Fermi: Overwhelmed By Problems And The Complexity of the Plant

Update July 15

The below list comes from the back of the inspection report. So Fermi identified severe corrosion in the 2018 outage and they put in a "WO" (work order)to fix the it. I highlighted in red the titles.

Check out all the cards on the CDRM system? The control rod drive system scrams, shutdowns and starts up the plant. The extent of the CDRM troubles is startling!!!!  

***May 9, 2019

SUBJECT: FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2—NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000341/2019001 

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 

 71111.04—Equipment Alignment  

 - Design Basis Document for the Control Air System; Revision C  

- Drawing 6M721–2084; Residual Heat Removal Division 1; Revision BP  

- Drawing 6M721–5730–3; Non-Interruptible Control Air System Division I and II; Revision AL  

- Drawing 6M721 

–5734; Emergency Diesel Generator Functional Operating Sketch; Revision BG  

- Drawing 6M721N–2049; P&ID Diesel Fuel Oil System and Lube Oil System Division II RHR Complex; Revision AV  

- Drawing 6M721N 

–2052; Process and Identification Residual Heat Removal Service Water System Division 1 RHR Complex; Revision AE  

- Procedure 23.208; RHR Complex Service Water Systems; Revision 122  

- Procedure 23.307; Emergency Diesel Generator System; Revisions 125 and 126 

- Procedure 24.202.05; HPCI System Cold Shutdown Valve Operability Test; Revision 50 

71111.05AQ—Fire Protection Annual/Quarterly 

 - CARD 19–21289; NQA Audit 19–0102 Deficiency  

— Required Gear Not Staged Properly for the Fire Brigade Dress Out Areas; 02/19/2019 - CARD 19 

–21870; Request Chemical Storage Areas Inventory and Hazards be Implemented into Fire Protection Pre Plans; 03/11/2019  

- Drawing 6A721–2031; Radwaste Building 1st Floor Plan Elevation 583’6”; Revision AD - Drawing 6A721 

–2033; Radwaste Building 2nd Floor Plan Elevation 613’6” and 2nd Floor Mezzanine Elevation 628’6”; Revision AC  

- Fire Drill Evaluation LP–FP–940–06YX; 1st Floor RAD Waste Chemistry Lab Storage Room Elevation 583’6”; Revision 1  

- MOP10; Fire Brigade; Revision 10  

- MRP09; Respiratory Protection; Revision 15A  

- Procedure 20.000.22; Plant Fires; Revision 46A  

- Procedure 65.000.768; Inspection of MSA Firehawk M–7 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus; Revision 5 - Procedure FP 

–RDWST; Radwaste Building Zones 22, 23, 24, and 25; Revision 6  

- WO 52580752; Perform Unannounced Fire Drill; 03/07/2019
 71111.06—Flood Protection Measures  

 - CARD 19–21537; Missed Classification and Initial Notification During an As Found Assessment; 02/28/2019 - SS–OP–904–1901; Fermi 2 Evaluation Scenario; Revision 0 

 71111.11—Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance 

 - CARD 19–21547; N3021C013, Number Five Low Pressure Intercept Valves Unitized Actuator Oil Temperature High; 02/28/2019  

- Procedure 22.000.03; Power Operation 25% to 100% to 25%; Revisions 103A and 104 

- Procedure 23.107; Reactor Feedwater and Condensate Systems; Revision 146  

- Procedure 23.109; Turbine Operating Procedure; Revision 94  

- Reactivity Maneuvering Plan; February 2019 Major RPA; Revision 0  

 71111.12—Maintenance Effectiveness  

 - CARD 14–23623; Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Placed C1107 in (a)(1) Status; 04/24/2014  

- CARD 14–23625; System Monitoring Under Maintenance Rule Program Identified Adverse Trend of PIP Failure; 04/24/2014 

- CARD 15–27522; Loss of RPIS Due to a Temporary Overcurrent Condition Crowbar on the C11KA01 5V Power Supply; 12-09/2015  

- CARD 18–20006; RPIS PIP Problems Identified During Suppression Testing; 01/01/2018  

- CARD 18–21250; Received 3080 ‘Control Rod Drift’ on HCU 34-03; 02/14/2018  

- CARD 18–21252; Received 3080 ‘Control Rod Drift’ on HCU 46-07; 02/14/2018  

- CARD 18–22007; CRD Accumulator Trouble HCU 26-51; 03/10/2018 

- CARD 18–22264; Received 30-17 IPCS Computer Trouble Due to Loss of MCD Data Link; 03/18/2018  

- CARD 18–23029; Control Rod 30-35 Missing Full In Light; 04/14/2018  

- CARD 18–23030; Control 42-11 has Blue Scram Light On with Only Half Scram In; 04/14/2018

- CARD 18–23122; Control Rod 18-15 Full In Light Did Not Extinguish when Rod Withdrawn; 04/17/2018  

- CARD 18–23131; Missing CRDM PIP Indications; 04/17/2018  

- CARD 18–23648; Loss of Position Indication Control Rod 42-27; 05/07/2018  

- CARD 18–23656; Control Rod Select Pushbutton for 54-23 Failing; 05/07/2018  

- CARD 18–23721; Received 3D80 ‘Control Rod Drift’ on CRD 46-07; 05/09/2018  

- CARD 18–24252; Control Rod Drift Alarm 06-15; 05/29/2018 

- CARD 18–26075; Control Rod 46-19 Briefly Lost Position 46 Indication; 08/11/2018  

