Junk Plant June 2012 Announcement of Special Unit Investigation

NRC special unit launches investigation into potential wrongdoing at Palisades nuclear plant related to leaking tank

By Fritz Klug | fklug@mlive.com

on June 27, 2012 at 6:35 PM, updated June 27, 2012 at 8:58 PM
 COVERT, MI — A special unit of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is investigating whether there was any wrongdoing related to how Entergy Energy handled a leaking cooling tank at the Palisades nuclear power plant.
 The investigation was launched Tuesday by the NRC's Office of Investigations, according to NRC spokeswoman Viktoria Mitlyng. Entergy shut Palisades down two weeks ago after a leak in a cooling tank surpassed a minimum level of 31 gallons a day. Mitlyng said Wednesday that the NRC cannot disclose details of the investigation because it is ongoing. Entergy spokesman Mark Savage would not comment on the investigation. Instead of looking for performance deficiencies at the

Why is the normal inspectors only relegated to only performance issues?  

plant as is typical of NRC investigations, the Office of Investigations looks at whether there was any "potential wrongdoing" in how the company handled a situation and the its participation in an inspection…

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Junk Plant Palisades Safety Culture

So basically on top of the control room sat the SIRWT. On top of of the SIRWT was the leaking roof. The roof and the SIRWT were both leaking. It looked to me the confusion with the leaking roof was intentional in covering up the Leaking SIRWT. They were certainly trying to disrupt oversight and delaying the repair of the SIRWT until proper planning and service were brought to the site.

It would be interesting when the NRC was first aware falsification was ongoing.

On June 25, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Office of Investigations initiated an investigation to determine whether personnel at the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant(Palisades) deliberately failed to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC regarding a safety injection and refueling water storage tank (SIRWT) leak. The investigation was completed on March 10, 2015.

Would the outcome be different on my 2.206 if the NRC disclose four individuals were being prosecuted for falsifying documents on the SIRWT instead of three year later?

Mike Mulligan's 2.206 on the Palisades SIRW tank. 

November 20, 2012

Mr. Michael Mulligan

P.O. Box 161

Hinsdale, NH 03451

Dear Mr. Mulligan: 

You recently submitted two petitions addressed to Mr. William Borchardt, Executive Director for Operations at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The petitions were referred to\ the NRC’s Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 2.206.

In your first petition dated June 18, 2012, as revised on June 27, 2012, you requested that the Palisades Nuclear Plant (Palisades) remain shutdown. In the petition, you were critical of Entergy Nuclear, the NRC, and the programmatic aspects of the regulatory program, including the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP). You focused on a leak of the Safety Injection Refueling Water (SIRW) tank at Palisades, but also discussed past events at both Palisades and other

Entergy-owned facilities. Finally, you also discussed the lack of an adequate safety culture environment at Palisades.

You requested that the following actions be taken:

(1) The shutdown resulting from the SIRW tank leak should be categorized as unplanned. 

(2) The NRC should move the Palisades performance indicator from Red to the next level V:Unacceptable Performance. 

(3) An outside authority (not the NRC’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG)) should determine why the NRC did not force Palisades (Entergy) to thoroughly investigate the SIRW leak when the leak first appeared. 

(4) Top Palisades management staff should be fired and replaced before startup. 

(5) Entergy’s corporate nuclear senior staff should be fired and replaced before restart. 

(6) The NRC should assign two additional NRC inspectors to Palisades and to the rest of the Entergy nuclear plants. 

(7) A local public oversight panel should be formed around every plant. 

(8) An emergency NRC senior official oversight panel should be convened to reform the ROP.

(9) A national NRC oversight panel of outsiders (consisting of a mixture of professional and academic people, as well as lay people) should be convened to oversee and report on agency activities.

(10) The NRC should perform an analysis to determine the cause of the numerous findings of problems with Entergy plants during this inspection reporting cycle.

(11) The NRC should evaluate if Region III has enough personnel and resources.

(12) Palisades should remain shutdown until all procedures are fully updated and corrected, all technical and maintenance backlogs are updated and corrected, all training completed, and all reports and safety processes are fully completed and implemented. 

(13) An independent outside investigation should review the insufficient process outcome of the 2008-2009 Palisades security falsification, investigation, safety survey local and fleet-wide training and safety surveys.

(14) President Obama should fire Chairman Jazcko and the four Commissioners.

In the second petition dated June 28, 2012, you requested that Palisades remain shutdown. 

This petition was focused on roof leaks at Palisades, but also discussed past events at both Palisades and other Entergy-owned facilities. You discussed a lack of adequate safety culture environment at Palisades, and were also critical of the NRC staff for “tolerating and covering up” very serious safety problems at Palisades and throughout the Entergy organization. This petition also included specific questions related to roof leaks.

