Nearly Identical To Pilgrim’s SRVs: 71% Target Rock Two Stage SRV Tech Spec Failure Rate

These are the 2 stage SRVs that replaced Pilgrim's 3 stage SRVs…they would be the same size 2 stage as Pilgrim? I doubt anyone is happy staying with the 2 stage?

***I would say Hope Creek's SRVs are identical to Pilgrim.

Part 21 on Pilgrim's 3 stage

While we have yet to determine if a specific defect exists, the following plants were supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:

- Pilgrim (Model 09J-001) Quantity Shipped = 8

- Fitzpatrick (Model 09H-001) Quantity Shipped = 4, Quantity on order= 8

- Hatch 1 and 2 (Model 09G-001) Quantity Shipped= 24, Quantity on order= 12

The following plants will be supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:

- Hope Creek (Models 14J-001, 14J-002) Quantity on order = 7

I hear rumor the borrowed Pilgrim 2 stage SRV valves come from Hope Creeks. Would it make a difference if they came from Hope Creek?  

Originally posted on 9/3 

Update 9/3, 2015

***Until recently there has been very little srv setpoint testing failures at Hope Creek. The last three operating periods sit outside the normal. The first two operating period consist of three or four SRV setpoint testing failures, while the last setpoint testing failures has 10 failed SRVs. Why are the failures skyrocketing? What has changed to cause this.    

You can't do a SRV lift setpoints accuracy test up at power. You have to shutdown to test these valve. If one of Pilgrims SRV valves was known to be outside their plus or minus 3% tech spec limit, they would be required to shutdown within 24 hours.

This exact problem with repeated two stage Target Rock inaccuracy setpoint testing problems at Hope Creek...the ones in the Pilgrim plant now... is the reason why Pilgrim dumped their two stage SRV valves and jumped into their defective three stage SRVs valves.

You get it, Target Rock hasn't made nuclear plant grade two or three stage safety relief valves for many decades. They are out of manufactor for decades. Currently the whole USA nuclear fleet (BWRs) gets their reliefs from canceled or decommissioning plant junk yards.

Current one of the Hatch plants is trying to get out of the unreliable Target Rock two stage SRV valves. They installed three Target Rock three stage relief valves in their plant in anticipating shifting all of their 12 Two stage reliefs into three stage. They are testing the reliability of the three stage reliefs. The issue of unreliable three stage relief  at Pilgrim had delay shifting over to all three stage reliefs in the Hatch nuclear plants.

***There is a fix to corrosion bonding or welding on inaccurate setpoint testing with the safety relief valves. You open and shut them once for a bi monthly or monthly bases during the operating period. The problem of this is duty of monthly testing is really the two or three stage Safety Relief Valves are too delicate for installation in these nuclear plants. They are a obsolete technology. They would quickly start to leak much like Pilgrim and then leakage would drive the valves into breaking and not operating when called upon. These utilities would begin to lie to stay up power with leaking valves saying they will definitely operative...then they won't. Then you got regulatory issues like Pilgrim today. As for today, we make believe this valves are operational when they are not. Lying, cheating and not telling the whole truth has a high probability of damaging the whole safety culture in a nuclear plant.***

***We really need a new bullet proof design for safety relief valves. We could beat the hell out of these valves without them degrading and not passing setpoint testing for many years. We can keep these valves in the plant for many operating cycles without excessive burdens with testing and maintenance.***

LER: As-Found Values for Safety Relief Valve Lift Set Points Exceed Technical Specification Allowable Limit

On June 2, 2015, Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) received initial results of the 'as-found' setpoint testing for the safety relief valve (SRV) pilot stage assemblies. The initial results indicated that three SRV pilot stage assemblies had exceeded the lift settings prescribed in Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.2.1. The TS requires the SRV lift settings to be within +/- 3% of the nominal setpoint value. During the nineteenth refueling outage (H1R19), all fourteen SRV pilot stage assemblies were removed for testing at an offsite facility. Between June 2 and June 1 O, 2015, HCGS received the test results for the remainder of the SRV pilot valve assemblies. A total of ten of the fourteen SRV pilot stage assemblies experienced setpoint drift outside of the TS 3.4.2.1 specified values. All of the valves failing to meet the limits were Target Rock Model 7567F two-stage SRVs. This is a condition reportable under 1 O CFR 50. 73{a)(2)(i)(B) as an Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications.

