"Mike Mulligan and the Hinsdale Route 119 bridge"

Updated Oct 17

Brigitte Mandel

Engineering and Operations Team Leader.

Federal Highway Administration HN....

It is too bad she talked to Washington. Her whole demeanor has changed...basically she says I trust everything the NH DOT says.

Basically I said after NH transportation system breaks down in the next two years or so...where the heck are you going to be? Who is going to hold you and your bosses accountable for doing nothing. So i ask her for he name. She himed and hawed, she said I don't want you saying something about me on your blog that is inaccurate. I said, I would let you say anything you want on my blog to defend yourself or your agency. She wouldn't give me her name. I said welcome to the United States of Russia where federal officials don't give their names because they are afraid bloggers will tell the truth. I told here I can't believe I live in the freest, most transparent and best nation on the planet...and a federal official refuses to give me her name when she is interacting with a member of the public in the interest of a federal agency...the federal Highway administration. I freaked out when she gave me this response. She told me her name, then I asked her to spell her name so I get it accurately. Then she said something like now you are making me upset...then she spelled her name.

That is the wide spread excuse for any state and federal officials' on the record....you can't hold me accountable because I can't defend myself on your blog....I won't give you my name. I hear this a lot with a lot of government agencies.

In the bad old days, they would just say screw you, I ain't giving you my name. They do the same thing today saying it more pleasantly, saying your are a blogger and you might say something inaccurate about me or the agency.

I have always been shocked by federal officials not being held accountable by staying or being on the record...the I ain't telling you my name because i don't feel safe telling you how we really work.

New OCT 16:
I just frame it like this...the condition of Route 119 pavement through Hinsdale is a abomination...it is a threat to our property values and businesses wanting to locate here, must be thinking twice with the condition of our main road. We are going to have a lot of road damage as we come into the spring warmup.  

Brattleboro/Hinsdale Bridge Unsafe

Fun with the NH DOT?

Severe staffing problems preventing bridge inspections (NH DOT)

Bridges: NH DOT 10 year plan

MMulligan: Best NH and USA Ambassador

Motorcycle Accident on Brats RT 119 bridge

How can they be sitting on this report for over a year...I got them to disclose the preliminary results. It is mind boggling they didn't immediately release the report! I made a accusation to the Federal Highway Administration that the NH DOT is severely overloaded and overwhelmed with road and especially bridge inspection issues..

Hello, Mr. Mulligan -

In response to your inquiry below, I have again attached my letter to you dated October 3, 2011 which states that the in-depth inspection was performed in the fall of 2011, just about one year ago. The engineering firm that performed this inspection, and the load rating based on those results, is AECOM, Inc., using staff from their Boston, MA, office. These preliminary reports are currently being reviewed by NHDOT Bridge Design staff.

I trust this adequately responds to your request below.

Regards, Mark W. Richardson, NHDOT Bridge Design

VY Turbine Lube Oil Vapor Extractor Plume

 Updated 6/30

Fukushima accident: March 11, 2011

The Vermont Yankee state liaison engineer documenting my concern....
　
I find it highly suspicious they can’t come up with a preliminary or back of a napkin estimation of the flow and the radioactive content in the plume.  

New Oct 18, 2011

The Vermont state nuclear engineer Uldis Vanags updated me on the results of my 2.206 and his investigation of the VY turbine lube oil vapor extractor fan radioactive release today. On Sept 12 Entergy wrote up a condition report CR-VTY-2011-03628 acknowledging they didn't ever have a analysis or technical evaluation of this release pathway with the vapor extractor discharge...never measured radiation...I wrote my 2.206 on Aug 26, 2011.

There is an expectation this pathway released radiation unmonitored...it is openly controversial now if their environmental reports ever were completely accurate.  Now it is a nationwide concern at BWRs if their radiological environmental reports were ever accurate if they had a LO vapor extractor...

 
It doesn't get passed any of us with the NRC answering me on Oct 4 "because the petition failed to provide sufficient facts to warrant further inquiy", while on Sept 12 Entergy wrote up CR-VTY-2011-036328 completely validating a response to my concern. Entergy has contracted with Areva nuclear to preform a investigation over this and measure vapor extractor radioactivity and evaluate if it reportable and radioactive environmental reports are accurate.

New Oct 17, 2011

Mr Kim,

For the PRB's interest, I got the Vermont nuclear engineer going into VY this week asking Entergy questions about the turb building plume and the vapor extractor.

mike

New Oct 12, 2011

Oh, I get it now, if Entergy and NRC don't have to disclose the facts, then there is never enough evidence for a 2.206 to be accepted.

Like I always have said, transparency is a enabler to meaningful public participation...

Mr. Mulligan,

On October 4, 2011, the PRB met internally to discuss the petition and to make the initial recommendation. The PRB determined that some of the petition requests do not meet the criteria for review because the petition failed to provide sufficient facts to warrant further inquiry. The remaining requests within the petition meet the criteria for rejection because they have already been reviewed, evaluated, and resolved by the NRC during prior 10 CFR 2.206 reviews. Therefore, the PRB’s initial recommendation is to not accept your petition.

Thanks

James Kim
Project Manager, DORL
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
301-415-4125

Yankee hearing leaves unanswered questions

" David McElwee, an Entergy engineer, told the legislative panel Tuesday that it was a result of rain washing off radiation from a roof on the turbine building, and getting into the storm drain. The ventilation problem was discovered in 1993, but there was no explanation about why the Cobalt 60 wasn't discovered until 1997."

By Susan Smallheer STAFF WRITER - Published: September 17, 2009

BRATTLEBORO – Entergy Nuclear refused to say Wednesday how Cobalt 60, a radioactive byproduct of the nuclear fission process, ended up in the Connecticut River in 1997, an issue that surfaced earlier this week during a legislative hearing on radiation monitoring at the Vermont Yankee plant.

Robert Williams said Entergy was preparing a report on the issue for the Committee on Administrative Rules and said it would decline further comment.

Williams said Cobalt 60 had gotten into the storm drains at Vermont Yankee and had ended up in the Connecticut River as a result of a ventilation problem, but he declined to say how the Cobalt 60 got out of the plant itself.

I bet you I am the first one in the history of Vermont Yankee who ever captured in a picture a steam or vapor plume emanating from the turbine or reactor building. My photograph of the any vapor plume was the first...

You can click on the Picasa link on the title...it is about 1.25 miles from my camera. You can keep clicking on the picture until it gets big enough for you.

The vapor extractor takes a suction on all the main turbine lube oil bearings. It looks like to me it sucks in main steam line reactor vessel steam. I think it provides a function like the main condenser where non condensables and other radionuclide congregate, basically increase concentration, then they go off for filtering and processing in the AOG system. I contend they are discharging reactor steam and vapor without radiological monitoring and the typical filtering that goes in AOG. It is bypassing the AOG. They got a grossly inaccurate radiological environmental report.

