Boston Globe On Pilgrim's Fire Protection Lapse.

Updated 10/8

Right, with the newspapers, the NRC and nuclear industry; all you are really getting is the extremely prettified version of events based on the so-called greater interest of the nation.

 Pilgrim plant failed to address 1992 safety advisory

The Pilgrim Nuclear power plant in Plymouth.

By Peter Schworm Globe Staff  October 07, 2015

Operators at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station have acknowledged a longstanding safety lapse after a review of its fire protection system revealed the plant had failed to comply with a government advisory issued in 1992, the latest setback for the Plymouth facility.

On Monday, engineers at the nuclear plant discovered vulnerabilities in two areas that required “fire watches,” where trained personnel monitor sections of the plant for any evidence of a fire. The lapse raised the alarming -- though remote -- possibility that the plant would be unable to

This the problem with the dopey and technically uneducated Boston Globe reporters. They are poorly educated on the operation and management of these nuclear power plants. The have little capability to know if the NRC officials and Entergy officials are telling the whole truth and accurate. Their technical skills just get them to parrot these official. They won't talk to anyone without a professional credential, because basically their too stupid to know even the basics of what is going on. A professional reputation as the all lawyers, know will keep a legal suit away from the newspaper. They are held hostage to the corporate professional class...they assume the like minded professional class are straight shooters.

There just is no evidence where the shorts are coming from with the NRC and Entergy. It is highly unlikely the fire threat comes within the control room. It will come from underneath the control room in the cable spreading room, the cable vault or below that in the 4160 volt switchgear room. It not fire they are worried about in the control room, its suffocation from the smoke, fumes and Freon they are worry about. Usually this is about separation of redundant instrumentation wiring or redundancy of safety grade electrical cables in the cable trays. The cable trays hold up numerous wires snaking throughout the plant. In a fires in the cable trays with redundant component wiring, the insulation burns out and there is shorting in the wiring. It can stop, start pumps, disrupt the involved instrumentation...basically leads to a runaway plant outside the control of the operators in the control room.
Cable trays fires are very hard to put out.

In my days, only water can put them out. They use to teach us over and over again, you might have to put fire water on energized trays in emergencies. There might be up to 4160 or 480 high current volts being shorted out in the cable trays. They tell us, either agree to put water on high voltage shorting cable trays or you can't work in this job. This is highly contrary to the offsite fire fighting training. Wires have to be positively de-energized if in the vicinity with a fire hose and spaying water.
  
So the dimwits Boston Globe statement "fire in its control room" is completely wrong...the BG reporter misheard what the officials were saying. We'll see a inspection report in three months, the details with that. As Donald Trump would say, I am right. 

***So basically we are worry about is fires in the cable vaults, switchgear rooms, and cable trays that snake through the plant for miles. It is a cheap work-around based on a fundimentally defective fire protection design of a plant. It is basically about redundant instrumentation and electrical supply congregating in one location at the plant. If a fire occurs in one of these unbelievable vulnerable area...the idea is to the locally operate equipment important to safety shutdown shutdown the plant. We bypass the control room, the cable vaults, cable separating rooms and cable trays...the whole ball of wax because a fire in a vulnerable area could led to a uncontrollable and runaway nuclear power plant. There generally is very little training and testing on these systems. It is a phony system for public consumption...these systems are just for show.

***After the Browns Ferry fire and TMI, basically the USA came to the conclusion most nuclear plants were of a defective design and dangerous in their current forms. We invented these add on systems to remotely shutdown the plants. These systems were constructed shortly after I arrive at Vermont Yankee in 1980. These half ass and corrupted safety systems have the high potential to corrupt the humans and safety cultures all around them. The employees, managers, officials, utilities, the regulatory agencies and the politicians...the communities all around them for economic reasons.

***When you have to hide problems for survival; lie, cheat and be deceptive just to make a buck and feed your family. It suffocates the human spirit in a broad manner. You see what I mean, when you have lie, cheat and be deceptive for survival, then you have to invent a corrupt enforcement system to keep the human system spinning. It kills the human spirit in a wide manner on both ends: the enforcers and victims. Don't you hear MLK. The whole deal with excessive privacy, secrecy, non-transparency, corrupt enforcement systems and giving a advantage to some and not the others...forced living a human life in shadows. It is a natural corruption systems. It corrupts people and humans by the billions. As Pope Francis tells us with the term: "the god of money"? You people just keep living your shallow lives just for money and security? Don't you people read the bible and listen to the peoples Pope Francis?          