This petition duplicated many of your requests discussed in the previous petition. However, in your second petition there were new requests which are provided below:

(15) Entergy should be prevented from starting up until all the safety problems at the site have been publicly identified and the safety culture repaired. 

(16) Heads need to roll in Region III and at headquarters for tolerating and covering up these very serious safety problems at Palisades and throughout the Entergy organization. This all has the potential to gravely damage our nation.

(17) The NRC should report on why the 2.206 petition process failed, and for the agency to hold officials accountable to the plant employees and me with not doing their jobs in trying to understand what was going on at the site and not repairing the organization at the earliest point.

(18) A meeting with the Palisades inspector and other…

Junk Grand Gulf Capacity factor

Feb 23 0%
22 0%
21 0%
20 0%
19 95%
18 95%
17 95%
16 95%
15 96%
14 96%
13 96%
12 96%

Usually it is in a paper if a plant goes into refueling. I would not spend so much time on this if Entergy reported the  refueling in the paper.

Sounds like they got failed fuel pin failures????

Grand Gulf has been saying for almost a year they are coasting down to refueling. I guess you can say there is a slow decline in the power level. They problem is this has been going on for about three months. 

Dec 23, 2015:

Grand Gulf 1

98

HOLD FOR SETUP FOR POWER SUPPRESSION TESTING

Dec 11

97

INCREASING POWER

*

Seems Grand Gulf has been having trouble keeping their plant at power.

GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION - NRC 95001 SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000416/2014009 (Aug 2014)  

Dear Mr. Mulligan (not me): On June 20, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a supplemental inspection at your Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. The enclosed report documents the results of this inspection, which were discussed with you and members of your staff, during an exit meeting on June 20, 2014, as well as during the re-exit meeting on August 6, 2014, with members of your staff. As required by the NRC Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix, this supplemental inspection was performed in accordance with Inspection Procedure 95001, “Supplemental Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area.” The purpose of the inspection was to examine the causes for, and actions taken related to, a White Performance Indicator in the Initiating Events Cornerstone at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. The performance indicator was for Unplanned Reactor Scrams per 7,000 Critical Hours and crossed the Green-to-White threshold during the first quarter of 2013. The performance indicator value was noted as 3.2. This inspection also reviewed the details of all five licensee event reports that were submitted to the NRC for unplanned scram events that occurred between the dates of December 29, 2012 and March 17, 2014. There was an additional unplanned scram event that occurred on March 29, 2014, but due to a vendor review in process, the root cause evaluation was not complete for this inspection period. Thus, the licensee event report for that event will not be addressed in this report.

201501 

Corrective actions associated with the adverse trend are:

• The licensee has taken action already to increase staff allocation in the electrical field so that there are more staff to accomplish the preventative maintenance tasks. Currently, the licensee has identified that there is a shortage of electrical workers and is actively working to increase staff.

November 13, 2015

SUBJECT: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1– NRC

COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION REPORT 05000416/2015007


Dear Mr. Mulligan:

On October 1, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1. On August 27, 2015, the NRC inspectors discussed the preliminary results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. On October 1, 2015, the NRC inspectors discussed the final results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff.

Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report. The NRC inspectors documented seven findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. All of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements; one of these violations was determined to be Severity Level IV under the traditional enforcement process. Additionally,

the NRC inspectors documented three Severity Level IV violations with no associated finding.

The NRC is treating these violations as non…

Security related violations and a security related OI investigation are always a symptom a plant is running away from management. 

GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION – NRC SECURITY INSPECTION REPORT 05000416/2015404

Dear Mr. Mulligan:

On October 8, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a security inspection at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. An NRC inspector discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The inspector documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report. NRC inspectors documented three findings of very low security significance (Green) in this report. All of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NVCs) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement

Policy
 

Dear Mr. Mulligan:

This letter refers to the investigation conducted by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission's Office of Investigations, Region IV, at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station; Inspection Report 05000416/2015406 enclosed. The purpose of the investigation was to determine if there was a willful security-related violation at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. Following notification by Grand Gulf Nuclear Station staff of a potential willful security-related violation the NRC initiated an investigation on February 26, 2014. The investigation was completed on February 25, 2015. Based on the evidence developed during the investigation, the NRC

determined that a willful security-related violation occurred. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 16, 2015, with Paul Salgado, Acting Director of Regulatory Assurance and Performance Improvement, and other members of your staff.

Palisades: My Proof The Junk NRC Is Corrupt As Hell.

I see the delay, this way the NRC and outsiders can't make the case there was a pattern of falsification going on in Palisades and Entergy.

You know what injustice is, Justice delayed.  

Just think if the NRC declared Palisades as a corrupt plant in May 2011 over the SIRWT...they told Palisades to shutdown and then said we are going to systematically shutdown your plants one by one for the foreseeable future until you thoroughly reform your organization from the top down.

Why did it take OI till now to come up with these violations? 