Remember, on a yearly bases this is huge amount of water....this goes on day in and day out.

There are many other BWR plants with the same setup. I think it is a national scandal with environmental reporting.

The plume (small) is behind the tall reactor rebuilding. It is on the roof of the shorter green turbine building, to the right of the reactor building.

Today the plume is heading directly towards Brattleboro Vermont...

Haboob around Palo Verde Nuclear Plant

Video: Three Arizona dust storms towered nearly 4,000 feet

...Wouldn't you like to see the security videos of the haboob?

...These plants went through a huge dust storm near phoenix Arizona. Everyone is wondering if the dust damaged delicate equipment in the plant...

 ...I would have called both DGs inop!

 ...So you got any design information that these machines could be run in that condition...

That would get you to the point of making the system make sure the DG could work in such a sand storm...

There would be a expectation these machine would quickly fail in this kind of storm...

I wouldn't require the plant to be shutdown...but I would want every vulnerable plant to be a able to deal with a sand storm...that is a notification...

 ...It calls in a lot of uncertainty...prove to me those DGs could say operating with such a dust load for say two hour and not clog up the intake filters...

If something new comes onto the scene and there is no proof of operability...then they are INOP...

 ...The storm blew off a school roof not far from the plant...Buckeye or something.

See, the rules cover very little what goes on at a complicated nuke plant, it more about what you do to behave conservatively...

At a minimum the plant should have made a report to the NRC we have a huge dust storm, we look stable now, but you should be warned in the unlikey case where something may goes wrong. Then the NRC should have communicate with their experts asking what could go wrong with the plant in a dust storm...

 ..."I think that the proof of burden is on the one making the claim that they will not work"...

There is no way a person can access inside the information to make a challenge based on the facts...so the poeple living around a plant have no constitutional rights in order to meaningfully protect their community...

...No access to information means no rights based a on facts based system...

It like you accuse me of bank robbery...you then lock me in jail incommunicado and you give me no opportunity of discovery. You pop me up in front of a judge who would fairly hear the case...but I got no legal advice and no ability to participate in the proceeding. You call that justice because I walk up to a judge without any preparation...

 ...Ok, so i called up the senior resident inspector and told him my concerns. He basically said most of the information is restricted and he explained the allegation process. He basically said the plant is covered by its environmental design bases and dust loads. I told him that language is hocus pocus and non specific. I basically said that is why we are in so much trouble...the agency basically throws me into these bureaucratic processes that never answers my question. You can never just ask a straight question man to man, then get a direct answer.

The senior inspector was a nice and decent guy...he was doing as much as he is allowed to say. I would like and respect him out in the street...I respect him for his position at the plant anyways. I get the feeling he was very knowledgeable and well spoken. I gave him a little taste of what the NRC is dealing with in NE. I was always respectful to him and the agency...professional and direct.

Anyways, I got him to make a official allegation about if the plant was covered in their design bases...ok'd the disclosure of my name and the agency could make a request to Palo Verde on my behalf...

Remember to talk about evacuation issues...who the Christ is out in the desert anyways and half their homes down that way is in foreclosure and abandoned...

I went by this plant a time or two on I-10

 ....I think the oil bath is better at taking out small quantities of dust, for long term maintenance consideration...not the loading you get from a haboob.

Ever experimented with running a DG in a haboob?

 ...Worst case somebody could plan a terrorist attacks around a haboob at a nuclear plant..say a illegal immigrant could signal the beginning of the attack...? He would know all the security cameras were inop!

See, i would want to see Palo Verde to be immediately thinking this was way abnormal, they knew it was coming, I am going to tell the NRC the possible vulnerabilities of the site. I would want everyone spun up and on alert, or at least on edge. Then if somebody would say boo to the NRC, they would have all the police and state police and special forces black helicopters heading to the site...they would train the satellites onto the plant. If the plant ran into operational problem the agency would be available with some big nuclear power NRC intellectual sources to help them...

Right, I want to see them have an after event serious engineering meeting at the site evaluation with senior staff asking, asking if there are any vulnerabilities with the dust storm and is everyone sure that if this happens again we would be certain all our system could handle another haboob...

I would want them inquisitive mad; why is this storm abnormal, what can we anticipate in the future..are there any peripheral issues we should consider as threats to plant operation and security...

I would want a such an important site like this always yearning and looking to the threats of the future...

Last time I did this shit I had a FBI special agent calling me by telephone saying I am a special agent of the FBI's JTTF, and I kid you not one bit, then he exactly said, "Mr Mulligan, the FBI needs to have a meeting with you "before the end of daylight today"...

Then he suggested meeting them in the Hinsdale NH police station...

After I hang up I thought the phone call was Liberian wackos trying to scam me for identity theft...lucky they gave me a call back number.

They were the real FBI!

Surry Nuclear plant

I just seen this, the rust color bother me thinking the rust is leaking out from the rebar, all this caulking got me wondering about how deep the cracks are...


http://weblogs.dailypress.com/news/science/dead_rise/surry%20again.jpg

U.S. Department of Homeland Security OIG hot line staff

I'll give you the down and dirty about nuclear power plant evacuation plans in the USA today.

Everyone knows it like pushing on a string, no organization or agency in the USA have the power and authority to enforce evacuation plan quality and order....

...I need to remind you about some employees in our government...say, our soldiers fighting for a cause greater than themselves...they are still dying on foreign lands and they are leaving their DNA identify in their blood spilt on foreign lands. Their names are almost daily seen up in media through their injury and deaths on our TV screens. These young heroes aren't accorded any privilege of anonymity...


This is a common theme I have recently heard in the bowels of governmental agencies. A lot of theses spineless bureaucrats our fixated on their personal security...fear of fruit cases and terrorist taking them and their families out...

I see it as them being cowards generally...they are using terrorism and internal fruit cases as the reason for not holding governmental employees and government in general accountable to the American public and voters.

...Do you really want that is the USA...terrorism being the excuse to distant government from its people? I see some gov employee not really having a fear of death and suffering, but some using this rationalization to protect themselves from scrutiny. The terrorist and killers then win...

Mr. Mulligan:

This is to acknowledge receipt of the information you e-mailed to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG). Our research has indicated that while FEMA evaluates the government’s ability to protect public health and safety, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) uses this information as part of its regulatory oversight responsibilities to make licensing decisions. The NRC operates a safety hotline number and may be reached at the following toll-free number at 800-695-7403, in the event that you would like to report an allegation regarding the Vermont Yankee evacuation drill.

