Transcipts: VY radioactive plume and NRC coverup

Mr. Mulligan, I will turn it over to you
5 to provide any information you believe the Petition
6 Review Board should consider as part of this petition.

7 PETITIONER MULLIGAN: Thank you, Mr.
8 Hiland.
9 Words are, the definition of words is,
10 pretty important in this thing. You spoke of the
11 Petition Review Board discusses this with me. You
12 have done it repeatedly over I don't know how many
13 petitions, but not once has anybody ever discussed
14 anything with me. You usually send a
15 couple-of-sentence explanation on what is going on and
16 that type of thing. It's never discussed. It's
17 always in a written form. So just if words mean
18 anything, I just wanted to bring that up.
19 I was curious, you know, why my full 2.206
20 petition is not on the Vermont Yankee docket. It
21 might be there. I looked a couple of times. I
22 couldn't find it. There are a lot of issues with the
23 search features on the NRC site, but I am surprised
24 that 2.206 isn't on the docket itself, the whole
25 thing.
1 I spoke a lot in the beginning about
2 Palisades. And I last testified on October 26th and
3 on September 19th at Palisades. They had a reactor
4 trip. And they found a broken valve, and there was
5 leaking.
6 Then on September 26th of the same year,
7 they had a broken breaker. And so I am just making
8 the case with that petition that Palisades and Vermont
9 Yankee are related in that it is operated by Entergy.
10 I think the major fault with Entergy is
11 they haven' t developed a strong centralized management
12 system. They usually defer their management to the
13 local plants and stuff.
14 There is a lot of under-funding that goes
15 on and not adequate skills. And that's where a heart
16 of a lot of these problems lie. I think that in a big
17 organization, there has to be a strong centralized
18 power that creates order in all of the branches, the
19 rest of the organization.
20 In my last testimony, I said, "Well, you
21 know, I know the NRC is in a process. I will know
22 when the NRC is in a process of repairing itself when
23 they redo the 2.206 process." I basically think we're
24 there with this.
25 I think essentially the NRC maliciously
1 goes through this NRC process. And the outcome is
2 known to be inaccurate and falsified and corrupted.
3 You might go through the process. You
4 might obey all the rules and stuff, but the outcome
5 leads to a false outcome and stuff. And everybody
6 knows you guys sign your names to these things. And
7 if it's inaccurate and if it's intentionally
8 inaccurate, there should be legal remedies.
9 On April 26th, Mr. Hiland was talking
10 about on the roof and trying to figure out where the
11 plume was going, where the plume was coming out of the
12 turbine building. I mean, you know, it's a picture
13 taken a couple of miles away.
14 I was kind of perplexed at that type of
15 thing, asking those kinds of questions. If I was a
16 confident agency and they were working for me, the NRC
17 would have had inspectors up on that turbine roof.
18 And they would have been feet away from it. And we
19 wouldn't be playing word games with how many
20 stanchions away is the plume. We would have known.
21 The inspectors would have been up there. And it would
22 have wrote an accurate report about it. And we
23 wouldn't be playing these kind of games. We're trying
24 to figure out what a photograph is saying.
25 It should be mentioned two days prior to
1 this, Entergy wrote up a condition report about the
2 plume, about my plume. They essentially admit that
3 it's an unanalyzed discharge. There's no
4 documentation at all with this through the history of
5 the plant. And they hired AREVA to do an
6 investigation and evidently take samples of the stuff
7 coming out of the pipe. It's too bad that we didn't
8 get that before the shutdown.
9 The theme here is there might be generic
10 issues with other plants as far as should they have
11 similar AREVA investigations as Vermont Yankee? You
12 know, a possibility if Entergy and NRC wanted to get
13 VY into an outage and on the other side of the outage
14 without making any modifications because they don't
15 have to take measurements if there are issues of
16 getting VY past the court case? And everybody could
17 have been stalling because of that.
18 And, you know, there are issues of
19 incompetent relicense of Vermont Yankee. How come
20 this wasn't caught during the relicensing problem?
21 Did not meet the criteria for review
22 because the petitioner failed to provide sufficient
23 facts that would warrant further inquiry. You're
24 right. You know, like I just talked in the beginning
25 of this thing, you know, I knew that the system wasn't
1 providing me with the facts that were ongoing at the
2 plant with the AREVA contract and condition report and
3 stuff.
4 So essentially two days before this, my
5 testimony, the completion of it, was this condition
6 report and stuff. And I know a lot of people were
7 wondering, asking questions about this and stuff like
8 that. And this evidence wasn't given to me prior to
9 the Petition Review Board meeting.
10 I think it's a cover-up. I suspect
11 there's a -- it's a pretty serious cover-up because
12 this stuff was withheld from me. And, you know, it
13 wasn't really withheld from me. It was withheld from
14 the public.
15 Honest guy asks an honest question. And
16 it was absolutely accurate and stuff. Everybody was
17 fiddling around behind the scenes, you know, in the
18 secret document chambers that the public can't get at.
19 And everybody could play like stupid, you know, "We
20 don't know what you're talking about, Mike. You have
21 insufficient evidence." You know, this is one of the
22 worst coverups I've seen in the NRC in a long time.
23 I would like to go over the timeline on
24 our August 26. I submitted the 2.206 and accurate
25 radiological environmental reports coming out of the
1 turbine building plume.
2 On September 8th, I made a request of Tom
3 Setzer to help me with this. Again, you know, like
4 you said, "Mike, you've got the Freedom of
5 Information. And you've got all of these ways to get
6 information, Mike."
7 You got 100,000 processes, but nobody
8 wants to talk to you. I mean, that's what the NRC
9 always come back to me with, "We've got all these
10 processes."
11 But you make an honest effort to talk to
12 somebody about a problem, like Mr. Setzer. And he
13 stiff-arms me by not answering me back. And I suspect
14 that's not an error with Tom Setzer. I suspect that
15 his bosses told him that's how they're going to
16 respond to Mike Mulligan, is to stiff-arm him.
17 So on September 8th, I made a request to
18 Tom Setzer to help me out with the developing
19 condition report and AREVA contract to figure out what
20 is going on with that plume.
21 On September 12th, like I said, Vermont
22 Yankee submitted a condition report, or
23 CR-VTY-2001-03628, rad pathway unanalyzed.
24 On September 14th, two days later, we had
25 the Petition Review Board. Just one wonders. Two
1 days beforehand, you know, all the stuff going on
2 behind the scenes as far as Mike is right and then
3 everybody coming to the conclusion that it's an
4 unanalyzed pathway.
5 There are no documents at all with this,
6 at all. It's mind-boggling to think that there are no
7 documents at all associated with the vapor extractor
8 emissions.
9 So what did I get down to? The September
10 14th Petition Review Board. It's when Vermont Yankee
11 had the evidence sitting in their hands. And, like I
12 said, you know, whether Mr. Entergy at these
13 proceedings could have talked to me about it or made
14 a few comments about it or Tom Setzer himself.
15 These people knew that I was right. They
16 essentially gave the environment of insufficient facts
17 for the Petition Review Board, which was wrong. It's
18 absolutely wrong.
19 And, like I'm saying, these people had had
20 the opportunity to be honest and truthful and admit
21 what was going on and explain it a little bit, but the
22 system -- you know, that's the way the system works,
23 forward a system to a falsified outcome.
24 And everybody is just getting sick and
25 tired of that. You know, I thought we were supposed