There is no doubt these Palisades extremely smart and corrupt officials were playing the NRC like a fiddle. Any plant operator can play the NRC like a fiddle because of a corrupt congress and rules. 

All the below would have never happened if Entergy would have had a near death experiance inflected on them by the NRC in and around the spring of 2011.  

On May 18, 2011 beginning of the SIRWT problem 

September 25, 2011: DC Cabinet short red finding 

March 31, 2013: One dead and eight injured at Arkansas Nuclear One  

2015: Pilgrim LOOP and notice of closing Pilgrim plant by Entergy.

They illegally falsified documents to keep this plant unsafely up a power and to keep the money coming into the coffers.

Think about this, with the OSHA recent finding Palisades had intimidated their security offices, while the NRC with the same information found no employee intimidation. 

February 22, 2015

EA–15–039
Mr. Anthony Vitale
Vice President, Operations
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Palisades Nuclear Plant
27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway
Covert, MI 49043–9530

SUBJECT: PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT, INSPECTION REPORT 05000255/2015013; INVESTIGATION REPORT 3–2012–021; AND APPARENT VIOLATIONS

Dear Mr. Vitale: 

This is in reference to an investigation completed on March 10, 2015, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC’s) Office of Investigations (OI) at your Palisades Nuclear Plant(Palisades). The purpose of the investigation was to determine whether personnel at Palisades deliberately failed to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC regarding a safety injection and refueling water storage tank (SIRWT) leak. A Factual Summary, included as Enclosure 1 to this letter, provides a summary of the factual basis for the apparent violations.

This is basically industry protection.They are trying to minimize this. Every separate piece of paper falsified should be treated a seperate violation.

It is like me robbing three separate banks at gunpoint and the NRC only charges me with one crime because I used the same gun in all the robberies. They immediately knew who did the three robberies, but inexplicable charged me a decade later. Who gains the advantage with this.      

Based on the results of NRC’s review of this investigation, three apparent violations were identified and are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRC’s website at

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. 

It appears to the NRC that parts of these violations were willful as described in the enclosed factual summary. The first apparent violation involves the willful failure, on the part of four individuals, to enter information concerning a leak in the SIRWT into the corrective action program as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V and procedure EN–LI–102, Revision 16. The second apparent violation involves the failure to perform adequate operability determinations of conditions associated with the SIRWT leak as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V and procedure EN–OP–104, Revision 5. The third apparent violation involves the apparent failure to comply with Technical Specification (TS), surveillance requirement Section SR 3.0.3, when you failed to perform the...

NRC Thinks Non Compliance to Rules (Moral Hazard) Is No Big Deal

They are improperly using The Risk-Informed Approach.

They have no proof the “Risk-Informed Approach is accurate or is qualified for safety relativeness.

All big accidents and institutional failures emerge from insignificant operability issues. Can the NRC distinguish between accident creating compliance issues from insignificant compliance issues.  

You notice how the agency never asked the question if the non-compliance was intentional or malicious.  

Basically the industry and the NRC  are saying something like a bank robbery under $500 isn't a enforceable crime. It creates insignificant harm to the bank and society at large. So they don't enforce bank robberies under $500? 

In economics, moral hazard occurs when one person takes more risks because someone else bears the cost of those risks. A moral hazard may occur where the actions of one party may change to the detriment of another after a financial transaction has taken place. 

Moral hazard occurs under a type of information asymmetry where the risk-taking party to a transaction knows more about its intentions than the party paying the consequences of the risk. More broadly, moral hazard occurs when the party with more information about its actions or intentions has a tendency or incentive to behave inappropriately from the perspective of the party with less information.

Remember the NRC and industry were fighting like hell to keep the leaking Davis Besse up at power. There is a lot of black swans out there that disproves the insignificance  not compliance issue. The NRC had that a small LOCA and increasing pressurizer level was a problem before TMI. They defined it as insignificant safety issue.  The operator's not have a real time indication of PWR vessel level and a malfunctioning pressurizer relief valve (PORV) would never lead to a meltdown.

The agency would have to prove that insignificant compliance issues never leads to significant safety problems.       

WIKI: Moral hazard also arises in a principal–agent problem, where one party, called an agent, acts on behalf of another party, called the principal. The agent usually has more information about his or her actions or intentions than the principal does, because the principal usually cannot completely monitor the agent. The agent may have an incentive to act inappropriately (from the viewpoint of the principal) if the interests of the agent and the principal are not aligned.