We apologize for the quality of your recent encounter with our toll-free allegation hotline. It is our policy to thoroughly review all complaints and determine the appropriate course of action. In many instances, we refer information or complaints to a bureau, agency or office that will more appropriately respond to it. Any additional information that you wish to send regarding the matter should be sent to the agency below:


U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Office of Chief Counsel
500 C Street SW Suite 840
Washington, DC 20472

Regards,

The Hotline Staff

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Red Finding

"In regards to your issue with potential falsification of documents, the NRC characterized the subject Licensee Event Reports as inaccurate."

That makes the first NRC inspection report more falsified than inaccurate...

We'd be in a different world if it was illegal to make a incomplete or inaccurate LER or inspection report....

In the comment section are the e-mails to the NRC about my allegation...

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257

June 10, 2011

Mr. Mike Mulligan
steamshovel2002@yahoo.com

SUBJECT: ISSUES YOU RAISED TO THE NRC REGARDING THE BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT – FILE NO. RII-2011-A-0078

Dear Mr. Mulligan:

The NRC has completed its follow up in response to the issues you brought to our attention on April 10, 2011, regarding the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. You identified issues with the safety of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant and falsification of documents submitted to the NRC by the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.

In regards to the safety of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, the NRC determines its regulatory response in accordance with an Action Matrix that provides for a range of actions commensurate with the significance of performance indicators (PI) and inspection results. Browns Ferry Unit 1 was recently assessed to be in the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column of the NRC’s Action Matrix. The Action Matrix is intended to provide consistent, predictable, understandable agency responses to licensee performance. The actions of the matrix are graded such that the NRC becomes more engaged as licensee performance declines. The NRC can make adjustments to the inspection plan based on plant performance trends. For example, for plants that do not have all green PIs and inspection findings, the NRC will perform additional inspections beyond the baseline program. Both Green inspection findings and PIs allow for licensee initiatives to correct performance issues before increased regulatory involvement is warranted. White, Yellow, or Red inspection findings or PIs each, respectively, represent a greater degree of safety significance and therefore trigger increased regulatory attention. It should be noted that an individual Red input may indicate a performance issue that is significantly degraded. However, overall plant performance may not be unacceptable due to the defense-in-depth design of the plant.

In regards to your issue with potential falsification of documents, the NRC characterized the subject Licensee Event Reports as inaccurate. Documentation concerning our finding can be found in NRC Integrated Inspection Reports 2010003 (ML102110467) and 2010005 (ML110400431). Licensee Event Reports are inspected by the staff and, as with all inspection findings, willful aspects, which can include falsification, are considered. None of the LERs reviewed were determined by the staff to be willfully false or written with the intent to mislead the NRC.

Thank you for informing us of this matter. Should you have any questions, please call me at 1-800-577-8510 or you may provide information to me in writing at P.O. Box 56274 Atlanta, GA 30343.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Eugene F. Guthrie, Chief

Projects Branch 6

Division of Reactor P

Homeland Security OIG complaint on DHS OIG staff over VY Evac drill

Mulliganism Quote: This NRC and Homeland Security OIG mind bogging excessive legalese and legality...the blind massive do nothing government bureaucracy is solely about making congress...the House and Senate...unaccountable to the American public...

I think Congress wants a non functioning government....
A blind restless voter and public serves our national interest better!

From: Michael Mulligan
To: "DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov"
Sent: Monday, June 13, 2011 4:25 PM
Subject: OIG office being disrespectfull to a person who has a problem

Dear Sir,
About 2 pm this afternoon I was investigating issues around a defective nuclear plant evacuation drill surrounding the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant. My child is going to school in the Hinsdale NH high school and he notified me of evacuation drill deficiencies. I discussed the issues with his principle and documented his concerns. It is the closest NH school to the nuclear power plant. Basically I know these are FEMA issues.

I just have had issues with talking to somebody in FEMA about this and the contact information on the FEMA and Homeland security internet front page is poor. It seems to me that FEMA and the Homeland security people are too busy to really talk with the little people as me about their problems....the efficiency and effectiveness of government services to a regular little person. This is how my problems defaulted to the DHS OIG...

What really concerns me today was the disrespect with the intake people in the DHS OIG office to me. I explained I have been in a agency to agency shuffle for many months now and I am extremely frustrated.

Anyways, I became irritated with the intake person's language to me....the phone line seem to be disconnected and I heard a loud irritating scratchy noise on the line. The human conversation stopped and the intake person couldn't hear me any more. I hung up after a few minutes and called right back. The intake person acknowledged the drop line and scratchy noise before I could say boo. He said, I was on the speaker phone and a broken button or loose wire caused the drop line and scratchy line. He emplied he knows his phone is defective to many outside people and your office is too lazy and disrespectful to fix it. I can make a case he put me excessively on hold with the phone call.

My complaint is when your staff gets a troubled and frustrated taxpayer and member of the public who seems irrigating to the intake staff...your staff unprofessionally pushes the defective phone speaker button or loose wire in order to punish the troubled public mushrooms with a phone disconnect and a extremely loud scratchy noise. I would be sickened if you have a intentionally designed button to punish irritating members of the public in the DHS OIG...

My suspicions are with particular irritating complaint makers to the DHS OIG, the punishment bottom on the speaker phone gets pushed to many voters and tax payers. So what is the extent of conditions and cause with the phone disconnect and punishment buttons in government that disconnects public members? You got a trap door button in each of your offices for problem makers?

What my son reported to me: http://www.topix.com/forum/city/brattleboro-vt/TKU0863JM3H23RQ56

My investigation and names: http://www.topix.com/forum/city/brattleboro-vt/TP2JDLALC6F7B2SHD

What happened today: http://www.topix.com/forum/city/brattleboro-vt/T1H4OO09IDN570EQK

Sincerely,

Mike Mulligan
PO box 161
Hinsdale, NH
1-603-336-8320

BWR Torus Venting Scam

work in progress

BWR Torus Venting Scam
Remember complexity drives the system towards the counter intuitive direction and we are really talking about a extremely complex outcome with a meltdown and large public release. I see the vent as a risk amplification tool...i think its intention was to be that tool.

Maybe a facility use amplification tool...a tool to cloak the true understanding and knowledge of risk. A risk understanding disrupter.

Right, risk is a calculation of the relative worth of the safety systems and the design of the system, defined by the corporation.

But total risk is the design the facility, and how we maintain and operate the facility, and the human-machine interactionm and how the world interactes with with the plant.

Right, we could collectively turn off all the safety systems, meltdown the reactor and destroy or bypass all the containment.

Right, our risk calculations don't capture this possible human machine interaction...I am trying to make the case that all risk is not captured in our corporate risk calculation. Actually, it carries a very narrow sector of risk and it doesn't capture chaos theory and complexity. It doesn't understand true complexity.