- CARD 18–27225; Drift Lights for CRD 26-31 and 50-23 Do Not Indicate on the Full Core Display; 09/24/2018  

- CARD 18–27279; Control Rod 26-19 and 30-11 Missing PIPs; 09/24/2018  

- CARD 18–27324; Trend CARD — Crud Found in HCI DCV During Inspection; 09/26/2018  

- CARD 18–28185; Control Rod 26-43 Loss of Full in Light; 10/11/2018  

- CARD 18–28201; During Control Rod Exercising 38-31 Notched Out and the Full In Light Remained Illuminated; 10/12/2018  

- CARD 18–28242; CRDM 50-31 Missing PIP Indications; 10/13/2018 

- CARD 18–28253; Control Rod 26-43 Full In Light Goes Out when Lifting at Position 00; 10/13/2018 - CARD 18–28311; Control Rod 14-27; 10/14/2018  

- CARD 18–28349; CR 30-15 Became Uncoupled When Fully Withdrawn; 10/15/2018  

- CARD 18–28354; Multiple Rod Movement Message Received on RWM-OD During Performance of Scram Time Testing; 10/15/2018 

- CARD 18–28388; Control Rod 26-43 ‘ Full Out’ Light Not Lit with the Rod at Position 48; 10/16/2018  

- CARD 18–28443; 3D76 Control Rod Over-Travel for Rod 26-19; 10/17/2018  

- CARD 18–28445; 3D80 Control Rod Drift for Rod 06-23; 10/17/2018  

- CARD 18–28448; Control Rod 30-43 Missing ‘18’ Indication; 10/17/2018  

- CARD 18–28449; 50-31 Missing Various PIP Indications; 10/18/2018 

- CARD 18–28450; Control Rod 50-51 Missing Various Indications; 10/18/2018  

- CARD 18–28550; PMT Failed for Rod 18-15 WO 50495365; 10/20/2018  

- CARD 18–28588; Full In Light 42-27 Momentarily Flickered; 10/21/2018  

- CARD 18–28673; CRD 54-23 Missing Various PIP Indications; 10/24/2018  

- CARD 18–28759; Control Rod 38-19 Full In Light Lit with Rod at Position 12; 10/26/2018  

- CARD 18–28892; Control Rod Drift Alarm 06-15; 10/29/2018  

- CARD 18–28989; Control Rod Drift Alarm 58-43; 11/01/2018  

- CARD 18–29030; RONOR Switch Failed; 11/03/2018  

- CARD 18–29201; RONOR Switch Failed; 11/10/2018  

- CARD 18–29679; Received 3D80, Control Rod Drift, Alarm for Control Rod 42-19; 12/03/2018  

- CARD 18–29830; 58-23 Abnormal Indications After Scram; 12/07/2018  

- CARD 18–29862; Rod Drift 42-27; 12/08/2018  

- CARD 18–29876; Rod 26-43 Double Notch; 12/09/2018  

- CARD 18–29912; Control Rod 50-31 Missing PIPs 30, 31, 34, 35, and 38 Entering FO18–02; 12/10/2018  

- CARD 18–29914; Control Rod Drift 58-23; 12/10/2018  

- CARD 18–29915; Control Rod Drift 06-23; 12/10/2018  

- CARD 18–29954; RONOR Switch is Working Intermittently when Placed in Override; 12/11/2018  

- CARD 18–30119; Control Rod Drift Alarm Received for Rod 46-55; 12/14/2018  

- CARD 18–30228; Rod 46-19 Received a Rod Drift Alarm while Moving from Position 00 to 02; 12/19/2018  

- CARD 18–30342; AB5/RB5 Secondary Containment Airlock Door will Not Open; 12/22/2018

- CARD 18–30369; Door Not Allowing Access; 12/25/2018  

- CARD 19–20015; Rod Drift 06-23; 01/01/2019  

- CARD 19–20020; Rod Drift 42-19; 01/02/2019  

- CARD 19–20026; Rod Drift 26-23; 01/02/2019  

- CARD 19–20048; Control Rod Drift Alarm Rod 34-19; 01/02/2019  

- CARD 19–20054; Rod Drift 06-15; 01/03/2019  

- CARD 19–20462; Control Rod 18-59 Full Out Indication Light Remained Lit When Driven to Position 46; 01/19/2019  

- CARD 19–20465; Received Rod for Rod 50-19; 01/19/2019  

- CARD 19-20614; Control Air Compressor Room North Airlock Malfunction; 01/26/2019  

- CARD 19–20854; RMOC 2019 RMOC Action Item Tracking; 02/06/2019  

- CARD 19–21227; AB5/RB5 Interlock Switch Needs Adjustment; 02/17/2019  

- CARD 19–21292; RB5 and AB5 Airlock Doors Opened at the Same Time Resulting in a Temporary Loss of Secondary Containment; 02/19/2019  