But what about the moral hazards   

‘Operability Meeting’ A Risk-Informed Approach for Addressing Low Risk Compliance Issues Robert Elliott, Branch ChiefTechnical Specifications BranchU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionFebruary 3, 2016  Section 1.5 of the NRC Enforcement PolicyStates: – “The NRC also has the authority to exercise discretion to permit continued operations—despite the existence of a noncompliance—where the noncompliance is not significant from a risk perspective and does not, in the particular circumstances, pose an undue risk to public health and safety. When noncompliance with NRC requirements occurs, the NRC must evaluate the degree of risk posed by that noncompliance to determine whether immediate action is required.“ – “Since some requirements are more important to safety than others, the NRC endeavors to use a risk-informed approach when applying NRC resources to the oversight of licensed activities, including enforcement activities.” • The NRC is considering development of a new process to facilitate resolution of low risk/low safety significance compliance issues that could affect operability.
 – When engaging a licensee on a degraded or nonconforming condition operability issue, the licensee/staff would assess the risk associated with the licensee’s condition. – If the condition is demonstrated to be low safety/risk significance, the staff would engage the licensee on a timetable for corrective action and appropriate interim compensatory measures.

Dr. Bill Corcoran's "Non Answer" Explanation.

Dr. Bill Corcoran

 February 10, 2016 at 5:42 am

The non-answer is a nonresponsive reply to a question. A non-answer can take the form of “I already told you the answer”, the form of an answer to a different question, or the form of an evasion.

A non-answer is slick and sleazy. It turns the stomach. A non-answer is like the tarpaulin over the pick-up truck cargo bed on the way to the landfill; it covers everything required by law and conceals the trash and filth.

Non-answers are a form of bullying. They make use of a position of power to stiff-arm the concerned questioner. They exploit asymmetric relationships.

Non-answers are a form of intellectual corruption. They impede honest dialogue. They are dismissively disrespectful of due process. Historically, non-answers have been used by intellectually corrupt regimes to create a chilling effect on honest dissent.

Once an organization perceives that it has used the non-answer to avoid admitting prior incompetence, lack of integrity, noncompliance, and/or lack of transparency, a precedent has been set. The non-answer becomes an accepted way of life, a part of the intellectually corrupt culture that pervades the agency. When management accepts non-answers to stakeholders it provides a convenient way to evade accountability.

Once the agency accepts non-answers to its critics it begins to accept non-answers from those it oversees. What were the roles of non-answers in agency embarrassing shortfalls such as the Callaway Xenon Shutdown, the Peach Bottom Sleeping Guards and the Davis-Besse 2002 Imprudent Extension?

Non-answers erode public confidence in the fundamental technologies. By not expressing outrage at non-answers to stakeholders the industries are driving nails into their own coffins.

Junk Plant ANO: Plant Spinning Wildly Out Of Control, Raising Power Level Will Fix It?

Licensee Event Report 50-313/2015-001-00

Manual Reactor Trip Due to Oscillations in the Feedwater System

On December 15, 2015, at approximately 0544, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1), manually scrammed during a scheduled automatic down power to 35% power for planned maintenance. The Integrated Control System (ICS) (JB) was being utilized for the down power. During the down power, oscillations occurred in the Main Feedwater (MFW) (SJ) system. The ICS was placed in manual and efforts were made to dampen the MFW oscillations. The Operators manually tripped the reactor from approximately 43% power when it became evident that an automatic reactor trip was imminent, based on the observed Reactor Coolant System (RCS) (AB) pressure rise caused by the significant reduction in MFW flow. The direct cause of the manual plant trip is currently considered a result of placing the “B” startup valve in HAND (manual) when the valve was ~36% open, which resulted in a significant underfeed condition of the “B” Once-Through Steam Generator (OTSG). There are currently two root causes considered for this condition: (1) inadequate maintenance practices applied to the ICS modules, and (2) inadequate procedural guidance to address ICS malfunctions.

Event Cause 

The direct cause of the manual plant trip is currently considered a result of placing the “B” startup valve in HAND when the valve was ~36% open, which resulted in a significant underfeed condition of the “B” OTSG. There are currently two root causes considered for this condition: (1) inadequate maintenance practices applied to the ICS modules, and (2) inadequate procedural guidance to address ICS malfunctions.

Just because a licensee says it is the most conservative means to the NRC it is the most conservative. 

So basically nuclear safety relay maintenance problems with poor operator training and poor procedures. They assumed though raising plant power level they understood what was going on in the plant…but it was spinning wildly out of control. It is the certainty/ uncertainty gaming…they assume they knew what was going on, but in actuality the plant was spinning wildly out of control. So it’s the operator’s management in the control room duty to perceive things are out of control…then to conservatively scram. It would have headed off the dangerous feed water flow oscillations.   

Remember the NRC thinks this is the worst plant in the USA. They killed an employee and injured eight others through not following procedures by dropping a 600 ton stater. A pipe broke through this, they (NRC and ANO) then accidentally discovered serous flooding vulnerabilities. These guys had many years since this to get their stuff in one sock…the results of this down power should have never happened. They are still not fixed and dangerous operators of nuclear plants.   

