Whistleblowing can be used as a potent creative tool to help your bureaucracy evolve towards a more enlightened organization.
Phone: 1-603-209-4206 steamshovel2002@yahoo.com
Note: I constantly update my articles.
Comments at the bottom of the article are always welcome!!!
Mike Mulligan, Hinsdale, NH
The NRC says they are always responsible for nothing. I say the NRC has a secret policy to let some plants to knowing, along with the acknowledgment of the NRC...to intentionally and secretly violate licensing and NRC rules.
“We will be assessing that,” Sheehan said. “Generically speaking, it is the responsibility of the company to comply with our regulations and address any safety issues,” Sheehan added. “We perform targeted inspections to evaluate compliance with our requirements, but we cannot touch on every aspect of plant operations.”
I think the shutdown notification was about this. The NRC is investigating itself over Pilgrim oversight. It just going to snowball from here on in. I certainly knew the right person Jim Isom to talk to? If you ever went not to talk about a painful episode, just say its under investigation. Then you got four to six months delay in talking about till everyone forgets. "Its under investigation, we can't talk about it :)"
Sheehan said it was also not clear why NRC inspectors had never noticed the lapse. “That’s something we’re going to have to look at, too,” he said.
Certainly Entergy knew I was raising the eyebrows in the Louisiana
news market. Don’t think for one moment your Louisiana nuclear plants were safe
from the regulators?
Update: they still using Freon as a fire extinguishment in the cable vault and 4160 volt switchgear room. We worried the Freon would kill us(suffocate)before it put out the fire.
I talked to the
“design engineering inspection working group Jim Isom, NRR/DIRS/IRIB (Chair)
today. I asked him are you doubling or cutting the design engineering inspections.
All he would say to me
Operators at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station have acknowledged a longstanding safety lapse after a review of its fire-protection system this week revealed the plant had failed to comply with a government advisory issued in 1992.
In the latest setback for the Plymouth facility, engineers disclosed Monday they had discovered vulnerabilities in two areas of the plant that required “fire watches,” where trained personnel monitor sections for any evidence of a fire.
The lapse raised the alarming — if remote — possibility that a fire in the control room would compromise the plant’s ability to safely shut down the nuclear reactor.
“It had never been properly addressed, for whatever reason,” said Neil Sheehan, spokesman for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which regulates commercial nuclear power plants. “We’re going to have to assess why it took them until now.”
Sheehan said it was also not clear why NRC inspectors had never noticed the lapse. “That’s something we’re going to have to look at, too,” he said.
The plant’s owner, Entergy Corp., said it has increased monitoring at the plant and is working on engineering changes.
The 1992 advisory, issued after a Washington power plant discovered that valves required for a shutdown could be damaged by a control room fire, was not a formal requirement. One specialist called the problem relatively minor.
But critics said the disclosure spoke to broader, persistent problems at the aging Pilgrim plant, which has come under increasing scrutiny from federal regulators.
“It’s not as if this is the first time safety concerns have been raised,” said Emily Norton, director of the Massachusetts chapter of the Sierra Club, which opposes nuclear energy. “We don’t need any more evidence.”
News of the lapse, first reported by the Cape Cod Times, follows a downgrade in the plant’s safety rating, raising the prospect that the plant may shut down to avoid millions of dollars in required improvements. A series of unplanned shutdowns in recent years, along with substantial safety problems that included recurring issues with relief valves, led to the downgrade.
Sheehan said the plant identified the “potential vulnerability” during a review of its fire protection system. He said the scenario of a fire threatening the plant’s ability to shut down is “highly improbable” but operators should be aware of the threat.
Regulators will review what steps the plant has taken during a November inspection, Sheehan said. It was too early to tell whether the plant would be fined, he said.
“We need to gather more information,” he said.
In a statement, Entergy said the station had established “robust levels of manual and automatic fire detection and suppression in all critical areas.” It added, “Engineering modifications are under development and will be implemented to address the issue.”
The company said the plant will conduct hourly watches “as an additional layer of protection” until the underlying problem is resolved. Workers already are patrolling the areas of concern, including rooms in the reactor building, every four hours.
The company will make phased improvements that will be completed in 2017, a spokeswoman said.
David Lochbaum, director of the Nuclear Safety Project for the Union of Concerned Scientists, said the problem was “relatively minor,” although it should have been noticed earlier. Resolving the issue would be straightforward, he said — “a simple fix compared to the other things on the to-do list.”
In the past two years, regulators have stepped up enforcement of previous advisories, Lochbaum said.
Under the scenario outlined in the advisory, a fire in the plant’s control room could cause short circuits, threatening motor-operated valves needed for a shutdown. The valves could sustain mechanical damage before operators could shift control to an alternative source.
The plant is one of just three nuclear reactors nationwide in the next-to-lowest performance category, officials said. There are no plants in the lowest category.
Critics of the nuclear plant said that even if the lapse was minor, the stakes are too high for virtually any risk.
“Even if there’s a small probability, the consequences when something goes wrong are very large,” said Mary Lampert, director of the group Pilgrim Watch. “And it further undermines the public’s confidence that the reactor is safe.”
is we are increasing the efficiency of the program. Jim reminded me I listen in by phone to the design engineering public meeting 6 months ago and made comments. The guy does have a great memory.
Update: Jim asked me if I was the guy who made a FOIA request on all design engineering inspection documentation. It wasn't me.
I asked him why
all the design inspections had missed the Pilgrim hot short problem. Basically a electrical problem. He told me
he would get back to me with a answer.
That is basic
deception and lying. Please define what "increase efficiency" and "ROP Realignment" means…is it high highfalutin deregulation and regulatory capture by the rich utilities.