I considers add-on systems as highly dangerous. The plant is not holistically designed. It gives outsiders the illusion the plants are safe. I call these systems papermacha safety systems... safety systems only made in paperwork forms. Basically cheap add on systems not holistically designed in one system, basically systems not thoroughly designed and tested as one system in the beginning of life. It is a safety system inherently with a lot of uncertainties still in the plant. The engineers just hasn't cleared out all the uncertainties. Usually we do this all for money and status.             

All these NRC and Entergy officials know there is a golden hour in public relations and in the news media. Basically a golden hour in hospital emergency care says if you get a serious injured person in the emergency room within the first hour after an injury...most people will survive the serious injury. The golden hour in the public relations and nuclear power plant news, people only listen to the nuclear news in the first 24 hours. The papers are only interested in publishing articles within 24 hours of the event because there after nobody listens.   

shut down the reactor in the event of a fire in its control room. 

The plant said it will conduct watches “as an additional layer of protection” until the underlying problem is resolved. The plant says it already patrols the areas in question every four hours.

“It had never been properly addressed, for whatever reason,” said Neil Sheehan, a NRC spokesman. “We’re going to have to assess why it took them until now.”

Sheehan said it was not clear why NRC inspectors had never identified the lapse.

“Why this particular area never caught our attention, that’s something we’re going to have to look at, too,” he said.

The revelation, first reported by the Cape Cod Times, follows a downgrade in the plant’s safety rating, raising the prospect that the plant may shut down to avoid millions in required improvements. A series of unplanned shutdowns in recent years, along with substantial safety problems, led to the demotion.

On average, the 43-year-old plant provides about 12 percent of the state’s electricity. It has been run by Entergy Corp. since 1999.

In a statement, Entergy said that the station has established “robust levels of manual and automatic fire detection and suppression in all critical areas.”

NRC: Republican Anti-Government Senators Discovers Horrendously Dysfunctional Agency

This got to be going all over the agency and especially within the plants. It is probably why the NRC missed Pilgrims "hot short" issue...with the agency now undergoing investigation with why they NRC missed it. Doesn't the Senate "research budget" documentation general incompetence and NRC confusion wit oversight of Pilgrim sound exactly identical? It the NRC can't keep the documentation of the $91 million dollars in the nuclear research project straight, the object chaos in a senate hearing, maybe the NRC documentation of the plants are just as screwed up...  

Generally these teabaggers Senate and House Republicans are hired hands of the anti-government of the utilities. They can save a few pennies over this to boost their profit. I think this is criminal activity. This is governmental disruption on a massive scale.

Clearly the House and Senate anti government Republicans have begun a war on the NRC. The cheap natural gas has undermined the safety of the nuclear plants and dangerous congressional teabaggers are scapegoating the hapless Nuclear regulatory Commission. This has turned into a national crisis at the intersection of politics and government oversight with dangerous industries. Generally  the democrats are incompetent...the Dems would love to hide in the bushes while the giant nuclear utilities disassemble the NRC alive.

This is a gigantic shadow over the federal agency and the whole culture is effected by the political and corporate intimidation. I bet you this is the test case with how in the future the teabaggers disrupt and destroy government. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Took 6 Months and 3 Tries To Produce Research Budget-Andrew Follett

Things are moving so slowly at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that it took nuclear regulators six months and three different attempts to give congressional overseers information they requested on the research budgets of projects. 

The NRC finally did give the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works the information, but it was an incomplete list delivered the night before the commission was set to testify. 

Republican Oklahoma Sen. Inhofe asked the NRC at the Wednesday hearing, “How do you develop a budget and meet your responsibility to be good stewards of taxpayer dollars and license fees if it takes six months and three oversight requests to produce a list of what projects this 91 million dollars will be spent on?” 

NRC Commissioner Stephen Burns replied that the slow response was because of the “responsible” accounting methods the commission uses to compile its list of projects. Burns continued by saying that NRC accounting, however, lacks the ability to “track” the data at the level of individual projects. 

According to Inhofe, “the NRC’s bureaucracy has grown beyond the size needed to accomplish its mission.” The nuclear industry has shrunk in recent years, and the NRC previously accomplished “a lot more work with a lot fewer resources.” 

Currently, the NRC plans to reduce its budget by roughly 10 percent by 2020 while reducing its staff by around 9.5 percent from the current 3,778 to 3,600 by September 2016.