- CARD 19-21474; MRC Cognitive Trend:  Door Airlock and Interlock Malfunction; 02/26/2019  

- LCO Tracking Sheet 2018-0267C; Secondary Containment Doors Without Interlocks; 06/26/2018  

- Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual, Appendix E, Maintenance Rule SSC Specific Functions; Revision 23A  

- Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual, Appendix F, Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria; Revision 21  

- Procedure 23.428; Secondary Containment Airlocks and Penetrations; Revision 35A 

- Procedure 24.000.01, Situational Surveillances/LCO Action Tracking; Revision 77  

- Procedure MGA03, Chapter 3, Procedure Use and Adherence; Revision 27A  

- WO 48136887; Perform Reactor/Aux Building Airlock Interlock Verification Test; 12/02/2018  

- WO 51444881; Restore Normal Operation to RB4/RB3 Interlock Doors; 08/01/2018  

- WO 52890935; Investigate/Repair RB5 Reactor/Aux Building Airlock Interlock Not Functioning; 01/04/2019 

 71111.13—Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control 

 - CARD 19–20212; RPS Relay C71A-K10B Deenergized; 01/09/2019  

- CARD 19–20214; 1 HPCV Low Pressure Light Did Not Illuminate; 01/10/2019  

- CARD 19–20215; Erratic Reading on 2 HPCV Indicator; 01/10/2019  

- CARD 19–21375; Enhancement to ODE-20 (Protected Equipment) for Protecting CREF Equipment; 02/21/2019  

- CARD 19–21711; WO D302210100, Refurbish West Circulation Water Makeup Pump P4100C011.  After Tagging, it was Discovered that Isolation had Not Been Achieved; 03/06/2019 

- Drawing 6I721–2040–07; Arrangement Trip System ‘B’ RPS Cabinet H11P611; Revision R  

- Drawing 6I721–2155–06; Reactor Protection System Trip System ‘A’ System Relays;  Revision V  

- Drawing 6I721–2155–07; Reactor Protection System Trip System ‘B’ System Relays; Revision X  

- Drawing 6I721–2155–09; Reactor Protection System Trip System ‘B’ Scram Trip Logic; Revision L  

- Drawing 6I721–2155–09A; RPS Trip System ‘B2’ Scram Trip Logic; Revision D  

- Drawing 6M721–5720; Circulating Water System Functional Operating Sketch; Revision BC  

- Drawing 6M721–5726; General Service Water System Functional Operating Sketch; Revision CG 

- Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual MMR12; Equipment Out of Service Risk Management; Revision 20  

- Procedure 23.101; Circulating Water System; Revision 103 

- Procedure 23.610; Reactor Protection System; Revision 24 

- Procedure 24.110.05; RPS — Turbine Control and Stop Valve Functional Test; Revision 47  

- Procedure 44.010.064; RPS — Turbine Stop Valve Limit Switch Closure Calibration; Revision 33  

- Risk Management Plan, EDG 14 Safety System Outage; 02/20/2019  

- WO 52936137; RPS Relay C71A-K10B De-energized; 01/10/2019 

- WO D302210100; Refurbish West Circulation Water Makeup Pump; 03/05/2019
 71111.15—Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments  

- CARD 19-20353; Mispositioned Component APRM 3 Not Bypassed during 45.604.001; 01/16/2019  

- CARD 19–20871; 9D18 Division 1 48/24V Battery 21A Trouble Due to Low Voltage; 02/06/2019  

- CARD 19–20951; Trip of 24/48 Volt Battery Charger 21A-2 and Erratic Division 1 IRM Recorder Readings; 02/08/2019  

- CARD 19–20965; Prompt Investigation IAW MGA23 for Trip of Division 1 48/24 Volt Battery Charger; 02/08/2019  

- CARD 19–21475; Abnormal Reactor Building Sump Input/Lifting RHRSW Relief Valve  Division 2; 02/26/2019  

- CARD 19–21535; RHRSW Thermal Relief Valve Lifted; 02/28/2019  

- Drawing 6SD721–2530–17; One Line Diagram 48/24 VDC Instrumentation Batteries Distribution; Revision AM  

- EFA–E11–19–001; E1100F056B Division 2 RHR Heat Exchanger Tube Side Relief Valve Stuck Open; 03/01/2019  

- MQA11–100; Operability Determination Process; Revision 2A 

- Procedure 20.300.24/48 VDC; Loss of 24/48V DC Battery Busses; Revision 2 - Procedure 23.310; 48/24 VDC Electrical System; Revision 29  

- Procedure 23.601; Instrument Trip Sheets; Revision 40 - Procedure 24.000.02; Shiftly, Daily, and Weekly Required Surveillances; Revision 154  

- Procedure 44.030.056; ECCS — Reactor Recirculation Riser DP, Division 1, Functional Test; Revision 30  

- Procedure 45.604.001; LPRM Testing and Preparation for Removal; Revision 47 - Procedure 57.000.10; LPRM Operational Status; Revision 40  

- Procedure ARP 9D18; Division 1 48/24 VDC Battery 21A Trouble; Revision 13 - TE–R32–19–008; Past Operability Review of Division 1 24/48 Volt Batteries; Revision 0  