The difference in the RCS cold-leg temperatures continued to build as the plant stabilized. With the “B” MFW low-load control valve considered non-functional, it was determined that the most conservative action would be to raise power slightly so the MFW block valves would re-open and the MFW pumps would shift back to the “Flow Control” mode. A slight power increase using the ICS station in manual was initiated at ~ 0455. Power began to rise as expected and the RCS Tcold condition improved as MFW flows became more evenly matched due to increased feedwater flow to the “A” OTSG.

Was the $724 million/ 13% Uprate at Grand Gulf Worth it?

Well, this was a Entergy special Walmart Uprate?

$724 Million Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant Uprate Will Soon Create 4,000 Jobs Entergy is preparing for a 13 percent power uprate that will make Grand Gulf the most powerful single-reactor nuclear plant in the country.

South Mississippi Electric (2012) 

The GGNS EPU project was over budget in cost and time to complete. That construction delay, combined with three forced outages after the unit returned to service, resulted in nuclear energy accounting for only 10 percent of our energy dispatch, which was well below expectation

Major components replaced as part of the EPU included nine low-pressure feedwater heaters; two moisture-separator reheaters; the reactor steam dryer; two reactor feedpumps and turbines; high-pressure turbine and casings; the main generator and rotor; and the main transformers. Crews also installed an additional water well and conducted a variety of other smaller equipment modifications. 

Approval from the Advisory Committee for Reactor Safety and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to operate the unit at full EPU capacity was granted on July 19, 2012, at which time the plant personnel began steps to safely and methodically increase the plant’s production to the newly-licensed level, which added an additional 178 MW to the electrical grid.

2013

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station performed better in 2013 than in recent years, producing 91 percent of budgeted energy.

Junk Plants Browns Ferry System Irrational Response to Dangerous Steam leak.

(works in progress)

Junk Plants Browns Ferry Irrational Response to Dangerous Steam leak. 

February 12, 2016

EA-16-14

SUBJECT: BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION

REPORT 05000259/2015004, 05000260/2015004, AND 05000296/2015004; AND

APPARENT VIOLATIONS

This would be my example of how the NRC trains their inspectors to act in a minimalist manner. Risk perspectives tells that we are are always save…our role is to stand by and let problems develop. If we just follow the minimalistic rules and procedures…tomorrow will just turn out like yesterday. It’s all programmed into the system with our rules and procedure. There is nothing more dangerous when a group gets complacent and in a trance.

Again, this is a three plant facility…this is a massively complex system between all the human interactions and the machinery. One plant has upwards to 5 million parts in. They are abysmal and have a poor replacement pairs stream. Or none at all. The new buzz in modern times at these facilities is, we have to reverse engineer all replacement part.

Then NRC is supposed to step in here, size up the situation when the problem first emerges. Once they see small leak like this, notify the licensee, they are supposed to bird dog the issue until the degradation if fix.

I just don’t think the inspectors are trained to wheel power. To control the licenses if they can’t control themselves. They are too afraid their reputation can be ruined by the licensees and their bosses. If you talk to these NRC guys and question why the event payed out like it did, to the one they will talk about they are a sampling agency and there just isn’t NRC resources on site to know everything going on. And I’ll make the case the licensees have an intentional policy of hiding information from the NRC. They are cagy as hell with hiding information. The licensees know the scale of the complexity in their facilities, the resource and political limitation…the NRC has to have a impossible triplicate proof to accuse anyone at a nuclear plant. And especially the big dog suits who sets up the plant to fail. So fundimentally the NRC doesn’t have enough power to inforce truth-telling. They will get bogged down in uncovering perfect triplicate evidence of not telling the complete. These guys are having a lot of problems keeping their HPCIs and RCICs operable and fully maintained.

Man, lets say the HPCI area and surroundings where camera’d up. The control room was camera’d up. You had a god’s eye view of how this problem developed and the incident itself. Seeing it all would  radically change your opinion of TVA nuclear.

I see the system basically set up as the NRC inspector, management and the employees…they are all insecure and fighting for survival. From these human perspectives, the only way to survive with the outsider wolfs howling at the door, is too secretly all collude. Either inadvertently or intentional, they all collude to keep the wolves at bay.

What is hear is systemic all across the nation, is the severe mental illness of normalization of devience (NOD). These guys can’t see when they are doing things wrong. I can make the case their brains were trained over and over again how to do NOD. They created new neural pathways and strengthen old pathways. They are hardwired to think deviance doesn’t matter. This is a addiction thing that changes the hard wiring in your head. Numerous people in the organization have this mental illness. Everyone! It is a pernicious mental illness, humans doesn’t recognized it in themselves. The organization constantly reinforces it…it takes a tremendous amount effort to rewire you head. You got to recognize in yourself its a hard-wiring thing in your head and dedicate yourself into rewiring you head. I am talking science here. What you do repeatedly, it rewires you head. 