The NRC has seen its budget expand by about 50 percent over the past decade. It predicted a wave of new reactor license requests and a general expansion of the nuclear industry following the applications of 13 different companies to the NRC for licenses to build 25 new nuclear power reactors in the United States between 2007 and 2009.

Changing economic conditions, however, especially low natural gas prices, slow demand growth for electricity, and the Fukushima nuclear disaster ended this “nuclear renaissance” in the United States. This caused a declining interest in the construction of new nuclear plants and as a result the NRC has received 40 percent fewer licensing requests and about half as many license renewal applications, greatly decreasing its work load.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Took 6 Months and 3 Tries To Produce Research Budget-Andrew Follett 

Things are moving so slowly at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that it took nuclear regulators six months and three different attempts to give congressional overseers information they requested on the research budgets of projects.

The NRC finally did give the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works the information, but it was an incomplete list delivered the night before the commission was set to testify.

Republican Oklahoma Sen. Inhofe asked the NRC at the Wednesday hearing, “How do you develop a budget and meet your responsibility to be good stewards of taxpayer dollars and license fees if it takes six months and three oversight requests to produce a list of what projects this 91 million dollars will be spent on?”

NRC Commissioner Stephen Burns replied that the slow response was because of the “responsible” accounting methods the commission uses to compile its list of projects. Burns continued by saying that NRC accounting, however, lacks the ability to “track” the data at the level of individual projects.

According to Inhofe, “the NRC’s bureaucracy has grown beyond the size needed to accomplish its mission.” The nuclear industry has shrunk in recent years, and the NRC previously accomplished “a lot more work with a lot fewer resources.”

Currently, the NRC plans to reduce its budget by roughly 10 percent by 2020 while reducing its staff by around 9.5 percent from the current 3,778 to 3,600 by September 2016.

The NRC has seen its budget expand by about 50 percent over the past decade. It predicted a wave of new reactor license requests and a general expansion of the nuclear industry following the applications of 13 different companies to the NRC for licenses to build 25 new nuclear power reactors in the United States between 2007 and 2009. 

Changing economic conditions, however, especially low natural gas prices, slow demand growth for electricity, and the Fukushima nuclear disaster ended this “nuclear renaissance” in the United States. This caused a declining interest in the construction of new nuclear plants and as a result the NRC has received 40 percent fewer licensing requests and about half as many license renewal applications, greatly decreasing its work load.

Mesothelioma In Nuclear Plants

I worked with Don Jadloski in the operations department for a decade. I was on his shift for the last years of his life (1992). We spend hours talking about our personal, family, exspeciually car problems on shift. Oh man, we'd talk on and on about car issue and the history of it. We talked on and on about the design of GM cars...I had a expensive one always in the shop.  

It started off as a pain in the back he couldn't get rid of. He went to one doctor after another but nobody could figure it out. He'd get colds much worst than normal and issues of lung infections. Then he got pneumonia. Then Mesothelioma... He always worried about it.

He worked at Oyster Creek when the plant was new. They were having main condenser tube leaks. Somebody came up with the bright idea of dumping asbestos in the inlet of the main condenser. Some of asbestos fibers would get sucked into the tiny holes and close off the leak. Most of the asbestos by the tons went into bay. He dumped tons of this stuff in a mixing tank over many years. It worked kinda good.

I visited him in the hospital in the last week of his life. He had one lung removed two years prior...he kinda thought it was caught. It was just wishful thinking. Then it got into the second one. It is like slowly drowning to death. It is a horrible horrible death. He had two beautiful daughters. He was so proud of them. They went through many boyfriends...they were beautiful. We worked together during the teenage years and marriage years. My kids were much younger. He told me pitifully, the girls always had the upper hand. Don told me his daughters were always in control of the boyfriends. It was total control. It was sickening how slavish the boys and would-be husbands were to his daughters. Both of them! Don smugly would declare, "the young men by the dozens didn't have any dignity at all?

Alabama judge awards $3.5 million in mesothelioma death case involving TVA plant 

By Lucy Berry | lberry@al.com The Huntsville Times
 
on October 06, 2015 at 6:21 PM, updated October 06, 2015 at 6:27 PM
 
The family of a Florence woman who died in 2013 from the lung disease mesothelioma will receive a $3.5 million award for her pain and suffering and medical expenses.

