the performance deficiency is more than minor.  The licensee entered the performance deficiency into their corrective action program as CR-1800175 and determined that preliminary calculations indicated that the ASCO valves are currently operable based on the additional information provided for review.

Unresolved Item (Open)
“Potential High Radiation Dose Areas with Unqualified Components” URI 05000395/2018010-05
71111.21N-Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs) Description:  The NRC opened a URI to determine if a performance deficiency exists.  The licensee did not perform analysis to determine the radiation exposure to shielded components adjacent to electrical and blank penetrations on the outboard side through containment.  As a result, many mild environment components may be adversely affected.  The inboard side of the penetrations is exposed to rad levels approaching 9X107 rads and the out board side is shielded by thin steel plates with electrical pass-thru holes.  The inspectors noted that there were many areas of the plant identified as mild environments with unanalyzed penetrations.  For example, the inspectors observed that the two trains for the plant service water were adjacent to unanalyzed penetrations. The components adjacent to the outboard side of the penetrations may be unqualified for service conditions expected during the most severe DBA as required by 10 CFR 50.49(e)(4).

NUREG-0588 Section 1.4 "Radiation Conditions Inside and Outside Containment," required, in part, that "(8) Shielded components need be qualified only to the gamma radiation levels required…" and that "(12) Equipment that may be exposed to radiation doses below 104 rads should not be considered to be exempt from radiation qualification, unless analysis supported by test data is provided to verify that these levels will not degrade the operability of the equipment below acceptable values.”  The licensee provided a white paper for this issue that asserts that consideration of radiation streaming was not part of their licensing basis, thus enforcement would be addressed through a backfit analysis in accordance with 10 CFR 50.109.  The team must determine whether the site licensing basis required consideration of radiation streaming and whether a backfit analysis would be appropriate in lieu of enforcement.  The licensee captured this issue in their corrective action program as CR-1800684 and determined that “the process for qualification of equipment used was found acceptable per the VCS SER. Further evaluation will be performed under this CR but currently all components are qualified to their expected operating conditions and will perform their design functions. At worst, the EQ life of components may be reduced. All equipment in penetration areas are operable.”

Unresolved Item (Open)
“Potential Unjustified Activation Energy for Barton Transmitters” URI 05000395/2018010-06
71111.21N-Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs) Description:  The contractor, Impell Corporation, changed the activation energy for the Barton transmitters from 0.5 eV to 0.78 eV.  The 0.78 eV was based upon an academic paper documenting experimental work, apparently, performed for the early space program and apparently first published in 1965.  The paper cautioned the reader that the methods used were experimental and were not validated.  A 0.5 eV activation energy for electronics was documented by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) report NP-1558, which attributed


11 Enclosure
it to electron migration of aluminum.  The report was available to the licensee at the time of the change.  Reports published by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) indicated that activation energies for various electronic failure modes could range from 0.50.66.  Impell did not document an independent failure modes and effects analysis to justify the activation energy that they used.  

The licensee did not find the original qualification activation energies to be in error or nonconservative.  The licensee chose to use less limiting activation energies that may not have been proven to be justified.  In addition, the licensee was unable to demonstrate acceptable margins for extrapolation uncertainty.  FSAR Section 3.11.2.1.3 stated that the environmental qualification of Class 1E equipment is in conformance with RG 1.89, Rev. 1.  The RG in Section C.5.c stated that “the aging acceleration rate and activation energies used during qualification testing and the basis upon which the rate and activation energy were established should be defined, justified, and documented.”  NUREG 0588 Section 5(2), “Qualification Documentation,” specified, in part that “a certificate of conformance by itself is not acceptable unless it is accompanied by test data and information on the qualification program.”  The licensee captured this issue in their corrective action program as CR-18-00500, and determined that the “NRC challenged the qualified life for Barton installed as IPT00456 based on an activation energy.  VC Summer engineering does not agree with the NRC, nor do the OEMs Barton, Weed/Foxboro and Rosemount who have reviewed their prior research and state that it is suitable and adequate for our applications.”  The team must determine whether the activation energy used for the Barton transmitters was appropriate and, if not, whether the licensee had the responsibility to verify the information provided by their vendors and contractor