Junk Plant River Bend: Sending a message to the NRC.

Out there in the ether of current time, I knew the NRC had a continuing interest in River Bend's junk and obsolete simulator and the serious issues with junk master-pact safety breakers. I chose a opportune time and issue to call the senior resident inspectors. I wanted to let my buddy NRC inspectors to know I was staying abreast of currents issues and had a particular issue with the NRC inspector not finding a large issue with not professionalism with licenced operators. They being poorly trained and continuing to bungle dealing with plant trips and  conservatively following the regs and their procedures. I idea the licenced troops are too intimidated to get the NRC to help them fix their organization.  

Personally I think the trouble here is Entergy's management is too ideologically doctrinaire...management is a tyrant and you must follow our orders without thinking. The high corporate financial pinheads without any nuclear training are running or destroying the plant. The troops or employees have a passive/aggressive organization disorder. Basically as a protest, the troops are bureaucratically sabotaging the management the plant. Say if management orders or request a operator to do something, he knows the request will lead to trouble for the plant, he will carry out the request without providing his valuable input and he might actually throw sand in the gears. The inspector told me Entergy had recently replaced senior management. It seems like the passive/ aggressive strategy has worked for the troops. I think there still is a huge gap of mistrust between the senior management and the troops. The idea that management can pick and chose the facts to support an agenda to boost senior management bonuses without qualms about using intimidation. 

The industry recently has talked about severe financial pressures threatening the operation of fifteen to twenty plants. The nuclear industry has never before faced this kind of pressure. Is that how this plays out, this severe pressure increasingly disconnects integrity and truthfulness from between senior management and the troops.

My objective on the discussion between the senior resident and me was to"take a read" on the "resident" and send a message higher NRC management. I had the opportunity to pick a sensitive time frame to speak to the NRC resident and enhance my message. Many NRC residents have spoken of the independent republican teabagger territory of the south. The local people and captured news media don't keep keep nipping at the heals of NRC and at a particular deep south nuclear plant like they do in the liberal northeast. There just isn't much broader interest in nuclear safety in the independent deep south, the breakaway territories of Republicanland. I had a list of talking points on paper. 

Basically, the licenced operators collectively aren't trained properly  and aren't qualified to be running the plant. The NRC is afraid to put this information in NRC documents. I wanted the senior resident to comment on the disclosed Entergy root cause analysis below. He was too cagey to speak at all about it.     

May 12, 2016

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION – NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/201600

 "Additionally, the team observed that during the root cause evaluation the licensee determined that the operating crew that was on-shift at the time of the event had multiple issues with communication, weakness in teamwork, and haste prior to the loss of SDC event."

Page 19

This was that horrendous not disclosed inspection circulating in the NRC's ether when I first called the River Bend Senior NRC's resident inspector. The NRC bills themselves as a sampling regulator. The plant system is just too big to inspect everything. The NRC also is a symbolic reporter of record. They only pick a few symbolic issues to violate out of many. In other words, they only pick a few symbolic violations to represent to the public out of many violations. Say they go looking at a problem and find 10 violations. They just pick a few symbolic violations out of the ten to disclosed to the public. The outsiders never see all the violation. The NRC is happy if the licencees documents and fixes the undisclosed violation  in  the dark "smoked filled rooms" of the not publicly disclosed secret document system. 

So on the big picture with simulator issues nationwide, they are saying to the other licencees to secretly fix your simulator fidelity before we come in to find violations. 

If the NRC was a legitimated US regulator, they would order to all licencees, we suspect simulator fidelity issues nationwide and order them to identify all simulator fidelity issues like at River Bend in their simulators, report to us on any mismatch and then fix it. This is a giant regulatory failure at River Bend and it is in all of the plants. We need to see the magnitude of all nuclear plant simulator violation nationwide on one NRC document, to ascertain why the NRC can't do their jobs.             

I feel the NRC thinks the plant is overloaded with past violations...the licencees is overwhelmed answering and fixing NRC identified violations. So the solution to this problem is for the agency to not issue anymore violations(No findings were identified during this inspection.). These guys need a prolonged mandated shutdown to reorganize the plant. 

Basically the same rendition of the agency is a toothless organization.    