U.S. District Judge Lynwood Smith. (File)

 

Court records dating back to 2012 show Barbara Bobo inhaled secondhand asbestos fibers while laundering her husband's work clothes for more than two decades. Bobo's husband, James, did clean-up work for a period of time after asbestos insulation was installed at the Athens-based Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, which is owned and operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority.
 
James Bobo, who began working for the plant in 1975, died of asbestos-induced lung cancer in 1997. His wife was diagnosed with malignant pleural mesothelioma, a rare lung cancer caused by asbestos exposure, in November 2011.
 
Judge Lynwood Smith of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama last week issued a judgment in favor of Melissa Ann Bobo and Shannon Jean Bobo Cox, Bobo's daughters and the co-personal representatives of her estate.
 
Dallas attorney Jay Stuemke, of Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartlett, PC, said Smith found Browns Ferry violated worker safety regulations set by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), as well as its own safeguards.
 
"This didn't have to happen," said Stuemke, who represents the family. "If the TVA had simply followed the law and its own guidelines, these two people might still be alive."
 
TVA spokeswoman Kristine Shattuck-Cooper said in an emailed statement the corporation is reviewing the Court's opinion and evaluating its options.
 
Bobo underwent surgery after her 2011 diagnosis to remove the lining in her affected lung. She also received chemotherapy treatments, which Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartlett, PC, said were painful and resulted in adverse side effects.
 
Court documents say Bobo, who was never an employee or contractor of TVA and was never physically inside the plant, would shake out her husband's work clothes in her home washroom, causing dust to disperse into the air. She would clean the floors of the washroom with a broom and dustpan, creating airborne dust she breathed.
 
A February filing said Bobo also had non-occupational exposure to asbestos from 1965-1975 when her husband worked as a machine operator for the Alabama Wire Plant in Florence. Additionally, she was exposed to asbestos during her years working as a beautician in Florence.

 

 

The End Of TMI?

Is the end of Three Mile Island near? (YDR opinion)

York Daily Record editorial

Updated:   10/06/2015 08:41:25 AM EDT

The future of Three Mile Island is uncertain

after the nuclear plant failed to secure a contract to sell power to the regional grid in 2018-2019. (Jason Plotkin — Daily Record/Sunday News)

In York County, we have a love-hate relationship with Three Mile Island. Let's start with the downsides:
We hate TMI because 1979.
The partial meltdown remains the worst nuclear accident in United States history. The incident panicked our community and forever colored Americans' perceptions of our region.
We suffered the fear and worry over the possible long-term effects of the meltdown.
And we still worry every time the nuclear power plant is cited for a safety violation or an equipment malfunction — or a fire, as occurred at the plant this week. It's not the kind of history you want in your community.
We love TMI because jobs.
Emissions-free electricity.
Reliable power.
It's comforting to know the plant is there to provide energy during peak power consumption times — scorching summer days, Arctic blasts.
But the plant's future seems uncertain.
This summer, for the first time in its four-decade history, TMI failed to get a contract to sell a year's worth of electricity — from June 1, 2018 to May 31, 2019.
Without that contract, there is no guarantee that PJM Interconnection — operator of the regional power grid — will buy any of the plant's power.
TMI and other U.S. nuclear plants are facing intense competition from natural-gas-fired power plants. The price of gas is low — thanks, in part, to the fracking revolution that has been such an economic boon to Pennsylvania. The number of gas-fired plants has mushroomed.
What does that mean for TMI's future?
It's not yet clear. The plant's owner, Exelon, recently closed two nuke plants, and it said it might close two Illinois plants that also failed to get contracts. Company officials said they're evaluating TMI, and profitability is a key component of that analysis. But there are no immediate plans to shutter the plant.
It leaves our community with an interesting conundrum. As much of a worrisome thorn in our side the plant has been since the accident, it does provide significant benefits.
It's an important part of our region's economy, and it's a major source of emissions-free power.
It seems ironic that at a time when carbon-emissions-fueled climate change is threatening the globe, economics are threatening one of the most potent and cleanest sources of electricity.
Old King Coal still rules when it comes to power production in the U.S. It's the source of 39 percent of our electricity. It's a cheap but dirty source of power.
Natural gas is No. 2 at 27 percent, followed by nukes at 19 percent.
Natural gas is cleaner than coal, but it still contributes significantly to global warming.
Can we afford to lose functional nuclear power plants?
Granted, they present serious waste-disposal issues — as spent fuel rods pile up at plant sites, and no progress has been made on a national storage facility. A closure of TMI, Peach Bottom and other nuclear plants would likely be cheered by some activists.
But it would seem foolish to shut them down until renewable, clean sources of power such as hydro, wind and other forms can carry more of the load.
In the end, economics will likely dictate the future of TMI and other plants. But power companies and government policy makers must also consider the climate-change implications.
TMI, York County hates what happened in 1979. But it would also hate to see you go — too soon.