The cause of the setpoint drift for the ten SRV pilot stage assemblies is attributed to corrosion bonding between the pilot disc and seating surfaces, which is consistent with industry experience. This conclusion is based on previous cause evaluations and the repetitive nature of this condition at HCGS and within the BWR industry.

Technical evaluations performed to assess the aggregate safety significance of ten SRVs with out of tolerance initial lift setpoints concluded that this condition had no safety significance.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRRENCE

During the nineteenth refueling outage (H1R19) at Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS), all 14 Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (SRV) pilot stage assemblies {SB/RV} were removed and tested at NWS Technologies. The SRVs are Target Rock Model 7567F two-stage SRVs. During the period from June 2, 2015 through June 10. 2015, HCGS received the results of the 'as-found' set pressure testing required by Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.4.2.2. A total of ten of the 14 SRV pilot stage assemblies had setpoint drift outside of the required

TS 3.4.2.1 tolerance values of +/-3% of nominal value. The 'as-found' test results for the ten SRVs not meeting the TS requirements are as follows:

Valve ID As Found TS Lift Setting Acceptable Band % Difference

(psig) (psig) (psig) Actual

F013C 1216 1130 1096.1 -1163.9 7.61%

F013F 1240 1108 1074.8 -1141.2 11.90%

F013G 1208 1120 1086.4 - 1153.6 7.86%

F013H 1148 1108 1074.8-1141.2 3.60%

F013J 1161 1120 1086.4 -1153.6 3.66%

F013K 1161 1108 107 4.8 -1141.2 4.80%

F013 L 1165 1120 1086.4 -1153.6 4.00%

F013 M 1207 1108 1074.8 -1141.2 8.90%

F013P 1221 1120 1086.4 -1153.6 9.00%

F013R 1169 1120 1086.4 -1153.6 4.38%

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of the setpoint drift for the ten SRV pilot stage assemblies is attributed to corrosion bonding between the pilot disc and seating surfaces, which is consistent with industry experience. This conclusion is based on previous cause evaluations and the repetitive nature of this condition at HCGS and within the BWR industry.

My 2013 Petition On Pilgrim Asking for Everyone To Come To Terms Over Bad SRVs

I presented this 2.206 to the regional officials at the SRV white finding public meeting this summer. I asked them why didn't you move on this 2.206 petition. They said, "at the time there was no evidence available to show the SRVs were inoperable or broken to anyone. This 2.206 was just based on wishful thinking." Everything in this 2.206 has come to be true post Jan storm Juno and the resulting NRC investigations.

I have these conversations recorded...

From: Michael Mulligan [mailto:steamshovel2002@yahoo.com]

Sent: Thursday, March 07, 2013 12:33 PM

Yep, I was desperately trying to get people to believe what I was saying. Took a shot at getting the Boston Globe involved. 

To: newstip~globe.com; NRC Allegation

Subject: 2.206: Pilgrim Nuclear Plant SRV Request for Emergency Shutdown 

Dear sir, 

I called this into your hotline by telephone and left a message to a reporter an hour or so ago. This is just a follow-up. 

I'd like to get Gov Patrick to demand an immediate Pilgrim shutdown and demand a special investigation of these events. 

Mike 

So the below is my 2.206 request to the NRC. You'd do me a favor if the BG calls our region I public relation people.. .Neil Shaheen.

March 7, 2013

This was shortly after storm Nemo...

Bill Borchardt

Executive Director for Operations

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

Dear Mr. Bochardt, 

Request an emergency and for a exigent bases, that the Pilgrim Nuclear plant be immediately shut down.

Don't tell me just before Nor'easter Nimo struck the Pilgrim plant with a leaking safety relief valve and down at 80%, Entergy was intending to operate that plant with a defective leaking safety relief valve till the next refuel outage. Tell it ain't so. It certainly looks like with the current leak today that are intending to operate till next month. 

Is the game plan today to incrementally increase reactor power from 94% by 1% to see if a new SRV leak is getting worse? 

Timeline: 

1) New three stage safety relief valves installed in the plant around May 2011. 