- WO 49664080; Perform IV Curves on APRM 3 LPRM Detectors; 01/18/2018
 71111.19—Post Maintenance Testing  

- CARD 19-21301; EDG 14 Air Coolant Pump Backlash; 02/19/2019  

- CARD 19–21308; During Cross-Drive Contingency Implementation, Flex Drive Gear Teeth Found Significantly Fretted and Pitted; 02/20/2019  

- CARD 19–21333; Missing Parts from EDG Flex Gear Kit; 02/20/2019 

- CARD 19–21479; Relief Valve E1100F056B Lost its Traceability After RF19; 02/26/2019  

- Drawing 6I721N–2201–50; Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower Fan ‘A’ High and Low Breaker Cont. E1156C001A; Revision W  

- Procedure 24.208.03; EESW and EECW Makeup Pump and Valve Operability Test; Revision 81  

- Procedure 24.307.17, Emergency Diesel Generator 14-Start and Load Test; Revision 5 

- Procedure 24.307.48; Emergency Diesel Generator 14-Fast Start Followed by Load Reject; Revision 15  

- Procedure 35.000.237; Alignment of Vertical Equipment; Enclosure B  

- Procedure 35.307.008; Emergency Diesel Generator-Engine General Maintenance;  Revision 44  

- Procedure 35.318.009; Inspection and Testing of ITE Ground and Overcurrent Protection Relays Revision 32  

- Procedure 46.000.105; ITT General Control Milliampere Hydramotor Actuator Model 91; Revision 28  

- Residual Heat Removal Complex HVAC Design Basis Document 

- WO 48522230, Perform 24.307.48 EDG 14 Fast Start Followed by Load Reject; 02/25/19  

- WO 49005245; Perform 24.208.03 D2 EECW M/U Pump and Valve Operability (Section 5.2); 03/28/2019  

- WO 51526965; Refurbish RHR HVAC EDG-14 Room Return Air Damper Actuator; 02/18/2019 

 71111.20—Refueling and Other Outage Activities  

 - CARD 19–20217; Fatigue Management Violation Associated with Torus Coating Activities; 01/10/2019  

- MGA17; Working Hour Limits; Revisions 10A and 11  

- MMR Appendix E; Maintenance Rule SSC Specific Functions; Revision 23A  

- Procedure 22.000.02; Plant Startup to 25% Power; Revision 101  

- Procedure 23.109; Turbine Operating Procedure; Revision 94  

- Procedure 23.118; Main Generator and Generator Excitation; Revision 67  

- WO 48693770; Extensive Coating Defects Identified During Torus Underwater Inspection; 09/22/2018  

- WO 48693800; Inspect and Repair Torus Coating, Above Water; 09/18/2017 

 71111.22—Surveillance Testing 

 - Procedure 24.137.01; Main Steam Line Isolation Channel Functional Test; Revision 46 

- WO 47498965; Perform 44.010.062 RPS MSIV’s Inboard Valve Limit Switch, Divisions I and II, CAL; 10/09/2018  

- WO 49253018; Perform 24.137.01 Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Channel Functional Test; 03/02/2019  

 71114.06—Drill Evaluation 

 - RERP Plan Implementing Procedure EP-101; Classification of Emergencies; Revision 42C  

 71151—Performance Indicator Verification  

 - LER 2018-002-00; Loss of Division 1 Offsite Power Causes Partial Loss of Feedwater Leading to ECCS Injection and Reactor Scram; 06/12/2018  

- LER 2018-006-00; Emergency Diesel Generator Load Sequencer Inhibits Automatic Start of Residual Heat Removal Pumps Under Certain Scenarios Due to Unrecognized Original Design Defect; 12/14/2018

- Licensee PI Data Submittal Reports for Scrams/Scrams with Complications, January 2018December 2018  

- Licensee PI Data Submittal Reports for Unplanned Power Changes, January 2018- December 2018  

- Licensing Performance Indicator Safety System Functional Failure CDE Data Entry, Verification and Approval Reports: February 2018 and September 2018  

71152—Problem Identification and Resolution 

 - CARD 17–27506; The MDCT Brake Inverter Panel, R1700S011B, is Indicating No AC Volts or AC Amps and the AC Power Light is Off; 09/09/2017  

- CARD 18–25847; Division 2 MDCT Fan Brake Inverter Found with No Power; 08/03/2018  

- CARD 18–27984; AECOM Threatened to be Laid Off if They Write a CARD; 10/08/2018  

- CARD 18–29027; E1150F068B Did Not Close as Expected; 11/02/2018  

- CARD 18–29322; Potential Issue with E1150F068A Noted by Abnormal System Response for RHRSW Pump ‘A’ Startup; 11/16/2018  

- CARD 18–29727; The MDCT Brake Inverter Panel, R1700S011B, is Indicating No AC Volts or AC Amps and the AC Power Light is Off; 12/04/2018  

- CARD 18–29745; Evaluate Vendor Suggested MDCT Inverter Replacement; 12/04/2018  

- CARD 19–20118; NQA Evaluate Adding Reference to NRC Information Notice 85-89 to Item Descriptions for Fabrication of 410 Stainless Steel Valve Stems; 01/04/2019 

