Thursday, February 18, 2016

No Such Thing As Science today-Just Aimless Interest?


This is my example there are no such thing as scientist and engineers. We have no higher belief others than self interest and money. Scientist and engineers are more corporate or business gun slingers. I think all real science and engineering is the illumination of universal truths according to great ethical and moral codes and rules. A interest in serving the greater good of the universe.

When I hear this thing today is based on science, I thinking it is a paid opinion based on money.

We have no agreed on and enforce structure defining science. We just pick and chose half-ass data to push a selfish agenda..

Like everything Flint Michigan poisoned water.

There is no such thing as government anymore- just aimless interest. 

By Peter Whoriskey February 17 at 7:05 PM  
FILE - This May 14, 2013 file photo shows salt shakers at a restaurant in Alexandria, Va. A large international study challenges the advice for most people to cut back on salt. Unless they have high blood pressure, the amount most folks consume is OK for heart health, and too little may be as bad as too much, the study suggests. (AP Photo/Cliff Owen, File)
The debate over the perils of salty diets may be one of the most polarized in all of science.
On one side, scientists warn ominously that most Americans are killing themselves with salt. On the other, scientists insist most Americans are fine.
The inability to resolve this question may seem puzzling. It is a question with deadly consequences, at least potentially. How much salt is healthy? Given the marvels of technology, it seems like that ought to be an easy one.
Now a review of hundreds of papers on the topic indicates that the inability to reach a consensus stems at least partially from the fact that the two groups of scientists operate, in essence, in parallel scientific universes.
In one, the scientists write papers about the dangers of our salt consumption, and typically cite other papers that point to the same conclusion. In the other, the scientists write papers dismissing or minimizing the danger, and typically cite papers agreeing with their position.
Each side, in other words, steers away from taking into account contrary results.
“We found that the published literature bears little imprint of an ongoing controversy, but rather contains two almost distinct and disparate lines of scholarship,” according to the paper from researchers at Columbia University and Boston University, and published by the International Journal of Epidemiology.
The researchers offer one particular image that shows how polarized the salt debate has become.
The blotches of red and blue here represent instances where scientists cited  like-minded research; those in green show instances where scientists referred to research that challenges their results.
In a more perfect world, where scientists sought balance in the evidence they reviewed, you would see more green - signs that scientists were considering evidence that is contrary to their beliefs.
As you can see, the image is dominated by red and blue, a sign that scientists are more likely to cite the research that conforms to their outlook. Overall the papers they reviewed were 50 percent more likely to cite reports that drew a similar conclusion than  to cite papers drawing a different conclusion.
"This shows the polarization within the scientific community," said Ludovic Trinquart, who completed the paper with colleagues David Merritt Johns and Sandro Galea.
Trinquart and his colleagues also turned up another factor that might pose even more profound problems in the salt research. It appears scientists could not even agree on what ought to be counted as evidence.
This finding arose from their review of ten "systematic reviews" of the evidence that have been conducted. In systematic reviews, scientists collect all of the primary research on a topic and, in effect, weight it on the whole. But there appears to have been widespread disagreement about what research papers ought to be included in a systematic review. If a research paper was selected for one systematic review, it was more than likely not selection for another, the researchers found.
"There is no agreement or very poor agreement on what should be counted as evidence," Trinquart said.
Exactly what governments and other public health organizations ought to tell people about salt has been the focus of fierce debate in recent years. The U.S. government, through the Dietary Guidelines for Americans, as well as the American Heart Association, have long warned that most Americans are consuming far too much salt, and that excess consumption raises risks for high blood pressure, strokes and heart disease. However, research in recent years by some prominent scientists have raised doubts about those warnings.
While advocates of salt restrictions often disparage their opponents by saying the food industry has funded their efforts, in truth, some milestones in the research were not funded by corporate interests. The new research did not assess which research efforts had industry funding.
But the researchers said their review found evidence of bias arising from scientists reluctant to change their view in light of new facts.
"Our findings support a strong bias towards the status quo and the absence of a genuine scientific conversation where each side engages the other."