I think as you go down the road of complexity you reach a point where a out come is not predictable and unknowable. A risk amplification tool is one that replaces uncertainty with illusory certainty.

Somebody really predicted large scale human responses...the torus hard vent path wasn't designed to vent the torus. It was designed to increase facility capacity factor. Its sole purpose was to increase corporate profits and it was the cheapest capacity factor increaser ever invented. They knew we would default into the primitive model or incomplete model with how system worked.

...Ok, so if you turned off the hardened vent input into the PRA and risk calculation what would happen? It would change the behavior of plant operations and the plant structure itself? Everything changes. Basically the harden vent in risk calculation says there has been a overall reduction in the risk at the top of the risk hierarchy...thus we got a chunk of global risk reduction we can play with to bring risk back up to the orginal limit. A case may now be made where you can say we can work with less redundancy, the NRC interaction with a utility is reduced, we accept larger infraction with a utility. So that chunk of harden vent path risk reduction is filled back up to its original level with global risk increases.

I don't how this is get played out, do we trade one full meltdown for 10 half meltdowns down the line, certainly we trade up to more plant upsets and more severe plant accidents?

We fill in that chunk of harden vent risk reduction with running the plant harder and at a higher capacity factor...or running the plant in more risk?

Browns Ferry red finding over RHR valve

Should we allow these gunslingers engineering firm without morals to support the nuclear industry...?

Is a engineering firm like a defense attorney where they can throw up any plausible story disconnected from the truth...or are engineers bound to tell the whole truth? Are engineers bound to tell the whole thruth, what about their engineering ethical obligation, or are they gunslingers for hire:

Southwest Research Laboratory (weld examinations)
Westinghouse Laboratory (valve component forensics)
Structural Integrity (thread strength analysis, sensitivity study)
Independent Burns & Roe metallurgist (aggregate review of forensics reports)
Idaho National Laboratory

Are you under a engineering ethics obligation to tell the truth when doing a RCA...?


Excerpts of my TVA safety complaint...

Associated Press

ATLANTA—Federal regulators on Tuesday ordered in-depth inspections at an Alabama nuclear-power plant after deciding the failure of an emergency cooling system there could have been a serious safety problem.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a rare "red" finding against the Tennessee Valley Authority's Browns Ferry nuclear plant, near Athens, Ala., after it investigated how a valve on a residual heat-removal system became stuck shut. Safety regulators said only five red findings—the most severe ranking the agency gives to problems uncovered in its inspections—have been issued nationwide in the past decade.

In an emergency, the failure of the valve could have meant that one of the plant's emergency cooling systems wouldn't have worked as designed. The problem, which was identified as the plant was being refueled in October 2010, was fixed before the reactor was returned to service.

"The valve was repaired prior to returning the unit to service, and Browns Ferry continued to operate safely," said Victor McCree, the NRC's Region II administrator. "However, significant problems involving key safety systems warrant more extensive NRC inspection and oversight."

It wasn't clear whether TVA officials would appeal the finding. TVA officials had attributed the valve to a manufacturer's defect and said it inspected all similar valves in the facility to catch any problems.

NRC officials were critical of the utility for not identifying the problem sooner through routine inspections and testing. The valve failed sometime after March 2009 but wasn't discovered until more than a year later.

As part of the upcoming inspections, the NRC said it will review the plant's performance, its safety culture and its organization.

"The results of this inspection will aid the NRC in deciding whether additional regulatory actions are necessary to assure public health and safety," Mr. McCree said in a letter to TVA officials.

Past problems at the plant have led to increased scrutiny. The Browns Ferry Plant is known in the industry as the site where a worker using a candle to check for air leaks in 1974 started a fire that disabled safety systems. It is similar in design to the reactors that malfunctioned at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant in Japan after an earthquake and tsunami this year.

The TVA, the county's largest public utility, supplies power to about nine million people in Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Kentucky, Georgia, North Carolina and Tennessee.

Vermont Yankee Emergency drill (May 3, 2011)

Update 8 am May 10

The Deputy Director of NH Homeland Security and Emergency Management says:

1) NH Don't do "out drills" because sending kids to Keene increases the risk to the kids (bus accident). This is patently ridiculous, it is like saying kids don't go off site with buses for sports and for invaluable off site educational experience because they can get into a bus accident...

They don't want to create a oppertunity of time test of the bus companies to get a fleet of buses to Hinsdale.

Where did the Hinsdale offical come up with the phrase "out drill"...

2) She said the drill wasn't completed at 11:30 as that contradicted Hasting and the command center...


Vermont Yankee Emergency drill (May 3, 201!)

How the information came to me

Information from a angry Hinsdale official

9 AM: Hinsdale got a phone announcement a VY drill was going to happen...everyone for days had been warned.

10 AM: alert to site area.

11:05: General Emergency and sending buses @ 11:45 AM

!!! it going to be a "full out drill" meaning the kids are going to Keene coming from the emergency command post...

High school immediately when into lunch mode for all the kids and then they all went to the auditorium in anticipation of going to Keene...

Absolutely no communications cues through the command post back channel with Hinsdale school officials...going to bus your kids out shortly after noon, you might want to feed the kids beforehand...

12:45 PM: Hinsdale got itchy with no communications and no buses yet, they called the emergency command post, Cliff Hasting said he called the drill completed at 11:30am. Hinsdale was never was called to say drill has been completely and canceled.

*** absolutely no communication with the Hinsdale school superintendent.

*** we don't think the Hinsdale elementary school was ever notified of anything, maybe the command post thew them a record message... it looks like the elementary school was completely out of the loop and fried.

*** seems to be rumors if you call the emergency command post right now there is still a loop recorded message saying VY is in a general emergency...

PWR Fukushima much worst than GE Mark 1

I don't think you can yet make the case this was a GE mark 1 centric event.

In other words, this outcome is rather mild to what would have happened if large PWR were sitting on the east coast of Japan.

I think the isolated loop of the PWR's primary system...this much higher pressure of the primary system, thus much harder to cool...

I think the PWRs would be a much more painful accident....

In other words, the core would have melted down much sooner and the pins would have skyrocketed to much higher temps...

I think tons more radiation would have been released to the world inviroment...

Brown's Ferry and TVA

Update:
April 4 public meeting...they got me on the phone bridge.

"Review of MOVAT testing data, combined with stellite aging research, strongly indicates that the disc separated prior to November 2008"

If you agree with TVA on this, the valve testing program for critical safety valves is ineffective. It missed a clear indication of a valve disc seperation over this, the NRC and TVA should have done a investigation on is movat a effective safety program....it looks totally dysfunctional to me according to the TVA’s own words. It should be a NRC violation.

Why hasn't anyone talked about fixing movats?

