NRC Blog: Current Pilgrim's 2 Stage SRVs Are Not Safe And A Continuing Cover-Up

Oct 16 update

Would it make a difference?

The rumor going on has it Pilgrim’s 2 stage SRVs have been borrowed from this Hope Creek’s SRV disaster?  All three of the test 3 stage SRVs failed lift testing and 71% of their 2 stage failed also. Check out the date I wrote my blog entry. Would it make a difference to Pilgrim's continued operation if they had Hope Creek 2 stage SRV in the plant? 

Nearly Identical To Pilgrim’s SRVs: 71% Target Rock Two Stage SRV Tech Spec Failure Rate

I like the concept of DG load testing. They test these guys monthly or so at full design load. They don’t test these guys at say 5% full plant design load. We got big quality troubles with both the 2 stage and 3 stage Target Rock safety relief salves. These failures are sending us a big signal something has to done about these problem. 

As most BWR plants during the worst case design accident…very infrequent…these Safety Relief Valves could/will have to be cycled up to 400 times. I don’t think the current testing regime covers this worst duty at all. How do we know how these delicate valves will behave after 100 cycle in a short period time and environment? We are talking science and engineering here? 

I’d be test cycling a hunk of these valves some 400 times...one valve 400 times per outage.  This is how the engineers screw the operations people when the plant is in the clutches of a terrible designed accident…they don’t have our backs. Nope, seeing how important these guys are when 99% of the safety systems have been wiped off the table and unavailable, I be regularly test cycling these guys 800 times just to make sure something is working when everything else is gone.  

By the way, I got a great question for everyone. They say test stand lift or pressure testing damaged the internal just before going into the Pilgrim plant. Why hasn’t the damaged proliferated to the other BWR plants who also used this test stand or similar? Why haven’t I seen problems similar to Pilgrim’s throughout the industry whose use similar test stand set-ups, testing regimes or procedures? 

Sincerely, 

Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH 

http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/

This is the NRC response to me. Mr Sheenan is a public relation NRC official. He has little contact with technical information and the plant itself...especially hands on experience with things going on in the plant.      

The NRC conducted an annual Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection sample at Pilgrim related to installation of these 2-stage safety relief valves (SRVs). As documented in the inspection report: 

• Entergy removed all four 3-stage SRVs and replaced them with refurbished 2-stage SRVs. 

• The 2-stage SRVs are of a design that is in use at other industry boiling water reactors. 

• The inspectors reviewed design documentation associated with this change. The inspectors determined that the modification and design of these 2-stage SRVs are consistent with Pilgrim’s design and licensing bases. 

• The inspectors observed surveillance testing of the 2-stage SRVs during startup from the last refueling outage, and observed proper operation when actuated manually from the main control room. 

• The inspectors concluded that the 2-stage SRV design did not invalidate any existing commitments or requirements.
Based on our inspection, we determined that use of the 2-stage SRVs was acceptable.
Neil Sheehan

My response?  

If I knew what plant those SRVs came from, then I could do an Adams look-up on the operational history of that model and the particular valves to see how safe they are? This unnecessary secrecy implies a cover-up in itself.  

Did they come from Vermont Yankee?

Why didn’t Energy just refurbish their old two stage 2010 valves to save money?

Are the SRVs in the plant now identical to the pre 2010 ones? Cause if not, they needed a 10 CFR 50:59 and LAR. As you know, these valves could operate perfectly in another plant, but be inappropriate in Pilgrim. Our domestic fleet of nuclear plants are basically a design one off...each are mostly a unique design?  

Blog: The inspectors observed surveillance testing of the 2-stage SRVs during startup from the last refueling outage, and observed proper operation when actuated manually from the main control room. Basically the 3 stage SRVs were unfit to be in an operating reactor plant.

They did exactly the same test at the beginning of the last operating period with the 3 stage SRVs and nobody ever discovered that the three SRVs were nonfunctional and required an immediate emergency shutdown. Was there NRC observers there on that test? 

There is increasingly widening gulf between what is documented in an “inspection report” and what really is going on in the plant. This is the story of the SRVs, Pilgrim and the NRC since 2010.

So we are going to make believe Entergy never wrote this 2010 evaluation and the document isn’t in the docket?

• “The SRVs require replacement because the current two-stage Target Rock SRVs have been unreliable performers with respect to leaking while in-service and the subject of setpoint drift. SRV pilot valve leakage has led to multiple plant shutdowns and the setpoint drift problem resulted in exceeding current TS limits and numerous Licensee Event Reports (LERs). It has been determined that pilot valve leakage is due to low simmer margin and high as-found lift setpoints are due to corrosion bonding at the pilot valve disc/seat. To address current SRV performance problems, Entergy has performed extensive investigations and feasibility studies. The preferred option for correcting these problems is to replace all SRVs and SSVs during the next refueling outage. RFO-1 8 is currently planned to start on or about April 17, 2011.”  

The NRC put it up on the blog...I am actually impressed with their transparency.

Entergy to NRC: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant To Cease Operations

Part 1 continuing 

By the way, I am impressed with the NRC for allowing me to discuss problems like this on your blog. 

Am I the only one reading documents submitted by Entergy to the NRC anymore? Does the NRC keep up with reading pertinent documents like Pilgrims 2010 SRV License Amendment Request? They are shifting from the 2 stage to the defective and dangerous 3 stage SRV. We now have these 2 stage reliefs back in Pilgrim?? 

Basically Entergy says the valves currently in the plant are dangerous, leak and unsafe in the below 2010 LAR document. These valves drift outside the tech spec set point often requiring a immediate shutdown wink, wink. But these dangerous degradations are undetectable at power. This is why we went to the 3 stage SRV. You might have inop two or more valves each requiring a immediate safety shutdowns, but the plant can’t detect the dangerous deterioration. Don’t be confused, I am not talking about the 3 stage SRV removed from the plant last spring…these are the guys in the plant right now.