Junk Plant River Bend’s Crazy February 2016 Power History So Far...

So they normally installed the butterfly valves backwards. Screwed up in the piping diagram and procedure not saying the normal position of the valve is backwards. Put the valve back in the original orientation …then it failed on high torque. Upped the setpoint. Then found problems with Part 21

Basically the valve has now abnormally high torque, it been qualified for a limited number of operations.

Why didn't they see the increasing torque in mov testing and ask questions.

It is massive "Normalization Of Deviance". 

It is a clusterpuck all around.

Part 21

Based on the PSEG unit in service valve, Weir determined that the friction was
increasing with age. The degradation of performance will be based on several factors
including;

1. Water quality
2. Materials
3. Applied load.
Based on the complexity of this issue, Weir will add a safety factor on the friction factor
for both of the calculations, The PSEG testing revealed that after 9 years of service in
aggressive water conditions, friction had increased to 150% of the calculated friction.
When maintenance was performed on only the seal stack and seat, the unit was
returned to the calculated values of torque.


http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1532/ML15329A157.pdf



Description. 1EAHV-2198C is the ‘C’ SW pump discharge isolation valve. The valve is a 28-inch Weir Tricentric butterfly valve with a SMB-1/HBC-4 (60-1) Limitorque motor operator. The valve has an active safety function in the open position to provide normal SW flow to the safety-related safety auxiliaries cooling system (SACS) heat exchangers (HXs) and non-1E reactor auxiliaries cooling system (RACS) HXs, and emergency SW flow to other systems. PSEG had originally intentionally installed all four 1EAHV-2198 valves in the reverse flow direction to permit the downstream header pressure to seat the valve tighter to minimize seat leakage during SW pump and strainer on-line maintenance. During refueling outage 18 (RF18) in October 2013, PSEG performed a planned refurbishment of the 2198C valve and SMB-1 actuator under work order 60112463-410, Step 1.D. On October 22, 2013, maintenance technicians initiated NOTF 20626219 to document that while installing the 1EAHV-2198C adapter plate, they noticed that the valve was installed 180 degrees different from where it was removed and requested support. The NOTF also documented that the MOV engineer agreed that reconfiguring the valve operator would be the easiest way to correct the issue. In an October 23, 2013, update to the NOTF, maintenance stated that they had applied match marks to ensure that the valve would be installed in the same orientation, but during the course of the work the match marks were erased. Maintenance also updated the NOTF to reflect that they had identified that the 2198 valve installation orientation design specification was not documented in valve drawing M-10-1 or the vendor manual (VTD 323981) as expected. The team also noted that several diagrams within the work order depicted the wrong valve orientation and may have contributed to the configuration control error. Finally, the team noted that there was no documented evaluation of the impact of this misalignment and configuration error prior to operations declaring the ‘C’ SW pump operable following the 2198C maintenance on October 23. PSEG initiated NOTF 20705874 for this operability screening performance gap.


update 2/18/2016
(1pm)I just talked to the River Bend acting NRC senior resident. I asked about the stinking capacity factor since the last scram, and why the shutdown today. I got out of her vague equipment troubles. Basically because of propriety/market issues and NRC rules, she couldn’t give me any information. You know when a NRC inspector is trying to dump you, is when she tries to give you the licensee number. I wished the normal senior resident was at the plant. I pressured her a little gentlemanly. She don’t realized what a difficult job she has. She is going to always be my hero. She is going to get back to me. I think I got her to read my blog.    
River Bend is secretly shutdown and at 0% today. Does anyone know why they shutdown?