So here is the
list of names of the working group. I believe these guys are saying we need
less design engineering inspection. I doubt the agency has a “god’s eye view” of
all past and current design engineering violations…more the agency field of
vision is 99% restricted. What proof do they have that all the unknown design violations have been seen by the NRC? ***You get the inspection contractors are now limited to the 2009 budget???
VIII.
DEIWG MembershipJim Isom, NRR/DIRS/IRIB (Chair)
................................................ (301)415-2954Don Norkin, NRR/DIRS/IRIB
......................................................... (301)415-1109Chris Cauffman, NRR/DIRS/IRIB ..................................................
(301)415-8416Frank Arner (lead), Region I/DRS
................................................. (610)337-5194Steve Pindale (backup), Region I/DRS
......................................... (610)227-5116Wayne Schmidt (SRA), Region I/DRS
.......................................... (610)337-5315Robert Berryman, Region II/DRS
.................................................. (404)562-4817Andy Dunlop, Region III/DRS
....................................................... (630)829-9726Laura Kozak (SRA), Region III/DRS
............................................. (630)829-9604Wayne Sifre, Region IV/DRS
........................................................ (817)860-8193Gerond George (backup), Region IV/DRS
.................................... (817)276-6562
Is there any validity that you only get one shot at a enginering sample set for the life of the plant? Basically you get the NRC policy here with the greater than green risk hurdle. The NRC doesn’t enforcing licensing and regulatory rules violation with a less than or green potential violations.
IX. Duration As part of the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP)
self-assessment process (Inspection Manual Chapter 0307) periodic (at least
biennially) reviews of the ROP inspection procedures are conducted to determine
if the inspection program is meeting the goals and intended outcomes. In
accordance with Appendix B of the Inspection Manual Chapter 0307, “ROP
REALIGNMENT PROCESS,” IRIB and regional staff conduct effectiveness review of the
inspection elements of the ROP to determine if the inspection’s effectiveness
can be improved. During this review it was determined that a working group
should be formed to evaluate the current CDBI procedure to consider a new
engineering design inspection procedure and to enhance effectiveness of the design
engineering inspection program. The following reasons were identified and
precipitated the need to form a working group to evaluate the current design
engineering inspection program:
Is the any validity that you only get one shot at a sample
set for the life of the plant? Basically you get the NRC policy here with the
greater than green risk hurdle. The NRC doesn’t enforcing licensing and
regulatory rules violation with a less than or green potential violation.
1) The feedback on the CDBI process indicates that the
number of high risk low margin component samples that remain uninspected at
each site is approaching exhaustion since the process does not normally allow
for the re-inspection of the same component unless there is good justification.
2) Concerns have been raised over the inspection’s effectiveness at identifying risk significant findings. Based on this observation the working group will explore a wide variety of options.
***So why didn't one of their Engineering inspections catch the hot short problem at Pilgrim? Are they all getting big bucks and away from home vacation time to turn their heads the other way?
This reminds me of the double yellow flooding findings at Arkansas Nuclear One. The NRC allowed ANO to operate for many years with flooding seal problems. It took them killing a employee recklessly dropping a 600 ton stator and massive seal leaks for them to enforce the violations. The shorts deal has been around for decades and the NRC has had many ineffective processes for catching this kinds of violations. If a licensee can't keep their plants safe, then the agency needs to command them to be safe. This violation is on a ineffective federal regulator.
"as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety"
I can make the case there our many scenarios with hot shorts. Take the case of a knowingly unsafe high voltage breaker. You could hire some sap minimum wage fire watch to stand next to the breaker cubicle waiting to catch the smell of a shorting breaker. You might not get any warning what-so-ever, just a massive electrical explosion incinerating the low wage sap contract employees.
So the NRC's campaign contribution scenarios with wire run fires and defective plant designs, is there will be a warning before the catastrophic fire. The fire watch could detect small fires and abnormal small/smoke to inform the control room. They might scram the plant or de-energized the wire runs. I say there are scenarios of no warnings, such as the high voltage breaker failure that self identifies itself with no need of a fire watch. Then the plant widely spins out of control because of a plant's poor design.
Catch the "political campaign" nuclear safety philosophy affecting
"as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety".
all of the nuclear industry here? You have to have triplicate perfect proof a plant is not safe that is never available to return a plant to the safe condition. The absence of proof it is safe is unnecessary.
***IN 92-18 : I am not sure if I provoked the inspection notice or not. I am not sure if this came before my complaint, after, or as a results. We knew we had shoddy procedure, can you even imagine the madness if these hot shorts occurred with the shoddy procedures and being severely undermanned
Why doesn't Pilgrim just shutdown until they get their ducks in a row. Shutdown until it is corrected. They will be dragging their feet for years until the final decision to permanently shutdown. That is why I think the final years of the plant is a unreview safety problem. It is a very dangerous period of the plant's life...the most dangerous. The idea of spending money is just a waste of money in the gray shadow of the prolonged decision point to a permanent shutdown!
Aren't you dying to hear the opinion of this by the Massachusetts's governor??? This could take out the governor on credibility issues and scandal. When did they really discover this?
By the way on Vermont Yankee: the operations employees in 1992 thought we didn't have enough operators to safety carry out a big fire in the plant and to abandoned the control room because of the fire and safety shut down and cool the plant at alternate shutdown panels. It would be a absolute circus. I made a complaint about this and got a huge internal Vermont Yankee investigation and then the NRC came in. This is one of the reasons I got fired. It is in the docket!!!
SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS FOR FIRE EVENT - OPEN ITEM WITH POTENTIAL TO IMPACT CAPABILITY TO OPERATE MOTOR OPERATED VALVES
"At 1725 [EDT] on Monday, October 5, 2015, while updating the site fire safe shutdown analysis report, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) identified vulnerabilities in two (2) specific fire areas that required a compensatory fire watch. The compensatory fire watches have already been established.
"The specific concern involves the unlikely scenario that fire forces evacuation of the control room. In addition, it is postulated that motor operated valves cannot be operated from their alternate control location due to spurious operation caused by hot shorts in control wiring. The specific failure mode is described in NRC Information Notice (IN) 92-18.
"Engineering modifications are under development and scheduled for implementation to address this specific IN 92-18 concern.
"Based on the above, the condition is reportable to the NRC as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. As such the condition is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), and requires an 8 hour notification.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Honestly, isn't this the universe helping me?
I got to translate what is going on. A lot of the anti governmentalism republican teabagger pronukers like minded people have gone off in a darkened room and decided engineering inspection are no longer needed. The NRC is portraying this corruptly carrying the industry's interest.
1) Basically, why have there been so many decades old engineering and licensing violations identified in recent years. There has been many violations picked up in malfunction and degradation by the residents these engineering inspections should have picked up?
2) How come these engineering inspections didn't pick up the Pilgrim hot short issues.
Design engineering inspections have been and continue to be
part of the NRC’s power reactor inspection program to ensure adequate public
safety. In the past, several different design engineering inspections process
have been implemented and they include Safety System Functional Inspection (IP
93801); Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection (IP 93811);
Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection (IP 93810); and Safety System
Design and Performance Capability Inspection (IP 71111.21). The Component
Design Bases Inspection (CDBI) (IP 71111.21) is the current design engineering
inspection. This inspection is performed under the ROP baseline inspection
program and will continue through
CY 2010 in its’ present form.
As part of the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) self-assessment
process (Inspection Manual Chapter 0307) periodic (at least biennially) reviews
of the ROP inspection procedures are conducted to determine if the inspection
program is meeting the goals and intended outcomes.
In accordance with Appendix B of the Inspection Manual
Chapter 0307, “ROP REALIGNMENT PROCESS,” IRIB and regional staff conduct
effectiveness review of the inspection elements of the ROP to determine if the
inspection’s effectiveness can be improved. During this review it was
determined that a working group should be formed to evaluate the current CDBI
procedure to consider a new engineering design inspection procedure and to
enhance effectiveness of the design engineering inspection program. The
following reasons were identified and precipitated the need to form a working
group to evaluate the current design engineering inspection program:
1) The feedback on the CDBI process indicates that the
number of high risk low margin component samples that remain uninspected at
each site is approaching exhaustion since the process does not normally allow
for the re-inspection of the same component unless there is good justification.
2) Concerns have been raised over the inspection’s effectiveness
at identifying risk significant findings. Based on this observation the working
group will explore a wide variety of options.
Just think about it, events in the last few months are focusing a high intensity laser light at Entergy? Will their credibility stand up to the intense scrutiny?
"The Central New York wholesale market is "even more challenging'' than the New England market where Pilgrim is struggling, Entergy officials said."
Entergy Corp. announced today that it will close Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth, Mass., no later than June 1, 2019, because of poor market conditions, reduced revenues and increased operational costs.
The announcement increased the anxiety in Oswego County, where Entergy has said it will decide by the end of this month whether to close the FitzPatrick plant in Scriba. Pilgrim is expected to lose between $10 million and $30 million in each of 2015, 2016 and 2017, Entergy said.
The Massachusetts plant faces many of the same challenges that could lead Entergy to close FitzPatrick, notably low power prices driven by abundant natural gas. In addition, the Pilgrim facility faced the likelihood of costly safety-related improvements because of heightened oversight from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Entergy officials today said the improvements were likely to cost at least $45 million to $60 million.
The Central New York wholesale market is "even more challenging'' than the New England market where Pilgrim is struggling, Entergy officials said.
"FitzPatrick, like Pilgrim, is a marginal unit located in an even more challenging wholesale power market,'' Entergy said today. "We are considering whether to proceed with (FitzPatrick's) next scheduled refueling outage. That decision will be made around the end of this month.''
Oswego County officials are worried about the effect closing FitzPatrick would have on the local economy, where the nuclear plant likely generates about $500 million of activity per year, according to estimates from similar facilities. FitzPatrick's payroll of $74 million is one of the area's largest.
Amid all the uncertainty, union employees at FitzPatrick will vote Wednesday on a new, multi-year contract proposal, said Ted Skerpon, president of Local 97 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.
Skerpon would not provide details of the proposal, but said he does not believe the union contract is a key factor in Entergy's decision about the future of FitzPatrick.
Basically Entergy declared war on liberal Massachusetts and their Republican Governor Baker.
Entergy To Shut Down Pilgrim NPP In Massachusetts Rate ThisNuclear Street News Tue, Oct 13 2015 2:21 PM Entergy Corporation, one of the largest energy companies in the United States, said Tuesday it would close down the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant in Plymouth, Mass., by June 1, 2019, citing economic factors.
The decision to close Pilgrim 1, a General Electric Type 3 boiling water reactor with a viable operating license that expires June 8, 2032, was based on a number of financial factors, Entergy said. Most pointedly, the company pointed to low current and forecast wholesale energy prices brought about by record low natural gas prices, driven by shale gas production. This has significantly impacted the nuclear power station's revenues, said Entergy, which, as a whole, has annual revenues of about $12 billion.
Do you think this only applies to Entergy???