1 to be honest and ethical. I thought we were supposed
2 to be focused on a higher good, a societal good type
3 of thing and not, you know, necessarily following the
4 procedures and processes.
5 The processes and procedures doesn't make
6 it ethical and truthful and righteous, the outcome.
7 You know, it doesn't create the honest story of really
8 what was going on and what happened and what we are
9 going to do in the future.
10 So on October 4th, the PRB made the
11 recommendation. I didn't get the recommendation until
12 October 11th, 2011.
13 On October 12th, I called Uldis Vanage,
14 the Vermont State Nuclear Engineer, and left a
15 recording on his phone. The spelling of his name is
16 U-l-d-i-s V-a-n-a-g-e. I still have a hard time
17 pronouncing his name. So I left a recording on it.
18 You know, I told him my story and left a recording on
19 his name, nice picture I gave him, too.
20 On October 14th around, Mr. Vanage called
21 me back, explained -- I explained my story, said he's
22 heading to Vermont Yankee to ask my questions.
23 On October 18th, 2001, the State Nuclear
24 Engineer reported back his results of his talk with
25 Entergy, you know. I couldn't get this out of -- you
1 know, Entergy was quiet. I couldn't get it out of the
2 NRC in the Petition Review Board and stuff, you know.
3 What kind of -- how do you get information? How do
4 you get information from people when the Board kind
5 of, you know, through its rule says you can't give
6 information out to Mike Mulligan?
7 You know, you say it's a one-way check
8 valve we've got going here. I have to abide by strict
9 legal precedences. And you guys get to use ghetto
10 laws and stuff like that that nobody can understand.
11 You make up your own rules behind the scenes that
12 nobody can understand and ghetto drug laws or however
13 you want to term it, these laws that really don't have
14 any foundation of serving society and the greater
15 good.
16 So he reported that there is definitely a
17 plume. He got this from Vermont Yankee. It is coming
18 from the turbine seals. It is coming from the turbine
19 seals. And maybe seal steam is getting into the lube
20 oil or the suction of the lube oil. There is tritium
21 released from it.
22 It is unanalyzed and undocumented through
23 the life of the plant. And Entergy -- like I said,
24 Entergy hired AREVA to do an evaluation of what
25 happened for the license basis.
1 That reminds me. I hope you got my last
2 email of kind of memorializing this.
3 Hello?
4 MR. KIM: Yes. We received your email.
5 And it has been disseminated to the PRB members.
6 PETITIONER MULLIGAN: Okay. Thank you.
7 You know, I say that the state engineer
8 says that he only wanted to talk about tritium, but I
9 believe it has all the components of reactor vessel
10 steam stuff.
11 And, you know, basically -- and this isn't
12 a little thing. I mean, to give people a little bit
13 of background, you have got tons of engineers at
14 Vermont Yankee. They're like ants. There are lots of
15 them and stuff. I know they're busy now in that
16 thing. And they all have -- most of them have good
17 degrees. They come from good colleges. Some have
18 advanced degrees.
19 Certainly the NRC is in the same way. You
20 know, these guys were all -- they have all a lot of
21 experience. And the NRC people have, you know, even
22 broader experiences. You know, engineers at Vermont
23 Yankee are experts at Vermont Yankee.
24 But the engineers with the NRC that are
25 associated with operation of these plants, I mean,
1 they have information on many plants. And, you know,
2 they have a greater view, wider view, of the nuclear
3 world and stuff like that.
4 So, you know, there's a lot of experience
5 here on both sides of it, a tremendous amount of
6 experience. You know, how could all these people miss
7 this through all these years?
8 You know, it's just mind-boggling to think
9 that somebody couldn't see that plume up there and
10 say, you know, "How is that damn thing in documents?
11 How do we get that thing -- how do we got our asses
12 covered?" And it was missed. It's at the end of
13 life. And something like this is missed at many
14 plants. Like I said, it raises generic issues at
15 other plants.
16 Like I said, in my 2.206 last time, I
17 begged for information on what was going on here.
18 And, according to your process, you were prevented
19 from giving me the information.
20 I mean, I don't think anybody, I don't
21 think Mr. Entergy was prevented from giving me the
22 information. I don't think Mr. Setzer was either. I
23 think he could have spoke up and said something, you
24 know, "This is going on" or something like that. But
25 the process says, you know, "You've got to lie by
1 omission." Everybody's got to lie by omission.
2 Everybody's got to be untruthful by omission.
3 It's okay to be dishonest because the
4 procedure says it's okay. It's allowed. And, you
5 know, I think there's something more here, you know.
6 That's really important.
7 I'll give my blocks another thing. It's
8 the Potterville Town Hall if anybody wants to see the
9 pictures and my write-up of it. I think this
10 constitutes a pervasive attitude with the NRC and
11 Entergy with an inability to tell us the truth. You
12 know, I think it's -- I think their systems allow them
13 to not tell the truth, you know. They can play the
14 rules, and the outcome can be untruth. I just think
15 that can't happen. That shouldn't be happening. That
16 shouldn't be happening in the United States of
17 America.
18 Malicious compliance with agency process,
19 knowing the outcome is not ethical, a falsification.
20 I believe that with all of my heart.
21 You've got to wonder if there's shredding
22 of documents going on at Vermont Yankee.
23 (Pause.)
24 PETITIONER MULLIGAN: I'm just going
25 through my paperwork here for a second to make sure
1 I've got everything.
2 The Catholic Church has an interesting
3 take on -- with their economic report recently about
4 the world situation with our financial system. And it
5 talks about technology and how we can't turn
6 technology into materialism or ethic or rules or use
7 technology for excessivity for personal benefit, what
8 I'm thinking of, the whole of the planet. It says
9 that, you know.
10 The soul of the NRC isn't the rules and
11 regulations. There's got to be something above rules
12 and regulations. I mean, in intelligence, there's got
13 to be something. Rules and regulations are primitive.
14 There's got to be something higher than rules and
15 regulations.
16 And intelligence is the ability to catch
17 associations, the ability to be fixated on something.
18 You know, you might get turned off a couple of times
19 or turn the wrong corner but, you know, the
20 intelligence to keep at it until you find a problem
21 and stuff like that.
22 There's a sense, you know, of the soul of
23 the agency, who they serve and what do they think of
24 human dignity. Human dignity is not found really in
25 a group of people. You could respect a group of
1 people but each other. And you can respect the
2 group's dignity, but you might disrespect the greater
3 societal dignity by over-focusing on group behavior
4 and not -- you know, where are we heading? Where are
5 we headed?
6 Here is a quote if I can just spend a
7 couple of seconds. "However, if we think clearly
8 about the new social question, we must avoid the
9 error, itself a product of neo-liberal thinking of
10 regarding all problems that need tackling as
11 exclusively technical in nature. In such a guise, the
12 problem evades discernment and ethical evaluation that
13 are urgently required. In this context, Benedict
14 XVI," I think, "encyclical warns about the dangers of
15 technical ideology; that is, of making technology
16 absolute, which tends to prevent people from
17 recognizing anything that cannot be explained in terms
18 of matter alone. It also minimized the value of
19 choices made by the concrete individual who works in
20 the economic financial system by reducing them to mere
21 technical variables, being closed to the beyond in the
22 sense of something more than technology not only makes
23 it impossible to find an adequate solution to the
24 problems but empowers the principal victims of the
25 crisis more and more from a material standpoint."
1 You know, all you've got to do is replace
2 "financial economic" with "nuclear power" and stuff.
3 And that essentially asks us the question, is there
4 something more than technology?
5 And, you know, of course, language is
6 being used more and more as a technical instrument.
7 You know, language is engineered processes are
8 created. Outcomes are assured.
9 You know, language becomes technically
10 engineered. You know, you can abuse language in the
11 same way as you can abuse the financial system.
12 You know, I talked a lot about this, about
13 how the NRC comes up with a process that's immoral.
14 It's the same way with language. And in a lot of
15 ways, we use language. Most our institutional
16 problems and failures are related to using language as
17 a technology to come to a predetermined outcome, to
18 force people to come to a predetermined outcome, and
19 not use their greater intelligence to really figure on
20 what is going on and what is best for us.
21 And so I just want everybody to realize
22 that language is important on how we use it. And we
23 can use it for good or we can use it for bad. And
24 this technical language that everybody uses nowadays,
25 you know, it's particularly potent. It can be used
1 for unbelievable, wonderful things. And it can be
2 used for some really nasty stuff.
3 Just one more quote from this guy. "As
4 Benedict XVI exhorts us, agents on all levels, social,
5 political, economic, professional, all are urgently
6 needed to have the courage to serve and promote the
7 common good through an upright life. Only they will
8 succeed in living and seeing beyond the appearance of
9 things and perceiving the gap between existing reality
10 and tried possibilities." This is unbelievable.
1] "Pope Paul VI emphasized revolutionary
12 power of forward-looking imagination that can perceive
13 the possibilities inscribed in the present and guide
14 people towards a new future.
15 "By freeing their imaginations, humans
16 free their existence. Through an effort of community
17 imagination, it is possible to transform not only
18 institutions but also lifestyles and encourage a
19 better future for all people."
20 I think that's important: our souls and
21 the souls of our organizations and how we serve some
22 higher purpose.
23 You know, one last thing is the pope says
24 -- well, not the pope. The church says, "Unity is
25 truth." You know, it kind of says, you know, if we
1 come to unity, you are almost god-like or over
2 cosmic-like and stuff like that. Unity is truth. It
3 couldn't be more beautifully expressed.
4 Thank you very much for allowing me to
5 speak.
6 CHAIRMAN HILAND: Are you finished, Mr.
7 Mulligan?
8 PETITIONER MULLIGAN: Yes, sir, I am.
9 CHAIRMAN HILAND: Okay. At this time does
10 the staff or anyone here at headquarters have any
11 questions for Mr. Mulligan?
12 (No response.)
13 CHAIRMAN HILAND: Hearing none, does the
14 staff in Region 1 have any questions?
15 MR. DeBOER: I do not.
16 CHAIRMAN HILAND: Does the license, who I
17 believe is listening on the call, have any questions?
18 MR. DeVINCENTIS: No, Entergy has no
19 questions.
20 CHAIRMAN HILAND: Okay. Before we
21 conclude the meeting, members of the public may
22 provide comments regarding the petition and ask
23 questions about the 2.206 petition process.
24 However, as stated at the opening, the
25 purpose of this meeting is not to provide and
1 opportunity for the petitioner or the public to
2 question or examine the Petition Review Board
3 regarding the merits of the petition request.
4 (No response.)
5 CHAIRMAN HILAND: Hearing no members of
6 the public, Mr. Mulligan, thank you for taking time to
7 provide the NRC staff with clarifying information on
8 the petition you have submitted.
9 PETITIONER MULLIGAN: Thank you, sir.