reposed from 2/17/16

You are suppose to be seeing for as far as the eyes can see at 100% power.
(Jan 2015) River Bend Start-Up Power History
(June 2015) River Bend: What A Junk Plant’s Power History Looks Like
By regulatory good will:
U.S. nuclear energy facilities generated electricity at a record high level of reliability in 2015, according to preliminary estimates. 
Ninety-nine nuclear power plants operating in 30 states posted an estimated average capacity factor of 91.9 percent, based on preliminary 2015 data compiled by the Nuclear Energy Institute. That surpasses the industry’s prior record set in 2007 by one-tenth of a percentage point. Capacity factor measures the total electricity generated as a percentage of potential generation for the entire year. 
Actual electricity production from nuclear energy facilities last year was the fifth-highest ever, at an estimated 797.9 billion kilowatt-hours (kwh). The industry’s record high electricity generation came in 2010, when the 104 reactors then operating produced 806.9 billion kwh of electricity while posting an industry average capacity factor of 90.9 percent. 
The amount of electricity generated in 2015 exceeded the amount produced in 2014, even though one less plant operated due to the 2014 closing of Vermont Yankee. This record efficiency is even more important as states strive to meet new carbon-reduction targets for the electric sector. 
Louisiana has nothing but kooks in it?  

Feb 17 30%

Feb 16 90%

Feb 15 95%

Feb 14 79%

Feb 13 71%

Feb 12 27%

Feb 11 100%

Feb 10 100%

Feb 9 100%

Feb 8 100% Special inspection announced over cooling the core problems.

Feb 7 100%

Feb 6 86%

Feb 5 90%

Feb 4 78%

Feb 3 57%

Feb 2 58%

Feb 1 18%

Jan 31 001%

Jan 30 0%


Jan 9 Shutdown over a lightning strike to plant. Can you imagine the amount of plant shutdowns if no plants have lightening surge protection? Lightening plant trips are very rare in the USA. They are all protected against it. So a switch was out of place or a safety component was broken to cause the trip.
NRC Begins Special Inspection at River Bend Station
(Feb 8) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has begun a special inspection at the River Bend Station nuclear power plant to review circumstances surrounding events that occurred following an unplanned reactor shutdown on Jan. 9. The plant, operated by Entergy Operations, Inc., is located in St. Francisville, La.
The plant was operating at full power when a lightning strike caused a momentary surge in the plant’s offsite power supply, triggering an unplanned shutdown. Operators subsequently took appropriate actions to place the plant in a safe shutdown condition. The following day, operational errors led to a one hour loss of shutdown cooling.
“The purpose of this special inspection is to better understand the circumstances surrounding the loss of shutdown cooling, determine if operator response was appropriate, and review the licensee’s corrective actions to ensure that the cause of the event, including associated equipment problems and any contributing operator actions have been effectively addressed,” NRC Region IV Administrator Marc Dapas said.
Several NRC inspectors will spend about a week on site evaluating the licensee’s root cause analysis, maintenance of some plant systems and adequacy of corrective actions. An inspection report documenting the team’s findings will be publicly available within 45 days of the end of the inspection
The Lightning strike caused about a 21 day outage. You get it, the NRC gave them a week’s at power grace period and a 21 day outage grace period before they called the special inspection. They waited to the plant was up and running, though crappy capacity factor.
Just look at this horrendous month of capacity factor…they ain’t making money with is.
Right, I have been documenting for about the past year the horrendous capacity at River Bend.  

Wednesday, February 17, 2016

Commissioner Ostendorff A Goner

Go USA: NRC Commissioner Ostendorff is Going to Answer My Email


Commissioner Ostendorff a goner. We are already down one commissioner.
William Ostendorff will not seek another term in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) after his term ends June 30, he announced Wednesday.
After six years in the five-member body that oversees the safety of the country’s nuclear power plants, Ostendorff has elected to return to the United States Naval Academy to teach, said Eliot Brenner, a spokesman for the agency.

Ostendorff, a Republican, has served at the NRC through numerous challenges to the agency, including its response to 2011’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in Japan and a very public leadership scuffle at the agency later that year. 