2) First leak and shut down on Dec, 26. 2011 (SRV RV-203-3D). 

3) Second leak and shut down on Jan 20, 2013 (SRV RV-203-3B). 

4) Third leak occurred a few weeks later and the Nemo blizzard tripped the plant...the NRC promised these valves would be fixed. (SRV RV-203-3B).

5) Basically they operated for 20 days at 100% power operation post shutdown, then reported on Feb 27 the plant is operating at 94% power with no explained reason until today. The reason for the down power was kept secret from the public. Don't forget the repetitive nature of the recently broken scram discharge volume vent and drain valves...implies Entergy is incapable of maintaining safety components of a nuclear plant. 

The repeated nature of the failures of the safety relief valves means Entergy doesn't know the mechanism of the failure...it is a common mode failure. The design and manufacture of these valves are defective and it is extremely unsafe to operate a nuclear plant with all safety relief valves being INOP. A condition adverse to quality... 

The NRC should have made a public comment about the new leaking safety relief when they first became aware of the leak. The implication is the agency was going to allow the plant to operate with unsafe SRVs until the refueling outage next month. The NRC is involved in a serious cover-up of an extremely unsafe operation of a nuclear power.

1) Request an immediate shutdown the Pilgrim Plant. 

I called for a big special inspection in early 2013. One wonders if the NRC a full scale special inspection in 2013; would Pilgrim not have a permanent shutdown hanging over their head today?

2) The is the second time I requested a special NRC inspection concerning the defective SRV valves.  

3) Not allow the plant to restart Pilgrim until they fully understand the past failure mechanisms of the four bad new three stage safety relief valves. 

4) Request the OIG investigate this cover-up to keep an unsafe nuclear plant at power.

References: 

The Popperville Town Hall (my blog):

http://steamshovel2002. blogspot.com/ 

"Pilgrim's Safety Relief Valve Leaking Boondoggle"

http: //steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2013/02/pilgrims-safetyrelief-valve-leaking.html

Sincerely,

Michael Mulligan

PO Box 161

Hinsdale, NH 03541

16033368320

steamshovel2002@vahoo.com

Boston Globe's Editorial On The Pilgrim Closing

I am convinced now the NRC has to give me a fair hearing on the installed 2 stage SRVs. Here I trying to petition "old Abe"(Lincoln) to start asking questions. If he begins asking just one question to Entergy or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on this, the whole "House of Cards" will collapse. I love that Netflix series.

Knowing the corrupt NRC, they will throw it into a official investigation forever to be lost in the belly of beast organization. 

From: Michael Mulligan <steamshovel2002@yahoo.com>

To: dabel@globe.com   

Today at 10:40 AM 

These guys (nuclear industry) are so huge and corrupt...they don't fear lying right to your face and they hold such political power. They have total control of the information. I wonder about you? The size of the cover-up going on here is mind boggling. What would you do to survive and feed your family? Most of the horrors of the world are created though/by doing so called "altruism", "doing good" or "for work or having a paycheck". In the name of protecting and providing for our families.    

My complaint is entered on the NRC's Blog. I have been ahead of these guys for years now: 

http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov/2015/10/14/entergy-to-nrc-pilgrim-nuclear-power-plant-to-cease-operations/#comments 

Entergy to NRC: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant To Cease Operations

My blog:

http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2015/10/nrc-blog-current-pilgrims-2-stage-srvs.html 

Mike Mulligan

Hinsdale, NH

I hear a letter to Governor Baker of Massachusetts with this is on the way? Is he a Republican?   

After Pilgrim closes, a nuclear graveyard

By The Editorial Board   October 14, 2015

Critics of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth — and there are many — have long portrayed it as a catastrophe waiting to happen. Their doomsday scenarios depict an accident or terrorist attack that causes a massive radiation leak, forcing a panicked evacuation of Southeastern Massachusetts and Cape Cod. But Entergy Corp.’s announcement Tuesday that the Louisiana-based company will shut down the Pilgrim plant by June 2019 — and probably earlier — was about an impending financial disaster, not safety. Cheap natural gas, a push to bring hydropower from Canada, and the huge investment needed to upgrade the 43-year-old plant all combined to turn a nuclear dinosaur into a white elephant. Entergy estimates Pilgrim will lose about $40 million this year, and the projections beyond that aren’t any better.