The company also said “policy-related issues” have eroded wholesale energy prices with current and forecast power prices down about $10 per megawatt hour. This represents an annual loss of more than $40 million in revenues for Pilgrim, Entergy said.
The company pointed out “design flaws” in the energy market that do not compensate nuclear power plants for providing carbon-free, large-scale 24/7 energy generation and onsite fuel storage. Entergy also blamed “unfavorable state energy proposals that subsidize renewable energy resources at the expense of Pilgrim and other plants.” There is also a proposal in the state that could hurt the nuclear plant financially, as it would provide above-market prices to utilities in Canada for hydro power representing about 33 percent of the state's electricity demand. Another detrimental factor is a recent state order that would further lower the price of natural gas and increase the region's reliance on it.
Entergy's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Leo Denault called the decision to shutter Pilgrim “incredibly difficult … because of the effect on our employees and the communities in which they work and live.”
In addition, the company pointed out that it had invested hundreds of millions of dollars to improve Pilgrim's safety, as well as its reliability and security. In turn, they company is faced with increased operating costs and enhanced Nuclear Regulatory Commission oversight. Entergy said it predicted closing the plant would have a “neutral to positive” effect on cash flow through 2020, depending on uncertainty about the shutdown date, the plant's capacity supply obligation and costs related to the NRC's recent placement of Pilgrim in Column 4 of the Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix.
After shutdown, Pilgrim will transition to decommissioning. The Pilgrim nuclear decommissioning trust had a balance of approximately $870 million as of Sept. 30, 2015, representing excess financial assurance of approximately $240 million for license termination activities above NRC-required assurance levels. Filings with the NRC for planned shutdown activities will determine whether any other financial assurance may be required and will specifically address funding for spent fuel management, which will be required until the federal government takes possession of the fuel and removes it from the site, per its current obligation. Currently, no additional funding is anticipated, Entergy said.
As I've talked about, as VY was dying, the agency withdrew inspection services from Pilgrim. They worried Pilgrim was going to catch the VY disease. Entergy didn't put in enough resources into Pilgrim, this caused the plant to wildly spin out of operational control. All the attention to Pilgrim's operational problems forced the NRC into enforcing their weak regulations. Personally I think the nuclear industry is worried about all this attention ending in reforming the NRC. All bets are off if the republicans recapture the presidency. One wonders how the nuclear industry teabaggers will blame the NRC for forcing Entergy to close Pilgrim? By the way, they can shutdown whenever they want independent to the NEISO. They will just be required to pay for replacement power.
The company that owns Pilgrim Nuclear
Power Station said Tuesday morning that it plans to close the 43-year-old plant
in Plymouth.
The company said in a statement it
will close the plant no later than June 2019.
“The decision to close Pilgrim was
incredibly difficult because of the effect on our employees and the communities
in which they work and live,” Leo Denault, Entergy’s chairman and chief
executive officer, said in a statement.
However, Denault said, “market
conditions and increased costs led us to reluctantly conclude that we had no
option other than to shut down the plant.”
Company officials plan to hold a
press conference at noon Tuesday in Plymouth.
The decision comes about a month after the federal Nuclear Regulatory
Commission downgraded the plant’s safety rating. Pilgrim and two reactors in
Arkansas are now considered the least safe in the country.
The repairs needed to improve Pilgrim’s safety rating would have likely cost
tens of millions of dollars for Entergy Corp., a Louisiana-based energy
conglomerate that has owned Pilgrim since 1999. Pilgrim was already facing
rising costs, declining revenues, and an energy market increasingly
inhospitable to nuclear power.
The decision will have a significant impact on the town of Plymouth as well
as the region. The plant employs about 600 people and provides the South Shore
town with $10 million a year and other financial benefits.
The closure of the plant could make it significantly harder to meet the
state’s goals of cutting its carbon emissions 25 percent below 1990 levels by
2020 and 80 percent below by 2050.
Pilgrim supplies an average of about 5 percent of the region’s energy, and
the 680-megawatt plant accounts for about 84 percent of the state’s non-carbon
emitting energy. Plant officials said they will have to continue operating the plant until
2019 because of agreements they have with ISO New England, the grid that
supplies energy to the region. The plant could possibly close earlier if
Entergy contracts with another power plant to replace the power that would have
come from Pilgrim.
Popeye’s J.
Wellington Wimpy "I'll gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger today".
Why pay the price of a plant shutdown...a proper refueling outage when you can put off maintenance
today for maintenance in the distant future.
This condition resulted in the development of a susceptible condition resulting in a failure by shell leakage of the heater during operation on August 15, 2014.
Come on, if the NRC and Entergy were competent, they would have replaced this heater in the prior refueling outage. What they all proved to us is they have zero capability to predict a heater failure and its erosion.
Annual Sample: Through-wall Leak of Feedwater Heater Shell E-103B
a.Inspection Scope
b.
The inspectors performed a review of Entergy’s root cause evaluation and corrective actions associated with CR-2014-4052. The inspectors assessed the problem identification threshold, extent of condition reviews, and the prioritization and timeliness of corrective actions to determine whether Entergy personnel were appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with the history of the erosion/corrosion of numerous locations of the E-103B feedwater heater shell.
Specifically, feedwater heater E-103B has a history of shell erosion/corrosion issues. Since 1999, these issues have been resolved by a series of repairs and evaluations performed as needed to extend the replacement date of the heater. The Flow Accelerated Corrosion Program has measured and monitored the thickness of portions of the shell since 1999. No tubes have been plugged (removed from service) since heater installation in 1984. Feedwater heater E-103B was removed and replaced during the current refuel outage (RFO 20) with an identical heater procured without modification or change to original specifications. The replacement feedwater heater was procured for a planned replacement due to the continued degradation and resultant leaks in the shell.