Phase II On The Mike Mulligan NRC Special Inspection Report at River Bend

works in progress. 
My first special inspection got four green findings and a white finding…

My second got three green findings plus another white findings.
Why do I feel like these findings were selectively chosen.
February 16, 2016

EA-15-140


Dear Mr. Olson:
On March 24, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed its initial assessment of the circumstances surrounding a loss of control building ventilation, which occurred on March 9, 2015, at the River Bend Station. Based upon the risk and deterministic criteria specified in NRC Management Directive 8.3, “NRC Incident Investigation Program,” the NRC initiated a special inspection in accordance with Inspection Procedure 93812, “Special

Inspection.” The basis for initiating the special inspection and the focus areas for review are detailed in the Special Inspection Charter (Attachment 2 of the enclosed inspection report). Based on this initial assessment, the NRC sent an inspection team to your site on March 30, 2015.

On January 20, 2016, the NRC completed its special inspection. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings that were discussed on January 20, 2016, with Mr. Dean Burnett, Acting Director, Regulatory and Performance Improvement, and other members of your staff. The team documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report. The enclosed inspection report documents a finding that has preliminarily been determined to be White, a finding with low to moderate safety significance that may require additional NRC inspections, regulatory actions, and oversight. As described in Section 2.6.a of the enclosed report, the team identified an apparent violation for a failure to adequately assess the increase in risk of operating the control building chilled water system chillers in various single-failure vulnerable configurations. As a result of this deficiency, the station reduced the reliability and availability of systems contained in the main control room and failed to account for the significant, uncompensated impairment of the safety functions of the associated systems.

***TBD. The NRC identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.65, “Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,” paragraph (a)(4) with preliminary white significance.

Prior to March 30, 2015, before performing maintenance activities, the licensee failed to adequately assess the increase in risk that may result from proposed maintenance activities. Specifically, the risk assessment performed by the licensee for plant maintenance failed to account for certain safety significant structures, systems, and components that were concurrently out of service. On multiple occasions, the licensee failed to adequately assess the risk of operating the control building chilled water system (HVK) chillers in various single failure vulnerable configurations. As a result of this deficiency, the station reduced the reliability and availability of systems contained in the main control room and failed to account for the significant, uncompensated impairment of the safety functions of the associated systems. In response to the NRC’s conclusions, the licensee initiated Condition Report CR-RBS-2016-00095. The licensee also completed engineering analyses to evaluate alternate cooling methods, including cross-connecting service water and the HVK chiller systems, in order to provide cooling to spaces housing electrical components.

***Green. The team reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” for the licensee’s failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality related to Masterpact circuit breakers. Specifically, the licensee did not promptly identify and correct a Masterpact breaker failure mechanism, even though related industry operating experience was available. The licensee determined the failure mechanism caused nine breaker failures since 2007, and may have contributed to an additional six failures where the cause was not conclusively determined. In response to the NRC’s conclusions, the licensee initiated Condition Report CR-RBS- 2015-03951. Further, the licensee modified all vulnerable Masterpact circuit breakers to remove this failure mechanism.

***Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” for the licensee’s failure to accomplish an operability determination in accordance with procedure EN-OP-104, “Operability Determination Process,” Revision 8. Specifically, the licensee referenced non-conservative data, contrary to steps 5.5 and 5.11 of procedure EN-OP-104, when assessing the reduced reliability of Masterpact circuit breakers as a degraded or nonconforming condition. The licensee restored compliance by completing a design modification to eliminate the failure mode and initiated Condition Report CR-RBS-2015-03952.

Notes on 2015 River Bend

Remember Entergy's Arkansas One and Pilgrim are the worst operating plants in the USA according to the NRC.

When does Entergy and the NRC become overwhelmed by Entergy's fleet of power plants. When does the declining financial conditions in the nuclear industry start to overwhelm and numb the NRC?

River Bend: Unprecedented Four Special Inspections Ongoing at Entergy Plants

The Mike Mulligan's Special Inspection At River Bend?

NRC: Proof I Instigated The 2014 Christmas River Bend plant Scram Special Inspection


***Like who ever in the industry ever got two special inspection at one plant every in a year...


Reposted from 7/23/15

Update Sept 11

They are going to say they are trying to protect my confidentiality...they know what is best for me.