Unlike the closing of other kinds of businesses — like a retail store or factory — there is no sense of finality in Entergy’s decision to pull the plug on Pilgrim. If anything, it raises more questions, offers few answers, and will demand vigilance by federal regulators, state leaders, and local officials. For starters, Pilgrim remains online now and could keep generating power for nearly four more years. That’s a concern, especially since the Nuclear Regulatory Commission last month lowered the plant’s safety ranking following unplanned shutdowns and chronic problems with pressure valves, demoting it to one of the three worst-performing nuclear power facilities in the United State.

Bill Mohl, president of Entergy Wholesale Commodities, said during a press conference in Plymouth that Entergy “will continue to work with the NRC under its enhanced oversight, with safety and security being our top priority.” Given the plant’s lame-duck status and dodgy track record, his scripted promise provides little comfort to those who live in the vicinity of Pilgrim.

Mohl said a permanent shutdown could come as soon as spring 2017 — if a scheduled refueling is scuttled — but even then, Pilgrim will hardly be history: Decommissioning takes decades. The most immediate worry is the security of several thousand spent fuel rods that sit in a water-filled pool built in the 1970s. Entergy has started transferring some rods to fortified concrete casks that can hold 360,000 pounds apiece. It’s unclear how the shutdown will affect that process, which, like everything associated with nuclear power procedures, is agonizingly slow. So-called dry cask storage has been used at other commercial nuclear plants for nearly 30 years, but the antinuclear coalition Cape Cod Bay Watch says the siting of the containers at Pilgrim, some only about 200 feet from the Atlantic Ocean, makes them vulnerable to the effects of climate change. However the old fuel is stored, it is staying put for a long time in what will become a nuclear graveyard — the NRC’s much-maligned plan to build a central waste storage facility at Yucca Mountain in Nevada lost federal funding years ago.

Beyond safety issues, taking Pilgrim off the grid will drastically reduce the region’s clean energy output. It accounts for about 84 percent of Massachusetts’s noncarbon-emitting energy. Entergy says a gas-powered plant generating the same amount of electricity, enough to power 600,000 homes, would produce 1.6 million tons of greenhouse gases annually. The shutdown provides momentum for the renewable-energy bills filed by Governor Charlie Baker that would make it easier to bring in hydropower from Canada and increase incentives for solar power. It could also reinvigorate efforts to construct offshore wind turbines. Those initiatives, though laudable, don’t lessen the need to expand the region’s gas pipeline capacity. But natural gas proposals, like the 188-mile pipeline Kinder Morgan Inc. wants to construct through parts of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, face opposition from environmentalists and would cost ratepayers.

Locally, the closure will deliver a moderate economic blow to Plymouth, including the loss of many of the 600 full-time jobs at Pilgrim, but municipal officials say they have been preparing for the day when the plant would cease to operate. Prior to the state’s deregulation of the utility industry in the 1990s, money from Pilgrim covered 25 percent of the town’s budget, keeping taxes low and sparking what was essentially a subsidized growth spurt. As Plymouth’s economic base grew and diversified, the town became far less reliant on plant revenue. Today, the $9.25 million that Entergy contributes in lieu of taxes accounts for about 5 percent of the community’s $200 million annual budget, and the company will still have to make payments of an undetermined amount even after the reactor is turned off.

Speaking in Plymouth after breaking the news to Entergy employees this week, a grim-faced Mohl said closing the plant was “a choice of last resort.” But make no mistake, this ending is in many ways just a beginning. Spent nuclear fuel remains dangerous for 250,000 years.

The Marcellus Natural Gas Monster is Choking On Insufficient Transmission Pipelines

America's Biggest Shale Gas Field Is Choking on Its Own Supply

The flow of natural gas from the nation’s biggest reservoir is close to dropping below last year as pipeline capacity fails to keep up with surging production. 

For the first time since the shale boom began in 2007, output from the Marcellus shale basin in Pennsylvania and West Virginia is faltering. While Appalachian pipeline capacity will more than double this year, it’s not happening quickly enough to keep the flow moving freely, according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance. 