- CARD 19–20217; Fatigue Management Violation Associated with Torus Coating Activities; 01/10/2019  

- CARD 19–20652; Provide Additional Training/Information Regarding the Purpose and Value of the Site Corrective Action Process; 01/29/2019 

- CARD 19–21516; 27.2019-5 Recorded Triggers on Division II by the Astromed Monitoring the Division 2 MDCT Inverter; 02/27/2019  

- LER 2016–006–00; Inadequate Interpretation of Technical Specifications Related to Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower Fan Brake System Leads to Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications, Loss of Safety Function, and Unanalyzed Condition; 10/20/2016  

- LER 2017–005–00; Non-Functional Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower Fan Brakes Leads to HPCI Being Declared Inoperable and Loss of Safety Function; 11/03/2017  

- LER 2018–005–0; Non-Functional Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower Fan Brakes Leads to HPCI Being Declared Inoperable and Loss of Safety Function; 09/29/2018  

- LER 89–016–00; Residual Heat Removal Service Water Cooling Tower Fan Brake Inoperable Due to Low Nitrogen Pressure; 07/11/1989  

- Procedure 35.000.235; Bolted Bonnet Globe Valve General Maintenance; Revision 29 - Procedure 46.205.001; Calibration of RHR Cooling Tower Fan Overspeed Protection System; Revision 30  

 71153—Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion  

- CARD 18–28572; Degraded Grid Relaying is Not Bypassed when the EDGs are Supplying their Respective ESF Bus; 10/20/2018  

- CARD 18–28990; Root Cause Evaluation Identified that EDP 80065 Inadvertently Changed 4160V ‘6’ Close Permissive; 11/01/2018  

- LER 2018–005–0; Non-Functional Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower Fan Brakes Leads to HPCI Being Declared Inoperable and Loss of Safety Function; 09/29/2018 

- LER 2018–006–00; Emergency Diesel Generator Load Sequencer Inhibits Automatic Start of Residual Heat Removal Pumps Under Certain Scenarios Due to Unrecognized Original Design Defect; 10/19/2018 - Operating Logs; 8/2/2018 – 08/05/

Fermi Had Employee Safety Intimidation Issues In the Same Outage They Falsified Inside The Torus Paint Inspection?

Technically they didn't falsify documents. It is a much more sophisticated corruption than that. It is systemic and widespread ethics and morality corruption on a grand scale. Everyone knows how to play the rules to not piss off their bosses at Fermi and higher levels at the NRC to appease them. Bury them in paperwork complexity to the higher managers so they blinded them...make them better than they should be.  There is plausible deniability all around here. I am sure there is a host of rule and code violations all around here. But everyone know nothing not much will happen even if caught. I'll bet they played the complexity of the plant and paperwork figuring the NRC would never dig deep into the paperwork. 

There are millions of components and parts in this plant. They amount of procedures, rules, engineering          


CARD 18-27984

May 9, 2019

SUBJECT: FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2—NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000341/2019001 

 On October 8, 2018, a plant employee generated condition assessment resolution document (CARD) 18-27984, which detailed a potential safety conscious work environment (SCWE) issue where an AECOM contractor working at the plant stated he was told that he would be laid off if he wrote a CARD.  In response to the issue, the licensee initiated various actions that included, but were not limited to:

• On October 10, 2018, the licensee convened an emergent Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (NSCMP) meeting to discuss the concerns outlined in CARD 18-27984 and to ensure that the proper investigation, actions, and communications were being conducted. • The Plant Manager held numerous meetings with AECOM and licensee craft employees at the plant to reinforce the importance of raising nuclear safety concerns and to emphasize the importance of a healthy SCWE. • The Employee Concerns Program (ECP) Coordinator conducted an investigation into the incident and performed an assessment of the nuclear safety culture at the plant, specifically focused on the AECOM contractor workforce. • The licensee performed a study of the number and types of CARDs initiated by the AECOM organization to confirm CARDs were being generated and that issues were being documented. • The Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO) discussed the licensee’s expectation in the area of problem identification with AECOM senior management.
 On January 18, 2019, the inspectors completed a review of the actions taken by the licensee associated with CARD 18-27984.
 The inspectors interviewed the ECP Coordinator and reviewed documents pertaining to the investigation of the events surrounding the CARD, which included written statements from individuals at the scene when the comment in question was made.  The inspectors also reviewed ECP records and performed a corrective action program (CAP) document search for issues relevant to SCWE for the previous 3 months leading up to the inspection.  In addition, the inspectors reviewed CARD initiation data from previous refueling outages at the plant and compared them to RFO 19 when CARD 18-27984 was written.
 The inspectors reviewed training material provided to new employees arriving at the plant to ensure that all personnel, particularly supplemental personnel brought in for refueling outages, were made aware of their responsibilities for raising nuclear safety concerns and the licensee’s expectation for maintaining a healthy SCWE.
 The inspectors conducted one focus group, consisting of seven AECOM craft personnel, and five individual interviews, comprised of three AECOM craft personnel and two AECOM supervisors, to assess the SCWE fostered by AECOM.  Additionally, the inspectors interviewed the Plant Manager and CNO regarding the actions taken in response to CARD 18-27984 and discussed any feedback that they received concerning those actions.
 Overall, the inspectors did not identify an environment where AECOM craft personnel at the plant were reluctant to raise nuclear safety concerns for fear of retaliation.  During the inspection, all of the individuals that participated in the focus group and interviews stated that they did not fear raising nuclear safety concerns and, in general, felt supported by their supervisors to do so.  None of the individuals who were interviewed identified with the comment