“Proposed License Amendment to Technical Specifications: Revised Technical Specification for Setpoint and Setpoint Tolerance Increases for Safety Relief Valves (SRV) and Spring Safety Valves (SSV), and Related Changes”March 15, 2010 

The SRVs require replacement because the current two-stage Target Rock SRVs have been unreliable performers with respect to leaking while in-service and the subject of setpoint drift. SRV pilot valve leakage has led to multiple plant shutdowns and the setpoint drift problem resulted in exceeding current TS limits and numerous Licensee Event Reports (LERs). It has been determined that pilot valve leakage is due to low simmer margin and high as-found lift setpoints are due to corrosion bonding at the pilot valve disc/seat. To address current SRV performance problems, Entergy has performed extensive investigations and feasibility studies. The preferred option for correcting these problems is to replace all SRVs and SSVs during the next refueling outage. RFO-1 8 is currently planned to start on or about April 17, 2011. 

Mike MulliganHinsdale, NH

http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/

Part 2 

Entergy's LER: Notice how Entegy is allow to pick and choose what information they release to the public? They aren’t required to explain the vulnerabilities and defective 2 stage design outlined in their 2010 LAR going into the plant after the 2015 spring outage. 

“All SRV body/bases were removed from the system during the current refueling outage. In place of the four SRV's removed from the plant during the current refueling outage, PNPS has installed 2-stage SRV's” 

This is a brazen cover-up on top of the first cover-up. It is mind boggling.

Inspection Report 2015-002, is this a full and accurate statement considering how defective and unsafe Entergy identified the 2 stage in the 2010 LAR? Should the residents discussed the limitation of the 2 stage in 2015-002-02?

“The inspectors concluded that the 2-stage SRV design did not invalidate any existing commitments or requirements.”

They are used valves from another plant and Entergy has indication this model valve is defective and dangerous in their 201O LAR. They certainly aren’t new. They basically grab them from a nuclear plant junk yard. They aren't being manufactured today.

Entergy Senior Communication Specialist Lauren Burm: “Burm said four new safety relief valves were installed during a recent refueling and refitting of the reactor.”

Seriously Bill, is this statement true? 

Bill Mohl, president of Entergy Wholesale Commodities: “Mohl said that the plant has previously addressed the safety relief valve issue and the plant is operating safely”. 

Again the skimpy information gives Entergy the advantage to keep operating with a poorly designed component and dangerous. You notice both sides of the story; this is why Pilgrim needs the valve and this is the vulnerabilities of the design of the valve? You decide if it is safe or not. The NRC never treats us as adults. 

NRC Public Affairs specialist: “The plant has since replaced all four valves...” 

Part 3 

As a compensatory action for the defective and dangerous SRV 2 stage SRVs outlined in the 2010 LAR: 

I request Pilgrim to shutdown for any indication of a leaking SRVs or any out of normal temperature reading of a tailpiece. I request Pilgrim to shutdown quarterly in order to detect the outside setpoint 3% plus or minus required tech spec vulnerabilities and unreliabilities. 

The OIG was really was involved with this…I request a outside the OIG and NRC investigation of this whole mess. 

It all leads to this…I am asking the NRC now. Is the 2 stage SRVs now installed in Pilgrim safe? Does these valves meet all codes and rules…do they meet the highest ethical and nuclear professional obligations. Could you direct me to a current comprehensive engineering document discussing all the historic safety limitation of the currently installed 2 stage SRV valves and the compensatory action? 

Sincerely, 

Mike Mulligan  

Hinsdale, NH

http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/

Dresden's Broken Electromatic Relief Valves?

You get it, two different component manufacturers for parts in the same model valve: GE Hitachi and Dresser Industries. Two different components on the same model valve being defective and cause the safety valve not to work. One is on a actuator and the other is on the cutoff switch.

Seem like very similar problems...the component parts are defective or improper maintenance. Got tiny parts dimensional problems, alignment, spring force problems, vibration, bushing issues and guild post misalignment. It's is basically defective internal component problem.

Kinda sounds like Pilgrim SRVs and Oyster Creek electromatic relief valves small internal component or parts problems too? 

PART 21 REPORT - ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE (EMRV) CUTOUT SWITCH

GENERAL ELECTRIC HITACHI

"Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 1804 [CDT], General Electric Hitachi (GEH) notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS [Dresden Nuclear Power Station], Units 2 and 3. "The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the

failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent roper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring.

"Identification of Facility and Component: DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001 "Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created): Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function. Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function "Plants with similar GEH cutout switches: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station."

LER 2015-002-02: 2C ERV Failed to Actuate duringExtent of Condition Testing

Dn February 7, 2015, with the reactor in mode 4, an Electromatic Relief Valve (ERV) actuator failed to open during the prerformance of an extent of condition test. The testing involved an operator manually actuating the ERV from the main control room with operators and engineers staged in the field. However, when the demand signal was given, the 20 actuator plunger did not move and the valve did not open. Th

The failed ERV actuator sub-components were inspected in the field and immediately following removal. Based upon the in-field inspection, the 2C ERV actuator's binding point was identified to be at the top of the guide post below the top of the top guide post bushing. PowerLabs performed a failure field inspection, the 2C ERV actuator's binding point was identified to be at the top of the guide post below the top of the top guide post bushing. PowerLabs performed a failure

NRC mechanical binding was determined to have been caused by preferential wear between the guide post and bushing due to an alignment issue. The 20 ERV actuator had measurable material loss on the bushing. The ERV actuator is normally open and de-energized. The bushings on the 20 were last replaced in 2005 per WO 636642. The wear due to actuation has been determined to be insignificant and is not related to the wear mechanism. The basis for the failure mechanism was determined by engineering inspection and a Powerlabs autopsy.

The preferential mechanical wear between ERV actuator sub components was determined to have been caused by the guide posts being in constant contact with the bushings during operation. The rigid guide post was noted to have been slightly angled away from the solenoid centerline, from the base of the post, with all base bolting completely intact and torqued, and interfering with the inside diameter of the bushing. These guide posts have sometimes been found slightly angled in previous WOs, requiring additional maintenance effort to bend the post into straight, concentric alignment with the bushing. Without this additional maintenance attention, the guide post and bushing would have had constant contact for the duration of cycle operation. The valve would have passed all as-left testing because the wear mechanism had not yet occurred.