VY Turbine Lube Oil Vapor Extractor plume

 
The Vermont Yankee state liaison engineer documenting my concern....
Condition Report: CR-VTY-2011-03628
New Oct 24
On Oct 25 this tues from 2:30 to 3:30 is my second shot with the NRC petition review board. You can listen to it and ask questions to me at the end it. It is free of charge, tel number 1-800-772-3842. You are going to have to enter the number 2206 when they ask you.

Mass. congressman questions Yankee's truthfulness! (Burlington Free Press)

Rep. Edward Markey, the top Democrat on the House Natural Resources Committee, wrote Friday to NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko to complain that a spokesman for the Vermont Yankee nuclear plant had made statements “at odds with the factual history of the plant,’’ and that the “NRC had not appropriately responded to concerns raised about this issue.’’

Is this letter suspicious...trying the illicit a response.

Oct. 21, 2011: Is Entergy Being Truthful About Radioactive Strontium in Fish Near Vermont Yankee?

Letter to the NRC 

Picture: VY Turbine Lube Oil Vapor Extractor plume

From: Michael Mulligan

To: "Kim, James"
Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2011 11:00 AM
Subject: Re: PRB's Initial Recommendation on your 2.206 petition-Vapor Plume from Turbine Building roof
Addendum to this 2.206

Dear Mr Hiland,
I had the Vermont State nuclear engineer Uldis Vanage investigate the phantom radioactive plume seen in my tiny said plume of VY. Entergy entered into their document system CR-VTY-2011-03628 on Sept 12 and we know you took my testimony on Sept 14, 2011. Generally the plume is acknowledge to be reactor steam leaking from the turbine seals and it is being sucked into the turbine lube oil system exiting out the vapor extractor piping on top of the turbine building. It has all the components of radioactivity that is in reactor steam. I bet you this steam leaves the reactor vessel and escapes out the turbine building within seconds, certainly less than a minute. It is a unanalyzed pathway discharge of radiation and it is a black hole radioactive discharge without any evaluation and no plant documentation of any kind for 40 years. I suspect a document shredding operation going on. People suspect I had inside help on this.
This has been one of largest cover-up operation of the NRC in many years and there is certainly high level NRC officials being involved. The PRB's response to me that I had insufficient evidence was a malicious fabrication....the PRB's response to me was maliciously inaccurate and falsification considering CR-VTY-2011-03628 and the NRC questioning that went on at the plant .
At the end of the day, everyone is left wondering what is so big going on behind the scenes that the NRC would risk attempting to perform such a dangerous blatant cover-up?
By the way, Entergy contracted with Areva to do a technical investigation of the licensing bases issues with the unanalyzed discharge and also doing sampling of the pipe discharge.
I requested a immediate special investigation both with VY and also the NRC's actions or strategic omissions with this.
This has generic issues with all BWRs with similar setup with the vapor extractor discharges.

Thanks,
mike mulligan
Hinsdale, NH

PS: This went unanswered?

From:
Michael Mulligan
To: "Setzer, Thomas"
Sent: Thursday, September 8, 2011 11:34 AM
Subject: Re: Regarding your August 23, 2011 email about Vermont Yankee

Tom,
Could I talk to you about the VY LO vapor extractor plume...or one of your inspectors before the 2.206 PRB? The basic operation of the system and what radiation goes out the pipe on top of the turbine building...the sampling results of the steam. Is VY continuously monitoring that emission? What is in that plume and how does it get into the lube oil? How does these emissions fit into plant studies and tech specs? Is there much radioactivity in the turbine lube oil?
VY has discovered abnormal contamination on the turbine building roof and they say some of it was discovered in the storm drain out take and into the mud of the Connecticut River.
Thanks.
mike

"Mike Mulligan and the Hinsdale Route 119 bridge"

Updated Oct 17

Brigitte Mandel

Engineering and Operations Team Leader.

Federal Highway Administration HN....

It is too bad she talked to Washington. Her whole demeanor has changed...basically she says I trust everything the NH DOT says.

Basically I said after NH transportation system breaks down in the next two years or so...where the heck are you going to be? Who is going to hold you and your bosses accountable for doing nothing. So i ask her for he name. She himed and hawed, she said I don't want you saying something about me on your blog that is inaccurate. I said, I would let you say anything you want on my blog to defend yourself or your agency. She wouldn't give me her name. I said welcome to the United States of Russia where federal officials don't give their names because they are afraid bloggers will tell the truth. I told here I can't believe I live in the freest, most transparent and best nation on the planet...and a federal official refuses to give me her name when she is interacting with a member of the public in the interest of a federal agency...the federal Highway administration. I freaked out when she gave me this response. She told me her name, then I asked her to spell her name so I get it accurately. Then she said something like now you are making me upset...then she spelled her name.

That is the wide spread excuse for any state and federal officials' on the record....you can't hold me accountable because I can't defend myself on your blog....I won't give you my name. I hear this a lot with a lot of government agencies.

In the bad old days, they would just say screw you, I ain't giving you my name. They do the same thing today saying it more pleasantly, saying your are a blogger and you might say something inaccurate about me or the agency.

I have always been shocked by federal officials not being held accountable by staying or being on the record...the I ain't telling you my name because i don't feel safe telling you how we really work.

New OCT 16:
I just frame it like this...the condition of Route 119 pavement through Hinsdale is a abomination...it is a threat to our property values and businesses wanting to locate here, must be thinking twice with the condition of our main road. We are going to have a lot of road damage as we come into the spring warmup.  

Brattleboro/Hinsdale Bridge Unsafe

Fun with the NH DOT?

Severe staffing problems preventing bridge inspections (NH DOT)

Bridges: NH DOT 10 year plan

MMulligan: Best NH and USA Ambassador

Motorcycle Accident on Brats RT 119 bridge

How can they be sitting on this report for over a year...I got them to disclose the preliminary results. It is mind boggling they didn't immediately release the report! I made a accusation to the Federal Highway Administration that the NH DOT is severely overloaded and overwhelmed with road and especially bridge inspection issues..

Hello, Mr. Mulligan -

In response to your inquiry below, I have again attached my letter to you dated October 3, 2011 which states that the in-depth inspection was performed in the fall of 2011, just about one year ago. The engineering firm that performed this inspection, and the load rating based on those results, is AECOM, Inc., using staff from their Boston, MA, office. These preliminary reports are currently being reviewed by NHDOT Bridge Design staff.

I trust this adequately responds to your request below.

Regards, Mark W. Richardson, NHDOT Bridge Design

VY Turbine Lube Oil Vapor Extractor Plume

 Updated 6/30

Fukushima accident: March 11, 2011

The Vermont Yankee state liaison engineer documenting my concern....
　
I find it highly suspicious they can’t come up with a preliminary or back of a napkin estimation of the flow and the radioactive content in the plume.  