18

made by the individual in CARD 18-27984 stating that they would be fired for writing a CARD.  None of the individuals interviewed had witnessed or heard of anyone in their organization being told not to write a CARD or being retaliated against for writing a CARD.  Pertaining to the ECP Coordinator’s investigation into CARD 18-27984, given the information that was available, the inspectors concluded that the investigation was reasonable in depth and scope and was sufficiently thorough to conclude that there was not a SCWE issue within the craft in the AECOM organization.
 The inspectors did not identify any additional issues pertaining to SCWE in their record review of the ECP and CAP.  The inspectors noted that the rate of CARD generation for contractors during the outage was consistent with previous outages indicating that conditions adverse to quality were being identified and documented in the CAP by AECOM personnel at an expected level.  Additionally, the inspectors did not identify any issues with the content of the training provided to new plant employees concerning their responsibilities for raising nuclear safety concerns or the licensee’s expectation for maintaining a healthy SCWE.
 The inspectors provided observations from the inspection to licensee management regarding opportunities for improving the knowledge retention of SCWE training received by new employees being processed into the plant as well as opportunities for licensee management to raise the level of understanding among the craft on how the CAP system functions to address issues.  These observations were documented by the licensee in CARD 19-20652.

Fermi Probably Lost All Containment and Core Cooling Pumps?

- WO 48693770; Extensive Coating Defects Identified During Torus Underwater Inspection; 09/22/2018 - WO 48693800; Inspect and Repair Torus Coating, Above Water; 09/18/2017
 

Update July 13

At the bottom of this all, do you want to be certain you are safe or certain you are unsafe??? 

I believe they did a regularly scheduled inspection of the Torus interior during the outage. They discovered the unexpected interior paint deterioration. They soon realized they would need a complete paint job. This would prolong the outage by many weeks. In the best light, they were going to schedule the next outage. The worst case scenario, this did this over many cycles. The discovered the    
deteriorated paint over many interior inspection cycles. Promised everyone next outage we will get to the paint job. As the next outage was approaching, Fermi discovered they had too many jobs for the length of the outage. They had to prioritize jobs for the new outage, meaning they were going to have cancelled scheduled jobs. This happens most outages. So the paint job just kept being put off outage after outage because of the crazy job prioritization system.

So why did the paint job fail? Could be age related. An improper application. Wrong kind of paint. The surface wasn't prepared right. It would be critical to scape away samples all through the torus and have them samples analyzed. I doubt they did that. These guys are really smart people. If they did the wide test scaping, found wide spread degradation...they would be forced into an immediate paint job. They now have no absolute proof the deterioration wouldn't clog the strainer. It is a hell of a environment in the torus in a LOCA. Large quantities of high temperate water would enter the torus. It would heat up very fast to some 160 degrees.

They got a large personal hatch for people to enter the torus. They commonly hoist a small boat into the water and paddle around the drywell for inspections. But you can't do they at power. In the drywell and torus, they fill them up for nitrogen. They will have to shutdown the reactor and take out the nitrogen for a inspection.    

Update July 12 at 1pm.

In line with everyone else: DTE stock price went down substantially more the rest of the nuke plants Friday. Fermi is very fragile because it is a single owner plant and DTE is rather a small utility.

Called the Fermi inspectors and spoke to the senior resident for about 45 minutes. He knew my name from the Palisades issues. He was very open to me, but staying within the rules of the NRC. I liked the guy.

I believed it is much worst than I first thought. Fermi inspected the torus, both above water and below water during Sept 2018 outage. That was the last time the Torus has been opened. The NRC did a engineering inspection in April of 2019. Through significant amounts of picturing up and videoing up the Torus in 2018 by the licensee, the NRC engineering inspectors went over the videos and pictures during the April 2019 inspection.

I contend both the licensee and NRC sat and didn't act on the very serous safety issue.

Why didn't the licensee see and act on the torus paint deterioration in in Oct 2018? 

Why didn't the NRC look over the license's torus paint videos and pictures? I get the feeling the NRC internal processes, schedules and procedures trumps emediately uncovering serious safety system deficiencies and quickly fixing them. The bureaucrats think safety is following the processes, schedules and procedures.           

Why didn't the NRC emediately launch a special surprise inspection in the engineering inspection in April of this year.

I requested the NRC order Fermi to shutdown emediately and comprehensively inspect all painted surfaces inside the Torus and fully repaint the Torus.

I asked the NRC when was the last time the torus was repainted. The inspector didn't know. 

From April of this year until yesterday,  the NRC allowed Fermi to intensify and deepen their paperwork falsification efforts surrounding the failing paint job. It allowed everyone at the plant to get their "story straight" before the announced special inspection yesterday.

For the licensee, it is so easy for them to play the NRC...     