Marcellus production has surged more than 14-fold in the past eight years. Now, drillers are awaiting seven new Appalachian pipeline projects scheduled to enter service this quarter, with eight more scheduled for 2016, according to Range Resources Corp., a Fort Worth, Texas-based producer active in the Marcellus. 

“The Marcellus is now totally infrastructure-constrained,” said Charles Blanchard, an analyst at BNEF in New York. “All through 2015, it couldn’t manage to get any incremental production out.” 

How 2015 is looking compared with previous years

Gas has tumbled 13 percent this year as mild weather limits demand and stockpiles approach a record. Without declining production and rising consumption by power plants, the price slump might have been even more pronounced. 

Marcellus gas production may slip 1.3 percent in November to 15.892 billion cubic feet a day from October, compared with 15.699 billion a year earlier, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s monthly Drilling Productivity Report. Output is poised to drop for four straight months. 

Even as the dearth of pipelines prevents some supplies from reaching high-demand markets, gas production is still set to climb this year, and there’s a chance it won’t dip below 2014 levels. 

“We’re on the cusp,” Blanchard said. ”But you have new pipelines coming in. Everyone hopes to finish these projects before the heating season in November.”

NRC Blog: Current Pilgrim's 2 Stage SRVs Are Not Safe And A Continuing Cover-Up

Oct 16 update

Would it make a difference?

The rumor going on has it Pilgrim’s 2 stage SRVs have been borrowed from this Hope Creek’s SRV disaster?  All three of the test 3 stage SRVs failed lift testing and 71% of their 2 stage failed also. Check out the date I wrote my blog entry. Would it make a difference to Pilgrim's continued operation if they had Hope Creek 2 stage SRV in the plant? 

Nearly Identical To Pilgrim’s SRVs: 71% Target Rock Two Stage SRV Tech Spec Failure Rate

I like the concept of DG load testing. They test these guys monthly or so at full design load. They don’t test these guys at say 5% full plant design load. We got big quality troubles with both the 2 stage and 3 stage Target Rock safety relief salves. These failures are sending us a big signal something has to done about these problem. 

As most BWR plants during the worst case design accident…very infrequent…these Safety Relief Valves could/will have to be cycled up to 400 times. I don’t think the current testing regime covers this worst duty at all. How do we know how these delicate valves will behave after 100 cycle in a short period time and environment? We are talking science and engineering here? 

I’d be test cycling a hunk of these valves some 400 times...one valve 400 times per outage.  This is how the engineers screw the operations people when the plant is in the clutches of a terrible designed accident…they don’t have our backs. Nope, seeing how important these guys are when 99% of the safety systems have been wiped off the table and unavailable, I be regularly test cycling these guys 800 times just to make sure something is working when everything else is gone.  

By the way, I got a great question for everyone. They say test stand lift or pressure testing damaged the internal just before going into the Pilgrim plant. Why hasn’t the damaged proliferated to the other BWR plants who also used this test stand or similar? Why haven’t I seen problems similar to Pilgrim’s throughout the industry whose use similar test stand set-ups, testing regimes or procedures? 

Sincerely, 

Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH 

http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/

This is the NRC response to me. Mr Sheenan is a public relation NRC official. He has little contact with technical information and the plant itself...especially hands on experience with things going on in the plant.      

The NRC conducted an annual Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection sample at Pilgrim related to installation of these 2-stage safety relief valves (SRVs). As documented in the inspection report: 

• Entergy removed all four 3-stage SRVs and replaced them with refurbished 2-stage SRVs. 

• The 2-stage SRVs are of a design that is in use at other industry boiling water reactors. 

• The inspectors reviewed design documentation associated with this change. The inspectors determined that the modification and design of these 2-stage SRVs are consistent with Pilgrim’s design and licensing bases. 

• The inspectors observed surveillance testing of the 2-stage SRVs during startup from the last refueling outage, and observed proper operation when actuated manually from the main control room. 

• The inspectors concluded that the 2-stage SRV design did not invalidate any existing commitments or requirements.
Based on our inspection, we determined that use of the 2-stage SRVs was acceptable.
Neil Sheehan

My response?  

If I knew what plant those SRVs came from, then I could do an Adams look-up on the operational history of that model and the particular valves to see how safe they are? This unnecessary secrecy implies a cover-up in itself.  

Did they come from Vermont Yankee?