New Oct 18, 2011

The Vermont state nuclear engineer Uldis Vanags updated me on the results of my 2.206 and his investigation of the VY turbine lube oil vapor extractor fan radioactive release today. On Sept 12 Entergy wrote up a condition report CR-VTY-2011-03628 acknowledging they didn't ever have a analysis or technical evaluation of this release pathway with the vapor extractor discharge...never measured radiation...I wrote my 2.206 on Aug 26, 2011.

There is an expectation this pathway released radiation unmonitored...it is openly controversial now if their environmental reports ever were completely accurate.  Now it is a nationwide concern at BWRs if their radiological environmental reports were ever accurate if they had a LO vapor extractor...

 
It doesn't get passed any of us with the NRC answering me on Oct 4 "because the petition failed to provide sufficient facts to warrant further inquiy", while on Sept 12 Entergy wrote up CR-VTY-2011-036328 completely validating a response to my concern. Entergy has contracted with Areva nuclear to preform a investigation over this and measure vapor extractor radioactivity and evaluate if it reportable and radioactive environmental reports are accurate.

New Oct 17, 2011

Mr Kim,

For the PRB's interest, I got the Vermont nuclear engineer going into VY this week asking Entergy questions about the turb building plume and the vapor extractor.

mike

New Oct 12, 2011

Oh, I get it now, if Entergy and NRC don't have to disclose the facts, then there is never enough evidence for a 2.206 to be accepted.

Like I always have said, transparency is a enabler to meaningful public participation...

Mr. Mulligan,

On October 4, 2011, the PRB met internally to discuss the petition and to make the initial recommendation. The PRB determined that some of the petition requests do not meet the criteria for review because the petition failed to provide sufficient facts to warrant further inquiry. The remaining requests within the petition meet the criteria for rejection because they have already been reviewed, evaluated, and resolved by the NRC during prior 10 CFR 2.206 reviews. Therefore, the PRB’s initial recommendation is to not accept your petition.

Thanks

James Kim
Project Manager, DORL
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
301-415-4125

Yankee hearing leaves unanswered questions

" David McElwee, an Entergy engineer, told the legislative panel Tuesday that it was a result of rain washing off radiation from a roof on the turbine building, and getting into the storm drain. The ventilation problem was discovered in 1993, but there was no explanation about why the Cobalt 60 wasn't discovered until 1997."

By Susan Smallheer STAFF WRITER - Published: September 17, 2009

BRATTLEBORO – Entergy Nuclear refused to say Wednesday how Cobalt 60, a radioactive byproduct of the nuclear fission process, ended up in the Connecticut River in 1997, an issue that surfaced earlier this week during a legislative hearing on radiation monitoring at the Vermont Yankee plant.

Robert Williams said Entergy was preparing a report on the issue for the Committee on Administrative Rules and said it would decline further comment.

Williams said Cobalt 60 had gotten into the storm drains at Vermont Yankee and had ended up in the Connecticut River as a result of a ventilation problem, but he declined to say how the Cobalt 60 got out of the plant itself.

I bet you I am the first one in the history of Vermont Yankee who ever captured in a picture a steam or vapor plume emanating from the turbine or reactor building. My photograph of the any vapor plume was the first...

You can click on the Picasa link on the title...it is about 1.25 miles from my camera. You can keep clicking on the picture until it gets big enough for you.

The vapor extractor takes a suction on all the main turbine lube oil bearings. It looks like to me it sucks in main steam line reactor vessel steam. I think it provides a function like the main condenser where non condensables and other radionuclide congregate, basically increase concentration, then they go off for filtering and processing in the AOG system. I contend they are discharging reactor steam and vapor without radiological monitoring and the typical filtering that goes in AOG. It is bypassing the AOG. They got a grossly inaccurate radiological environmental report.

Remember, on a yearly bases this is huge amount of water....this goes on day in and day out.

There are many other BWR plants with the same setup. I think it is a national scandal with environmental reporting.

The plume (small) is behind the tall reactor rebuilding. It is on the roof of the shorter green turbine building, to the right of the reactor building.

Today the plume is heading directly towards Brattleboro Vermont...

Haboob around Palo Verde Nuclear Plant

Video: Three Arizona dust storms towered nearly 4,000 feet

...Wouldn't you like to see the security videos of the haboob?

...These plants went through a huge dust storm near phoenix Arizona. Everyone is wondering if the dust damaged delicate equipment in the plant...

 ...I would have called both DGs inop!

 ...So you got any design information that these machines could be run in that condition...

That would get you to the point of making the system make sure the DG could work in such a sand storm...

There would be a expectation these machine would quickly fail in this kind of storm...

I wouldn't require the plant to be shutdown...but I would want every vulnerable plant to be a able to deal with a sand storm...that is a notification...

 ...It calls in a lot of uncertainty...prove to me those DGs could say operating with such a dust load for say two hour and not clog up the intake filters...

If something new comes onto the scene and there is no proof of operability...then they are INOP...

 ...The storm blew off a school roof not far from the plant...Buckeye or something.

See, the rules cover very little what goes on at a complicated nuke plant, it more about what you do to behave conservatively...

At a minimum the plant should have made a report to the NRC we have a huge dust storm, we look stable now, but you should be warned in the unlikey case where something may goes wrong. Then the NRC should have communicate with their experts asking what could go wrong with the plant in a dust storm...

 ..."I think that the proof of burden is on the one making the claim that they will not work"...

There is no way a person can access inside the information to make a challenge based on the facts...so the poeple living around a plant have no constitutional rights in order to meaningfully protect their community...

...No access to information means no rights based a on facts based system...

It like you accuse me of bank robbery...you then lock me in jail incommunicado and you give me no opportunity of discovery. You pop me up in front of a judge who would fairly hear the case...but I got no legal advice and no ability to participate in the proceeding. You call that justice because I walk up to a judge without any preparation...

 ...Ok, so i called up the senior resident inspector and told him my concerns. He basically said most of the information is restricted and he explained the allegation process. He basically said the plant is covered by its environmental design bases and dust loads. I told him that language is hocus pocus and non specific. I basically said that is why we are in so much trouble...the agency basically throws me into these bureaucratic processes that never answers my question. You can never just ask a straight question man to man, then get a direct answer.

The senior inspector was a nice and decent guy...he was doing as much as he is allowed to say. I would like and respect him out in the street...I respect him for his position at the plant anyways. I get the feeling he was very knowledgeable and well spoken. I gave him a little taste of what the NRC is dealing with in NE. I was always respectful to him and the agency...professional and direct.

Anyways, I got him to make a official allegation about if the plant was covered in their design bases...ok'd the disclosure of my name and the agency could make a request to Palo Verde on my behalf...

Remember to talk about evacuation issues...who the Christ is out in the desert anyways and half their homes down that way is in foreclosure and abandoned...

I went by this plant a time or two on I-10

 ....I think the oil bath is better at taking out small quantities of dust, for long term maintenance consideration...not the loading you get from a haboob.

Ever experimented with running a DG in a haboob?

 ...Worst case somebody could plan a terrorist attacks around a haboob at a nuclear plant..say a illegal immigrant could signal the beginning of the attack...? He would know all the security cameras were inop!

See, i would want to see Palo Verde to be immediately thinking this was way abnormal, they knew it was coming, I am going to tell the NRC the possible vulnerabilities of the site. I would want everyone spun up and on alert, or at least on edge. Then if somebody would say boo to the NRC, they would have all the police and state police and special forces black helicopters heading to the site...they would train the satellites onto the plant. If the plant ran into operational problem the agency would be available with some big nuclear power NRC intellectual sources to help them...

Right, I want to see them have an after event serious engineering meeting at the site evaluation with senior staff asking, asking if there are any vulnerabilities with the dust storm and is everyone sure that if this happens again we would be certain all our system could handle another haboob...

I would want them inquisitive mad; why is this storm abnormal, what can we anticipate in the future..are there any peripheral issues we should consider as threats to plant operation and security...

I would want a such an important site like this always yearning and looking to the threats of the future...

Last time I did this shit I had a FBI special agent calling me by telephone saying I am a special agent of the FBI's JTTF, and I kid you not one bit, then he exactly said, "Mr Mulligan, the FBI needs to have a meeting with you "before the end of daylight today"...

Then he suggested meeting them in the Hinsdale NH police station...