TMI Is Junk: Fire Alert!

 I count a least two overload current protection devices that failed to operate properly. What is the extent on condition, cause with all current protection devices at TMI and Exelon nuclear? A protection device had to trip the bus?

Like to see the maintenance on the motor/breaker.

 

ALERT DECLARATION DUE TO FIRE IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING "At 2115 [EDT] on 10/05/15, an Alert was declared due to a fire in the Auxiliary building affecting DC-P-1A [Decay closed cooling pump 1A] and A-Train safety equipment. The fire is out." The licensee reported the fire was extinguished at approximately 2201 EDT. The fire did not hamper operations personnel responding to the fire. Offsite fire assistance was requested. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. The licensee notified the York Haven Power Station, PEMA (Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency), and the counties of Cumberland, Lebanon, Lancaster, York, and Dauphin. Notified DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, DHS NICC, EPA EOC, FEMA NWC (via email), FDA EOC (via email) and Nuclear SSA (via email). * * * UPDATE AT 0015 EDT ON 10/06/15 FROM JAMES CREIGHTON TO S. SANDIN * * * The licensee is terminating the Alert at 0009 EDT on 10/06/15 based on the following: "At 2115 [EDT] on 10/05/15, an Alert (HA3) was declared due to a fire in the Decay Closed Cooling Water Pump '1A' motor and breaker. The fire was extinguished at 2201 [EDT]. "Following inspection by electrical maintenance the 'P' 480V bus was re-energized at 2305 [EDT] and restoration of previously running loads is in progress. "Station (TMI) is in a 72-hour LCO for repairs to the Decay Closed Cooling Water Pump '1A' (DC-P-1A). "TMI (Three Mile Island) is terminating the event based upon the above information." The licensee notified the York Haven Power Station, PEMA (Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency), and the counties of Cumberland, Lebanon, Lancaster, York, and Dauphin. The licensee will issue a press release. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Bickett), NRR (Howe) and IRD (Gott). Notified DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, DHS NICC, EPA EOC, FEMA NWC (via email), FDA EOC (via email) and Nuclear SSA (via email).

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51457
Facility: GRAND GULF Region: 4 State: MS Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: BRANDON STARNES HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA	Notification Date: 10/06/2015 Notification Time: 17:56 [ET] Event Date: 10/06/2015 Event Time: 13:30 [CDT] Last Update Date: 10/06/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION	Person (Organization): NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)

Is the end of Three Mile Island near?

Two fires?

DAUPHIN COUNTY, Pa. —A spokesman for Three Mile Island in Dauphin County says an electrical short on a motor caused a brief fire at Three Mile Island on Monday night.

"The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is continuing to follow up on the “Alert” declared just after 9 last night at the Three Mile Island 1 nuclear power plant. (An “Alert” is the second-lowest of four levels of emergency classification used by the NRC.) The “Alert” was declared in response to a fire in a pump that is part of a system would be used to help remove decay, or residual, heat following a reactor shutdown. The pump’s motor and electrical breaker were affected.

Does this mean really two fires. Did the switchgear fire alarm go off and did the fire extinguisher system activate?

The pump’s motor and electrical breaker were affected.

Weren't they just talking about permanently shutting this guy down?

It is safety related having a fire at a nuclear plant and getting into a alert.

This is a official NRC strategy ...why do they neglect to identify the specific component and system of the failed component. This all is called official NRC protection of the nuclear industry. How do you protect the nuclear industry, is not having incidences like this. Shielding them from accountability is making it worst. Of course, the newspaper might just not be reporting it.

Hmm, are they up at power or in a outage? They are at 100% power?

Small fire at pump at Three Mile Island nuclear plant

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission said Tuesday it was continuing to follow up on the event.

An alert was declared at the plant. That is the second lowest of four levels of emergency classifications used by the agency.