Like I said, there is micro difference in diameter of the disc and the seat, noise of the electrical lines suppling the valve motor, that would give you movat noise seen on the recording. You can only tell by looking at a bunch of movat testing recordings, whether these bumps are the real deal or noise. Did TVA just choose the pretty data?

Was the movat equipment calibrated properly...

Though, I just don’t find much certainty evidence that the disc would have unseated...all I see is the gunslinger pro nuclear industry engineering firms doing TVA’s bidding for money...

So let me get this straight, according to the NRC pilgrim’s inspection report 2011-008 dated from February 14 through March 4,2011, the HPCI diaphragm event happened before July 2010, why still no LER? Basically there is the same kind of issues with the delay of the reliefs valves thread LER with on two Vermont Yankee petitions on Entergy.

The Brown Ferry identical LER 2009-004 says the event date is 07 24 2009, the NRC says they made the document on sept 2009...why is Entergy having so much problems with pushing out LERs? The BF inspection report 2009-005 came out between October 1, 2009 through December 31, 2009

Just to be clear, the NRC drums out their inspection report on TVA in 3 months...while Pilgrim’s inspection takes 7 mouths, and they still don’t have the LER out...

It is just hit and miss and completely erratic with NRC inspection reports and utilities LERs ...

It just fascinating, so on the VY HPCI steam line leak and gasket issues on LER 2011-001...the event occurs on around Feb 17, 2011, Entergy pumps the LER out on April 14 (good as far a timeliness))....basically a petition maker forces the NRC to do a inspection on the gasket problem and the LER. It is object insanity! Now it seems the inspection report is mon
ths away...

...April 10..."By the way, I think Browns Ferry is the most dangerous plant it the nation and they have a culture of falsification of documents to the government. Check out their LER falsification. Matter of fact, you got a wide spread culture of falsification throughout the nuclear industry as outlined narrowly in the NRC OIG investigation on LERs and part 21..."

Mike Mulligan

Hinsdale, NH

From: "Lewis, Shani"

To: "steamshovel2002@yahoo.co m"

Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2011 8:12 AM

Subject: Your Concerns Regarding Browns Ferry

Mr. Mulligan,

This is to acknowledge our receipt of your e-mail dated April 10, 2011. We will respond specifically to the concerns you raised regarding the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant but first we need to verify that we can communicate with you via this e-mail address. Please reply to this email or call me at the number listed below to advise us of your preference going forward.

My name is Shani Lewis, Allegation Coordinator. You can contact me by calling 1-800-577-8510, extension 4461 or communicate with me via e-mail, Shani.Lewis@nrc.gov. Please also be advised that we cannot protect the information during transmission on the Internet and there is the possibility that someone else could read your and our responses while it is transmission.

Shani A. Lewis
Allegation Coordinator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II
404-997-4461

From: Michael Mulligan
To: "Lewis, Shani"
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2011 1:14 PM
Subject: Re: Your Concerns Regarding Browns Ferry

Ms. Lewis,
Inspection Report 2009005
I see many more safety processes being in similar straits....identification, RCA and corrective action problems...

.....PG 19 In September, 2008, the inspectors presented a concern to the licensee that approximately 17 Cause Determination Evaluations (CDE) had exceeded the licensee’s Maintenance Rule (MR) program completion guidelines, and the licensee initiated PER 152007 to address this potential adverse trend. But in April 2009, the licensee identified additional late CDEs and initiated PER 169954 which required an effectiveness review in six months. In those six months, the inspectors and the licensee identified approximately 20 more CDEs that were untimely or past due. Inspectors discussed this potential adverse trend with the licensee who entered the issue into their CAP as PER 210091.

What you can say about LER 2009-004, is all the hand holding the NRC had to do to get to them to get them to submit a LER and be it accurate. One wonders all the missed LERs that wasn’t submitted that the NRC didn’t have time to catch.

This is the crazy talk of the NRC I was talking about “was not repetitive or willful”, but in this inspection report there are two issues with failure to submit a LER

“However, because this violation was of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful, and was entered into the licensee’s CAP as PERs 177206 and 204364, the NRC has characterized the significance of this reporting violation as a Severity Level IV NCV in accordance with Section IV.A.3 and Supplement I of the NRC Enforcement Policy.”

I read a lot of issues with the Watts Bar....with the TVA habitually not filling timely responses and documentation. I believe it is systemic within TVA...

Don’t forget in the lead up to the RCA valve injection valve failure, you had a disgraceful event with a bowed RHR rotor and its subsequent destruction within days of the RHR injection valves. You had three safety relief valves technically inop that would have caused you shutdown if you could have seen it. I am saying the equipment failures indicate the plant carries a lot more level of risk to the community that what you risk analyses shows. Can you imagine a accident with all these defects showing up instantaneously in one accident.

Inspection Report 2010-005

NPG-SPP-02.8 was adequate to meet the purpose and objectives of the ITR program. The inspectors also reviewed the two most recent Integrated Trend (IT) reports. The licensee had identified certain departments that did not submit their reports on time which contributed to the site report being issued after its required due date. The inspectors noted that SRs were written for each occurrence. The inspectors also noted that the new procedures improved the consistency of trend discussions and the report format across departments.

...PER 213116 was generated to address the licensee’s actions to address an inspector identified trend, concerning the adequacy of post maintenance testing (PMT), which has been previously documented in multiple inspection reports, but is yet to be adequately addressed by the corrective action program.

...The inspectors identified a potential adverse trend regarding inaccuracy and incomplete information contained in LERs. During the review of LERs from 2009 through 2010, inspectors identified seven examples where LERs contained inaccurate statements, incomplete descriptions and details, and other technical and editorial errors. The licensee had previously initiated the following PERs to resolve the issues identified by the inspectors: PERs 215479, 205308, 201410, and 163176. Additionally, as documented in report Section 4OA3.1 below, the inspectors identified two violations associated with inadequate and incomplete information in Unit 3 LER 2009-003. The licensee initiated SR 314177 to address this apparent adverse trend.

Over the past operating cycle, Units 2 and 3 have developed a large number of control rod Rod Position Indication System (RPIS) component problems. Unit 2 had outstanding WO’s on about 25 different control rods with RPIS related problems, and Unit 3 had about 15 control rods with WO’s. These problems involved incorrect back lighting, intermittent drift alarms, and primarily inaccurate rod position indication at one or more positions. The licensee initiated SRs 313460 and 313465 to address this adverse trend.

What can be said clearly from the LER crazy talk in 2009 “was not repetitive or willful” with two LERs, then the proliferation of LER problems in 2010-005...you might have covered it, but the agency’s ROP is not effective with changing a plant’s behavior.

I am just saying the NRC might be somewhat good on describing the pieces of the puzzle...but you suck a putting the puzzle together and seeing the big picture.