After I hang up I thought the phone call was Liberian wackos trying to scam me for identity theft...lucky they gave me a call back number.

They were the real FBI!

Surry Nuclear plant

I just seen this, the rust color bother me thinking the rust is leaking out from the rebar, all this caulking got me wondering about how deep the cracks are...


http://weblogs.dailypress.com/news/science/dead_rise/surry%20again.jpg

U.S. Department of Homeland Security OIG hot line staff

I'll give you the down and dirty about nuclear power plant evacuation plans in the USA today.

Everyone knows it like pushing on a string, no organization or agency in the USA have the power and authority to enforce evacuation plan quality and order....

...I need to remind you about some employees in our government...say, our soldiers fighting for a cause greater than themselves...they are still dying on foreign lands and they are leaving their DNA identify in their blood spilt on foreign lands. Their names are almost daily seen up in media through their injury and deaths on our TV screens. These young heroes aren't accorded any privilege of anonymity...


This is a common theme I have recently heard in the bowels of governmental agencies. A lot of theses spineless bureaucrats our fixated on their personal security...fear of fruit cases and terrorist taking them and their families out...

I see it as them being cowards generally...they are using terrorism and internal fruit cases as the reason for not holding governmental employees and government in general accountable to the American public and voters.

...Do you really want that is the USA...terrorism being the excuse to distant government from its people? I see some gov employee not really having a fear of death and suffering, but some using this rationalization to protect themselves from scrutiny. The terrorist and killers then win...

Mr. Mulligan:

This is to acknowledge receipt of the information you e-mailed to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG). Our research has indicated that while FEMA evaluates the government’s ability to protect public health and safety, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) uses this information as part of its regulatory oversight responsibilities to make licensing decisions. The NRC operates a safety hotline number and may be reached at the following toll-free number at 800-695-7403, in the event that you would like to report an allegation regarding the Vermont Yankee evacuation drill.

We apologize for the quality of your recent encounter with our toll-free allegation hotline. It is our policy to thoroughly review all complaints and determine the appropriate course of action. In many instances, we refer information or complaints to a bureau, agency or office that will more appropriately respond to it. Any additional information that you wish to send regarding the matter should be sent to the agency below:


U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Office of Chief Counsel
500 C Street SW Suite 840
Washington, DC 20472

Regards,

The Hotline Staff

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Red Finding

"In regards to your issue with potential falsification of documents, the NRC characterized the subject Licensee Event Reports as inaccurate."

That makes the first NRC inspection report more falsified than inaccurate...

We'd be in a different world if it was illegal to make a incomplete or inaccurate LER or inspection report....

In the comment section are the e-mails to the NRC about my allegation...

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257

June 10, 2011

Mr. Mike Mulligan
steamshovel2002@yahoo.com

SUBJECT: ISSUES YOU RAISED TO THE NRC REGARDING THE BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT – FILE NO. RII-2011-A-0078

Dear Mr. Mulligan:

The NRC has completed its follow up in response to the issues you brought to our attention on April 10, 2011, regarding the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. You identified issues with the safety of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant and falsification of documents submitted to the NRC by the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.

In regards to the safety of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, the NRC determines its regulatory response in accordance with an Action Matrix that provides for a range of actions commensurate with the significance of performance indicators (PI) and inspection results. Browns Ferry Unit 1 was recently assessed to be in the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column of the NRC’s Action Matrix. The Action Matrix is intended to provide consistent, predictable, understandable agency responses to licensee performance. The actions of the matrix are graded such that the NRC becomes more engaged as licensee performance declines. The NRC can make adjustments to the inspection plan based on plant performance trends. For example, for plants that do not have all green PIs and inspection findings, the NRC will perform additional inspections beyond the baseline program. Both Green inspection findings and PIs allow for licensee initiatives to correct performance issues before increased regulatory involvement is warranted. White, Yellow, or Red inspection findings or PIs each, respectively, represent a greater degree of safety significance and therefore trigger increased regulatory attention. It should be noted that an individual Red input may indicate a performance issue that is significantly degraded. However, overall plant performance may not be unacceptable due to the defense-in-depth design of the plant.

In regards to your issue with potential falsification of documents, the NRC characterized the subject Licensee Event Reports as inaccurate. Documentation concerning our finding can be found in NRC Integrated Inspection Reports 2010003 (ML102110467) and 2010005 (ML110400431). Licensee Event Reports are inspected by the staff and, as with all inspection findings, willful aspects, which can include falsification, are considered. None of the LERs reviewed were determined by the staff to be willfully false or written with the intent to mislead the NRC.

Thank you for informing us of this matter. Should you have any questions, please call me at 1-800-577-8510 or you may provide information to me in writing at P.O. Box 56274 Atlanta, GA 30343.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Eugene F. Guthrie, Chief

Projects Branch 6

Division of Reactor P

Homeland Security OIG complaint on DHS OIG staff over VY Evac drill

Mulliganism Quote: This NRC and Homeland Security OIG mind bogging excessive legalese and legality...the blind massive do nothing government bureaucracy is solely about making congress...the House and Senate...unaccountable to the American public...

I think Congress wants a non functioning government....
A blind restless voter and public serves our national interest better!

From: Michael Mulligan
To: "DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov"
Sent: Monday, June 13, 2011 4:25 PM
Subject: OIG office being disrespectfull to a person who has a problem

Dear Sir,
About 2 pm this afternoon I was investigating issues around a defective nuclear plant evacuation drill surrounding the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant. My child is going to school in the Hinsdale NH high school and he notified me of evacuation drill deficiencies. I discussed the issues with his principle and documented his concerns. It is the closest NH school to the nuclear power plant. Basically I know these are FEMA issues.

I just have had issues with talking to somebody in FEMA about this and the contact information on the FEMA and Homeland security internet front page is poor. It seems to me that FEMA and the Homeland security people are too busy to really talk with the little people as me about their problems....the efficiency and effectiveness of government services to a regular little person. This is how my problems defaulted to the DHS OIG...

What really concerns me today was the disrespect with the intake people in the DHS OIG office to me. I explained I have been in a agency to agency shuffle for many months now and I am extremely frustrated.

Anyways, I became irritated with the intake person's language to me....the phone line seem to be disconnected and I heard a loud irritating scratchy noise on the line. The human conversation stopped and the intake person couldn't hear me any more. I hung up after a few minutes and called right back. The intake person acknowledged the drop line and scratchy noise before I could say boo. He said, I was on the speaker phone and a broken button or loose wire caused the drop line and scratchy line. He emplied he knows his phone is defective to many outside people and your office is too lazy and disrespectful to fix it. I can make a case he put me excessively on hold with the phone call.

My complaint is when your staff gets a troubled and frustrated taxpayer and member of the public who seems irrigating to the intake staff...your staff unprofessionally pushes the defective phone speaker button or loose wire in order to punish the troubled public mushrooms with a phone disconnect and a extremely loud scratchy noise. I would be sickened if you have a intentionally designed button to punish irritating members of the public in the DHS OIG...

My suspicions are with particular irritating complaint makers to the DHS OIG, the punishment bottom on the speaker phone gets pushed to many voters and tax payers. So what is the extent of conditions and cause with the phone disconnect and punishment buttons in government that disconnects public members? You got a trap door button in each of your offices for problem makers?

What my son reported to me: http://www.topix.com/forum/city/brattleboro-vt/TKU0863JM3H23RQ56

My investigation and names: http://www.topix.com/forum/city/brattleboro-vt/TP2JDLALC6F7B2SHD

What happened today: http://www.topix.com/forum/city/brattleboro-vt/T1H4OO09IDN570EQK

Sincerely,

Mike Mulligan
PO box 161
Hinsdale, NH
1-603-336-8320

BWR Torus Venting Scam

work in progress

BWR Torus Venting Scam
Remember complexity drives the system towards the counter intuitive direction and we are really talking about a extremely complex outcome with a meltdown and large public release. I see the vent as a risk amplification tool...i think its intention was to be that tool.

Maybe a facility use amplification tool...a tool to cloak the true understanding and knowledge of risk. A risk understanding disrupter.

Right, risk is a calculation of the relative worth of the safety systems and the design of the system, defined by the corporation.

But total risk is the design the facility, and how we maintain and operate the facility, and the human-machine interactionm and how the world interactes with with the plant.

Right, we could collectively turn off all the safety systems, meltdown the reactor and destroy or bypass all the containment.