The enclosed inspection report discusses two findings for which the NRC has not yet reached a preliminary significance determination. As described in Section 4OA3.3 of the enclosed report, two findings related to the failure of the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) turbine steam admission valve 2-FCV-73-16 packing. The first finding was identified for Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) failure to maintain the design of 2-FCV-73-16 packing assembly. The failure to correctly install the packing gland follower and the use of an incorrect packing type resulted in the development of a progressively degrading high pressure steam leak through the packing gland of 2-FCV-73-16. A second finding was identified for TVA’s failure to characterize the steam leak in accordance with procedure NPG-SPP-06.8, Leak Reduction Program, which required it to have been characterized as the highest priority, a Category 1, Severity level 5 leak. This classification would have required an expedited repair of the steam leak.

Junk Plants Browns Ferry Back To Bad Old Days?

Was the progress from the red finding (clearing it) just a mirage, illusion or worst?

The column 4 heightened inspection has been cleared too. They are back under a regular inspection regime. 

Do they really deserve it and have they earned it? 

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 'red finding' removed, but plant still under intensive inspection status
By Brian Lawson The Huntsville Times

on January 30, 2014 at 9:48 PM, updated February 01, 2014 at 1:01 PM

ATHENS, Alabama -- Federal regulators have removed a critical "red" finding from TVA's Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, but the plant remains in a state of heightened inspections due to other problems.

The announcement that Browns Ferry had completed work related to the 2011 red finding that identified a significant safety problem, was made during a public meeting hosted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Athens tonight.

Browns Ferry remains in the NRC's Column 4, which means a heightened inspection regimen for Browns Ferry's Unit 1 reactor. Regulators will monitor plant operations, safety culture, maintenance, equipment reliability and work planning. The Category scoring system reflects a number of problems or safe operations over a defined period of time.

Victor McCree, the Atlanta-based regional administrator for the NRC, said the red finding removal shows TVA has made progress, but needs to do more.

"We've seen areas of significantly improved performance, but is there still room for improvement? Yes," McCree said, Browns Ferry's upgraded procedures and a new approach to addressing equipment reliability. "But TVA didn't arrive at this point overnight. There were a number of years where they didn't take care of the plant equipment well enough, they didn't invest in people, procedures or processes.

"It will take some time to see sustained performance, but they're on the right track. They need to continue to invest."

Regulators issued a "red finding" in 2011 after the fall 2010 discovery of a 600-pound valve blocking the primary emergency cooling line at Unit 1 at the plant. TVA cited poor manufacturing, but the NRC found it was TVA's own inadequate testing, that let the blocked line sit undiscovered for years.

The NRC determined that the broken valve would have prevented TVA from successfully implementing its shutdown procedure at the plant in the event of a fire.

The inspection results reported today indicate TVA has taken the necessary steps to address the issues that contributed to the problem and has a plan in place to prevent it from happening again.

Keith Polson, site vice president for Browns Ferry, said TVA is committed to not only making the improvements called for by the NRC, but sustaining its performance with an improved safety culture, accountability, upgraded procedures and a program that ensures equipment reliability. Polson said TVA is also committed to meeting increased fire safety standards.

Polson pointed that the plant's three reactors had no problems meeting power demand during the recent snap of bitterly cold weather.

In leaving Browns Ferry Unit 1 in its Column 4 - Column 5 is unacceptable performance - the NRC cited reliability problems related to a high pressure injection system that is central to the plant's safety cooling system. McCree said the system had problems identified last January in both starting and staying on during testing. The NRC's grading system faults a utility for the number of hours a given critical system is unavailable.

Browns Ferry was also marked down due to the need to upgrade its diesel generators The eight huge diesel generators that are needed in case of a loss of off-site power. The generators needed significant maintenance and TVA has undertaken that effort. McCree said the program to improve the generators was the right thing to do and will benefit TVA in the long run, but the recorded downtime during the maintenance was also counted against TVA.

Both of those problems fell under the "white finding" category, less serious than a red finding, but multiple white findings can also lead to a plant being placed, or remaining in the Column 4.

McCree said the current Column 4 standing will likely be changed over time as TVA continues to make improvements and the downtime problems associated with the downtime cycle out.

Updated at 11 p.m. to correct TVA column class term. Updated Friday to correct plant size designation.

The UCS's take on the Browns Ferry red finding problem.

TVA’s Bad Nuclear Report Cards
Dave Lochbaum, director, Nuclear Safety Project | February 11, 2014, 6:00 am EST

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) owns six of the 23 reactors not in the Licensee Response Column. TVA owns five of the eight reactors in the third and fourth columns of the Action Matrix. In other words, TVA owns 62.5% of the worst performing reactors currently operating. Its three reactors at the Browns Ferry nuclear plant in Alabama occupy the second, third, and fourth columns of the Action Matrix—the only company to earn “Win,” “Place” and “Show” podium spots.

Our Takeaway

Why does TVA have six reactors outside of the acceptable column of the NRC’s Action Matrix?