May 25, 2016
EA-15-043 

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION – NRC SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2016010

The NRC determined that misalignment of the simulator configuration to the design basis of River Send Station led to negative operator training, which complicated the operators’ response to a reactor scram on December 25, 2014. The NRC concluded that your staff identified appropriate corrective actions to address the root cause, contributing cause, and extent of cause of the simulator configuration misalignment. During the on-site portion of the inspection, NRC inspectors determined that your staff’s extent of condition evaluation was too limited in scope. The simulator testing activities used were not effective in identifying differences between the simulator and River Bend Station operating characteristics of components and systems that resulted in negative operator training. In response, your staff conducted an additional extent of condition evaluation, which was provided to the inspectors on March 29, 2016, after completion of the on-site portion of the inspection. The inspectors performed an in-office review of the information and, due to concerns regarding the adequacy of the sample selection, determined that the extent of condition evaluation was inadequate. Based on these determinations, the NRC concluded that the inspection objective involving the extent of condition was not met.

The NRC has determined that completed or planned corrective actions were insufficient to address this performance issue. Specifically, the extent of condition review was insufficient. Therefore, the White finding will remain open and continue to receive consideration as an Action Matrix input until inspectors verify that all inspection objectives have been met. You should notify the NRC of your readiness for a re-inspection when corrective actions have been completed.

No findings were identified during this inspection.

I am trying to give you my setup to the call to the River Bend residents. What is spinning in the ether of time. I make the call on the morning of May 11. The phone rings for a prolong period of time. He must have call waiting capabilities. I think he is busy. Then he answers me in a hushed voice. I tell him who I am. He knows me by my name. He says in a low voice, "I am in a important meeting. "Can I call you back Mike". I am chagrined with him answering the phone. I call these residents all the time. I often go to voice mail, leave a recording. I often get a call back by these busy government officials. I often just call them back and eventually they answer the phone. I would say about 90% of the time they will answer a cold call on the fly and will talk for awhile.

On May 12 I get a e-mail message from the region IV Head public affairs officers. Mr. Dricks once worked in NE. Me and him go back a long ways. When you a get a e-mail or call from a Mr Dricks, it signifies the NRC has put you in Siberia. I generially hate all NRC public affairs officers. I feel their intent is to stiff arm you. They are information disruptors. They make the conversation as painful as possible so you won't call them back. They generially have no current information in their heads. I always ask myself, are these guys that stupid or are they professional actors tasked to look stupid? I just get from these guys, they never whole heartily act for my interest. I always get from these guys they act like corporate public relations hucksters. There primary ends is to always protect the agency and industry, not be truthful US governmental communicators. It doesn't have to be like this. Half of his problem is he lives in Texas now.   

Dricks, Victor <Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov>  

I understand you called the River Bend resident inspector’s office. They asked me to follow up as they are extremely busy. Is there something I can help you with? Victor Dricks  

Senior Public Affairs Officer U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission / Region IV 1600 E. Lamar Blvd. Arlington, Texas 76011 (817) 200-1128 (Office) (817) 983-1992 (Cell)Tosteamshovel2002@yahoo.com
May 12 at 4:09 PM
Victor Dricks
Senior Public Affairs Officer
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission / Region IV
1600 E. Lamar Blvd.
Arlington, Texas 76011
(817) 200-1128  (Office)
(817) 983-1992  (Cell)

Here is my response to Mr Drinks. My beef with the Mr Dricks's kind of people is their lack of curiosity and achingly quest for new information or changing conditions, constantly searching to update their model of the world in their heads. Poor Mr. Dricks was just the middleman in this fiasco. It is as if he has to play stupid in order to protect their bosses. If it would have been me getting a strange response from a guy like mike Mulligan, I give this guy a call back to see if I met his needs. Strengthen and maintain communication channels with an special outside stakeholder. Get his take on the events. Ascertain if he really wants to talk to the regional NRC manager or the boss of the inspectors and why. Investigation secrecy is just a tool to make a better report. But it is just a tool that can be used properly or tremendously misused. Increasingly these plants are being put under a umbrella of investigation secrecy. Every time you talk to these guys they say its under investigation and we can't talk about the problem. Recent events with the prolonged completion of investigations such as the stator drop accident at ANO and recently the special inspections River Bend speaks to these delayed inspection result. We are talking about the delayed investigations results for almost year or more, with ANO and a prolong delay with River Bend Special inspections. These results should come out in 60 days or so. These plants are put under a cloud of investigative secrecy for years at a time and nobody ever puts the NRC on the carpet with why the investigation took so long to come out. The more trouble a plant gets into, the more secrecy is afforded to the malicious bad actor.