Right, our risk calculations don't capture this possible human machine interaction...I am trying to make the case that all risk is not captured in our corporate risk calculation. Actually, it carries a very narrow sector of risk and it doesn't capture chaos theory and complexity. It doesn't understand true complexity.

I think as you go down the road of complexity you reach a point where a out come is not predictable and unknowable. A risk amplification tool is one that replaces uncertainty with illusory certainty.

Somebody really predicted large scale human responses...the torus hard vent path wasn't designed to vent the torus. It was designed to increase facility capacity factor. Its sole purpose was to increase corporate profits and it was the cheapest capacity factor increaser ever invented. They knew we would default into the primitive model or incomplete model with how system worked.

...Ok, so if you turned off the hardened vent input into the PRA and risk calculation what would happen? It would change the behavior of plant operations and the plant structure itself? Everything changes. Basically the harden vent in risk calculation says there has been a overall reduction in the risk at the top of the risk hierarchy...thus we got a chunk of global risk reduction we can play with to bring risk back up to the orginal limit. A case may now be made where you can say we can work with less redundancy, the NRC interaction with a utility is reduced, we accept larger infraction with a utility. So that chunk of harden vent path risk reduction is filled back up to its original level with global risk increases.

I don't how this is get played out, do we trade one full meltdown for 10 half meltdowns down the line, certainly we trade up to more plant upsets and more severe plant accidents?

We fill in that chunk of harden vent risk reduction with running the plant harder and at a higher capacity factor...or running the plant in more risk?

Browns Ferry red finding over RHR valve

Should we allow these gunslingers engineering firm without morals to support the nuclear industry...?

Is a engineering firm like a defense attorney where they can throw up any plausible story disconnected from the truth...or are engineers bound to tell the whole truth? Are engineers bound to tell the whole thruth, what about their engineering ethical obligation, or are they gunslingers for hire:

Southwest Research Laboratory (weld examinations)
Westinghouse Laboratory (valve component forensics)
Structural Integrity (thread strength analysis, sensitivity study)
Independent Burns & Roe metallurgist (aggregate review of forensics reports)
Idaho National Laboratory

Are you under a engineering ethics obligation to tell the truth when doing a RCA...?


Excerpts of my TVA safety complaint...

Associated Press

ATLANTA—Federal regulators on Tuesday ordered in-depth inspections at an Alabama nuclear-power plant after deciding the failure of an emergency cooling system there could have been a serious safety problem.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a rare "red" finding against the Tennessee Valley Authority's Browns Ferry nuclear plant, near Athens, Ala., after it investigated how a valve on a residual heat-removal system became stuck shut. Safety regulators said only five red findings—the most severe ranking the agency gives to problems uncovered in its inspections—have been issued nationwide in the past decade.

In an emergency, the failure of the valve could have meant that one of the plant's emergency cooling systems wouldn't have worked as designed. The problem, which was identified as the plant was being refueled in October 2010, was fixed before the reactor was returned to service.

"The valve was repaired prior to returning the unit to service, and Browns Ferry continued to operate safely," said Victor McCree, the NRC's Region II administrator. "However, significant problems involving key safety systems warrant more extensive NRC inspection and oversight."

It wasn't clear whether TVA officials would appeal the finding. TVA officials had attributed the valve to a manufacturer's defect and said it inspected all similar valves in the facility to catch any problems.

NRC officials were critical of the utility for not identifying the problem sooner through routine inspections and testing. The valve failed sometime after March 2009 but wasn't discovered until more than a year later.

As part of the upcoming inspections, the NRC said it will review the plant's performance, its safety culture and its organization.

"The results of this inspection will aid the NRC in deciding whether additional regulatory actions are necessary to assure public health and safety," Mr. McCree said in a letter to TVA officials.

Past problems at the plant have led to increased scrutiny. The Browns Ferry Plant is known in the industry as the site where a worker using a candle to check for air leaks in 1974 started a fire that disabled safety systems. It is similar in design to the reactors that malfunctioned at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant in Japan after an earthquake and tsunami this year.

The TVA, the county's largest public utility, supplies power to about nine million people in Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Kentucky, Georgia, North Carolina and Tennessee.

Vermont Yankee Emergency drill (May 3, 2011)

Update 8 am May 10

The Deputy Director of NH Homeland Security and Emergency Management says:

1) NH Don't do "out drills" because sending kids to Keene increases the risk to the kids (bus accident). This is patently ridiculous, it is like saying kids don't go off site with buses for sports and for invaluable off site educational experience because they can get into a bus accident...

They don't want to create a oppertunity of time test of the bus companies to get a fleet of buses to Hinsdale.

Where did the Hinsdale offical come up with the phrase "out drill"...

2) She said the drill wasn't completed at 11:30 as that contradicted Hasting and the command center...


Vermont Yankee Emergency drill (May 3, 201!)

How the information came to me

Information from a angry Hinsdale official

9 AM: Hinsdale got a phone announcement a VY drill was going to happen...everyone for days had been warned.

10 AM: alert to site area.

11:05: General Emergency and sending buses @ 11:45 AM

!!! it going to be a "full out drill" meaning the kids are going to Keene coming from the emergency command post...

High school immediately when into lunch mode for all the kids and then they all went to the auditorium in anticipation of going to Keene...

Absolutely no communications cues through the command post back channel with Hinsdale school officials...going to bus your kids out shortly after noon, you might want to feed the kids beforehand...

12:45 PM: Hinsdale got itchy with no communications and no buses yet, they called the emergency command post, Cliff Hasting said he called the drill completed at 11:30am. Hinsdale was never was called to say drill has been completely and canceled.

*** absolutely no communication with the Hinsdale school superintendent.

*** we don't think the Hinsdale elementary school was ever notified of anything, maybe the command post thew them a record message... it looks like the elementary school was completely out of the loop and fried.

*** seems to be rumors if you call the emergency command post right now there is still a loop recorded message saying VY is in a general emergency...

PWR Fukushima much worst than GE Mark 1

I don't think you can yet make the case this was a GE mark 1 centric event.

In other words, this outcome is rather mild to what would have happened if large PWR were sitting on the east coast of Japan.

I think the isolated loop of the PWR's primary system...this much higher pressure of the primary system, thus much harder to cool...

I think the PWRs would be a much more painful accident....

In other words, the core would have melted down much sooner and the pins would have skyrocketed to much higher temps...

I think tons more radiation would have been released to the world inviroment...

Brown's Ferry and TVA

Update:
April 4 public meeting...they got me on the phone bridge.

"Review of MOVAT testing data, combined with stellite aging research, strongly indicates that the disc separated prior to November 2008"

If you agree with TVA on this, the valve testing program for critical safety valves is ineffective. It missed a clear indication of a valve disc seperation over this, the NRC and TVA should have done a investigation on is movat a effective safety program....it looks totally dysfunctional to me according to the TVA’s own words. It should be a NRC violation.

Why hasn't anyone talked about fixing movats?

Like I said, there is micro difference in diameter of the disc and the seat, noise of the electrical lines suppling the valve motor, that would give you movat noise seen on the recording. You can only tell by looking at a bunch of movat testing recordings, whether these bumps are the real deal or noise. Did TVA just choose the pretty data?

Was the movat equipment calibrated properly...

Though, I just don’t find much certainty evidence that the disc would have unseated...all I see is the gunslinger pro nuclear industry engineering firms doing TVA’s bidding for money...

So let me get this straight, according to the NRC pilgrim’s inspection report 2011-008 dated from February 14 through March 4,2011, the HPCI diaphragm event happened before July 2010, why still no LER? Basically there is the same kind of issues with the delay of the reliefs valves thread LER with on two Vermont Yankee petitions on Entergy.

The Brown Ferry identical LER 2009-004 says the event date is 07 24 2009, the NRC says they made the document on sept 2009...why is Entergy having so much problems with pushing out LERs? The BF inspection report 2009-005 came out between October 1, 2009 through December 31, 2009

Just to be clear, the NRC drums out their inspection report on TVA in 3 months...while Pilgrim’s inspection takes 7 mouths, and they still don’t have the LER out...

It is just hit and miss and completely erratic with NRC inspection reports and utilities LERs ...

It just fascinating, so on the VY HPCI steam line leak and gasket issues on LER 2011-001...the event occurs on around Feb 17, 2011, Entergy pumps the LER out on April 14 (good as far a timeliness))....basically a petition maker forces the NRC to do a inspection on the gasket problem and the LER. It is object insanity! Now it seems the inspection report is mon
ths away...