It get you to wondering, is the TVA being shown favoritism because they are they brought back on line BF 1 and working on bringing on other new nuclear plant.

I’d like to see a full scale investigation on the recent history TVA’s LERs and the current status.

As I said, a assortment of safety bureaucracy and processes are dysfunctional leading to preventable failures of safety systems...you got to know there are many defects within the plant not seen and one wonders if all these defects will conspire to come together in a big accident and create shame to our nation.

With the HPCI diaphragms, why did you ding them on not writing a LER accurately, when you should have dinged them with illegally putting in the defective quality safety repair parts.

I remember being at the HB Robinson plant public meeting...where there was serous talk about in the future how safety critical LERs are. They were talking about inaccurate information from Robinson. It is interesting, last spring the NRC came to visit Vermont Yankee about their tritium leak. I got up behind Jazcko chanting "Remember the HB Robison plant"....everyone including the anti's thought I was nuts. I was talking about the terrible Robinson plant accident in March...I didn't think it was over with. Then the plant had two more serous plant accidents and many NRC findings.

Mullanism

This testimony came way before the NRC OIG investigation...you notice how starling close my language was the NRC OIG report about LERs and part 21...

http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2011/04/mulliganism-and-nrc-oig-investigation.html

2.206 transcripts on June 29, 2010 on the Vernon Tie.

(I like my language better because it is more colorful and accurate.)

MR Mulligan: "The new way they do it nowadays is, you have a set of conflicting codes and regulations. You have five or six of them all intertwining and intermingling and very few people can understand, and you have an outcome in mind, and you twist these codes and regulations around until you get the outcome you want.

Nowadays, we play games, we twist around regulations, and we make believe that the regulations, you know, are going to tell us the ultimate truth, if we obey the regulations, it's going to tell us the ultimate truth, and the perfect outcome. If we just follow the rules, there's going to be a perfect outcome."

MR. PICKETT: One more, again, Doug Pickett.

Mr. Mulligan, you were making a number of statements about the codes and regulations are twisted by regulators to get the desired results. Are you aware of any particular regulation or code that is not being met?

MR. MULLIGAN: Well, a code. Well, you see, the problem is I've got a big barrier in front of me, everybody knows that, you know? This is what this is about, is to keep me -- keep a barrier in front of me, and not be able to get the hard questions asked and stuff like that.

You know, I -- you know, one day, you know, I envision a different 2.206 process, where, you know, you are my government, I don't own the government, but I do in a way, but you work for me and stuff, and there's an issue of, you know, I have access to NRC people, we get into a group where there's an assertion like this, and people are on my side, you know.

I don't have these techno barriers, and these legalistic barriers, and these kind of evidence, super-duper evidence barriers and all that sort of stuff that people play games, like, you know, to put a barrier in front of me and stuff like that. I have a thing where a group of people, NRC people, would get together with me before 2.206, we talk about all the different issues, and you would bring up the information, we'd share it freely and stuff like that, and would go into a 2.206 process a lot different way than we do now.

You know, that's how I would make my government work for me. As of now, this process works for the utilities and the NRC. It's designed to be a barrier for me, as far as legalistic stuff, you know, Congress and stuff. So, that's my envision of a government that works for me.

Fukushima meltdown: HPCI and RCIC Rupture Disc?

Update:
By around 2:30 a.m., the pressure inside the vessel that forms a protective bulb around the reactor's core reached twice the level it was designed to withstand. Amid delays and technical difficulties, it was another 12 hours before workers finished releasing radioactive steam from this containment vessel, via reinforced pipes, to the air beyond the reactor building.

About an hour later, the reactor building itself exploded—a blast that Japanese and U.S. regulators have since said spread highly radioactive debris beyond the plant. The explosion, along with others amid overheating at reactors 2, 3 and 4, contributed to radiation levels that led to mandatory evacuations around the plant and the government's admission that the Fukushima Daiichi disaster ranks alongside Chernobyl at the top of the nuclear-disaster scale.

Tepco says pressure in the containment vessel likely hit 840 kilopascals (the metric equivalent of 121.8 pounds per square inch) around 2:30 a.m, roughly double the maximum pressure of 427 kilopascals the vessel was designed to handle.

BURSTING OF HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION STEAM LINE RUPTURE DISCS INJURES PLANT PERSONNEL

This is how I came to talk about it...topix.
OK, so I am really talking about a rupture disc...I will corrected the title...

Questions for fukushima building explosions...

It is excessive pressure safety device on the piping between HPCI exhaust and the torus....if the HPCI exhaust piping or torus pressure gets too high, the blow out panel is designed to rupture.

It is beyond interesting with the WSJ saying the Japanese torus and primary containment got to be twice the design pressure...why didn't these blow out panels let go.

The HPCI or RCIC exhaust needs to go under water, to be condensed by the torus cool water, I think comes in from the bottom of the tous.

It would be interesting in the Fukushima plants how these blow out panels functioned.

If they are under water, did the panel rupture and did that lead to prematurely draining the torus.

If above the water line in the torus, did the lowering of the torus water uncover the blow out panel and lead to the leak of hydrogen into secondary containment that distroyed the buildings...

NRC says VY HPCI is obsolete

Message 45 and Feb 22, 2010 on topix

Yep, it was a flexitallic gasket thing...they didn't have the proper replacement gasket on site, so they had to special order if from Texas, and you how long the shipping takes from across the country.

As NRC resident Dave Spindler says, "its a obsolesce thing" with not having adequate and the appropriate safety grade spare parts on site at the plant. The HPCI is obsolete? Dave said its going on at every plant in the nation.

Entergy had to do a engineering equivalency thing, cause they had to manufacture it in Texas, meaning it is not a identical replacement.

By the way, RCIC is not a standby system from HPCI...all of these components are suppose to operational when the fault hits the plant...their design accident.

So as Dave said according to the NRC...it doesn't matter to the NRC if the repair took 13 days or the gasket was replaced immediately within a few hours with a on site spare repair part....the NRC doesn't care if we are fully prepared for a design accident or partially prepared.

Pilgrim: Unsafe repair parts in nuclear industry...

Wednesday, April 13, 2011...Transcipts on 2.206 about VY reliefs concern buna n thread material

“In Browns Ferry at Unit 1, another LER, 2009-004, I can make a comment that there's questions of the, if everything is reported in LERs, but these are just three of a bunch of LERs. Interesting Buna N material defect was without fibers. It was in the HPCI oil control. That was also due to heat.”

Well., I mean to say it was in hydraulic oil....

Wednesday, April 13, 2011...Transcripts on 2.206 about VY reliefs concerning buna n thread material

So for the VY threaded Buna n, I tried to bring in three industry example, o rings, hydraulic diaphragm and air diaphragms as the scram solenoid valves. Browns Ferry was the hydraulic diaphragm issue, and it is identical to the pilgrim...