The inspectors assessed Entergy’s problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timeliness of Entergy’s corrective actions to determine whether Entergy staff were appropriately, identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and, whether the planned and/or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors took note that the feedwater heater while being risk significant is not a safety-related component. However, the feedwater heater was designed and fabricated to the requirements of ASME Section VIII. In addition, the inspectors interviewed responsible engineering personnel to assess the effectiveness of the implemented corrective actions.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
The direct cause of the shell leaks was erosion of shell base metal and penetration in areas around the shell structural stiffeners until those areas could no longer carry the required loads. The inspectors reviewed test records of ultrasonic thickness readings acquired to support that wall thickness met the acceptance levels contained in engineering documents. However, wall thinning and loss of adjacent structural support to the shell and stiffeners continued.
The inspectors reviewed Entergy’s causal evaluation that identified the likely causes of the failure, including the degradation by corrosion of the shell in numerous area locations and in the areas of shell structural support. This condition resulted in the development of a susceptible condition resulting in a failure by shell leakage of the heater during operation on August 15, 2014. The inspectors noted that a replacement for the E-103B heater had been purchased and placed into storage in 2000.
The inspectors confirmed the critical parameters were being tracked and included appropriate alert and action levels when wall thinning decreased to a “t-critical” level. This wall thickness provides design margin with an inclusive allowance such that action is taken prior to actual encroachment on the design minimum allowable wall thickness.
The inspectors also reviewed a selection of sample locations where the highest wear rates have been detected in heater wall thickness monitoring plans. The inspectors interviewed engineering staff and reviewed test data to verify that monitoring and trending of wear data was measured and evaluated by engineering personnel.
The inspectors reviewed a selection of test data for various components and did not identify any additional issues. The inspectors determined Entergy’s overall response to this issue was commensurate with the safety significance, was timely, and included reasonable compensatory actions. The inspectors concluded that actions completed were reasonable to correct the problem and prevent reoccurrence.
They know Callaway is in big trouble. This guy is going to be bored being in a corporation with just one nuclear plant.
***Opdated 10/10: This is the collective nuclear industry trying to bail out Callaway and Ameren. They are loading up their firearms for battle on the regulatory and political battlefields. Don't you institutional investors and others bail out of us yet with a quarterly 4% increase cash dividends. That is a whopping more than 16% increase in cash dividends per year. This is called doing artificial respiration on the price of their stock!
LOUIS, Oct.
9, 2015 /PRNewswire/ -- The board of directors of Ameren Corporation
(NYSE: AEE)
announced today that Rafael Flores, senior vice president and chief nuclear
officer of Luminant, has been elected to the Ameren board of directors
effective Nov. 1. Luminant is the largest generator of electricity in Texas,
operating coal, nuclear and natural-gas power plants, and is a subsidiary of
Energy Future Holdings Corporation.
Flores has
served as senior vice president and chief nuclear officer of Luminant since March
2009, and in various other capacities with the company and its predecessors
since 1983. His responsibilities include overseeing operations of the
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant in Texas and representing Luminant with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, the
Nuclear Energy Institute and on various committees and working groups in the
nuclear industry. Flores has announced his retirement from Luminant
effective Dec. 31…
This is the preceding July 24 shutdown and MFP trip. It is a horror show. What caused the feedwater booms...the water hammer after no feedwater. Usually this is leaking containment check valves.
Think about it...coming on to this LER is 5 years. The document doesn't cue you into the NRC flipped this event into special inspection and problems associated with systemic problems with all four discharge flow control valves. I call it as federal falsification with not reporting this in this document.
Basically their is very little oversight with LER public reporting and the industry has forced the NRC into writing skimpy LER rules for reporting.
It just bothers me, the industry just operates collectively to the minimum intent of the regulatory requirements. The professional are just rule and procedure automaton without any intent of thinking and acting in a holistic manner.
I am just saying Callaway is starved for founding and the problems at this one-off plant are overwhelming everyone.
***This event was caused by the inadvertent inclusion of jumpers in the current transformer (CT) circuits of the main transformers that were installed as part of Main Transformer Replacement Modification 09-0044 implemented in Refuel 19. following the event, the inadvertently placed CT jumpers were removed and the plant was successfully restarted.
***The reactor trip was uncomplicated, as systems responded as expected. This included satisfactory operation of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFP), which provided flow to all four steam generators. For the “B” Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (MDAFP), discharge flow control valve ALHV0007(MDAFP Bto S/G A HV) initially responded as required (i.e., closed on demand). However, in response to a subsequent demand to open the valve, the valve remained closed and could not be manipulated from the control room using ALHK0007A, SG A MD AFP AFW CTRL. ALHV0007 was declared inoperable, and Condition C of Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.5, “Auxiliary feedwater (AfW) System”, was entered for the inoperable ‘B’ MDAFP train. An Operating Technician (01) was dispatched to the valve, and the valve was manipulated locally by turning its handwheel. The valve was repaired prior to the end of the TS 72-hour Completion Time for Required Action C.1. Inoperability of this valve did not prevent the delivery of adequate auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators.
They must have fixed it, back up to 100%. I like they disclosed it.
I missed this in the morning report. Somebody made a
good catch!
Pilgrim nuclear plant lowers power amid heater issue
By Patriot Ledger
Posted Oct. 8, 2015 at 12:58 PM Updated at 1:00 PM
PLYMOUTH - The operator of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station has lowered the plant’s power to 95 percent as officials investigate an issue with a feed water heater.