...April 10..."By the way, I think Browns Ferry is the most dangerous plant it the nation and they have a culture of falsification of documents to the government. Check out their LER falsification. Matter of fact, you got a wide spread culture of falsification throughout the nuclear industry as outlined narrowly in the NRC OIG investigation on LERs and part 21..."

Mike Mulligan

Hinsdale, NH

From: "Lewis, Shani"

To: "steamshovel2002@yahoo.co m"

Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2011 8:12 AM

Subject: Your Concerns Regarding Browns Ferry

Mr. Mulligan,

This is to acknowledge our receipt of your e-mail dated April 10, 2011. We will respond specifically to the concerns you raised regarding the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant but first we need to verify that we can communicate with you via this e-mail address. Please reply to this email or call me at the number listed below to advise us of your preference going forward.

My name is Shani Lewis, Allegation Coordinator. You can contact me by calling 1-800-577-8510, extension 4461 or communicate with me via e-mail, Shani.Lewis@nrc.gov. Please also be advised that we cannot protect the information during transmission on the Internet and there is the possibility that someone else could read your and our responses while it is transmission.

Shani A. Lewis
Allegation Coordinator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II
404-997-4461

From: Michael Mulligan
To: "Lewis, Shani"
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2011 1:14 PM
Subject: Re: Your Concerns Regarding Browns Ferry

Ms. Lewis,
Inspection Report 2009005
I see many more safety processes being in similar straits....identification, RCA and corrective action problems...

.....PG 19 In September, 2008, the inspectors presented a concern to the licensee that approximately 17 Cause Determination Evaluations (CDE) had exceeded the licensee’s Maintenance Rule (MR) program completion guidelines, and the licensee initiated PER 152007 to address this potential adverse trend. But in April 2009, the licensee identified additional late CDEs and initiated PER 169954 which required an effectiveness review in six months. In those six months, the inspectors and the licensee identified approximately 20 more CDEs that were untimely or past due. Inspectors discussed this potential adverse trend with the licensee who entered the issue into their CAP as PER 210091.

What you can say about LER 2009-004, is all the hand holding the NRC had to do to get to them to get them to submit a LER and be it accurate. One wonders all the missed LERs that wasn’t submitted that the NRC didn’t have time to catch.

This is the crazy talk of the NRC I was talking about “was not repetitive or willful”, but in this inspection report there are two issues with failure to submit a LER

“However, because this violation was of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful, and was entered into the licensee’s CAP as PERs 177206 and 204364, the NRC has characterized the significance of this reporting violation as a Severity Level IV NCV in accordance with Section IV.A.3 and Supplement I of the NRC Enforcement Policy.”

I read a lot of issues with the Watts Bar....with the TVA habitually not filling timely responses and documentation. I believe it is systemic within TVA...

Don’t forget in the lead up to the RCA valve injection valve failure, you had a disgraceful event with a bowed RHR rotor and its subsequent destruction within days of the RHR injection valves. You had three safety relief valves technically inop that would have caused you shutdown if you could have seen it. I am saying the equipment failures indicate the plant carries a lot more level of risk to the community that what you risk analyses shows. Can you imagine a accident with all these defects showing up instantaneously in one accident.

Inspection Report 2010-005

NPG-SPP-02.8 was adequate to meet the purpose and objectives of the ITR program. The inspectors also reviewed the two most recent Integrated Trend (IT) reports. The licensee had identified certain departments that did not submit their reports on time which contributed to the site report being issued after its required due date. The inspectors noted that SRs were written for each occurrence. The inspectors also noted that the new procedures improved the consistency of trend discussions and the report format across departments.

...PER 213116 was generated to address the licensee’s actions to address an inspector identified trend, concerning the adequacy of post maintenance testing (PMT), which has been previously documented in multiple inspection reports, but is yet to be adequately addressed by the corrective action program.

...The inspectors identified a potential adverse trend regarding inaccuracy and incomplete information contained in LERs. During the review of LERs from 2009 through 2010, inspectors identified seven examples where LERs contained inaccurate statements, incomplete descriptions and details, and other technical and editorial errors. The licensee had previously initiated the following PERs to resolve the issues identified by the inspectors: PERs 215479, 205308, 201410, and 163176. Additionally, as documented in report Section 4OA3.1 below, the inspectors identified two violations associated with inadequate and incomplete information in Unit 3 LER 2009-003. The licensee initiated SR 314177 to address this apparent adverse trend.

Over the past operating cycle, Units 2 and 3 have developed a large number of control rod Rod Position Indication System (RPIS) component problems. Unit 2 had outstanding WO’s on about 25 different control rods with RPIS related problems, and Unit 3 had about 15 control rods with WO’s. These problems involved incorrect back lighting, intermittent drift alarms, and primarily inaccurate rod position indication at one or more positions. The licensee initiated SRs 313460 and 313465 to address this adverse trend.

What can be said clearly from the LER crazy talk in 2009 “was not repetitive or willful” with two LERs, then the proliferation of LER problems in 2010-005...you might have covered it, but the agency’s ROP is not effective with changing a plant’s behavior.

I am just saying the NRC might be somewhat good on describing the pieces of the puzzle...but you suck a putting the puzzle together and seeing the big picture.

It get you to wondering, is the TVA being shown favoritism because they are they brought back on line BF 1 and working on bringing on other new nuclear plant.

I’d like to see a full scale investigation on the recent history TVA’s LERs and the current status.

As I said, a assortment of safety bureaucracy and processes are dysfunctional leading to preventable failures of safety systems...you got to know there are many defects within the plant not seen and one wonders if all these defects will conspire to come together in a big accident and create shame to our nation.

With the HPCI diaphragms, why did you ding them on not writing a LER accurately, when you should have dinged them with illegally putting in the defective quality safety repair parts.

I remember being at the HB Robinson plant public meeting...where there was serous talk about in the future how safety critical LERs are. They were talking about inaccurate information from Robinson. It is interesting, last spring the NRC came to visit Vermont Yankee about their tritium leak. I got up behind Jazcko chanting "Remember the HB Robison plant"....everyone including the anti's thought I was nuts. I was talking about the terrible Robinson plant accident in March...I didn't think it was over with. Then the plant had two more serous plant accidents and many NRC findings.

Mullanism

This testimony came way before the NRC OIG investigation...you notice how starling close my language was the NRC OIG report about LERs and part 21...

http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2011/04/mulliganism-and-nrc-oig-investigation.html

2.206 transcripts on June 29, 2010 on the Vernon Tie.

(I like my language better because it is more colorful and accurate.)

MR Mulligan: "The new way they do it nowadays is, you have a set of conflicting codes and regulations. You have five or six of them all intertwining and intermingling and very few people can understand, and you have an outcome in mind, and you twist these codes and regulations around until you get the outcome you want.

Nowadays, we play games, we twist around regulations, and we make believe that the regulations, you know, are going to tell us the ultimate truth, if we obey the regulations, it's going to tell us the ultimate truth, and the perfect outcome. If we just follow the rules, there's going to be a perfect outcome."

MR. PICKETT: One more, again, Doug Pickett.

Mr. Mulligan, you were making a number of statements about the codes and regulations are twisted by regulators to get the desired results. Are you aware of any particular regulation or code that is not being met?

MR. MULLIGAN: Well, a code. Well, you see, the problem is I've got a big barrier in front of me, everybody knows that, you know? This is what this is about, is to keep me -- keep a barrier in front of me, and not be able to get the hard questions asked and stuff like that.

You know, I -- you know, one day, you know, I envision a different 2.206 process, where, you know, you are my government, I don't own the government, but I do in a way, but you work for me and stuff, and there's an issue of, you know, I have access to NRC people, we get into a group where there's an assertion like this, and people are on my side, you know.

I don't have these techno barriers, and these legalistic barriers, and these kind of evidence, super-duper evidence barriers and all that sort of stuff that people play games, like, you know, to put a barrier in front of me and stuff like that. I have a thing where a group of people, NRC people, would get together with me before 2.206, we talk about all the different issues, and you would bring up the information, we'd share it freely and stuff like that, and would go into a 2.206 process a lot different way than we do now.