Commonality of Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee's Shutdown Pressures

There was hanky-panky going on in Vermont with the politicians over Hydro Quebec and Gas Metro with the Vermont Yankee shutdown. Basically CVPS was bought out Gas Metro. CVPS was the largest electric utility in Vermont. Then Hydro Quebec came in and replaced VY’s electric load for the state Of Vermont. Trans Canada is big in our area. The Hydro Quebec power agreement over decades was notoriously loaded with Vermont political corruption and money. Hydro Quebec in New York and all though NE has for decades been trying to push out American electricity onto the border states. The Canadian energy electric power cabal has been trying desperately to push their electricity into our metropolitan high population areas such as NYC and Boston. 

I mean, because Entergy is so dependent on cheap natural gas fracking in Louisiana...could they really say anything negative about it. Who is the real foreigner in NE: Entergy or Canada. I know Canada in a lot closer?

Gaz Metro is a large energy corporation and Hydro Quebec is really an arm of the Canadian Government. What a powerhouse of influence.  Then Vermont has the Hydro Quebec line? Check out that new switchyard in Vernon VT?

In the early 1990s Vermont through political corruption bungled the Hydro-Quebec line power purchase agreement. The electricity was terribly overpriced and nearly led to the CVPS bankruptcy. I guess the state forced CVPS to purchase really expensive Hydro Quebec electricity. There were rumors of Vermont politicians exchanging money for Canadian electricity.  You remember the big ice storm, then Hydro Quebec electricity became unreliable because all their cheap and poorly design transmission towers. They mostly collapsed in the ice storm.

We had that big monster deregulation approaching in the late 1980s and early 1990s…we had a near political Vermont rebellion over the high priced electricity charged to the rate payers and especially for the republican Vermont businesses and ski areas. Basically eventually Maine Yankee failed and Millstone collapsed over the withdrawal of plant funding and maintenance. Massive regional nuclear power plant budget cutbacks, a weak NRC…gigantic nuclear employee intimidation. So CVPS came under intense pressure to reduce their electricity prices mostly by the businesses (IBM plant). They came up with the bright idea to cutback budgets to Vermont Yankee…easier than the politically protected really expensive green electricity and the smaller power plants. This is how I became a reluctant whistleblower at Vermont Yankee. Equipment started failing because of insufficient funding and maintenance, this cause the VY officials to be deceptive and out right lying to maintain capacity factor. Then off to the races when I sent a letter to the Vermont Governor complaining about it all.

The Entergy story about favored electric prices from Hydro-Quebec today…does the gigantic Canadian power house influencers such as Gaz Metro, Hydro-Quebec, the Canadian government, the Vermont Hydro Quebec line and the future NH Hydro-Quebec line…do they hold more sway over the form of our NE and NY electric grid and markets than we think.

I am just saying the extremely low worldwide petroleum prices are imploding the Canadian Tar Sands and their petroleum miracle. The Canadian stock index is in full rout.  Our natural gas fracking miracle is going to blow up the enormous Canadian electricity markets coming into NY and NE. Their Hydro-Quebec lines in Vermont and possibly in NH is junk because of the cheap and cheaper fracking nature gas. Just Look at the natural gas prices. I wouldn’t be making any expensive long term electricity contracts with anything greasy monied-hand Canadians today. Electricity prices are going to continue to decline for years especially as they build in the gas lines. Will the Canadian electricity exports to the USA go the way as their expensive petroleum exports…a collapse?  I think is going to be a historic electric USA/Canada transformation. Will we one day make big money exporting electricity to Canada?

 

Entergy: Maybe Some Level of Truth With Canadian Power House Influencors s?

Entergy: Maybe Some Level of Truth With The Canadian Power House Influencers?

Hydro-Quebec looking south to new markets

Quebec Premier Philippe Couillard and Gov. Peter Shumlin discuss the relationship between Vermont and Quebec during a dinner ceremony at a energy conference in Burlington on Monday. Photo by John Herrick/VTDigger
BURLINGTON — Hydro-Quebec and its owner, the province of Quebec, indicated Monday that they want Northeast states to build new high-voltage power lines to carry hydropower south.

The province has “vast resources” of hydroelectric power and wants to send more of it to urban markets where electricity is in high demand.
“If we want to go further and extend our trade, we need to extend our transmission capacity,” Quebec Premier Philippe Couillard said during a dinner ceremony with Vermont Gov. Peter Shumlin following an energy conference in Burlington on Monday.
Hydro-Quebec, the province’s electric utility, is building four new hydroelectric dams capable of delivering 1,550 megawatts of power — enough electricity to serve 1.5 million New England homes.

The utility exports to New England, New York, Ontario and New Brunswick. The company has 30 terawatt-hours of hydropower available for export, about half of which is contracted to supply utilities in New England. Vermont utilities contract for 1.2 terawatt-hours of electricity.
“I would like to think there is a hydro opportunity for the region,” said Stephen Molodetz, vice president of business development for Hydro Quebec U.S.

To attract investments in transmission lines, Molodetz said the region should split the costs of projects among ratepayers, change project-siting processes and offer a “fuel diversity bonus” for hydropower.

There are two interconnections with New England — an 1,800 MW transmission line to western Massachusetts and a 225 MW line in Vermont. The company is partnering on another transmission line that would carry hydropower from Quebec into New Hampshire. The Northern Pass project has run into stiff public opposition from residents who fear it will scar the White Mountain National Forest.
At least two similar projects are proposed in Vermont by New York-based TDI New England and Massachusetts-based Anbaric. The projects both would pass beneath Lake Champlain and cross underground through southern Vermont. HQ has not publicly announced support for either project.
Environmentalists warn the projects could harm Vermont’s landscape. And other alternatives, such as upgrades to existing interconnections, have not been considered, according to Sandra Levine, a senior attorney at the Conservation Law Foundation.

CLF is a party in a regulatory case involving TDI New England’s application for a state permit to build a 1,000 megawatt, $1.2 billion transmission line under Lake Champlain. She said the project has environmental impacts yet to be fully studied.

“For the most part, they are digging up a big trench and placing down a transmission line and waiting for the sediment to settle. It releases sediment into the lake. And releases phosphorous. There is also heat associated with the transmission line during its operation that has an impact on the critters and plants that live in the water and that live at the bottom of the lake,” she said.