Laura Burm, a spokeswoman for plant operator Entergy, said crews lowered the power level Wednesday night after detecting an unexpected level change in the heater. She said the plant's power would remain at that level while crews investigate and correct the issue.
Basically NRC's Sheehan is saying employee safety is not a concern to the NRC. Isn't it the NRC job to back up their brother employees' safety. Basically OSHA has a hands off agreement with the nuke plants NRC...it is the lead agency's (NRC) responsibility to be the eyes and ears of OSHA.
Posted Oct. 8, 2015 at 12:58 PM Updated at 2:23 PM
PLYMOUTH - The operator of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station lowered the plant’s power to 95 percent Wednesday night as officials investigated an issue with a water heater.
Laura Burm, a spokeswoman for plant operator Entergy, said crews lowered the power level after detecting an unexpected level change in one of the plant's feed water heaters, which are used to reheat water that has been cooled after passing through the turbine as steam. She said the plant's power would remain at that level while crews investigate and correct the problem.
Neil Sheehan, a spokesman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, said the heater issue relates to power production at the plant and did not present a safety concern.
Somebody e-mailed me saying they don't know what a teabagger is. It was a stupid newspaper reporter.
Somebody who can put both human testicles inside his mouth at the same time : )
The NRC just put up a NRC blog entry in support of my teabagger position. Explaining the value of research reactors.
It is a vulgar euphemism for people who side with or belong to the tea party.Basically government disruptors… extremist libertarian like mided people without a conscience out to disrupt and destroy government for fun. I consider them all national security terrorist.
Here are political senatorial terrorist trying to disrupt and destroy government (NRC) I just illuminated on the NRC blog.
Me on the NRC's Blog: “I believe the pressures to not do the radiation study comes from the congressional anti-government regulatory disruptors. These concentrated forces are severely disrupting plant NRC oversight and it is only going to get worst if the House and Senate are taken over by the extremist government hating forces. As the recent senate NRC budget hearing highlighted, if the inept NRC (Sen. Inhofe) can’t keep tract of federal spending documentation on $91 million dollars worth of reactor research, (me) do you think the documentation on plant oversight is any better? I keep thinking about the Pilgrim recent daily event report with the NRC missing the 1992 information notice on fire protection wire hot short issue.”
This government teabagger disruption strategy is coming to a neighborhood near you. They are going to cut the NRC's budget in half or defund it entirely before this is over. Can't you hear them: lets privatized the NRC.
This is what the nation is going to look like if the anti- government teabagger factions take over both the House and Senate...anti-govermentalism disruption on a massive scale. At least we got a weak and do nothing democrat as president.
I agree with my House and Senate extremist anti government libertarians brothers...at the plant oversight level the NRC is very dysfunctional. I seen this over and over again, the general cowardness of the general population. I know through personal contact, most of the NRC officials and NRC inspectors are good people with good hearts. But most of the good people confronted by seemly overpowering force just caves in to the corrupt forces. It just easier to comply, and less risky, to comply with massive corruption. I have always been so disappointed with the good people of the USA, actually all the good people all over the planet, the good people of the NRC is no better than the multitudes. The world doesn't get into the place we are today without the complacency and permission of the good people.
Don't you worry one bit you good NRC employees, you will never disappoint me. When you take that wrong "fork in the road"? You probably took it years ago and don't know it. I seen this so often, I just don't get disappointed anymore. I have adapted to my life's disappointments on massive scale. I wonder how god adapts to disappointments of the living world? Yea, I am just doing my pathetic mother's Irish guilt trip.
Republican legislation planned to revise US NRC's fee system
Washington (Platts)--8 Oct 2015 622 am EDT/1022 GMT
The Republican chairman of the Senate committee that oversees the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission said Wednesday he is developing legislation that would revise the way NRC collects fees from its licensees.
Senator James Inhofe, an Oklahoma Republican, said in his opening statement at a hearing of the Environment and Public Works Committee that the agency's workload has been declining in recent years due in part to less applications for new reactor licenses than had been expected. Inhofe also said despite the fact the US nuclear power industry has spent more than $4 billion on actions taken in response to the Fukushima I accident in Japan, "NRC staff has repeatedly sent proposals to the Commission, which they admit are not safety-significant or cost-justified. I believe this shows the NRC's bureaucracy has grown beyond the size needed to accomplish its mission."
Inhofe also criticized "the NRC's extreme level of corporate overhead costs; reactor oversight spending increasing despite the decline in operating reactors; over-budgeting for new reactors work that no longer exists; and persistent carry-over funds."
Inhofe said he does not "have confidence that the agency will diligently address the need for reform on its own."
"I believe it's time for Congress to step in. I intend to draft legislation to reform the NRC's budget structure and fee collection in an effort to instill fiscal discipline in the agency and ensure that resources are properly focused on safety-significant matters and timely decision-making," he added.
Inhofe did not provide details about what might be included in the legislation, or when it might be introduced.
Asked whether Inhofe has definite plans to introduce such legislation during the current session of Congress, committee spokeswoman Kristina Baum said in an email, "the Chairman is developing legislation on the topic. However, we'll keep you posted in regards to timing."
NRC is required by law to recover 90% of its annual budget from licensee fees. The Nuclear Energy Institute has told the agency several times in recent years, in comments on the annual fee recovery rules, that the US nuclear power industry believes the agency's annual fees are increasing at an excessive rate.
NRC Chairman Stephen Burns and the other three commissioners said during the hearing Wednesday that the agency's ongoing Project Aim 2020 will increase NRC's efficiency and better tailor the size of its staff and budget to the type and amount of work expected in the next few years.