You know, that's how I would make my government work for me. As of now, this process works for the utilities and the NRC. It's designed to be a barrier for me, as far as legalistic stuff, you know, Congress and stuff. So, that's my envision of a government that works for me.

Fukushima meltdown: HPCI and RCIC Rupture Disc?

Update:
By around 2:30 a.m., the pressure inside the vessel that forms a protective bulb around the reactor's core reached twice the level it was designed to withstand. Amid delays and technical difficulties, it was another 12 hours before workers finished releasing radioactive steam from this containment vessel, via reinforced pipes, to the air beyond the reactor building.

About an hour later, the reactor building itself exploded—a blast that Japanese and U.S. regulators have since said spread highly radioactive debris beyond the plant. The explosion, along with others amid overheating at reactors 2, 3 and 4, contributed to radiation levels that led to mandatory evacuations around the plant and the government's admission that the Fukushima Daiichi disaster ranks alongside Chernobyl at the top of the nuclear-disaster scale.

Tepco says pressure in the containment vessel likely hit 840 kilopascals (the metric equivalent of 121.8 pounds per square inch) around 2:30 a.m, roughly double the maximum pressure of 427 kilopascals the vessel was designed to handle.

BURSTING OF HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION STEAM LINE RUPTURE DISCS INJURES PLANT PERSONNEL

This is how I came to talk about it...topix.
OK, so I am really talking about a rupture disc...I will corrected the title...

Questions for fukushima building explosions...

It is excessive pressure safety device on the piping between HPCI exhaust and the torus....if the HPCI exhaust piping or torus pressure gets too high, the blow out panel is designed to rupture.

It is beyond interesting with the WSJ saying the Japanese torus and primary containment got to be twice the design pressure...why didn't these blow out panels let go.

The HPCI or RCIC exhaust needs to go under water, to be condensed by the torus cool water, I think comes in from the bottom of the tous.

It would be interesting in the Fukushima plants how these blow out panels functioned.

If they are under water, did the panel rupture and did that lead to prematurely draining the torus.

If above the water line in the torus, did the lowering of the torus water uncover the blow out panel and lead to the leak of hydrogen into secondary containment that distroyed the buildings...

NRC says VY HPCI is obsolete

Message 45 and Feb 22, 2010 on topix

Yep, it was a flexitallic gasket thing...they didn't have the proper replacement gasket on site, so they had to special order if from Texas, and you how long the shipping takes from across the country.

As NRC resident Dave Spindler says, "its a obsolesce thing" with not having adequate and the appropriate safety grade spare parts on site at the plant. The HPCI is obsolete? Dave said its going on at every plant in the nation.

Entergy had to do a engineering equivalency thing, cause they had to manufacture it in Texas, meaning it is not a identical replacement.

By the way, RCIC is not a standby system from HPCI...all of these components are suppose to operational when the fault hits the plant...their design accident.

So as Dave said according to the NRC...it doesn't matter to the NRC if the repair took 13 days or the gasket was replaced immediately within a few hours with a on site spare repair part....the NRC doesn't care if we are fully prepared for a design accident or partially prepared.

Pilgrim: Unsafe repair parts in nuclear industry...

Wednesday, April 13, 2011...Transcipts on 2.206 about VY reliefs concern buna n thread material

“In Browns Ferry at Unit 1, another LER, 2009-004, I can make a comment that there's questions of the, if everything is reported in LERs, but these are just three of a bunch of LERs. Interesting Buna N material defect was without fibers. It was in the HPCI oil control. That was also due to heat.”

Well., I mean to say it was in hydraulic oil....

Wednesday, April 13, 2011...Transcripts on 2.206 about VY reliefs concerning buna n thread material

So for the VY threaded Buna n, I tried to bring in three industry example, o rings, hydraulic diaphragm and air diaphragms as the scram solenoid valves. Browns Ferry was the hydraulic diaphragm issue, and it is identical to the pilgrim...

“In Browns Ferry at Unit 1, another LER, 2009-004, I can make a comment that there's questions of the, if everything is reported in LERs, but these are just three of a bunch of LERs. Interesting Buna N material defect was without fibers. It was in the HPCI oil control. That was also due to heat.”

Well., I mean to say it was in hydraulic oil....

April 15, 2011

PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION'NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT O5OOO293/201 1OO8

02/14/2011 – 03/04/2011

Findings

(1) Failure to Follow Corrective Action Process for HPCI Diaphragm Degraded Condition Introduction: The NRC identified a finding of very low significance (Green) for Entergy's failure to follow their corrective action process in the identification, documentation, and evaluation of a degraded condition. Specifically, Entergy failed to recognize and capture in their condition report process that a diaphragm in the HPCI system exceeded its service life.

Description: On March 22,2Q10, GE Hitachi issued a Safety Information Communication in conjunction with the 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part21

Report titled, "Failure of HPCI Turbine Overspeed Reset Control Valve Diaphragm." The failure of this diaphragm would result in a loss of the HPCI turbine lube and control oil and could ultimately result in a failure of the HPCI system. Entergy identified that a 'like' diaphragm was installed in Pilgrim's HPCI system pressure control valve (PCV-2301-238) and evaluated the 10 CFR Part 21 Report on July 20, 2010 in CR-PNP-2010-2500. Entergy concluded that the manufacturing defect in the diaphragm described in the Part 21 evaluation was not directly applicable to Pilgrim because the report specified a manufacturing year of 1984 or later. Pilgrim's PCV-2301-238 diaphragm was manufactured in 1981, however it was the same design (2-ply fabric-reinforced BUNA-N material) as specified in the Part2l evaluation. Since the diaphragm was installed and could not be completely inspected to verify reinforcing-fiber continuity, Entergy appropriately scheduled the diaphragm to be replaced during the next HPCI maintenance window, as recommended by the manufacture.

Jaczko doesn't honor the dead in the nuclear industry

Added Apr 14: This accident caused a plant trip and was a very serious nuclear accident.

You know, if we had a USA nuclear plant meltdown and our own Fukushima with lots fatalities and abandoned territory...these lying Ayn Rand republic senators and willing democrat accomplices would frame the question so hyper narrowly, and the answer, they would never admit it was a nuclear accident even if the some of the innocent population was forced to be buried in lead caskets.

Even as they were picking up radioactive fuel pellets on plant property, Chairman Jaczko would say the accident began in the non nuclear and non safety related secondary system, and technically it wasn't a nuclear accident and core meltdown.

We are so captured by the power of the media and all our power brokers who control our political system.

I talked about it a little today...what is going on is we are corrupting language and communication. Matter of fact, I lectured the NRC on this point yesterday.

The senate fruit cakes yesterday, and I included the democrats...they repeatedly asked Jaczko how many people were ever killed in the nuclear industry. Some of them, and the democrats to be more honest with their lies, asked how many people were ever killed by radiation in the nuclear industry. Jazcko repeated responded none. He's got degrees in philosophy and physics, he got a doctorate in physics. This guy spent half his life in the best schools.

The correct full answer is, maybe none with radiation, but to honor the dead in the nuclear power industry, the correct answers is four bottom of the barrel pipe fitters and insulation people lost their lives around 1986 in the Surrey Nuclear Plant. The cheapsters let the feedwater pipes erode and a high pressure pipe burst. It must have been a horrific death for these low level employees. Right, the NRC is all highly educated people, and anyone without college degree is throw away garbage and they don't count. This brought broad reforms throughout the secondary and primary systems...it was a nuclear plant event no question.

So this big shot with a philosophy degree and a doctorate in high falutin physics should have been able to frame it in a few sentences. A little humility for the dead and the people at the bottom from the head regulator of the NRC. We had no deaths from direct radiation, but we had four fatalities who died from a nuclear plant accident. This accident caused a plant trip and was a very serious nuclear accident.We are sorry for this and our reforms with measuring pipe wall thickness is a attempt to make up for the deaths of these honorable workers at a nuclear plant. Their deaths constantly remind us of the sacrifices of all the employees in the nuclear industry and it is a beacon for us to always be alert at these sites.

It blatant sickening language corruption right in front of our eyes in a senate hearing. The weasely senators set up the question in a way for PR points for a lily white nuclear industry...knowing the chairman would give a partial or incomplete happy-land and triumphal falsified answer.

Yea, it took a lot of wasted intelligence and a decades of education at the best schools to be able to slickly dance around the deaths of honorable men with suffering families, at a nuclear power plant accident.