You just have to wonder if the NRC is trying to protect the boss of the NRC inspectors or the regional head with not coming back to me querying if I still want to talk to them. I am convinced I now need to talk to the regional administrator. I lot of times this foot dragging and mock inquisitiveness is just cover for the protection of organizational plausible deniability.

    

  



Mr Dricks,

Could you set up a discussion with the boss of the RB inspectors and the regional administrator. One at a time.  Basically over the NRC's
inability to gain control over River Bend. Four special inspections in a year. i would settle for just the regional administrator. I hope he's up on current River Bend Issues?

Most interesting, is the continued chaos in the control room incidences and it their set up…everything about the collapse of the ops department to control their facility. A banana clip tripping the plant three times?

How come the NRC couldn’t come up with a severe violation over this. I am astonished the inspectors haven’t identified this as across all crews:

“Additionally, the team observed that during the root cause evaluation the licensee determined that the operating crew that was on-shift at the time of the event had multiple issues with communication, weakness in teamwork, and haste prior to the loss of SDC event.”

Why hasn’t the NRC failed their training department?

Is the control room and their licensed operators (and management) sacrosanct because they are so politically and media sensitive? Basically the new special inspection is a repeat of all the rest of them.

This is an indicator the NRC doesn’t have the power to stop bad plant management. So what as the NRC see it, is your big picture with River Bend? We see River Bend as a developing San Onofre  were the NRC allowed the whole organization to operated in a severely degraded condition for a decade until they tripped over the new steam generator job. Where we finally seen the true size of the organization dysfunction.The same model as Fort Calhoun.

I see the segments of the RB organization in a passive/ aggressive syndrome. Yessing management to death to their face, but maliciously in administrative manner  sabotaging their bosses and top executives behind the scenes. 

It won't be long before they leak sensitive documents to me?

Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH  

               

Junk Plant Hatch and NRC: Ping Ponging between the 2 and 3 Stage SRVs

You know what see here, the object failure of the NRC and Hatch engineering problem analysis and anticipating component degradation since 2010. Their engineering sucks. Don't forget the southern company is hugely influential  It really scares me the experimentation going on here. The inability of the NRC to control SRV durability and reliability. I am sure this is not limited to the SRV valves.

This LER comes from the outage comes before this May's 2016 most recent outage. So the 2 stage is leak prone and has issues of not passing the lift point accuracy test.

Safety Relief Valves As Found Settings Resulted In Not Meeting Tech Spec Surveillance Criteria

Licensee Event Report 2014-003-00

On May 7, 2014, at approximately 0837, Unit 1 was at 99.9 percent rated thermal power (RTP) when the "as-found" testing results of the 2-stage main steam safety relief valves (SRVs) were received which indicated that five of eleven SRVs had experienced setpoint drift during the previous operating cycle which resulted in their failing to meet the Technical Specification (TS) opening setpoints of 1150 psig +1- 3 percent as required by TS surveillance requirement 3.4.3.1.

That is about a 50% test failure rate. Check out these guys with lift setpoint drift test failures of about 50% since 2010 and multiple shutdowns over the leaking 3 stage. The basic 2 stage and 3 stage valve designs are defective. For some reason, they can't dump these target rock valves and jump into a better and newer design.

In 2014 the cause of the setpoint drift is corrosion induced bonding.   

The root cause of the SRV setpoint drift is attributed to corrosion-induced bonding between the pilot disc and seating surfaces. This conclusion is based on previous root cause analyses and the repetitive nature of this condition at Hatch and within the BWR industry. The 2-stage SRVs with platinum coated pilot seats were removed from Unit 1 during the 2014 refueling outage and replaced with 3-stage SRVs with a modified pilot. 3-stage SRVs typically do not exhibit set point drift, additionally the modified pilot reduces instances of vibration induced spurious openings and leak-by.

A 3-stage SRV with a similar modified pilot was installed on Unit 2 during the 2013 outage. Current plans are to replace the remaining ten valves at Unit 2 with the same modified pilot valves during the next outage in 2015.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

LEA 1-2012·004, identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for 8 of the 11 SRVs. Corrective actions included replacement of the 2-stage SRVs with 2-stage SRVs whose pilot discs had undergone a platinum surface treatment which was considered at that time to be the long term fix for this corrosion bonding issue.

LEA 2-2011-002, identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for 8 of the 11 SRVs. Corrective actions included replacement of the 2-stage SRVs with 3-stage SRVs during the Unit 2 Spring 2011 refueling outage which was considered at that time to be the long term fix for this corrosion bonding issue. Subsequent to that outage the 3-stage SRVs exhibited signs of unacceptable leakage which resulted in two separate outages that involved changing out four SRVs during the first outage and the remaining seven SRVs during the subsequent outage in May 2012. The 3-stage SRVs were

replaced with 2-stage SAVs containing pilot discs that had undergone the platinum surface treatment.