Why didn’t Energy just refurbish their old two stage 2010 valves to save money?

Are the SRVs in the plant now identical to the pre 2010 ones? Cause if not, they needed a 10 CFR 50:59 and LAR. As you know, these valves could operate perfectly in another plant, but be inappropriate in Pilgrim. Our domestic fleet of nuclear plants are basically a design one off...each are mostly a unique design?  

Blog: The inspectors observed surveillance testing of the 2-stage SRVs during startup from the last refueling outage, and observed proper operation when actuated manually from the main control room. Basically the 3 stage SRVs were unfit to be in an operating reactor plant.

They did exactly the same test at the beginning of the last operating period with the 3 stage SRVs and nobody ever discovered that the three SRVs were nonfunctional and required an immediate emergency shutdown. Was there NRC observers there on that test? 

There is increasingly widening gulf between what is documented in an “inspection report” and what really is going on in the plant. This is the story of the SRVs, Pilgrim and the NRC since 2010.

So we are going to make believe Entergy never wrote this 2010 evaluation and the document isn’t in the docket?

• “The SRVs require replacement because the current two-stage Target Rock SRVs have been unreliable performers with respect to leaking while in-service and the subject of setpoint drift. SRV pilot valve leakage has led to multiple plant shutdowns and the setpoint drift problem resulted in exceeding current TS limits and numerous Licensee Event Reports (LERs). It has been determined that pilot valve leakage is due to low simmer margin and high as-found lift setpoints are due to corrosion bonding at the pilot valve disc/seat. To address current SRV performance problems, Entergy has performed extensive investigations and feasibility studies. The preferred option for correcting these problems is to replace all SRVs and SSVs during the next refueling outage. RFO-1 8 is currently planned to start on or about April 17, 2011.”  

The NRC put it up on the blog...I am actually impressed with their transparency.

Entergy to NRC: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant To Cease Operations

Part 1 continuing 

By the way, I am impressed with the NRC for allowing me to discuss problems like this on your blog. 

Am I the only one reading documents submitted by Entergy to the NRC anymore? Does the NRC keep up with reading pertinent documents like Pilgrims 2010 SRV License Amendment Request? They are shifting from the 2 stage to the defective and dangerous 3 stage SRV. We now have these 2 stage reliefs back in Pilgrim?? 

Basically Entergy says the valves currently in the plant are dangerous, leak and unsafe in the below 2010 LAR document. These valves drift outside the tech spec set point often requiring a immediate shutdown wink, wink. But these dangerous degradations are undetectable at power. This is why we went to the 3 stage SRV. You might have inop two or more valves each requiring a immediate safety shutdowns, but the plant can’t detect the dangerous deterioration. Don’t be confused, I am not talking about the 3 stage SRV removed from the plant last spring…these are the guys in the plant right now.

“Proposed License Amendment to Technical Specifications: Revised Technical Specification for Setpoint and Setpoint Tolerance Increases for Safety Relief Valves (SRV) and Spring Safety Valves (SSV), and Related Changes”March 15, 2010 

The SRVs require replacement because the current two-stage Target Rock SRVs have been unreliable performers with respect to leaking while in-service and the subject of setpoint drift. SRV pilot valve leakage has led to multiple plant shutdowns and the setpoint drift problem resulted in exceeding current TS limits and numerous Licensee Event Reports (LERs). It has been determined that pilot valve leakage is due to low simmer margin and high as-found lift setpoints are due to corrosion bonding at the pilot valve disc/seat. To address current SRV performance problems, Entergy has performed extensive investigations and feasibility studies. The preferred option for correcting these problems is to replace all SRVs and SSVs during the next refueling outage. RFO-1 8 is currently planned to start on or about April 17, 2011. 

Mike MulliganHinsdale, NH

http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/

Part 2 

Entergy's LER: Notice how Entegy is allow to pick and choose what information they release to the public? They aren’t required to explain the vulnerabilities and defective 2 stage design outlined in their 2010 LAR going into the plant after the 2015 spring outage. 

“All SRV body/bases were removed from the system during the current refueling outage. In place of the four SRV's removed from the plant during the current refueling outage, PNPS has installed 2-stage SRV's” 

This is a brazen cover-up on top of the first cover-up. It is mind boggling.