Generally the NRC gets very few, if any, request like this.

I bet you very few outsider ever gets a double header special inspection to a trouble plant. 

I think the agency and industry fears openly disclosing the "allegation letter" will raise my stature. 

note: It is a poor choice of mine making this letter on 9/11...anything 9/11 has nothing to do with this.  
Michael Mulligan   
RIVER BEND STATION – NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2015009; PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING

I wanted to get the message out (holy crap) that I was really impressed with the agency's response to my complaint. How many outsiders ever initiated two special inspection at a US nuclear plant ever?  
Mrs. Weaver,  
 
I want the agency to put this response on the River Bend docket. So far this is just between me and the NRC. They have had issues with that in the past. Their wording is; as to not inhibit the NRC's allegation process and to protect your confidentiality/ anonymity...we are going to override your request to add secret allegation material onto Adams documents in the nation's and your best interest.     
Mike Mulligan
PO Box 161
Hinsdale, NH 03451
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV
1600 E. LAMAR BLVD
ARLINGTON, TX 76011-4511

June 2, 2015

SUBJECT: CONCERN YOU RAISED TO THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC) REGARDING THE RIVER BEND STATION
RE: RIV-2015-A-0004

Dear Mr. Mulligan:

The NRC has completed its follow up in response to the concern you brought to our attention on January 5, 2015, regarding the River Bend Station. Your concern was related to equipment issues leading to scrams and operator performance following scrams. The enclosure to this letter restates your concern and describes the NRC's review and conclusions with regard to the concern.

Thank you for informing us of your concern. Allegations are an important source of information in support of the NRC's safety mission. We take our safety responsibility to the public seriously and will continue to do so within the bounds of our lawful authority. We believe that our actions have been responsive to your concerns.

You should note that final NRC documents may be made available to the public under the Freedom of Information Act subject to redaction of information pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. Requests under the Freedom of Information Act should be made in accordance with 10 CFR 9.23, Requests for Records. Information is accessible from the NRC's website at http://www. nrc. gov/reading-rm/foia/foia-reouest. html#how.

Should you have any additional questions, or if the NRC can be of further assistance, please contact Mr. Jesse M. Rollins, Senior Allegations Coordinator, at the Region IV toll-free number 1-800-952-9677, extension 1245, Monday - Friday between 8 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. Central time. Information in writing may be provided to the address listed in the letterhead.

Greg Warnick, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch C
Division of Reactor Projects
RESPONSE TO CONCERN

ALLEGATION RIV-2015-A-0004

Concern

Equipment issues leading to scrams and operator performance problems following scrams continue at the River Bend Station and are not being addressed and resolved.

Response to Concern

You made a valid observation with regard to a number of contributing factors involved in the most recent events at the River Bend Station. These factors are currently being reviewed by the NRC staff. For instance, the NRC's most recent End-of-Cycle assessment of the River Bend Station identified that the River Bend Station's safety-significant performance indicator for Unplanned Scrams with Complications, crossed the White threshold during the 4th Quarter 2014. This was due to two unplanned scrams that the River Bend Station experienced in the 4th Quarter of 2014. As a result, the NRC plans to conduct Inspection Procedure 95001, "Supplemental Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area." The main focus of this inspection will be to review the contributing factors that led to the scrams, and the conditions that gave rise to the complications encountered.

In looking at your concern, the NRC found that the specifics of the following event, and the NRC's response, to be relevant:
On December 25, 2014, at 8:37 a.m., the River Bend Station scrammed from 85 percent power following a trip of the B reactor protection system motor generator set. At the time of the motor generator set trip, a Division 1 half scram existed due to an unrelated equipment issue with a relay for the No. 2 turbine control valve fast closure reactor protection system function. The combination of the B reactor protection system motor generator set trip and the Division 1 half scram, resulted in a scram of the reactor.