“In Browns Ferry at Unit 1, another LER, 2009-004, I can make a comment that there's questions of the, if everything is reported in LERs, but these are just three of a bunch of LERs. Interesting Buna N material defect was without fibers. It was in the HPCI oil control. That was also due to heat.”

Well., I mean to say it was in hydraulic oil....

April 15, 2011

PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION'NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT O5OOO293/201 1OO8

02/14/2011 – 03/04/2011

Findings

(1) Failure to Follow Corrective Action Process for HPCI Diaphragm Degraded Condition Introduction: The NRC identified a finding of very low significance (Green) for Entergy's failure to follow their corrective action process in the identification, documentation, and evaluation of a degraded condition. Specifically, Entergy failed to recognize and capture in their condition report process that a diaphragm in the HPCI system exceeded its service life.

Description: On March 22,2Q10, GE Hitachi issued a Safety Information Communication in conjunction with the 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part21

Report titled, "Failure of HPCI Turbine Overspeed Reset Control Valve Diaphragm." The failure of this diaphragm would result in a loss of the HPCI turbine lube and control oil and could ultimately result in a failure of the HPCI system. Entergy identified that a 'like' diaphragm was installed in Pilgrim's HPCI system pressure control valve (PCV-2301-238) and evaluated the 10 CFR Part 21 Report on July 20, 2010 in CR-PNP-2010-2500. Entergy concluded that the manufacturing defect in the diaphragm described in the Part 21 evaluation was not directly applicable to Pilgrim because the report specified a manufacturing year of 1984 or later. Pilgrim's PCV-2301-238 diaphragm was manufactured in 1981, however it was the same design (2-ply fabric-reinforced BUNA-N material) as specified in the Part2l evaluation. Since the diaphragm was installed and could not be completely inspected to verify reinforcing-fiber continuity, Entergy appropriately scheduled the diaphragm to be replaced during the next HPCI maintenance window, as recommended by the manufacture.

Jaczko doesn't honor the dead in the nuclear industry

Added Apr 14: This accident caused a plant trip and was a very serious nuclear accident.

You know, if we had a USA nuclear plant meltdown and our own Fukushima with lots fatalities and abandoned territory...these lying Ayn Rand republic senators and willing democrat accomplices would frame the question so hyper narrowly, and the answer, they would never admit it was a nuclear accident even if the some of the innocent population was forced to be buried in lead caskets.

Even as they were picking up radioactive fuel pellets on plant property, Chairman Jaczko would say the accident began in the non nuclear and non safety related secondary system, and technically it wasn't a nuclear accident and core meltdown.

We are so captured by the power of the media and all our power brokers who control our political system.

I talked about it a little today...what is going on is we are corrupting language and communication. Matter of fact, I lectured the NRC on this point yesterday.

The senate fruit cakes yesterday, and I included the democrats...they repeatedly asked Jaczko how many people were ever killed in the nuclear industry. Some of them, and the democrats to be more honest with their lies, asked how many people were ever killed by radiation in the nuclear industry. Jazcko repeated responded none. He's got degrees in philosophy and physics, he got a doctorate in physics. This guy spent half his life in the best schools.

The correct full answer is, maybe none with radiation, but to honor the dead in the nuclear power industry, the correct answers is four bottom of the barrel pipe fitters and insulation people lost their lives around 1986 in the Surrey Nuclear Plant. The cheapsters let the feedwater pipes erode and a high pressure pipe burst. It must have been a horrific death for these low level employees. Right, the NRC is all highly educated people, and anyone without college degree is throw away garbage and they don't count. This brought broad reforms throughout the secondary and primary systems...it was a nuclear plant event no question.

So this big shot with a philosophy degree and a doctorate in high falutin physics should have been able to frame it in a few sentences. A little humility for the dead and the people at the bottom from the head regulator of the NRC. We had no deaths from direct radiation, but we had four fatalities who died from a nuclear plant accident. This accident caused a plant trip and was a very serious nuclear accident.We are sorry for this and our reforms with measuring pipe wall thickness is a attempt to make up for the deaths of these honorable workers at a nuclear plant. Their deaths constantly remind us of the sacrifices of all the employees in the nuclear industry and it is a beacon for us to always be alert at these sites.

It blatant sickening language corruption right in front of our eyes in a senate hearing. The weasely senators set up the question in a way for PR points for a lily white nuclear industry...knowing the chairman would give a partial or incomplete happy-land and triumphal falsified answer.

Yea, it took a lot of wasted intelligence and a decades of education at the best schools to be able to slickly dance around the deaths of honorable men with suffering families, at a nuclear power plant accident.

NRC Chairmen Jazcko, Adam web search timeout queries

The fixed it at about 9:30 AM this morning on April 11.

This is endemic within the NRC, the cult of self protection...they never disclose what was the problem with Adams web and are they having problems with it. They are exactly like the nuclear power plants...but worst. You know,  you never get a long open discussion with the problems of Adams web. Its the cult of secrecy!


...Dear Chairman Jazcko,

Adam Search: http://wba.nrc.gov :8080/ves/

I logged my problems with Adams queries at this site beginning in Feb 2011:

NRC Web Based Adams timeout query

Why was the search feature of Adams broken for the last three days over this weekend? To tell you the truth, the operation of this has been erratic and dysfunctional since day one...it is a poorly designed system and doesn't lend to public credibility of the agency. I'd be firing people for not doing their jobs!

So I would a search on 05000296, either do a "greater than a date" within the last six months or year, or do a range within the last 6 months or year, then you would get a queried time out. I have long terms problems with queried time out. It is rude a heck to be doing a search and twiddling your thumbs for a minute or two, then get a queried time out and get thrown out without any results. You would be bankrupt if you were Google.

Is Adams search overwhelmed by Fukushima?

By the way, I think Browns Ferry is the most dangerous plant it the nation and they have a culture of falsification of documents to the government. Check out their LER falsification. Matter of fact, you got a wide spread culture of falsification throughout the nuclear industry as outlined narrowly in the NRC OIG investigation on LERs and part 21...

Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH

Electrical self generation in RCIC/ HPIC?

UCS: SOARCA and Vermont Yankee.
SOARCA:

“One concern has been that SOARCA credits certain B5b mitigating strategies (such as RCIC operation w/o DC power) that have really not been reviewed to ensure that they will work to mitigate severe accidents.

I mean, how hard would it be, what don't they have a "alternator" like device attacked to the turbine, like in our cars... where the turbine self generates electricity for the whole machine. Then a computor like device could figure if to stay on the batteries or go alternator.