Probably because TVA only operates six reactors. If it operated more reactors, their performance levels would likely be languishing too.

The worst performing reactor in the country—Browns Ferry Unit 1—was shut down between 1985 and 2007. Its two decade rest and recuperation didn’t prevent it from relatively quickly sinking to last place on the performance charts.

The three Browns Ferry reactors are of similar design and age to the two Brunswick reactors sitting comfortably in the Action Matrix’s first column.

The Sequoyah and Watts Bar reactors are of similar design and age to the two Catawba reactors sitting comfortably in the Action Matrix’s first column.

All of these reactors are in NRC Region II.

Is TVA's Junk Nuclear Fleet In Trouble?

So the natural gas and coal brothers carried the nuclear brother?

Nov 2015

Cheaper fuel helps cut TVA electric rates over past four years 

As the economy of the Tennessee Valley has gained back most of the power it lost during the Great Recession, the cost of power in the region has declined over the past four years...

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TVA mulls sale of unfinished Bellefonte Nuclear Plant 

By Robert Walton | February 19, 2016
Dive Brief: 

*Tennessee Valley Authority is considering selling the unfinished Bellefonte Nuclear Plant in Alabama, the Associated Press reports. Construction on the facility was begun in 1974, but was halted decades ago.  

*While no pricetag was set, the federal utility has spent $4 billion on the plant. 

*TVA said last year it was halting all development of the plant, turning instead to focus more heavily on gas-fired generation and efficiency, and less on nuclear power. the utility operates about 6,700 MW of nuclear capacity. 

Dive Insight: 

The Bellefonte Nuclear Plant could be for sale, and if you've got a few billion to spare, here's what you'd get: Parking lots.Transmission equipment. Rail lines, a heli-pad and multiple finished buildings. And, of course, a matching pair of unfinished nuclear reactors. 

According to the AP, TVA is considering putting the unfinished plant up for sale, less than a year after the utility said it was permanently halting construction. No price tag is set, but TVA has spent $4 billion on the facility to date.

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...TVA said Monday its average cost of delivered power has declined from 7.2 cents per kilowatthour in fiscal 2011 to 6.9 cents per kilowatthour in fiscal 2015. The rate savings, mainly due to lower operating expenses and cheaper fuel, helped make TVA more competitive with neighboring utilities in the South, although some TVA industrial rates remain above the regional average.

Bill Johnson speaks as the TVA board of directors hold a public meeting at TVA's Chattanooga Office Complex.

Bill Johnson speaks as the TVA board of...

Photo by John Rawlston /Times Free Press.

The rate cuts came despite relatively flat electricity sales coming out of the recession and growing profits for TVA.

The Tennessee Valley has added back most of of the jobs lost in the region during the 2009-2010 downturn. TVA's power demand, however, has not returned to its 2007 level, in part, due to improved energy efficiency at many homes and businesses.

Despite only sluggish growth in power sales, the federal utility has boosted net income in each of the past four years, rising to a record $1.1 billion in the fiscal year ended Sept. 30.

"The costs of generating electricity were substantially lower this year, reflected by large reductions in TVA operating costs," Johnson said Monday in a conference call about TVA's financial results for the past year. "As a result, we finished 2015 with a record high level of net income, which was invested back into the power system to keep debt mostly flat for the year."

Natural gas and coal costs have declined amid a glut of fossil fuels, while above-average rain this year helped boost production from TVA's cheapest power source — its 29 power-generating dams.

Johnson, who joined TVA three years ago as CEO after heading Progress Energy and Duke Power Co., said he initially estimated TVA could pare $542 million of annual operating and maintenance expenses at TVA.

"I'm happy to say we not only met that goal, we exceeded it with more than $600 million of savings in operating and maintenance expenses," Johnson said. "Operational savings go right to the benefit of our customers, keeping rates affordable and freeing up funds that can be invested to make our power fleet cleaner and more reliable."

Overall, TVA's operating expenses in fiscal 2015 were down 8 percent, or $760 million, from the previous year.

TVA invested a record high $3.6 billion in capital projects last year. At the same time, TVA has trimmed its full-time staff by about 2,000 positions since 2012 to end last year with 10,918 jobs.

TVA raised its base rates on Oct. 1 by an average 1.5 percent at the retail level. But most of those increases will be offset next month by another drop in TVA's monthly fuel cost adjustment.

TVA has become more competitive with its power rates than a few years ago, but major industrial customers point out their power rates are lower at some other Southern utilities, such as Duke and Georgia Power, than they are with TVA.

"TVA rates are getting better and we're pleased with the improvement, but we'd like to see them do even better," said Pete Mattheis, an attorney for Nucor Steel who serves as chairman of the Tennessee Valley Industrial Committee.