There were no injuries or off-site impacts, though the Londonderry Fire Company was called to the scene, but not needed.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission spokesman Neil Sheehan said one of the agency’s resident inspectors responded to the plant and performed an independent assessment of operator actions, equipment response and any damage. “No immediate performance deficiencies were identified,” Sheehan said.

The agency will now follow up on the company’s review of what caused the fire and repairs.

The portion of the decay heat removal system affected by the fire remains out of service, pending repair work.

The pump that caught fire is part of the system that circulates water to cool plant equipment. The pump’s motor and electrical breaker were affected. Exelon, the plant’s owner, said the motor on the pump overheated.

The Braidwood Junk Nuclear Plants

This is a symbol of bad testing, maintenance and management across the board. Having the both the operating start-up feedwater pump and its backup fail within a period of time is unprofessional nuclear wise. It is horrible to test both Aux feedwater pumps. It is unprofessional to allow the SG level to get so low. The steam dumps operated and got a reactor scram...insufficient training is severely implicated.

The plant was wildly spinning out of control this shutdown...

So what is going to happen when fuel damage is threaten...the training is going to fail and a host of pumps are going to trip on over current and over heating bearing?

Does Braidwood have a maintenance department? Do they got any federal oversight...

***at approximately 15% power, operators attempted to start the Start Up Feedwater (SFWP) pump and the pump immediately tripped on Phase A Overcurrent.

***2A MDFWP was manually secured due to pump inboard journal bearing temperature exceeding its [200 Degree-F] operating limit. At 0105 [CDT] an anticipated automatic Auxiliary Feedwater actuation signal was generated on low Steam Generator level (36.3%) and both the 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater pumps (AFP) auto-started.

Wait a minute, the start feeedwater pump and then the humongous #2 motor driven feedwater pump? My bad.
Was feed water regulating valves were on service? Some aren't designed for the dynamic condition of withdrawing steam and high decay heat load. Thus the word start-up feedwater pump and start up feedwater regulating valves. I don't see feed water start-up and shutdown word in there?  

 

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51450
Facility: BRAIDWOOD Region: 3 State: IL Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: LINDSAY GREEN HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO	Notification Date: 10/05/2015 Notification Time: 08:41 [ET] Event Date: 10/05/2015 Event Time: 01:05 [CDT] Last Update Date: 10/05/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): STEVE ORTH (R3DO)

 

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	N	0	Hot Standby	0	Hot Standby

Event Text

SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATIONS "Braidwood Unit 2 was performing a planned plant shutdown for refueling outage A2R18. In accordance with plant shutdown procedures while in Mode 1 (Power Operations) at approximately 15% power, operators attempted to start the Start Up Feedwater (SFWP) pump and the pump immediately tripped on Phase A Overcurrent. The 2A Motor Driven Feedwater pump (MDFWP) was manually started to maintain Steam Generator Water Level during the shutdown and subsequent plant cooldown. While in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) at [550 Degree-F], the 2A MDFWP was manually secured due to pump inboard journal bearing temperature exceeding its [200 Degree-F] operating limit. At 0105 [CDT] an anticipated automatic Auxiliary Feedwater actuation signal was generated on low Steam Generator level (36.3%) and both the 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater pumps (AFP) auto-started. Also at 0105 [CDT] a Reactor Protection System (RPS) Reactor trip signal was received due to low Steam Generator level (36.3%) with the reactor not critical. Both Auxiliary Feedwater trains operated as designed with the Main Steam Dumps in service and the Main Condenser providing the heat sink. "All systems operated as designed with the exception of the SFWP and the MDFWP described above. "The plant is currently stable in Mode 5 with both AFPs secured. "This report is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for automatic actuation of the (1) RPS Reactor Trip with the reactor not critical and (6) Auxiliary Feedwater System, 8 hour notification." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Entergy Got To Do Something?

NEW ORLEANS, Oct. 5, 2015 /PRNewswire/ -- Entergy Corporation (NYSE: ETR) announced that Mark Savoff, executive vice president and chief operating officer and Jeff Forbes, executive vice president and chief nuclear officer, plan to retire, effective first quarter 2016. Both leaders will transition to an advisory role beginning Nov. 1 until their effective retirement dates. Tim Mitchell, a 26-year Entergy nuclear veteran, has been named acting chief nuclear officer for the fleet, effective Nov. 1.

In an organizational change, the chief nuclear officer will report directly to Entergy Chairman and CEO Leo Denault. To fill the CNO role, Entergy will conduct an external candidate search including consideration of Mitchell....