Vermont’s energy history with Quebec

The University of Vermont hosted the two-day conference this week to discuss the region’s energy relationship as well the social and economic impact of hydropower. The conference opened by focusing on Vermont’s history with Quebec. Shumlin said the relationship to Quebec is “absolutely critical” to Vermont’s energy future.

He said hydropower has helped the state’s economy and provided baseload generation to help build out other renewables such as wind and solar. Vermont was the first to consider large-scale hydropower as renewable energy.

“We were the first state to call hydropower green power regardless of size,” Shumlin said Monday night.

Vermont utilities first contracted for power from Hydro-Quebec in 1987. The state then replaced the contract that began in 2012 to supply 225 megawatts of power for 26 years, which is about a quarter of Vermont’s consumption.
But as Quebec brings new dams online, First Nation communities displaced by reservoirs say they still struggle to have a say in new projects. For decades, First Nation communities have been pushed aside for development projects, according to Ghislain Picard, the chief of the Assembly of the First Nations of Quebec and Labrador.
“We find ourselves in 2015 very frustrated. The political process has not evolved as much as the issue itself has evolved,” Picard said.

In the 1990s, when early projects were being constructed, Picard said the Cree people traveled to New England in search of support.

“You’re one of the consumers of our hydro. It’s important for you to realize that the bigger the demand is, the more impact it has on our lands where we still continue to hunt and fish,” Picard said.

Since 1975, HQ has signed about 30 agreements with First Nation communities regarding development projects. Molodetz, of HQ, said the company has a process to consider local support for development projects.

“HQ takes it very seriously,” he said. “The projects don’t move forward if it’s not accepted by the community through that process.”

Quebec could avoid building new dams if it improved its own energy conservation, some advocates say. Low electricity prices — about 8 cents per kilowatt-hour for residential customers — and demand for electric heating has created relatively high electricity consumption in the province.



Pierre Arcand, Quebec’s’ minister of Energy and Natural Resources, spoke during an energy conference in Burlington on Monday. Photo by John Herrick/VTDigger 

“We’re not very good in energy efficiency, let’s say it. Someone said to me the other day, ‘You are the Hummers of green energy,’” said Pierre Arcand, Quebec’s’ Minister of Energy and Natural Resources.
Vermont officials say there may an opportunity for Vermont to help drive down Quebec’s electricity consumption by expanding efficiency programs that have been successful here. Quebec officials agree.

“One area where Vermont can help us is in the area of energy efficiency,” Arcand said.

Environmentalists say hydropower should be used to balance intermittent renewables, like wind and solar, and not replace them. They point out that traditional hydropower floods large areas of land that affects wildlife, native populations and releases greenhouse gas emissions.

“We should not be writing a blank check to destroy vast areas of northern Quebec to satisfy an energy appetite in southern New England. It’s great we’re closing down coal plants, but we shouldn’t be trading one environmental disaster for another,” Levine said.

Boston Globe Didn't Tell The Complete Decommissioning story about Pilgrim?

Boston Globe:

  Decommissioning Pilgrim could take decades, millions

The Boston Globe article is just carrying Entergy's water. It is easier and cheaper just taking Entergy's word at face value...then picking and choosing other peoples representation to bolster Entergy position. It is all about just cheap and stupid newspaper stories. Merchant plants are bad news and they corrupt everyone in their wake.

I could make the case the Boston Globe set the plant up to fail because they never paid enough attention to them. Has Entergy paid the BG to lay off them or some other incentive not to write stories on them?

Commons: "On the plant’s website, administrators say they chose “immediate dismantlement [...] because it was the most practical and environmentally responsible option for the plant.”

"Administrators said they also considered other factors, including the availability of experienced plant employees to help in the process and the “prevention of long-term maintenance costs.” 

Connecticut Yankee completely decommissioned in a decade. Maine Yankee did about the same. They are about the same size as Pilgrim? It is possible to decommission Pilgrim in a decade and the industry now has a lot more experience with it. The Safestore scenario is nothing but big bucks nuclear industry political campaign contributions totally capturing the nuclear Regulatory Commission!!!   

Nuke panelists find tranquility at Connecticut Yankee site 

VNDCAP members visit site of decommissioned nuclear plant, where they found little evidence of prior operations and an atmosphere akin to 'wildlife sanctuary

Originally published in The Commons issue #326 (Wednesday, October 7, 2015). This story appeared on page B1.

By Mike Faher/The Commons

BRATTLEBORO—There’s not much that Connecticut Yankee and Vermont Yankee have in common, other than their names and the fact that they’re both nuclear plants that no longer produce power. But a recent field trip to the Connecticut site provided several members of the Vermont Nuclear Decommissioning Citizens Advisory Panel (VNDCAP) with some important insights.

For VNDCAP Chair Kate O’Connor, the most powerful impression was Connecticut Yankee’s reclamation by nature — and her realization that something similar might one day happen in Vernon.

“If you didn’t have to drive through a security gate, you would never know that you were entering the site of a former nuclear power plant,” O’Connor recalled from her visit to the Connecticut property.

“I drove down to Vernon not long after the trip and tried to imagine what the site will look like when the buildings are gone,” O’Connor added. “It is a hard thing to imagine, but after seeing [Connecticut Yankee], I know it is possible to restore a site back to green grass.”

Vermont Yankee owner Entergy cited economic factors in its decision to stop producing power at the Vernon plant as of Dec. 29, 2014. The plant’s reactor has been de-fueled, and some site cleanup has begun.

But under a program called SAFSTOR, the site is entering a decades-long period of dormancy until its decommissioning fund earns enough money to complete decommissioning work.
Two plants, two decommissioning paths

Things went much differently at Connecticut Yankee, which is not owned by Entergy. At the Haddam Neck, Conn., plant, which shut down in 1996, decommissioning started in May 1998 and was finished in November 2007.

On the plant’s website, administrators say they chose “immediate dismantlement [...] because it was the most practical and environmentally responsible option for the plant.”

Administrators said they also considered other factors, including the availability of experienced plant employees to help in the process and the “prevention of long-term maintenance costs.”

The speed of decommissioning was just one of the differences between the Yankees in Connecticut and Vermont. Others include:

• The Connecticut plant operated for 28 years, while VY produced electricity for 42 years. That’s a big factor in the amount of spent nuclear fuel that must be stored at the sites: There are 1,019 fuel assemblies at the Connecticut site and 3,880 in Vermont.