Junk Plant Pilgrim Now Gets New Individual NRC's Web Page

Additional NRC Oversight at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant

The Pilgrim nuclear power plant, in Plymouth, Mass., is under increased oversight from the NRC. In September 2015, the agency announced the finalization of a "White" (low to moderate safety significance) inspection finding that stemmed from issues involving the plant's safety relief valves. Based on that enforcement action, in combination with two earlier "White" findings received by the plant, Pilgrim moved to Column 4, of the agency's Action Matrix, which dictates the agency's level of oversight at plants. The NRC has embarked on a review process that will entail three phases and numerous hours of inspection.

(NRC)"Subject: 2.206: Pilgrim Nuclear Plant SRV Request for Emergency Shutdown"

(My blog Write-up) 2.206: Pilgrim Nuclear Plant SRV Request for Emergency Shutdown

I presented this 2.206 to the regional officials at the SRV white finding public meeting this summer. I asked them why didn't you move on this 2.206 petition. They said, "at the time there was no evidence available to show the SRVs were inoperable or broken to anyone. This 2.206 was just based on wishful thinking." Everything in this 2.206 has come to be true post Jan storm Juno and the resulting NRC investigations.

I have these conversations recorded...

From: Michael Mulligan [mailto:steamshovel2002@yahoo.com]

Sent: Thursday, March 07, 2013 12:33 PM

Yep, I was desperately trying to get people to believe what I was saying. Took a shot at getting the Boston Globe involved. 

To: newstip~globe.com; NRC Allegation

Subject: 2.206: Pilgrim Nuclear Plant SRV Request for Emergency Shutdown 

Dear sir, 

I called this into your hotline by telephone and left a message to a reporter an hour or so ago. This is just a follow-up. 

I'd like to get Gov Patrick to demand an immediate Pilgrim shutdown and demand a special investigation of these events. 

Mike 

*** So the below is my 2.206 request to the NRC. You'd do me a favor if the BG calls our region I public relation people.. .Neil Shaheen.

March 7, 2013

This was shortly after storm Nemo...

Bill Borchardt

Executive Director for Operations

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

Dear Mr. Bochardt, 

(March 2013)Request an emergency and for a exigent bases, that the Pilgrim Nuclear plant be immediately shut down.

Don't tell me just before Nor'easter Nimo struck the Pilgrim plant with a leaking safety relief valve and down at 80%, Entergy was intending to operate that plant with a defective leaking safety relief valve till the next refuel outage. Tell it ain't so. It certainly looks like with the current leak today that are intending to operate till next month.

Is the game plan today to incrementally increase reactor power from 94% by 1% to see if a new SRV leak is getting worse? 

Timeline: 

1) New three stage safety relief valves installed in the plant around May 2011.

***Actually, later discovered the first leak with new SRVs occurred within the first weeks after first plant start-up in May 2011.

2) First leak and shut down on Dec, 26. 2011 (SRV RV-203-3D). 

3) Second leak and shut down on Jan 20, 2013 (SRV RV-203-3B). 

4) Third leak occurred a few weeks later and the Nemo blizzard tripped the plant...the NRC promised these valves would be fixed. (SRV RV-203-3B).

5) Basically they operated for 20 days at 100% power operation post shutdown, then reported on Feb 27 the plant is operating at 94% power with no explained reason until today. The reason for the down power was kept secret from the public. Don't forget the repetitive nature of the recently broken scram discharge volume vent and drain valves...implies Entergy is incapable of maintaining safety components of a nuclear plant. 

The repeated nature of the failures of the safety relief valves means Entergy doesn't know the mechanism of the failure...it is a common mode failure. The design and manufacture of these valves are defective and it is extremely unsafe to operate a nuclear plant with all safety relief valves being INOP. A condition adverse to quality... 

The NRC should have made a public comment about the new leaking safety relief when they first became aware of the leak. The implication is the agency was going to allow the plant to operate with unsafe SRVs until the refueling outage next month. The NRC is involved in a serious cover-up of an extremely unsafe operation of a nuclear power.

1) Request an immediate shutdown the Pilgrim Plant. 

I called for a big special inspection in early 2013. One wonders if the NRC a full scale special inspection in 2013; would Pilgrim not have a had permanent shutdown hanging over their head today?

2) The is the second time I requested a special NRC inspection concerning the defective SRV valves.  

3) Not allow the plant to restart Pilgrim until they fully understand the past failure mechanisms of the four bad new three stage safety relief valves. 

The NRC OIG just below blew this request for help off without even a notification to me.

4) Request the OIG investigate this cover-up to keep an unsafe nuclear plant at power.

References:

The Popperville Town Hall (my blog):

http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/ 

"Pilgrim's Safety Relief Valve Leaking Boondoggle"

Http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2013/02/pilgrims-safety-relief-valve-leaking.html

 

Sincerely,

Michael Mulligan
PO Box 161
Hinsdale, NH 03541
1-603-336-8320
(Cell)1-603-209-4206
steamshovel2002@yahoo.com