Everyone is waiting for the special inspection report.
The new inspection report indicates continued profound weakness in the organization. Remember, the inspectors told me the plant has been having leading industry experts coming in and out of the site. Was it enough to turn around the organization...
Inspection Report.Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed simulator training for operating crews. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators’ critique of their performance.
• January 19, 2017, the inspectors observed “Just-In-Time” simulator training for an operating crew which consisted of implementation of the startup integrated operating instruction.
• January 21, 2017, the inspectors also observed a directed learning activity for a shift manager which focused on a weakness identified during high intensity training.The inspectors also observed portions of three emergent work activities that had the potential to affect the functional capability of mitigating systems and/or to impact barrier
integrity:
• January 27, 2017, the reactor core isolation cooling motor operated valve inoperable/power loss annunciator illuminated; the licensee stopped withdrawing control rods and performed immediate troubleshooting of thirteen isolation valves prior to verifying the capability of the reactor core isolation cooling system to
perform its function.
• January 28 – 29, 2017, the intermediate range monitor C failed; the licensee stopped withdrawing control rods and performed immediate troubleshooting that revealed a damaged cable.
• January 31 – February 3, 2017, the local power range monitor inputs to the 3D Monicore program failed to transmit data such that safety limits could be readily verified; the licensee stopped withdrawing control rods, maintained power below 21.8 percent, performed troubleshooting, and ultimately replaced the computer system.Problem Identification and Resolution (71152)
.1 Routine Review
a. Inspection Scope
Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensee’s corrective action program. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution.The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee’s
problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues
a. Inspection Scope
On February 8, 2017, the inspectors completed a review of Grand Gulf Nuclear Station’s recovery plan, specifically focused on the restart plan corrective actions and operator high intensity training. Grand Gulf Nuclear Station performed a technical specification required shutdown on September 8, 2016, to address an issue with the residual heat removal pump A. During the shutdown, the licensee had two human performance errors in the operations department. On September 27, 2016, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station plant management notified the NRC of their intent to delay start-up of the plant, following the
forced outage, to implement corrective actions to assess and resolve operational performance concerns (See Preliminary Notification PNO-IV-16-003, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML16273A330).
b. Observations and Assessments
1. Restart Corrective Actions
• The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s restart plan, dated January 4, 2017, and focused on the corrective actions that the licensee had designated as, “Actions required for restart.” Of the nine corrective actions with this designation, the inspectors concluded that four were satisfactorily completed, four had received due date extensions that extended beyond the date of the restart without documented justification, and one was closed without documentation demonstrating that the intent of the corrective action was met.
The four due date extended corrective actions were centered on performing external assessments/benchmarking to ensure that normal and off-normal procedures were up to industry standards. The actions were also to address benchmarking in the area of immediate operator actions. These corrective actions were identified because inadequate procedures and operator actions played a significant role in the events leading up to the decision to stay shutdown for over four months.
Following the team’s questions, the licensee provided written discussions to be documented in the corrective actions that justified the due date extensions. In addition, the licensee was able to demonstrate that the corrective action which was closed without documenting that the intent had been met was actually
accomplished through another corrective action. They performed out-of-the-box evaluations (OBE’s) with first line supervisors in the maintenance department which met the intent of the closed corrective action.
The inspectors assessed the licensee’s problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews, and compensatory actions. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective actions
and that these actions were adequate to correct identified weaknesses in operator fundamentals and station weaknesses.
2. Roles and Responsibilities
• The inspectors noted weaknesses in the outage control center’s precision, rigor, and leadership. The inspectors did not observe the outage control center driving completion of work items, and instead noted a more reactive mode of operation.
• The team noted that the operations manager occasionally stepped outside of his broader oversight role and provided specific guidance on the performance of a procedure to answer the questions of the at-the-controls operator. The inspectors concluded this was, more appropriately, the responsibility of the control room supervisor.
3. Communications
• The inspectors observed that three way communication in the control room and the field has improved significantly.
• The inspectors noted that pre-job briefs tended to be lengthy, unfocused, and unengaging. For instance, reading a procedure from start to finish was not uncommon, and the level of engagement by the operators diminished significantly after a few minutes.
• The inspectors observed that communications between the outage control center, the control room, and the in-the-field crews were not consistent, and this resulted in multiple miscommunications. On numerous occasions, while trying to ascertain status or schedule of activities, neither the shift manager nor the outage control center could provide an accurate answer.
• The inspectors observed that control room log entries lacked detail which made it difficult for an independent reviewer to assess the events reflected in the entries.
4. Procedure Use and Adherence
• During the inspection, the team observed activities that involved the operations, maintenance, and radiation protection departments. The team observed that procedure use and adherence was generally improved and that discrepancies or ambiguities in procedural steps were addressed by stopping and involving supervisors to get the problems resolved.
5. Operator Fundamentals
• The inspectors observed that the high intensity training has had a substantial impact on the operating crews, and it appears that the new higher standards are being applied throughout the operations organization. The team observed many activities in the field, which involved licensed and non-licensed operators, and directly observed the new standards in use.
• The inspectors observed operators being engaged and deliberate when manipulating controls in the control room; the operators discussed the action, the expected outcome, and verified the desired outcome following manipulations.
6. Training for Other Departments
• The inspectors noted that the licensee invested significant resources in high intensity training and improving operator fundamentals, standards, expectations, and procedures for the operations department. However, the inspectors noted
that the licensee invested fewer resources in improving the performance of the maintenance department, and the team noted that very little emphasis was placed on training, procedure quality, and setting standards and expectations in the engineering, security, chemistry, and radiation departments.
These activities constituted completion of one annual follow-up sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152.