Update July 12

May 9, 2019

SUBJECT: FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2—NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000341/2019001 

A finding of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 26.205(c) and (d) was identified by the inspectors when the licensee failed to appropriately schedule and control the work hours of eight workers that performed or directed onsite maintenance activities on the safety-related torus during Refueling Outage 19 (RFO 19).  Specifically, the Nuclear Projects Group inappropriately determined that planned torus coating maintenance activities did not have the potential to impact any risk significant functions of primary containment.  As a result, workers performing planned torus maintenance activities were inappropriately excluded from the work hour limits specified in 10 CFR 26.205(d)(1), (d)(2), and (d)(4) and exceeded these limits during torus maintenance activities. Description:
 Title 10 CFR Part 26, “Fitness for Duty Programs,” describes NRC requirements associated with the implementation of a Fitness for Duty (FFD) program at nuclear power plants.  These requirements include work hour restrictions associated with safety-related work.
 During RFO 19, which was conducted from September 22, 2018, to October 27, 2018, coating inspections and repairs were performed inside the torus, which is a safety-related structure within primary containment.  One of the functions of the torus is to provide a large volume of water to supply the emergency core cooling system (ECCS).  As discussed in industry operating experience, if torus coatings are improperly applied and maintained, coating delamination and plugging of ECCS suction strainers could occur.  The inspectors identified that the licensee classified coating work inside the torus as uncovered work and therefore the work hours of those individuals were not tracked to ensure that 10 CFR 26, “Fitness for Duty Programs,” work hour rules were followed in accordance with Procedure MGA 17, “Working Hour Limits.”
 Prior to the start of RFO 19, the Nuclear Projects Group utilized Fermi Procedure MGA 17, “Working Hour Limits,” to identify workers that were subject to 10 CFR 26 work hour rule limits based on the prescribed work activity impact on structures, systems, or components (SSCs) and whether or not the SCC was considered risk significant.  The torus coating maintenance work was inappropriately screened to not have any potential SSC impact based on a misinterpretation of the safety function descriptions referenced in Fermi Procedure MMR Appendix E, “Maintenance Rule SSC Specific Functions,” for primary containment.  In particular,  the Nuclear Projects Group independently determined there was no potential adverse impact on the torus to provide a source of water as a suction supply for ECCS equipment.  Therefore, the torus coating maintenance activities were scheduled as uncovered work.

 Following RFO 19, the inspectors reviewed the work hours for workers who performed covered work and questioned whether the torus coating inspection and repair work that had been performed by workers and not identified by the licensee to be subject to the work hour rule limits of 10 CFR Part 26 should have been included.
 The licensee evaluated the classification of the work and determined that the torus coating inspection and repair work in the safety-related torus should have been categorized as work that was subject to 10 CFR Part 26 limitations.
 A licensee follow-up evaluation determined that eight individuals assigned to torus maintenance activities worked 8 or more consecutive days with a 12-hour shift and that this exceeded the allowable work hour rules specified in 10 CFR Part 26.
 Corrective Action:  Torus coating work was reclassified as covered work for future outages and incorporation of an Operations department review of Nuclear Projects Group work activities to determine the impacts on SSCs for appropriate work hour rule screening was implemented. 

Ok, these guys had paint potentially plating off the inside of the Torus for years. You got to assume the suction strainers would have clogged. How would you verify the magnitude of the filter clogging? The only way to accurately verify the magnitude of the strainer clogging is to throw a full scale worst LOCA at the torus. I know you can't do that. So the utility and NRC just guess get at it. Nobody really knows how bad the clogging could have been. What was the true risk of a terrible accident, really what would be the offsite dose? You know the insiders scam the extent of the potential clogging. Paint sheeting of the torus happens over and over again in the industry because of cheap and poor maintenance. 

Right, the NRC has reduced transparency and the punishment of coloring outside the lines with these plants. It is a grand experiment.  Are we heading into seeing more significant events at the plants because there is no or little incentives not to have them.  

When was the last time we've seen a NRC special inspection at the plants? Has it been years? The NRC has drastically cut back having special inspection by weakening the requirements based on phony risk assumptions.

You know another indicator of weaker regulations and requirments? Fermi 2 is still at 100% power. They are not shutdown by the NRC.        

RC Launches Special Inspection at Fermi Nuclear Power Plant 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has launched a special inspection at the Fermi nuclear power plant to determine if degraded paint inside a portion of the reactor containment could impact certain safety systems in accident conditions. During a recent engineering inspection, the NRC noted a degradation in the paint inside the torus, a donut-shaped component of the reactor containment located below the reactor vessel. Filled with water, the torus is designed to absorb energy from the reactor or supply water to safety systems during an accident. Loose paint chips from the torus could potentially impede the flow of water to safety-related equipment. NRC’s five-person inspection team will focus on establishing a sequence of events related to degraded paint in the torus; reviewing the plant’s maintenance practices; and assessing the overall response since the discovery of the condition.  The inspectors will provide their preliminary conclusions regarding the significance of the issue in a publicly available report to be released approximately 45 days following completion of the inspection. The plant continues to operate safely. The plant, operated by DTE Electric Company, is located in Newport, Mich., approximately 25 miles northeast of Toledo. Graphic by General Electric

Hurricane Heading Towards New Orleans And The Associated Entergy Nukes

Update July 12

New Orleans faces a never-before-seen problem with Tropical Storm Barry

By Dakin Andone, Paul P. Murphy and Brandon Miller, CNN

Updated 5:40 AM ET, Fri July 12, 2019 

***I am going to be watching the four nuclear plants in the River Bend and Waterford. The four plants aren't designed for this level precipitations...we can have roof collapses and puddling of outside water leaking into the plant. Big outside electrical conduits flooding water into the plants.