LEA 1-201 0·001, identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for 5 of the 11 SRVs. Corrective actions included refurbishment of the pilot valves and included the replacement of the pilot discs with discs made from Stellite 21 material. Additionally, the insulation surrounding each SRV was upgraded to improve resistance to corrosion induced bonding. These were the same actions that were taken following similar failures reported in LEA 2-2009- 001, since improved results had been seen to some degree in the industry for at least one operating cycle when these actions were implemented.

Drought: How Much Drier Will It Get In Our Area?

This is not good for the beginning of summer.

USGS Current Water Data for the Nation

We’ve had a lot of spectacularly beautiful days recently. Today is one of those days?

Drought Monitor

Mid-Atlantic and Northeast

Dry conditions prevailed over much of the region, though well-placed showers (1-2 inches) in southwestern Pennsylvanian and environs led to the removal of Moderate Drought (D1) and a reduction of Abnormal Dryness (D0) across the central Appalachians. In contrast, D0 and D1 were increased from New York into New England due to declining streamflows (locally below the 10th percentile) and a lack of rain over the past 90 days (less than half of normal). In fact, many of the Northeast’s D1 areas are now running rainfall deficits in excess of 6 inches over the past 6 months.

Part 21 Notification of Junk Breaker and Electric Control Devices

Basically, this comes out of the River Bend and other plant concerns with large breaker reliability. Look at the  notification with the *.

I think this is unprecedented?

* 2016-31-00	Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division	Interim Report Regarding a Nonconformance on Struthers-Dunn Relay Part No. B255XCXPFHSC125V Supplied to PSEG	06/08/2016	ML16162A679
* 2016-29-00	ABB Inc.	Notification of Deviation Related to K-Line Circuit Breaker Secondary Trip Latch	06/03/2016	ML16162A681
* 2016-28-00	Xcel Energy Prairie Island	Initial Notification of a Failure to Comply Related to ABB Circuit Breaker Type K-600S EO	06/03/2016	ML16162A682
			06/02/2016	ML16154A268
*2016-26-01	Ametek Solidstate Controls	Notification of Potential Defect with Ametek Inverter Manufactured with Signal Transformer R-10607 (Updated)	06/02/2016	ML16162A683
* 2016-26-00	Ametek Solidstate Controls	Notification of Potential Defect with Ametek Inverter Manufactured with Signal Transformer R-10607	06/02/2016	ML16162A680
* 2015-26-02	AZZ/Nuclear Logistics Inc.	Potentially Unqualified Component in Certain Allen Bradley Model 700RTC Timing Relays	05/26/2016	ML16154A207
* 2016-24-00	AZZ/Nuclear Logistics Inc.	Potential Reportable Condition Related to Eaton Freedom Series Contactor	05/19/2016	ML16154A205
2016-23-00	Nutherm International, Inc.	Potential Defect Found in a Moore Industries SCT Series Signal Converter	05/17/2016	ML16154A206
* 2016-22-00	United Controls International	Thomas & Betts Power Solutions/Cyberex Printed Circuit Boards and Mersen (formerly Ferraz Shawmut) Fuses	05/16/2016	EN 51936
* 2016-20-01	AZZ/Nuclear Logistics Inc.	Masterpact NT and NW Style Circuit Breakers Failed to Electrically Close Following an Anti-Pump Condition (Updated)	05/13/2016	ML16139A832
* 2016-20-00	AZZ/Nuclear Logistics Inc.	Masterpact NT and NW Style Circuit Breakers Failed to Electrically Close Following an Anti-Pump Condition	05/12/2016	ML16139A833
* 2016-19-00	Electroswitch	Part 21 Notification on Various Electroswitch Products Sold as Safety Class 1E	05/10/2016	ML16139A834
* 2016-11-01	Rotork Controls, Inc.	Part 21 Notification Concerning V12 [Part No N69-921] and K5 [N69-838 & N69·926] Safety Related Micro Switches	05/04/2016	ML16127A595
* 2016-16-01	National Technical Systems	Updated Potential Part 21 on Siemens 401-158 Safety Clip used on Type 3AF Circuit Breakers	04/29/2016	ML16126A111
2015-88-01			04/26/2016	ML16118A372
* 2016-14-00	Prairie Island Units 1 and 2	Interim Report of a Deviation or Failure to Comply Related to a Load Sequencer Undervoltage Relay	04/14/2016	ML16106A207
* 2015-26-01	AZZ / Nuclear Logistics	Potentially Unqualified Component in Certain Allen Bradley Model 700RTC Timing Relays (Update)	04/08/2016	ML16109A177
2016-07-01	Louisiana Energy Services	Final Report for Potential 10 CFR 21 Notification	04/06/2016	ML16104A403
			03/22/2016	ML16102A078
* 2016-13-00	United Controls International	Part 21 Notification for Mersen (formerly Ferraz Shawmut) OT15 Fuses	03/22/2016	ML16098A446
2015-20-01	United Controls International	Follow Up to Resistive Short Identified on Thomas & Betts Power Solutions/Cyberex Sense & Transfer Module	03/22/2016	ML16098A445
*2016-11-00	Rotork Controls, Inc.	Interim Report Related to a Basic Micro Switch Which Did Not Change State	03/18/2016	ML16088A087
*2016-16-00	National Technical Systems	Potential Part 21 on Siemens 401-158 Safety Clip used on Type 3AF Circuit Breakers