• There are 43 dry-cask storage containers for spent fuel at Connecticut Yankee. There will be 58 at Vermont Yankee when all fuel eventually is removed from a storage pool.

• Connecticut Yankee is a much more sprawling site: 525 acres, compared to 125 acres at Vermont Yankee.

• That site size allowed Connecticut administrators to place their spent-fuel-storage facilities three-quarters of a mile from the plant’s reactor. At Vermont Yankee, the existing spent-fuel pad is just 200 feet from the reactor — a proximity that some fear will lead to a longer and more costly decommissioning process.

Members of VNDCAP traveled to Connecticut to get a full tour of the site, including its spent-fuel storage. In a summary of the visit presented at the Sept. 24 VNDCAP meeting, officials wrote that “it was noted that locating the [spent fuel pad] well away from the facility made decommissioning easier.”

The Vermont panelists who made the June 26 trip were O’Connor, a citizen appointee to VNDCAP; David Andrews, who represents the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers on the advisory panel; Chris Campany, Windham Regional Commission executive director; Bill Irwin, radiological and toxicological sciences program chief at Vermont Department of Health; Jim Matteau, another citizen appointee; and Steve Skibniowsky, representing the town of Vernon. Also traveling to Connecticut Yankee was Tony Leshinskie, Vermont state nuclear engineer.

Skibniowsky said the trip was “very productive from the standpoint of seeing the physical location both of the site — what the site looks like now — and also to see where the fuel-storage facility is located at that site, which is a very different site than what Vermont Yankee has.”

He also took note of the site’s relative tranquility following demolition of the main plant structures.

“Their entire facility is no longer visible,” Skibniowsky said. “It’s really not possible to tell there was a nuclear plant there.”

O’Connor, in recounting the visit for The Commons, said there was “no asphalt except for a road, not even an indentation in the ground.”

“It looked like a wildlife sanctuary or a park. They mow the lawns, so nothing is overgrown,” O’Connor wrote in an email. “We saw deer and even a bald eagle. It was actually very peaceful. Of course, there is one dry cask storage pad, but you can’t see it. It’s built far from the entrance and is surrounded by trees. I think the dry cask pad is one of the major differences between Connecticut Yankee and VY. Unlike [at] Connecticut Yankee, the casks at VY will be visible.

Aesthetics aside, there might also be a lesson at Connecticut Yankee for those who hope for eventual redevelopment of the Vermont Yankee site: The removal of most nuclear-plant structures has not yet spurred commercial activity at the Connecticut property.

The VNDCAP visit notes indicate that there had been efforts to redevelop Connecticut Yankee as a gas-fired or alternate-fuel-source electric generating station.

But “these efforts collapsed during the 2008 recession,” the VNDCAP document says, and “there are currently no efforts for any site redevelopment.”

Connecticut Yankee’s website says administrators remain open to talking about redevelopment options, though there is “no timetable for making such a decision.”

Warning To Massachusetts: Pilgrim’s New Unreviewed Safety Issue

Sept 6, 2015: Pilgrim Nuclear Plant Following Exactly the Vermont Yankee Model?

Oyster Creek represent this perfectly. Exelon notified the NRC many years ago they were going to shut down in 2019. I contend Exelon was throttling funds to the plant for many years…the NRC had to secretly contend with this. Instead of funding a plant for decades, they began funding and putting off work based on a shutdown in a few years. So you had a grossly obsolete plant basically with tons of components grossly gone past their usefull life spans…with maintenance and safety funding being withheld do to a near shutdown. It just not worth it to replace gear and keep up with all the maintenance and replace expensive parts, do the expensive and time consuming surveillance because of the impending shutdown. Then its natural to get a yellow finding on maintenance with the obsolete electromatic relief Valve ( safety relief Valve) and all the preventable shutdowns and scrams. Oyster Creek is the poster boy going into a permanent shutdown withb terrible plant reliability and preventable regulatory actions and violations. The NRC residents becomes exhausted and overwhelmed in  the no-man-lands shadow of a permanent shutdown. How much more overwhelmed will region I be with Pilgrim, Oyster Creek and others being in terrible regulatory shape heading for the grave yards. 

Will we have four terrible years with all sorts of plant reliability and regulatory issues all over the place like Oyster Creek? What will Gov Baker and the NRC do if a yellow finding shows up? Will it really be unforeseen? It’s going to be a terrible shadow over gov Baker and it can severely impair his credibility.  

Do you think even for one second Entergy would protect the credibility of Ma Gov Baker. How have they done so far? 

Pilgrim's 2010 License Amendment Request For defective Three Stage Safety Relief Valves

Why is this such a fascinating document today?

Proposed License Amendment to Technical Specifications: Revised Technical Specification for Setpoint and Setpoint Tolerance Increases for Safety Relief Valves (SRV) and Spring Safety Valves (SSV), and Related Changes

March 15, 2010

The SRVs require replacement because the current two-stage Target Rock SRVs have been unreliable performers with respect to leaking while in-service and the subject of setpoint drift. SRV pilot valve leakage has led to multiple plant shutdowns and the setpoint drift problem resulted in exceeding current TS limits and numerous Licensee Event Reports (LERs). It has been determined that pilot valve leakage is due to low simmer margin and high as-found lift setpoints are due to corrosion bonding at the pilot valve disc/seat. To address current SRV performance problems, Entergy has performed extensive investigations and feasibility studies. The preferred option for correcting these problems is to replace all SRVs and SSVs during the next refueling outage. RFO-1 8 is currently planned to start on or about April 17, 2011.

Millstone: Four Special Inspections Since Aug 2014. Just Junk!

Basically Millstone has had two special inspections within a year and a half…four since Aug 2014. What a wonderful record. Two on their inability to come to terms with maintenance problems on the Turbine Driven Aux feedpump, one on the dual plant trip caused by Dominion’s inability to maintain their switchyard and now on a leaking relief valve at 248 psig and degrees f. Way to go NRC?

Holy smokes 90 minutes. A steam leak like this can cause much grounding of electrical, fire detection and other instrumentation problems.

 The incident, which lasted 90 minutes, qualified as an "unusual event," which is the lowest of four levels of NRC emergency classifications.