 "Overlapping extreme-weather events aren't just a New Orleans problem."   

Is this the year when Entergy nuclear plants, especially the Louisiana plants will be deluded by hurricanes. 

Look at what is going on here!!! The Mississippi River is heading for historic flooding and over topping of New Orleans levees before the hurricane hits the city. 10 inches of rain yesterday and flooding in the street of the city today.  This is because of the all the rain in the mid west in recent months. This guy hitting New Orleans next week is going to be a tremendous rain maker.  Wha 

***The National Weather Service is now predicting the Mississippi River to crest at 20 feet at the Carrollton gauge near Uptown New Orleans. This would put the river at the top of the levee in some areas, but still more than a foot below the recorded all-time high of 21.3 feet.

Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards says the greatest risk of river flooding is in Plaquemines Parish.

"There could be a considerable amount of overtopping of the Mississippi River levees in Plaquemines Parish on both the Eastbank and the Westbank," said Gov. Edwards. "We are targeting areas south of Oakville on the Westbank and south of Caernarvon on the Eastbank as being most likely to be at risk for flooding due to overtopping of the levees."

***Days Before Hurricane Expected to Hit New Orleans, City Endures 10 Inches of Rain as Mississippi River Swells

"Overlapping extreme-weather events aren't just a New Orleans problem."

by

Eoin Higgins, staff writer

While the Louisiana coast braces for what's expected to be the first formed hurricane of the 2019 season, predicted to make landfall Saturday, New Orleans on Wednesday endured torrential downpours of up to 10 inches in parts of the city.

The Mississippi River is predicted to crest at 20 feet on Saturday, which, as meteorologist Eric Holthaus pointed out, is the height of New Orleans' levees. 

***National Hurricane Center

Eric Holthaus

✔ @EricHolthaus

UPDATE: The NHC has just issued a storm surge watch and tropical storm watch for coastal Louisiana, in anticipation of #Barry.

NHC expects storm surge of 3-5 feet, and total rainfall as much as 18 inches. (Parts of New Orleans have already received more than 10 inches today.)

Where Oh Where is Arkansas Nuclear 2 In The Critical Summer Months

ANO 2: What Happened To This Guy Since May 28

So they were at the end of a outage when they had this short? 

Either they had a short in the wiring or the pump? You get it, big piece of equipment fails, over and over again, that is how you get this long repair period.


Just saying, they got the all clear from the column 4 fiasco. 

INSPECTION SCOPES In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0305, Section 10.02.d.7, this inspection report is a follow-up inspection of your improvement initiatives completed since the Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) (EA 16-124) was closed to verify that performance improvement was sustained in selected areas.  Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted.  Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at  http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.  Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with IMC 2515, “Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase.”  The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Unit

SCRAM Code

RX Crit

Initial PWR

Initial RX Mode

Current PWR

Current RX Mode

2

A/R

Y

100

Power Operation

0

Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP ON GROUND FAULT "This is a 4-hour Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) notification due to a Plant Protection System (PPS) actuation. Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, automatically tripped from 100 percent power at 0512 CDT. The reactor automatically tripped due to 2P-32B Reactor Coolant Pump tripping as a result of grounding. "No additional equipment issues were noted. All control rods fully inserted. Emergency Feedwater (EFW) actuated and was utilized to maintain Steam Generator (SG) levels. The EFW actuation meets the 8-hour Non-Emergency Immediate Notification Criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). No Primary safety valves lifted. Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) did lift initially after the trip. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. "Decay heat is being removed via the steam dump valves to the main condenser. Unit 2 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. Unit 1 was not affected by the transient on Unit 2. The licensee notified the State of Arkansas."

The Operation Of River Bend Is A Disgrace

Check all the preventable fuel failures? 

June 25, 2019

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION – REVISED NRC BASELINE INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2018012  

The Russians Are Back?

?

What I mean is I am getting a lot more Russian hits on my blog.

Cooper Plant Cyberly Attacked By The Russians

Ok, obsolete plants like this generally got a ancient mainframe covered by a airgap. But all it takes in one disgruntle computer guy to override this. And we know Americans are highly susceptible to economic blackmail. Who even knows what off site contractors could bring into a plant. Outsides have no idea how prevalent this is because of so much secrecy. There is no doubt the transmission breakers around the plant are effected and ISOs in the systems.    

U.S. Escalates Online Attacks on Russia’s Power Grid

When General Nakasone took over both Cyber Command and the N.S.A. a year ago, his staff was assessing Russian hackings on targets that included the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, which runs a nuclear power plant near Burlington, Kan., as well as previously unreported attempts to infiltrate Nebraska Public Power District’s Cooper Nuclear Station, near Brownville. The hackers got into communications networks, but never took over control systems.