Entergy's Waterford Plant In Trouble With Their Emergency Feedwater System.

Originally posted on 8/10...

Docket No. 50-382

July 30, 2015 SUBJECT: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION,UNIT 3 – NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2015002

The Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On April 17, 2015, the licensee lowered power to 70 percent due to a level switch failure on the low pressure feedwater heater 5C. Following repairs, the licensee raised power to 100 percent on April 20, 2015. On June 3, 2015, the control room operators manually tripped the reactor due to the automatic isolation of feedwater heater 2C and subsequent trip of main feedwater pump A. Following repairs to the feedwater heater 2C normal level control valve, the licensee restarted the reactor on June 6, 2015, and achieved 100 percent power on June 8, 2015. The licensee shutdown the reactor on June 23, 2015, to address a steam leak on an isolation valve that was downstream of a main feedwater regulating valve. The licensee restarted the reactor on June 24, 2015, and achieved 100 percent power on June 25, 2015. The unit maintained 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Why does Entergy's Louisiana nuclear plants have so many issues with emergency and normal reactor cooling feedwater feed? Why all the problems with feed water pump trips.     

Loss of Feed water pump...I called it sabotage?  

I can't begin to tell you how bad this is. It indicates the plant is effectively out of control. A component failure occurs, then a important safety system such as the emergency feed water system is found to be broken. It is really bad when two components show up broken in the same plant event.

So there were never any pre operational testing of the emergency feedwater system...this system had been inop from first start-up.

I think 10% to 15% of domestic nuclear industry fleet capacity factor is illegitimate. We would have between 10% to 15% less capacity if the licensees were forced to follow all the rules and tell the truth. There is widespread blatant dishonesty and blatant rules violations that supports up to 15% of our domestic nuclear plant average fleets capacity factor. This is a tremendous amount of money.   

Licensee Event Report (LER) 2015-004-00, Emergency Feedwater System Flow Oscillations and LER 2015-005-00, Manual Reactor Trip due to Low Steam Generator Levels Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3)

The safety function of the EFW system is to provide sufficient supply of cooling water to one or both SGs for the removal of decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) [AB] in response to any event causing low SG level coincident with the absence of a low pressure trip.

On June 3, 2015, at 1707, following a manual reactor scram [RCT] from 100% power, an Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal (EFAS) [JE] was automatically actuated to both Steam Generators (SGs). Following flow initiation, the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) [BA] Backup Flow Control Valves (BFCVs) [FCV] for both trains exhibited wide, frequent oscillations. The Primary Flow Control Valves (PFCVs) [FCV] operated correctly in automatic. To prevent further oscillations, operators took manual control of both trains of EFW in accordance with station procedures and stabilized flow. Both channels of EFAS flow control logic [JB] and both trains of EFW BFCVs were subsequently declared INOPERABLE and Technical Specifications (TSs) 3.3.2.b and 3.7.1.2.d were entered, respectively. The EFW system functioned adequately to fill the SGs and maintain the specified safety function (Reactor Coolant System Heat Removal).

The air operated EFW valves are provided with nitrogen backup from dedicated accumulators [ACC] which are only used during a loss of the instrument air (IA) system [LD]. These nitrogen accumulators also supply backup nitrogen to the Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) [V]. Follow up analysis has determined that the identified valve cycling would have exceeded the assumed nitrogen consumption rate and, without operator intervention, would have exhausted the accumulators prior to the credited 10 hour analyzed mission time. The specified safety functions of both trains of EFW and both ADVs would not have been fulfilled.

Investigation into this event revealed that the components comprising the EFW flow control system were not configured to appropriately respond to the changes observed in the system operating parameters and that periodic testing to confirm the stability of the BFCVs in the automatic flow control mode had not been performed. It is therefore reasonable to assume that this condition has likely existed within 3 years of the time of discovery.

Compensatory measures have been put in place to station a dedicated operator to control the EFW BFCVs in manual following a reactor trip to establish and maintain the SG level in accordance with emergency operating procedures. This action will protect the associated nitrogen accumulators from depletion due to the excessive cycling of the BFCVs during an EFW actuation. Crediting the established compensatory measures, the EFW and ADVs are capable of performing their specified safety functions for the evaluated mission times.