Yep, then the RCIC pump would have to work with the temp of the water up to 212 degrees, then it might be able to suppy through self generated electrcity power to a motor to cool the torus.

Then you are basically talking about time to boil off the torus and need a vent.

Right, its basically a trade off of primary containment capability, with stretching the core cooling capability as long as can as you are consuming you water reservoirs capabilities.

You could have a small diesel generator stationed in a safe area, up high or distant...run the cable through the reactor building...then all you would have to do is keep the fuel tank full till exhaustion of water resouces on site...that could be the deadicated power source to RCIC or such.

What is your highest prioroity...intergrity of the fuel in the core or primary containment?What is your highest prioroity...intergrity of the fuel in the core or primary containment?

Mulliganism and the NRC OIG investigation on LERs and part 21

I believe the contradictory and incomplete, or too complex for human or public understanding with NRC's rules and policies...it is endemic in the NRC. It is a secret deregulation or reduction in federal oversight scheme with their utilities buddies who work in the NRC. It is a mofia like organization that owns the NRC.  I think the agency employees are maliciously sabotaging government oversight. Most of these guys at the top are extraordinarily educated and experienced...and I don't think these things happen as a one off or by mistake. These things are engineered...purposely taken advantaged to protect the agency employees and give secret benefits to the nuclear industry.

Like I said, we need a outside group or somebody with extraordinarily power to come into the NRC...to immediately create order in this troubled agency.

NRC Office of Inspector General investigation

Audit of NRC's Implementation of 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance

"Part 21 component defect reporting issues exist because NRC regulations and guidance for implementing Section 206 are contradictory and unclear. Specifically, NRC regulations and guidance for implementing Section 206 contain stipulations that have been interpreted as not requiring a report under Part 21 if an LER was not required. This interpretation seemingly contradicts Section 206, which requires reporting of component defects that could cause substantial safety hazards. Furthermore, applicable NRC reportability guidance is not utilized by some licensees and NRC staff, and NRC’s Baseline Inspection Program does not include requirements to inspect licensee reporting of Part 21 defects." (you get it, there is inadequate NRC training to the local inspectors and the reactor oversight process doesn't carry it. It is interesting looking at the graph from 1998 to 2009. Other LER reporting are in similar straights )

2.206 transcripts on June 29, 2010 on the Vernon Tie.

(I like my language better because it is more colorful and accurate.)

MR Mulligan: "The new way they do it nowadays is, you have a set of conflicting codes and regulations. You have five or six of them all intertwining and intermingling and very few people can understand, and you have an outcome in mind, and you twist these codes and regulations around until you get the outcome you want.

Nowadays, we play games, we twist around regulations, and we make believe that the regulations, you know, are going to tell us the ultimate truth, if we obey the regulations, it's going to tell us the ultimate truth, and the perfect outcome. If we just follow the rules, there's going to be a perfect outcome."

MR. PICKETT: One more, again, Doug Pickett.

Mr. Mulligan, you were making a number of statements about the codes and regulations are twisted by regulators to get the desired results. Are you aware of any particular regulation or code that is not being met?

MR. MULLIGAN: Well, a code. Well, you see, the problem is I've got a big barrier in front of me, everybody knows that, you know? This is what this is about, is to keep me -- keep a barrier in front of me, and not be able to get the hard questions asked and stuff like that.

You know, I -- you know, one day, you know, I envision a different 2.206 process, where, you know, you are my government, I don't own the government, but I do in a way, but you work for me and stuff, and there's an issue of, you know, I have access to NRC people, we get into a group where there's an assertion like this, and people are on my side, you know.

I don't have these techno barriers, and these legalistic barriers, and these kind of evidence, super-duper evidence barriers and all that sort of stuff that people play games, like, you know, to put a barrier in front of me and stuff like that. I have a thing where a group of people, NRC people, would get together with me before 2.206, we talk about all the different issues, and you would bring up the information, we'd share it freely and stuff like that, and would go into a 2.206 process a lot different way than we do now.

You know, that's how I would make my government work for me. As of now, this process works for the utilities and the NRC. It's designed to be a barrier for me, as far as legalistic stuff, you know, Congress and stuff. So, that's my envision of a government that works for me.

Paper Mache Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems

Paper Mache Nuclear Plant Safety systems:

I have been talking about "Paper Mache" nuclear plant safety systems recently...maybe first brought it up in my Palisades 2.206 last week. Paper Mache are non testable safety systems...systems where the engineers create mind boggling tons of paperwork and procedures, but fundamentally the system is never tested under real operating conditions. The system or component is made out of nothing but Paper Mache...and in the first huff and puff of the wolf in "The Story of the Three Little Pigs" the house blows over.

The clear example is the backup cooling water system of our Emergency Diesel Generator, the RHR/Service Water cross connects. Say we lose the intake structure or have to shutdown while not using the control room, it is a very complicated procedure and there is a lot of walking around the plant and outside by the cooling towers, it eats up huge shift resources...then the cooling of the Emergency DG's comes from the deep basin, a big swimming pool type structure, the emergency cooling towers cell and the RHR service water pumps.

The gold standard of nuclear safety is the system has been tested in real conditions and the employees have used the system over and over again so they know easily how to bring on the system. So then when the shock of a accident occurs...then you can almost automatically put on the system without any kinks because you trained over it so many times.

Really, the fire pump becomes a ECCS core cooling systems...and everthing in the fire system and the fire pumps should be Nuclear Safety Grade quality such as the ECCS systems. They never really test this system under real conditions.


NRC examines nuclear plant risks in U.S.

Virgilio addressed the NRC e-mails, obtained by the Union of Concerned Scientists through the Freedom of Information Act and released Wednesday. In the e-mails, NRC risk analysts questioned an exercise that simulated a catastrophic loss of power at a nuclear plant due to an earthquake, and whether operators should rely on equipment that was not certified to survive an earthquake.

The exercise, played out on a computer model, looked at what would happen at two U.S. power plants, Surry in Virginia and Peach Bottom in Pennsylvania, with new equipment and procedures, called B.5.b, ordered since the 9/11 terror attacks to make nuclear power plants more resistant to attack. One of the hypothetical accidents that the NRC analyzed was a "station blackout" at Peach Bottom where the plant fails to recover power before backup batteries run out, as happened at Fukushima.

Under the scenario, the plant loses outside power, its diesel backup generators and battery power too, Virgilio said. The new B.5.b strategy would employ new, portable equipment to operate emergency cooling pumps off steam from the reactor core.

One NRC risk analyst questioned how NRC could rely on strategies "that have really not been reviewed to ensure that they will work to mitigate severe accidents.

Questions raised by this and other analysts "are an open item that will need to be looked at," Virgilio said. But he added that the exercise looked at an unlikely scenario — a major earthquake that knocks out power inside and outside the plant.