The following equipment issues occurred during the initial scram response:
  • An unexpected Level 8 (high) reactor water level signal was received which resulted in tripping all reactor feedwater pumps.
  • Following reset of the Level 8 (high) reactor water level signal, operations personnel were unable to start RFP C. They responded by starting reactor feedwater pump A at a vessel level of 25". The licensee subsequently determined that the circuit breaker (Magne Blast type) for reactor feedwater pump C did not close because an interlock lever for a microswitch that controls the breaker close permissive was not fully engaged in the cubicle.
  • Following the start of reactor feedwater pump A, the licensee attempted to open the startup feedwater regulating valve but was unsuccessful prior to the Level 3 (low) reactor water RIV-2015-A-0004 level trip setpoint at +9.7". The licensee then opened main feedwater regulating valve C to restore reactor vessel water level. The lowest level reached was +7.5". Subsequent troubleshooting revealed a faulty manual function control card. The card was replaced by the licensee and the feedwater regulating valve was used on the subsequent plant startup.

Following restoration of reactor vessel water level, the plant was stabilized in Mode 3. A plant startup was conducted on December 27, 2014, with reactor protection system bus B being supplied by its alternate power source. During power ascension following startup, reactor feedwater pump B did not start. The licensee re-racked its associated circuit breaker and successfully started reactor feedwater pump B.

The NRC evaluated this event through its Management Directive 8.3, "NRC Incident Investigation Program," to determine the level of NRC response appropriate for this event. Based on the multiple failures of the feedwater system, the potential generic concern with the Magne Blast circuit breakers, and the issues related to reactor vessel level between the Level 3 (low) and Level 8 (high) setpoints following a reactor scram, the NRC determined that the appropriate level of NRC response was to conduct a special inspection. 
On January 26, 2015, the NRC began the special inspection. This inspection was concluded on May 21. Similar issues to those listed by you were identified during this inspection. The results of this inspection will be documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000458/2015009. This inspection identified a number of observations, issues, and findings-with regard to the licensee's equipment, maintenance, and operations personnel performance. 
In addition to the above event, on March 9, 2015, the River Bend Station experienced another event, whereby the HVK chiller 1 C failed to start, followed by the subsequent loss of the control building ventilation system. This event and associated equipment failures revealed a much broader concern that has been ongoing with an identified master pact breaker deficiency related to the breaker's ability to open and close. This, along with the issues associated with the GE Magne Blast circuit breakers described above, calls into question the overall adequacy of the licensee's breaker maintenance program. These concerns resulted in a second special inspection, which began on March 30, 2015 and was completed on May 28. Again, similar concerns to those listed by you were identified during this inspection.

These reports will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC's Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agency wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). If you are unable to retrieve these documents from ADAMS, you can request a copy from the NRC resident staff at the River Bend Station. 
Therefore, your concern that equipment issues leading to scrams and operator performance problems following scrams continue at the River Bend Station is valid. As previously stated, the NRC is currently monitoring the licensee's actions to resolve these issues, and the results of our inspections will be made available to the public upon issuance of our inspection reports.
RIV-2015-A-0004 2







River Bend: NRC's Allegation Employee Mrs. Weaver Intentionally Blew Me Off



Reposted from 9/14/2015
I asked this senior Allegations employee...How old is the River Bend simulator. He told that information is protected, I can't tell you it. 
It's so silly... 
I hate the NRC Allegation department. They are too secrecy oriented and this effectively makes them gods unto themselves. They get to interpret the outsider allegations and the rules and regulations without adequate public oversight. I don't think they are properly overseen by senior management ever. Does the Allegation department meet the greater needs of the people who have unaddressed concerns and allegations or do they protect the NRC and licensees?
 
My choices with River Bend were to make a NRC allegation or directly talking to the residents. Outsiders have little influence with either these guys. I hate the arrogant Allegation department, with that in mind, I called the NRC River Bend resident. I hoped I could get the residents nervous with insider information, the inspectors would have a lot more credibility with Allegations. I was hoping from before the telephone call I could flip this into a special inspection. I had no chance talking to the allegation department flipped my concerns into a special inspection. 
 