The air operated EFW valves are provided with nitrogen backup from dedicated accumulators [ACC] which are only used during a loss of the instrument air (IA) system [LD]. These nitrogen accumulators also supply backup nitrogen to the Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) [V]. Follow up analysis has determined that the identified valve cycling would have exceeded the assumed nitrogen consumption rate and, without operator intervention, would have exhausted the accumulators prior to the credited 10 hour analyzed mission time.

One contributing cause of this event was that there is no periodic testing that confirms the stability of the BFCVs in the automatic flow control mode. No startup test exists where the system was allowed to shift the BFCVs to the flow control mode and control in this mode.

Waterford's Mike Mulligan Special NRC inspection Didn't Work?

Update 10/5

It is amazing how little the Louisiana media covers their nuclear power plants.  

The basic theme, why can't they always have a clean scram without complications? That is called safe.

Aug 10: Entergy's Waterford Plant In Trouble With Their Emergency Feedwater System

***I vociferously advocated...made a complaint... to the NRC, because of the additional employee needed to control SG water level and the backup feedwater control valve being outside licensing, they needed a license amendment request. The need public disclosure with this.

The NRC said because of compensatory action of calling the employee to the control room to just operate the BFCV the LAR wasn't needed 

So how did the compensatory action work for you?

You catch on a absolutely disgusting level the NRC allowed/allows the plants to continue operating with their feedwater system being outside licensing in Waterford and River Bend?   

Licensee Event Report (LER) 2015-004-00

Investigation has revealed that the components comprising the EFW flow control system were not configured to appropriately respond to the changes observed in the system operating parameters. Both EFW BFCVs cycled more than assumed in the nitrogen accumulator sizing calculation. The excessive cycling has the potential for exhausting the accumulators that power the ADVs and the EFW valves prior to their 10 hour analyzed mission time in the event of a loss of IA. Periodic testing to confirm the stability of the BFCVs in the automatic flow control mode has not been performed. It was concluded that it is likely that the EFW FCVs and the ADVs have been inoperable for the time in which the reactor operated in the modes requiring applicability during the three year time period leading up to this event.

You need the operator to be on station within seconds... 

Operations has issued a standing order to implement a manual compensatory action for this condition. This requires that an additional operator to be stationed to operate the BFCVs in manual following a reactor trip to establish and maintain the SG water level in accordance with emergency procedures.

***Hmm, so a feed pump caused a plant trip on June 3, then another feedwater pump trip during shortly after the scram on 10/3…

River Bend had tons of feedwater pump trips leading to a special inspection.

Why is Waterford having so many feedwater pump trips.

“Employee Sabotage: Knocking Off Line The Waterford Nuclear Plant?”

Maybe the question is, we need a feedwater pump trip special inspection at Waterford...

***My bad, the Mike Mulligan special inspection occurred at River Bend, not Waterford.  

I know what happened, the NRC didn't force Waterford before restart to fix their tremendously leaking feedwater regulation valves. They are afraid to inconvenience a terribly operating plant.

Like how effective is the Mike Mulligan Waterford Special inspection. Looks like it tripped on a runaway reactor vessel level.

The problem is, you tweek the components and procedures...how do you know it all worked? You start the plant up and trip it. If something doesn't work, you tweek and test it again. It is a testing régime until it is fixed.

The guys are having a lot of plant trips...indicator of general incompetence.

If reflects on the NRC in they don't make these guys fix the plant right the first time...    

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51447
Facility: WATERFORD Region: 4 State: LA Unit: [3] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [3] CE NRC Notified By: LEIA MILSTER HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN	Notification Date: 10/04/2015 Notification Time: 03:51 [ET] Event Date: 10/03/2015 Event Time: 23:07 [CDT] Last Update Date: 10/04/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
3	A/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP "At 2307 CDT Waterford 3 experienced an automatic reactor trip and all Control Element Assemblies (CEAs) inserted into the core. The cause of the automatic reactor trip is currently under investigation. "The plant is currently in Mode 3 [Hot Standby] and stable with Main Feedwater feeding and maintaining both Steam Generators. Main Feedwater Pump 'A' tripped subsequent to the reactor trip. Emergency Feedwater actuated following the plant trip as expected, but was not required to maintain Steam Generator level. "The plant entered the Emergency Operating Procedure for an uncomplicated reactor trip and has now transitioned to the normal operating shutdown procedure." Unit 3 is in a normal post trip electrical lineup. The Main Condenser is in-service removing decay heat.. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51448
Facility: MILLSTONE Region: 1 State: CT Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3