I'l bet you they put shutdown cooling on at about 300 psig and the relief valve opened then.

That is a real lot of energy. What does greater than 25 gallons a minute mean? It is a really a lot of dangerous steam in a small room. They were lucky they didn't scald a employee to death.  

Current RCS temperature is 248 degrees F with RCS pressure at 248 psig. The declaration was based on reactor coolant system leakage of greater than 25 gallons per minute.

So how many gallons of steam? I'll bet you the relief discharged directly into room...maybe in the sump. They'd not be much difference?  

"...exceeding 25 gallons per minute [GPM], per EAL BU2, due to a relief valve leaking on the Shutdown Cooling System common header.

Are you going to find simulator fidelity issues here like Pilgrim and River Bend?  

 

Millstone is still in the refueling outage at zero percent power today. Usually they wait till they get back up at power to declare the special inspection. This must be a big deal. 

The special inspection notification today:  

NRC Initiates Special Inspection at Millstone Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has begun a Special Inspection at the Millstone Unit 2 nuclear power plant to review issues associated with an “Unusual Event” declared at the facility on Oct. 4. The two-member team arrived at the Waterford, Conn., plant today to begin the review. 

Operators at the plant declared an “Unusual Event” – the lowest of four levels of emergency classification used by the NRC – at about 9:30 a.m. on Oct. 4. The declaration was based on reactor coolant system leakage of greater than 25 gallons per minute. The leakage came from a relief valve on the plant’s shutdown cooling system, which is used to provide cooling to the reactor when it is out of service. 

The Dominion-owned and operated plant was preparing to enter a refueling and maintenance outage at the time of the event. 

In response to the leakage, the shutdown cooling system was isolated from the reactor coolant system, allowing repairs to be made and the return of the system to operational status. The emergency declaration was terminated at 11 a.m. All of the leakage was contained within other plant systems, as designed. 

After conducting a preliminary assessment of the event, the NRC has determined that it meets the criteria for a Special Inspection. Among other things, the team will review operator response to the event, equipment performance and immediate corrective actions. 

“Our initial review of the event has raised questions regarding operator performance,” NRC Region I Administrator Dan Dorman said. “We have determined that the use of a Special Inspection is appropriate in this case to help the NRC better understand Dominion’s response to the event.” A report documenting the team’s findings will be issued within 45 days after the conclusion of the inspection.

The event notification:

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO IDENTIFIED RCS LEAKAGE > 25 GPM

At 0932 EDT on 10/4/15, the licensee declared an Unusual Event for identified RCS [Reactor Coolant System] leakage exceeding 25 gallons per minute [GPM], per EAL BU2, due to a relief valve leaking on the Shutdown Cooling System common header. The RCS leakage was within the capacity of the Charging System. At 0954 EDT the RCS leakage was terminated by isolating the Shutdown Cooling System. The cause of the relief valve failure is unknown and under investigation.

The RCS cooldown was terminated and both RCS loops were restored to service for decay heat removal using both Steam Generators and the Main Condenser. Current RCS temperature is 248 degrees F with RCS pressure at 248 psig. All offsite power and EDGs [Emergency Diesel Generators] are available.
The licensee intends to repair the relief valve to resume the RCS cooldown using the shutdown cooling system..

The licensee informed State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified DHS SWO, DHS NICC, FEMA, and Nuclear SSA via email.

* * * UPDATE AT 1115 EDT ON 10/04/15 FROM FRED PERKINS TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1100 EDT, based on verification that the RCS leakage was stopped.

The licensee informed State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (Bower), NRR EO (Morris), and IRD (Gott).

Notified DHS SWO, DHS NICC, FEMA, and Nuclear SSA via email.

Pilgrim Again: The Scandalous NRC!!!

The NRC says they are always responsible for nothing. I say the NRC has a secret policy to let some plants to knowing, along with the acknowledgment of the NRC...to intentionally and secretly violate licensing and NRC rules.  

“We will be assessing that,” Sheehan said. “Generically speaking, it is the responsibility of the company to comply with our regulations and address any safety issues,” Sheehan added. “We perform targeted inspections to evaluate compliance with our requirements, but we cannot touch on every aspect of plant operations.”

I think the shutdown notification was about this. The NRC is investigating itself over Pilgrim oversight. It just going to snowball from here on in. I certainly knew the right person Jim Isom to talk to? If you ever went not to talk about a painful episode, just say its under investigation. Then you got four to six months delay in talking about till everyone forgets. "Its under investigation, we can't talk about it :)" 

Sheehan said it was also not clear why NRC inspectors had never noticed the lapse. “That’s something we’re going to have to look at, too,” he said.

Certainly Entergy knew I was raising the eyebrows in the Louisiana news market. Don’t think for one moment your Louisiana nuclear plants were safe from the regulators?

"Sending a Messages to Entergy's Corporate Headquarters?"

Originally  published 10/06...republished 10/13

Update: they still using Freon as a fire extinguishment in the cable vault and 4160 volt switchgear room. We worried the Freon would kill us(suffocate)before it put out the fire.   

I talked to the “design engineering inspection working group Jim Isom, NRR/DIRS/IRIB (Chair) today. I asked him are you doubling or cutting the design engineering inspections. All he would say to me 

Pilgrim plant admits to long lapse in fire safety

David L. Ryan/Globe Staff

The Pilgrim Nuclear power plant in Plymouth.

By Peter Schworm Globe Staff October 07, 2015

Operators at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station have acknowledged a longstanding safety lapse after a review of its fire-protection system this week revealed the plant had failed to comply with a government advisory issued in 1992.

In the latest setback for the Plymouth facility, engineers disclosed Monday they had discovered vulnerabilities in two areas of the plant that required “fire watches,” where trained personnel monitor sections for any evidence of a fire.

The lapse raised the alarming — if remote — possibility that a fire in the control room would compromise the plant’s ability to safely shut down the nuclear reactor.

“It had never been properly addressed, for whatever reason,” said Neil Sheehan, spokesman for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which regulates commercial nuclear power plants. “We’re going to have to assess why it took them until now.”

Sheehan said it was also not clear why NRC inspectors had never noticed the lapse. “That’s something we’re going to have to look at, too,” he said.