"A central element of the Project Aim effort is the rebaselining process," Burns said in written testimony. "In our direction to staff, my colleagues and I made clear that the focus should be on identifying what work is most important to the safety and security mission of the agency, and what activities can be shed, deprioritized, or performed with a less intense resource commitment."
--Steven Dolley, steven.dolley@platts.com
--Edited by Kevin Saville, kevin.saville@platts.com
Right, with the newspapers, the NRC and nuclear industry; all you are really getting is the extremely prettified version of events based on the so-called greater interest of the nation.
Operators at Pilgrim Nuclear Power
Station have acknowledged a longstanding safety lapse after a review of its
fire protection system revealed the plant had failed to comply with a
government advisory issued in 1992, the latest setback for the Plymouth
facility.
On Monday, engineers at the nuclear
plant discovered vulnerabilities in two areas that required “fire watches,”
where trained personnel monitor sections of the plant for any evidence of a
fire. The lapse raised the alarming -- though remote -- possibility that the plant
would be unable to
This the problem with the dopey and technically uneducated Boston Globe reporters. They are poorly educated on the operation and management of these nuclear power plants. The have little capability to know if the NRC officials and Entergy officials are telling the whole truth and accurate. Their technical skills just get them to parrot these official. They won't talk to anyone without a professional credential, because basically their too stupid to know even the basics of what is going on. A professional reputation as the all lawyers, know will keep a legal suit away from the newspaper. They are held hostage to the corporate professional class...they assume the like minded professional class are straight shooters.
There just is no evidence where the shorts are coming from with the NRC and Entergy. It is highly unlikely the fire threat comes within the control room. It will come from underneath the control room in the cable spreading room, the cable vault or below that in the 4160 volt switchgear room. It not fire they are worried about in the control room, its suffocation from the smoke, fumes and Freon they are worry about. Usually this is about separation of redundant instrumentation wiring or redundancy of safety grade electrical cables in the cable trays. The cable trays hold up numerous wires snaking throughout the plant. In a fires in the cable trays with redundant component wiring, the insulation burns out and there is shorting in the wiring. It can stop, start pumps, disrupt the involved instrumentation...basically leads to a runaway plant outside the control of the operators in the control room. Cable trays fires are very hard to put out.
In my days, only water can put them out. They use to teach us over and over again, you might have to put fire water on energized trays in emergencies. There might be up to 4160 or 480 high current volts being shorted out in the cable trays. They tell us, either agree to put water on high voltage shorting cable trays or you can't work in this job. This is highly contrary to the offsite fire fighting training. Wires have to be positively de-energized if in the vicinity with a fire hose and spaying water. So the dimwits Boston Globe statement "fire in its control room" is completely wrong...the BG reporter misheard what the officials were saying. We'll see a inspection report in three months, the details with that. As Donald Trump would say, I am right.
***So basically we are worry about is fires in the cable vaults, switchgear rooms, and cable trays that snake through the plant for miles. It is a cheap work-around based on a fundimentally defective fire protection design of a plant. It is basically about redundant instrumentation and electrical supply congregating in one location at the plant. If a fire occurs in one of these unbelievable vulnerable area...the idea is to the locally operate equipment important to safety shutdown shutdown the plant. We bypass the control room, the cable vaults, cable separating rooms and cable trays...the whole ball of wax because a fire in a vulnerable area could led to a uncontrollable and runaway nuclear power plant. There generally is very little training and testing on these systems. It is a phony system for public consumption...these systems are just for show.
***After the Browns Ferry fire and TMI, basically the USA came to the conclusion most nuclear plants were of a defective design and dangerous in their current forms. We invented these add on systems to remotely shutdown the plants. These systems were constructed shortly after I arrive at Vermont Yankee in 1980. These half ass and corrupted safety systems have the high potential to corrupt the humans and safety cultures all around them. The employees, managers, officials, utilities, the regulatory agencies and the politicians...the communities all around them for economic reasons.
***When you have to hide problems for survival; lie, cheat and be deceptive just to make a buck and feed your family. It suffocates the human spirit in a broad manner. You see what I mean, when you have lie, cheat and be deceptive for survival, then you have to invent a corrupt enforcement system to keep the human system spinning. It kills the human spirit in a wide manner on both ends: the enforcers and victims. Don't you hear MLK. The whole deal with excessive privacy, secrecy, non-transparency, corrupt enforcement systems and giving a advantage to some and not the others...forced living a human life in shadows. It is a natural corruption systems. It corrupts people and humans by the billions. As Pope Francis tells us with the term: "the god of money"? You people just keep living your shallow lives just for money and security? Don't you people read the bible and listen to the peoples Pope Francis?
I considers add-on systems as highly dangerous. The plant is not holistically designed. It gives outsiders the illusion the plants are safe. I call these systems papermacha safety systems... safety systems only made in paperwork forms. Basically cheap add on systems not holistically designed in one system, basically systems not thoroughly designed and tested as one system in the beginning of life. It is a safety system inherently with a lot of uncertainties still in the plant. The engineers just hasn't cleared out all the uncertainties. Usually we do this all for money and status. All these NRC and Entergy officials know there is a golden hour in public relations and in the news media. Basically a golden hour in hospital emergency care says if you get a serious injured person in the emergency room within the first hour after an injury...most people will survive the serious injury. The golden hour in the public relations and nuclear power plant news, people only listen to the nuclear news in the first 24 hours. The papers are only interested in publishing articles within 24 hours of the event because there after nobody listens.
shut down the reactor in the event
of a fire in its control room.
The plant said it will conduct
watches “as an additional layer of protection” until the underlying problem is
resolved. The plant says it already patrols the areas in question every four
hours.