I would consider the allegation department as having a infinite set of rules and regulation. All these rules and regulations get to be interpreted in a secretive agency process...effectively they get to deposition a allegation on a group and individual whim. Most allegations are flushed down the toilet by NRC design.  
 
So I am trying to get a little street cred over this and notify the industry that outsiders are watching.
 
1) From: Mike Mulligan
To R4ALLEGATION Resource
Sep 11 at 1:08 PM
Mrs. Weaver,
 
“NRC: Proof I Instigated The 2014 Christmas River Bend plant Scram Special Inspection”
 
I thought I made a request to the NRC to place my River Bend allegation closeout letter on the River Bend docket. I recently searched for it and couldn’t find it. Why do I feel the NRC understood my request, but decided to silently blow me off without an explanation? I thought the NRC would be fair and decent enough to at least give me an  written explanation why you won’t put my NRC allegation closeout letter on the docket. I just think there is an unseen agenda with the NRC, why this is not on Adams. It could also be a harmless oversight and I am paranoid?
What is the harm, it is already on the internet? I am a transparency freak and I think the world runs better with everything placed on the table where everyone can see it.  

Sincerely,
Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH
1-603-336-8320 

2) From: Mike Mulligan
To  R4ALLEGATION Resource
Sep 11 at 2:28 PM
Mrs. Weaver,

Here is my request sent to R4ALLEGATION REOURCE.

Mike
 
From: Mike Mulligan 
To R4ALLEGATION Resource
Jul 23
Mrs. Weaver,

Holy Crap. I am so surprised with this letter.

I request the NRC closure letter be placed on the River Bend Docket.

Could I discuss this with you say sometime next week or at your convenience?    
 
Thank You,

Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH

These is no doubt Mrs. Weaver read and understood my request to put the NRC closeout letter on the docket. She chose to not answer this and make believe she didn't see it. I am in a special category ... the special inspection was initiated on my request. She could have respected me, answered my question, she could have explained why it is not possible. She knew this would be controversial...so she just buried it. 
My problem now, is worrying this is what the allegation department does across the board. The Allegation departmental gets into a controversial problem...the agency finds a way to bury it or make believe they didn't even see the concern.  

The senior allegation inspector gave me a call today telling me putting my closeout letter on the docket was against NRC policy. They should have done that on my first request..


This wasn't a open discussion hashing out the problem, it was god has spoken and there is no way to contest it. I am the god, just accept it. 

He said the the agency feels placing it on the docket would chill other employees from reporting problems to the NRC. Does the agency have any open analysis how this might occur or evidence it is a threat? Why didn't the agency withhold the result of my allegation as this might chill all the rest of the nuclear employees. 

This is what I mean by they are the gods. You can't create a open discussion if the chilling was valid. The NRC is great with mitigation...could they do something to mitigate the possible chilling effect? They could put a notification on top of close out letter...we put closeout letters on the docket strictly on the choice of the confidential concern maker. We would never release anything about alleger unless he positively requested it. I might make the case in a recent Millstone OI investigation and violation on 10 CFR 50.59 issues, a senior NRC official disclose to me it came from a Millstone alleger...came from the allegation program.
I asked the senior allegation department employee if he could memorize this conversation and put it on the docket. Could you give me a response to my request in writing? They ARE worried about seeing their written response on my blog. This guy knows their River Bend written closeout is up on my blog.  
I asked him could I talk to your boss about this problem. Could he call me...he said that won't be possible.
 
He reminded me there is the OIG. I consider the OIG as corrupt and most allegations vanishes in their black hole never to be seen again. So does the main line NRC troops tell the public you can make a complaint to the OIG knowing the complaint will vanish in the OIG cesspool. That is the little trick of the NRC, public concerns about the agency never goes up the management line for disposition and deeper discussions. They use the OIG to just disappear concerns about the agency. Certainly the licensees don't have this problem. 

Requesting Another 'Mike Mulligan Special At River Bend", and then one on the ineffective NRC