The plant’s owner, Entergy Corp., said it has increased monitoring at the plant and is working on engineering changes.

The 1992 advisory, issued after a Washington power plant discovered that valves required for a shutdown could be damaged by a control room fire, was not a formal requirement. One specialist called the problem relatively minor.

But critics said the disclosure spoke to broader, persistent problems at the aging Pilgrim plant, which has come under increasing scrutiny from federal regulators.

“It’s not as if this is the first time safety concerns have been raised,” said Emily Norton, director of the Massachusetts chapter of the Sierra Club, which opposes nuclear energy. “We don’t need any more evidence.”

News of the lapse, first reported by the Cape Cod Times, follows a downgrade in the plant’s safety rating, raising the prospect that the plant may shut down to avoid millions of dollars in required improvements. A series of unplanned shutdowns in recent years, along with substantial safety problems that included recurring issues with relief valves, led to the downgrade.

Sheehan said the plant identified the “potential vulnerability” during a review of its fire protection system. He said the scenario of a fire threatening the plant’s ability to shut down is “highly improbable” but operators should be aware of the threat.

Regulators will review what steps the plant has taken during a November inspection, Sheehan said. It was too early to tell whether the plant would be fined, he said.

“We need to gather more information,” he said.

In a statement, Entergy said the station had established “robust levels of manual and automatic fire detection and suppression in all critical areas.” It added, “Engineering modifications are under development and will be implemented to address the issue.”

The company said the plant will conduct hourly watches “as an additional layer of protection” until the underlying problem is resolved. Workers already are patrolling the areas of concern, including rooms in the reactor building, every four hours.

The company will make phased improvements that will be completed in 2017, a spokeswoman said.

David Lochbaum, director of the Nuclear Safety Project for the Union of Concerned Scientists, said the problem was “relatively minor,” although it should have been noticed earlier. Resolving the issue would be straightforward, he said — “a simple fix compared to the other things on the to-do list.”

In the past two years, regulators have stepped up enforcement of previous advisories, Lochbaum said.

Under the scenario outlined in the advisory, a fire in the plant’s control room could cause short circuits, threatening motor-operated valves needed for a shutdown. The valves could sustain mechanical damage before operators could shift control to an alternative source.

The plant is one of just three nuclear reactors nationwide in the next-to-lowest performance category, officials said. There are no plants in the lowest category.

Critics of the nuclear plant said that even if the lapse was minor, the stakes are too high for virtually any risk.

“Even if there’s a small probability, the consequences when something goes wrong are very large,” said Mary Lampert, director of the group Pilgrim Watch. “And it further undermines the public’s confidence that the reactor is safe.”

is we are increasing the efficiency of the program. Jim reminded me I listen in by phone to the design engineering public meeting 6 months ago and made comments. The guy does have a great memory.

Update: Jim asked me if I was the guy who made a FOIA request on all design engineering inspection documentation. It wasn't me.   

I asked him why all the design inspections had missed the Pilgrim hot short problem. Basically a electrical problem. He told me he would get back to me with a answer.

That is basic deception and lying. Please define what "increase efficiency" and "ROP Realignment" means…is it high highfalutin deregulation and regulatory capture by the rich utilities.

So here is the list of names of the working group. I believe these guys are saying we need less design engineering inspection. I doubt the agency has a “god’s eye view” of all past and current design engineering violations…more the agency field of vision is 99% restricted. What proof do they have that all the unknown design violations have been seen by the NRC? 

***You get the inspection contractors are now limited to the 2009 budget???

VIII. DEIWG MembershipJim Isom, NRR/DIRS/IRIB (Chair) ................................................ (301)415-2954Don Norkin, NRR/DIRS/IRIB ......................................................... (301)415-1109Chris Cauffman, NRR/DIRS/IRIB .................................................. (301)415-8416Frank Arner (lead), Region I/DRS ................................................. (610)337-5194Steve Pindale (backup), Region I/DRS ......................................... (610)227-5116Wayne Schmidt (SRA), Region I/DRS .......................................... (610)337-5315Robert Berryman, Region II/DRS .................................................. (404)562-4817Andy Dunlop, Region III/DRS ....................................................... (630)829-9726Laura Kozak (SRA), Region III/DRS ............................................. (630)829-9604Wayne Sifre, Region IV/DRS ........................................................ (817)860-8193Gerond George (backup), Region IV/DRS .................................... (817)276-6562

Is there any validity that you only get one shot at a enginering sample set for the life of the plant? Basically you get the NRC policy here with the greater than green risk hurdle. The NRC doesn’t enforcing licensing and regulatory rules violation with a less than or green potential violations.

IX. Duration As part of the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) self-assessment process (Inspection Manual Chapter 0307) periodic (at least biennially) reviews of the ROP inspection procedures are conducted to determine if the inspection program is meeting the goals and intended outcomes. In accordance with Appendix B of the Inspection Manual Chapter 0307, “ROP REALIGNMENT PROCESS,” IRIB and regional staff conduct effectiveness review of the inspection elements of the ROP to determine if the inspection’s effectiveness can be improved. During this review it was determined that a working group should be formed to evaluate the current CDBI procedure to consider a new engineering design inspection procedure and to enhance effectiveness of the design engineering inspection program. The following reasons were identified and precipitated the need to form a working group to evaluate the current design engineering inspection program:

Is the any validity that you only get one shot at a sample set for the life of the plant? Basically you get the NRC policy here with the greater than green risk hurdle. The NRC doesn’t enforcing licensing and regulatory rules violation with a less than or green potential violation.

1) The feedback on the CDBI process indicates that the number of high risk low margin component samples that remain uninspected at each site is approaching exhaustion since the process does not normally allow for the re-inspection of the same component unless there is good justification.

2) Concerns have been raised over the inspection’s effectiveness at identifying risk significant findings. Based on this observation the working group will explore a wide variety of options.

***So why didn't one of their Engineering inspections catch the hot short problem at Pilgrim? Are they all getting big bucks and away from home vacation time to turn their heads the other way?

Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) Design Engineering Inspection Working Group (DEIWG)

This reminds me of the double yellow flooding findings at Arkansas Nuclear One. The NRC allowed ANO to operate for many years with flooding seal problems. It took them killing a employee recklessly dropping a 600 ton stator and massive seal leaks for them to enforce the violations. The shorts deal has been around for decades and the NRC has had many ineffective processes for catching this kinds of violations. If a licensee can't keep their plants safe, then the agency needs to command them to be safe. This violation is on a ineffective federal regulator.

"as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety"

I can make the case there our many scenarios with hot shorts. Take the case of a knowingly unsafe high voltage breaker. You could hire some sap minimum wage fire watch to stand next to the breaker cubicle waiting to catch the smell of a shorting breaker. You might not get any warning what-so-ever, just a massive electrical explosion incinerating the low wage sap contract employees.

So the NRC's campaign contribution scenarios with wire run fires and defective plant designs, is there will be a warning before the catastrophic fire. The fire watch could detect small fires and abnormal small/smoke to inform the control room. They might scram the plant or de-energized the wire runs. I say there are scenarios of no warnings, such as the high voltage breaker failure that self identifies itself with no need of a fire watch. Then the plant widely spins out of control because of a plant's poor design.

Catch the "political campaign" nuclear safety philosophy affecting

"as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety". 

all of the nuclear industry here? You have to have triplicate perfect proof a plant is not safe that is never available to return a plant to the safe condition. The absence of proof it is safe is unnecessary.

 ***IN 92-18 : I am not sure if I provoked the inspection notice or not. I am not sure if this came before my complaint, after, or as a results. We knew we had shoddy procedure, can you even imagine the madness if these hot shorts occurred with the shoddy procedures and being severely undermanned 

Why doesn't Pilgrim just shutdown until they get their ducks in a row. Shutdown until it is corrected. They will be dragging their feet for years until the final decision to permanently shutdown. That is why I think the final years of the plant is a unreview safety problem. It is a very dangerous period of the plant's life...the most dangerous. The idea of spending money is just a waste of money in the gray shadow of the  prolonged decision point to a permanent shutdown!

Aren't you dying to hear the opinion of this by the Massachusetts's governor??? This could take out the governor on credibility issues and scandal. When did they really discover this?

By the way on Vermont Yankee: the operations employees in 1992 thought we didn't have enough operators to safety carry out a big fire in the plant and to abandoned the control room because of the fire and safety shut down and cool the plant at alternate shutdown panels. It would be a absolute circus. I made a complaint about this and got a huge internal Vermont Yankee investigation and then the NRC came in. This is one of the reasons I got fired. It is in the docket!!!

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51456
Facility: PILGRIM Region: 1 State: MA Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-3 NRC Notified By: KENNETH GRACIA HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ	Notification Date: 10/05/2015 Notification Time: 21:48 [ET] Event Date: 10/05/2015 Event Time: 17:25 [EDT] Last Update Date: 10/05/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION	Person (Organization): BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS FOR FIRE EVENT - OPEN ITEM WITH POTENTIAL TO IMPACT CAPABILITY TO OPERATE MOTOR OPERATED VALVES "At 1725 [EDT] on Monday, October 5, 2015, while updating the site fire safe shutdown analysis report, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) identified vulnerabilities in two (2) specific fire areas that required a compensatory fire watch. The compensatory fire watches have already been established. "The specific concern involves the unlikely scenario that fire forces evacuation of the control room. In addition, it is postulated that motor operated valves cannot be operated from their alternate control location due to spurious operation caused by hot shorts in control wiring. The specific failure mode is described in NRC Information Notice (IN) 92-18. "Engineering modifications are under development and scheduled for implementation to address this specific IN 92-18 concern. "Based on the above, the condition is reportable to the NRC as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. As such the condition is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), and requires an 8 hour notification. "The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

Honestly, isn't this the universe helping me?

I got to translate what is going on. A lot of the anti governmentalism  republican teabagger pronukers like minded people have gone off in a darkened room and decided engineering inspection are no longer needed. The NRC is portraying this corruptly carrying the industry's interest.

1) Basically, why have there been so many decades old engineering and licensing violations identified in recent years. There has been many violations picked up in malfunction and degradation by the residents these engineering inspections should have picked up?

2) How come these engineering inspections didn't pick up the Pilgrim hot short issues. 

Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) Design Engineering Inspection Working Group (DEIWG)

Background

Design engineering inspections have been and continue to be part of the NRC’s power reactor inspection program to ensure adequate public safety. In the past, several different design engineering inspections process have been implemented and they include Safety System Functional Inspection (IP 93801); Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection (IP 93811); Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection (IP 93810); and Safety System Design and Performance Capability Inspection (IP 71111.21). The Component Design Bases Inspection (CDBI) (IP 71111.21) is the current design engineering inspection. This inspection is performed under the ROP baseline inspection program and will continue through

CY 2010 in its’ present form.

As part of the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) self-assessment process (Inspection Manual Chapter 0307) periodic (at least biennially) reviews of the ROP inspection procedures are conducted to determine if the inspection program is meeting the goals and intended outcomes.

In accordance with Appendix B of the Inspection Manual Chapter 0307, “ROP REALIGNMENT PROCESS,” IRIB and regional staff conduct effectiveness review of the inspection elements of the ROP to determine if the inspection’s effectiveness can be improved. During this review it was determined that a working group should be formed to evaluate the current CDBI procedure to consider a new engineering design inspection procedure and to enhance effectiveness of the design engineering inspection program. The following reasons were identified and precipitated the need to form a working group to evaluate the current design engineering inspection program:

1) The feedback on the CDBI process indicates that the number of high risk low margin component samples that remain uninspected at each site is approaching exhaustion since the process does not normally allow for the re-inspection of the same component unless there is good justification.

2) Concerns have been raised over the inspection’s effectiveness at identifying risk significant findings. Based on this observation the working group will explore a wide variety of options.

USA Declares Shutting Down Seven Nuclear Power Plants in One Week?

Exelon Nuclear: You Are NEXT

Exelon’s been blackmailing shutting down 7 or so nuclear plants in the last few years.

Think about it, get all the dirty news out at one time. Send a clear message to your state and Washington?

So Entergy declares shutting two plants and you guys declare permanently shutting down say Five.

Just saying, Exelon says they are shutting down Oyster Creek 2019.

It seems like they are going Oyster Creek and Pilgrim in 2019? What is so special about 2019?