“It had never been properly
addressed, for whatever reason,” said Neil Sheehan, a NRC spokesman. “We’re
going to have to assess why it took them until now.”
Sheehan said it was not clear why
NRC inspectors had never identified the lapse.
“Why this particular area never
caught our attention, that’s something we’re going to have to look at, too,” he
said.
The revelation, first reported by
the Cape Cod Times, follows a downgrade in the plant’s safety rating, raising
the prospect that the plant may shut down to avoid millions in required
improvements. A series of unplanned shutdowns in recent years, along with
substantial safety problems, led to the demotion.
On average, the 43-year-old plant
provides about 12 percent of the state’s electricity. It has been run by
Entergy Corp. since 1999.
In a statement, Entergy said that
the station has established “robust levels of manual and automatic fire
detection and suppression in all critical areas.”
This got to be going all over the agency and especially within the plants. It is probably why the NRC missed Pilgrims "hot short" issue...with the agency now undergoing investigation with why they NRC missed it. Doesn't the Senate "research budget" documentation general incompetence and NRC confusion wit oversight of Pilgrim sound exactly identical? It the NRC can't keep the documentation of the $91 million dollars in the nuclear research project straight, the object chaos in a senate hearing, maybe the NRC documentation of the plants are just as screwed up...
Generally these teabaggers Senate and House Republicans are hired hands of the anti-government of the utilities. They can save a few pennies over this to boost their profit. I think this is criminal activity. This is governmental disruption on a massive scale.
Clearly the House and Senate anti government Republicans have begun a war on the NRC. The cheap natural gas has undermined the safety of the nuclear plants and dangerous congressional teabaggers are scapegoating the hapless Nuclear regulatory Commission. This has turned into a national crisis at the intersection of politics and government oversight with dangerous industries. Generally the democrats are incompetent...the Dems would love to hide in the bushes while the giant nuclear utilities disassemble the NRC alive.
This is a gigantic shadow over the federal agency and the whole culture is effected by the political and corporate intimidation. I bet you this is the test case with how in the future the teabaggers disrupt and destroy government.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Took 6 Months and 3 Tries To Produce Research Budget-Andrew Follett
Things are moving so slowly at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) that it took nuclear regulators six months and three different attempts
to give congressional overseers information they requested on the research
budgets of projects.
The NRC finally did give the Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works the information, but it was an incomplete list delivered
the night before the commission was set to testify.
Republican Oklahoma Sen. Inhofe asked the NRC at the Wednesday hearing, “How do you develop
a budget and meet your responsibility to be good stewards of taxpayer dollars
and license fees if it takes six months and three oversight requests to produce
a list of what projects this 91 million dollars will be spent on?”
NRC Commissioner Stephen Burns replied that the slow response was
because of the “responsible” accounting methods the commission uses to compile
its list of projects. Burns continued by saying that NRC accounting, however,
lacks the ability to “track” the data at the level of individual projects.
According to Inhofe, “the NRC’s bureaucracy has grown beyond the
size needed to accomplish its mission.” The nuclear industry has shrunk in
recent years, and the NRC previously accomplished “a lot more work with a lot
fewer resources.”
Currently, the NRC plans to reduce its budget by roughly 10 percent by 2020 while reducing its staff by
around 9.5 percent from the current 3,778 to 3,600 by September 2016.
The NRC has seen its budget expand by about 50 percent over the
past decade. It predicted a wave of new reactor license requests and a
general expansion of the nuclear industry following the applications of 13
different companies to the NRC for licenses to build 25 new nuclear power
reactors in the United States between 2007 and 2009.
Changing economic conditions, however,
especially low natural gas prices, slow demand growth for
electricity, and the Fukushima nuclear disaster ended this “nuclear
renaissance” in the United States. This caused a declining interest in the
construction of new nuclear plants and as a result the NRC has
received 40 percent fewer licensing requests and about half as many
license renewal applications, greatly decreasing its work load.
Things are moving so slowly at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that it took nuclear regulators six months and three different attempts to give congressional overseers information they requested on the research budgets of projects.
The NRC finally did give the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works the information, but it was an incomplete list delivered the night before the commission was set to testify.
Republican Oklahoma Sen. Inhofe asked the NRC at the Wednesday hearing, “How do you develop a budget and meet your responsibility to be good stewards of taxpayer dollars and license fees if it takes six months and three oversight requests to produce a list of what projects this 91 million dollars will be spent on?”
NRC Commissioner Stephen Burns replied that the slow response was because of the “responsible” accounting methods the commission uses to compile its list of projects. Burns continued by saying that NRC accounting, however, lacks the ability to “track” the data at the level of individual projects.
According to Inhofe, “the NRC’s bureaucracy has grown beyond the size needed to accomplish its mission.” The nuclear industry has shrunk in recent years, and the NRC previously accomplished “a lot more work with a lot fewer resources.”
Currently, the NRC plans to reduce its budget by roughly 10 percent by 2020 while reducing its staff by around 9.5 percent from the current 3,778 to 3,600 by September 2016.
The NRC has seen its budget expand by about 50 percent over the past decade. It predicted a wave of new reactor license requests and a general expansion of the nuclear industry following the applications of 13 different companies to the NRC for licenses to build 25 new nuclear power reactors in the United States between 2007 and 2009.
Changing economic conditions, however, especially low natural gas prices, slow demand growth for electricity, and the Fukushima nuclear disaster ended this “nuclear renaissance” in the United States. This caused a declining interest in the construction of new nuclear plants and as a result the NRC has received 40 percent fewer licensing requests and about half as many license renewal applications, greatly decreasing its work load.
