Update July 13
At the bottom of this all, do you want to be certain you are safe or certain you are unsafe???
I believe they did a regularly scheduled inspection of the Torus interior during the outage. They discovered the unexpected interior paint deterioration. They soon realized they would need a complete paint job. This would prolong the outage by many weeks. In the best light, they were going to schedule the next outage. The worst case scenario, this did this over many cycles. The discovered the
deteriorated paint over many interior inspection cycles. Promised everyone next outage we will get to the paint job. As the next outage was approaching, Fermi discovered they had too many jobs for the length of the outage. They had to prioritize jobs for the new outage, meaning they were going to have cancelled scheduled jobs. This happens most outages. So the paint job just kept being put off outage after outage because of the crazy job prioritization system.
So why did the paint job fail? Could be age related. An improper application. Wrong kind of paint. The surface wasn't prepared right. It would be critical to scape away samples all through the torus and have them samples analyzed. I doubt they did that. These guys are really smart people. If they did the wide test scaping, found wide spread degradation...they would be forced into an immediate paint job. They now have no absolute proof the deterioration wouldn't clog the strainer. It is a hell of a environment in the torus in a LOCA. Large quantities of high temperate water would enter the torus. It would heat up very fast to some 160 degrees.
They got a large personal hatch for people to enter the torus. They commonly hoist a small boat into the water and paddle around the drywell for inspections. But you can't do they at power. In the drywell and torus, they fill them up for nitrogen. They will have to shutdown the reactor and take out the nitrogen for a inspection.
Update July 12 at 1pm.
In line with everyone else:
Called the Fermi inspectors and spoke to the senior resident for about 45 minutes. He knew my name from the Palisades issues. He was very open to me, but staying within the rules of the NRC. I liked the guy.
I believed it is much worst than I first thought. Fermi inspected the torus, both above water and below water during Sept 2018 outage. That was the last time the Torus has been opened. The NRC did a engineering inspection in April of 2019. Through significant amounts of picturing up and videoing up the Torus in 2018 by the licensee, the NRC engineering inspectors went over the videos and pictures during the April 2019 inspection.
I contend both the licensee and NRC sat and didn't act on the very serous safety issue.
Why didn't the licensee see and act on the torus paint deterioration in in Oct 2018?
Why didn't the NRC look over the license's torus paint videos and pictures? I get the feeling the NRC internal processes, schedules and procedures trumps emediately uncovering serious safety system deficiencies and quickly fixing them. The bureaucrats think safety is following the processes, schedules and procedures.
Why didn't the NRC emediately launch a special surprise inspection in the engineering inspection in April of this year.
I requested the NRC order Fermi to shutdown emediately and comprehensively inspect all painted surfaces inside the Torus and fully repaint the Torus.
I asked the NRC when was the last time the torus was repainted. The inspector didn't know.
From April of this year until yesterday, the NRC allowed Fermi to intensify and deepen their paperwork falsification efforts surrounding the failing paint job. It allowed everyone at the plant to get their "story straight" before the announced special inspection yesterday.
For the licensee, it is so easy for them to play the NRC...
Update July 12
A finding of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 26.205(c) and (d) was identified by the inspectors when the licensee failed to appropriately schedule and control the work hours of eight workers that performed or directed onsite maintenance activities on the safety-related torus during Refueling Outage 19 (RFO 19). Specifically, the Nuclear Projects Group inappropriately determined that planned torus coating maintenance activities did not have the potential to impact any risk significant functions of primary containment. As a result, workers performing planned torus maintenance activities were inappropriately excluded from the work hour limits specified in 10 CFR 26.205(d)(1), (d)(2), and (d)(4) and exceeded these limits during torus maintenance activities. Description:
Title 10 CFR Part 26, “Fitness for Duty Programs,” describes NRC requirements associated with the implementation of a Fitness for Duty (FFD) program at nuclear power plants. These requirements include work hour restrictions associated with safety-related work.