Inspection Report 2015-002, is this a full and accurate statement considering how defective and unsafe Entergy identified the 2 stage in the 2010 LAR? Should the residents discussed the limitation of the 2 stage in 2015-002-02?

“The inspectors concluded that the 2-stage SRV design did not invalidate any existing commitments or requirements.”

They are used valves from another plant and Entergy has indication this model valve is defective and dangerous in their 201O LAR. They certainly aren’t new. They basically grab them from a nuclear plant junk yard. They aren't being manufactured today.

Entergy Senior Communication Specialist Lauren Burm: “Burm said four new safety relief valves were installed during a recent refueling and refitting of the reactor.”

Seriously Bill, is this statement true? 

Bill Mohl, president of Entergy Wholesale Commodities: “Mohl said that the plant has previously addressed the safety relief valve issue and the plant is operating safely”. 

Again the skimpy information gives Entergy the advantage to keep operating with a poorly designed component and dangerous. You notice both sides of the story; this is why Pilgrim needs the valve and this is the vulnerabilities of the design of the valve? You decide if it is safe or not. The NRC never treats us as adults. 

NRC Public Affairs specialist: “The plant has since replaced all four valves...” 

Part 3 

As a compensatory action for the defective and dangerous SRV 2 stage SRVs outlined in the 2010 LAR: 

I request Pilgrim to shutdown for any indication of a leaking SRVs or any out of normal temperature reading of a tailpiece. I request Pilgrim to shutdown quarterly in order to detect the outside setpoint 3% plus or minus required tech spec vulnerabilities and unreliabilities. 

The OIG was really was involved with this…I request a outside the OIG and NRC investigation of this whole mess. 

It all leads to this…I am asking the NRC now. Is the 2 stage SRVs now installed in Pilgrim safe? Does these valves meet all codes and rules…do they meet the highest ethical and nuclear professional obligations. Could you direct me to a current comprehensive engineering document discussing all the historic safety limitation of the currently installed 2 stage SRV valves and the compensatory action? 

Sincerely, 

Mike Mulligan  

Hinsdale, NH

http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/

Dresden's Broken Electromatic Relief Valves?

You get it, two different component manufacturers for parts in the same model valve: GE Hitachi and Dresser Industries. Two different components on the same model valve being defective and cause the safety valve not to work. One is on a actuator and the other is on the cutoff switch.

Seem like very similar problems...the component parts are defective or improper maintenance. Got tiny parts dimensional problems, alignment, spring force problems, vibration, bushing issues and guild post misalignment. It's is basically defective internal component problem.

Kinda sounds like Pilgrim SRVs and Oyster Creek electromatic relief valves small internal component or parts problems too? 

PART 21 REPORT - ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE (EMRV) CUTOUT SWITCH

GENERAL ELECTRIC HITACHI

"Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 1804 [CDT], General Electric Hitachi (GEH) notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS [Dresden Nuclear Power Station], Units 2 and 3. "The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the

failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent roper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring.

"Identification of Facility and Component: DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001 "Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created): Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function. Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function "Plants with similar GEH cutout switches: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station."

LER 2015-002-02: 2C ERV Failed to Actuate duringExtent of Condition Testing

Dn February 7, 2015, with the reactor in mode 4, an Electromatic Relief Valve (ERV) actuator failed to open during the prerformance of an extent of condition test. The testing involved an operator manually actuating the ERV from the main control room with operators and engineers staged in the field. However, when the demand signal was given, the 20 actuator plunger did not move and the valve did not open. Th

The failed ERV actuator sub-components were inspected in the field and immediately following removal. Based upon the in-field inspection, the 2C ERV actuator's binding point was identified to be at the top of the guide post below the top of the top guide post bushing. PowerLabs performed a failure field inspection, the 2C ERV actuator's binding point was identified to be at the top of the guide post below the top of the top guide post bushing. PowerLabs performed a failure

NRC mechanical binding was determined to have been caused by preferential wear between the guide post and bushing due to an alignment issue. The 20 ERV actuator had measurable material loss on the bushing. The ERV actuator is normally open and de-energized. The bushings on the 20 were last replaced in 2005 per WO 636642. The wear due to actuation has been determined to be insignificant and is not related to the wear mechanism. The basis for the failure mechanism was determined by engineering inspection and a Powerlabs autopsy.