During RFO 19, which was conducted from September 22, 2018, to October 27, 2018, coating inspections and repairs were performed inside the torus, which is a safety-related structure within primary containment. One of the functions of the torus is to provide a large volume of water to supply the emergency core cooling system (ECCS). As discussed in industry operating experience, if torus coatings are improperly applied and maintained, coating delamination and plugging of ECCS suction strainers could occur. The inspectors identified that the licensee classified coating work inside the torus as uncovered work and therefore the work hours of those individuals were not tracked to ensure that 10 CFR 26, “Fitness for Duty Programs,” work hour rules were followed in accordance with Procedure MGA 17, “Working Hour Limits.”
Prior to the start of RFO 19, the Nuclear Projects Group utilized Fermi Procedure MGA 17, “Working Hour Limits,” to identify workers that were subject to 10 CFR 26 work hour rule limits based on the prescribed work activity impact on structures, systems, or components (SSCs) and whether or not the SCC was considered risk significant. The torus coating maintenance work was inappropriately screened to not have any potential SSC impact based on a misinterpretation of the safety function descriptions referenced in Fermi Procedure MMR Appendix E, “Maintenance Rule SSC Specific Functions,” for primary containment. In particular, the Nuclear Projects Group independently determined there was no potential adverse impact on the torus to provide a source of water as a suction supply for ECCS equipment. Therefore, the torus coating maintenance activities were scheduled as uncovered work.Following RFO 19, the inspectors reviewed the work hours for workers who performed covered work and questioned whether the torus coating inspection and repair work that had been performed by workers and not identified by the licensee to be subject to the work hour rule limits of 10 CFR Part 26 should have been included.
The licensee evaluated the classification of the work and determined that the torus coating inspection and repair work in the safety-related torus should have been categorized as work that was subject to 10 CFR Part 26 limitations.
A licensee follow-up evaluation determined that eight individuals assigned to torus maintenance activities worked 8 or more consecutive days with a 12-hour shift and that this exceeded the allowable work hour rules specified in 10 CFR Part 26.
Corrective Action: Torus coating work was reclassified as covered work for future outages and incorporation of an Operations department review of Nuclear Projects Group work activities to determine the impacts on SSCs for appropriate work hour rule screening was implemented.
Ok, these guys had paint potentially plating off the inside of the Torus for years. You got to assume the suction strainers would have clogged. How would you verify the magnitude of the filter clogging? The only way to accurately verify the magnitude of the strainer clogging is to throw a full scale worst LOCA at the torus. I know you can't do that. So the utility and NRC just guess get at it. Nobody really knows how bad the clogging could have been. What was the true risk of a terrible accident, really what would be the offsite dose? You know the insiders scam the extent of the potential clogging. Paint sheeting of the torus happens over and over again in the industry because of cheap and poor maintenance.
Right, the NRC has reduced transparency and the punishment of coloring outside the lines with these plants. It is a grand experiment. Are we heading into seeing more significant events at the plants because there is no or little incentives not to have them.
When was the last time we've seen a NRC special inspection at the plants? Has it been years? The NRC has drastically cut back having special inspection by weakening the requirements based on phony risk assumptions.
You know another indicator of weaker regulations and requirments? Fermi 2 is still at 100% power. They are not shutdown by the NRC.
RC Launches Special Inspection at Fermi Nuclear Power Plant
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has launched a special inspection at the Fermi nuclear power plant to determine if degraded paint inside a portion of the reactor containment could impact certain safety systems in accident conditions. During a recent engineering inspection, the NRC noted a degradation in the paint inside the torus, a donut-shaped component of the reactor containment located below the reactor vessel. Filled with water, the torus is designed to absorb energy from the reactor or supply water to safety systems during an accident. Loose paint chips from the torus could potentially impede the flow of water to safety-related equipment. NRC’s five-person inspection team will focus on establishing a sequence of events related to degraded paint in the torus; reviewing the plant’s maintenance practices; and assessing the overall response since the discovery of the condition. The inspectors will provide their preliminary conclusions regarding the significance of the issue in a publicly available report to be released approximately 45 days following completion of the inspection. The plant continues to operate safely. The plant, operated by DTE Electric Company, is located in Newport, Mich., approximately 25 miles northeast of Toledo. Graphic by General Electric