The preferential mechanical wear between ERV actuator sub components was determined to have been caused by the guide posts being in constant contact with the bushings during operation. The rigid guide post was noted to have been slightly angled away from the solenoid centerline, from the base of the post, with all base bolting completely intact and torqued, and interfering with the inside diameter of the bushing. These guide posts have sometimes been found slightly angled in previous WOs, requiring additional maintenance effort to bend the post into straight, concentric alignment with the bushing. Without this additional maintenance attention, the guide post and bushing would have had constant contact for the duration of cycle operation. The valve would have passed all as-left testing because the wear mechanism had not yet occurred.

Commonality of Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee's Shutdown Pressures

There was hanky-panky going on in Vermont with the politicians over Hydro Quebec and Gas Metro with the Vermont Yankee shutdown. Basically CVPS was bought out Gas Metro. CVPS was the largest electric utility in Vermont. Then Hydro Quebec came in and replaced VY’s electric load for the state Of Vermont. Trans Canada is big in our area. The Hydro Quebec power agreement over decades was notoriously loaded with Vermont political corruption and money. Hydro Quebec in New York and all though NE has for decades been trying to push out American electricity onto the border states. The Canadian energy electric power cabal has been trying desperately to push their electricity into our metropolitan high population areas such as NYC and Boston. 

I mean, because Entergy is so dependent on cheap natural gas fracking in Louisiana...could they really say anything negative about it. Who is the real foreigner in NE: Entergy or Canada. I know Canada in a lot closer?

Gaz Metro is a large energy corporation and Hydro Quebec is really an arm of the Canadian Government. What a powerhouse of influence.  Then Vermont has the Hydro Quebec line? Check out that new switchyard in Vernon VT?

In the early 1990s Vermont through political corruption bungled the Hydro-Quebec line power purchase agreement. The electricity was terribly overpriced and nearly led to the CVPS bankruptcy. I guess the state forced CVPS to purchase really expensive Hydro Quebec electricity. There were rumors of Vermont politicians exchanging money for Canadian electricity.  You remember the big ice storm, then Hydro Quebec electricity became unreliable because all their cheap and poorly design transmission towers. They mostly collapsed in the ice storm.

We had that big monster deregulation approaching in the late 1980s and early 1990s…we had a near political Vermont rebellion over the high priced electricity charged to the rate payers and especially for the republican Vermont businesses and ski areas. Basically eventually Maine Yankee failed and Millstone collapsed over the withdrawal of plant funding and maintenance. Massive regional nuclear power plant budget cutbacks, a weak NRC…gigantic nuclear employee intimidation. So CVPS came under intense pressure to reduce their electricity prices mostly by the businesses (IBM plant). They came up with the bright idea to cutback budgets to Vermont Yankee…easier than the politically protected really expensive green electricity and the smaller power plants. This is how I became a reluctant whistleblower at Vermont Yankee. Equipment started failing because of insufficient funding and maintenance, this cause the VY officials to be deceptive and out right lying to maintain capacity factor. Then off to the races when I sent a letter to the Vermont Governor complaining about it all.

The Entergy story about favored electric prices from Hydro-Quebec today…does the gigantic Canadian power house influencers such as Gaz Metro, Hydro-Quebec, the Canadian government, the Vermont Hydro Quebec line and the future NH Hydro-Quebec line…do they hold more sway over the form of our NE and NY electric grid and markets than we think.

I am just saying the extremely low worldwide petroleum prices are imploding the Canadian Tar Sands and their petroleum miracle. The Canadian stock index is in full rout.  Our natural gas fracking miracle is going to blow up the enormous Canadian electricity markets coming into NY and NE. Their Hydro-Quebec lines in Vermont and possibly in NH is junk because of the cheap and cheaper fracking nature gas. Just Look at the natural gas prices. I wouldn’t be making any expensive long term electricity contracts with anything greasy monied-hand Canadians today. Electricity prices are going to continue to decline for years especially as they build in the gas lines. Will the Canadian electricity exports to the USA go the way as their expensive petroleum exports…a collapse?  I think is going to be a historic electric USA/Canada transformation. Will we one day make big money exporting electricity to Canada?