Indian Point Junk

They just finished big old outage and they got a crack in the 20 inch service water system. Any dummy can tell they don't have a process to keep their service water system pipes clean of dangerous cracks and flaws. it become a patchwork process of dealing with one crack at a time and not a system of making the piping system durable enough to not interrupt plant operations.

I wonder if they didn't have the baffle bolt problem would they even shutdown. 

Remember the snap back from Brexit?

Facility: INDIAN POINT Region: 1 State: NY Unit: [2] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: JUSTIN MACDONALD HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE	Notification Date: 06/24/2016 Notification Time: 04:05 [ET] Event Date: 06/24/2016 Event Time: 04:00 [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/24/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS	Person (Organization): GLENN DENTEL (R1DO) CHRIS MILLER (NRR) WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	Y	93	Power Operation	92	Power Operation

Event Text

TS REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO LEAKING SERVICE WATER WELD ON CCW HX "At 0400 (EDT) on June 24, 2016, Indian Point Unit 2 initiated actions to commence reactor shutdown to comply with Technical Specification (TS) LCO 3.7.7, Condition B. TS LCO 3.7.7, Condition A had been entered at 0230 on June 21, 2016 in order to repair a leaking weld on the 20 inch service water pipe to nozzle weld on the 21 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger (CCW HX). Condition A allows 72 hours to restore the inoperable CCW train to service or Condition B is entered which requires the plant to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 4 in 12 hours. "The initiation of a nuclear plant shutdown required by TS requires a 4-hour report in accordance with 50.72(b)(2)(i) which is being made by this notification." The licensee notified the New York Independent System Operator and the New York Public Service Commission. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Junk Plant Hatch Plant Junk SRVs

05000321/366

This is the 3 stage model that got Pilgrim plant into so much trouble last year. This model is supposed to be immune to setpoint drift. This is why they recently jumped out of the 2 stage SRVs.

I think Target Rock thinks why even bother playing with these little nuke boys. Or the valves are to old to repaired and tested by them. So the local two bit "NWS Technologies" now does the testing and repair on the obsolete SRVS.  

Across the board, Hatch has been having a lot of problems with maintaining the reliability of the 2 stage or the three stage SRVs for many years. They wasted a lot of money on their SRVS.

I believe the dimensions and the material quality of the components are in play. We generially don't know the true material quality of the component, there is just is no facts to predict how these components will fail.       

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 1

LER 2016-004-001
Safety Relief Valves As Found Settings Resulted in Not Meeting Tech Spec
Surveillance Criteria

On March 30 2016, with Unit 1 at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) , "as-found" testing of the 3-stage main steam safety relief valves (SRVs) (EllS Code RV) showed that two of the eleven main steam SRVs that were tested had experienced a drift in pressure lift setpoint during the previous operating cycle such that the allowable technical specification (TS) surveillance requirement (SR) 3.4.3.1 limit of 1150 +1- 34.5 ( +1- 3%) psig had been exceeded. Below is a table illustrating the Unit 1 SRVs that failed as found testing results after being removed from service during the Spring

2016 refueling outage.
MPL
1821-F013D
1B21-F013E 

Usually it's seat/valve bonding. This gap thing problem is new. In the Pilgrim 3 stage issue, they seemed to blame it on inappropriate test stand testing. I always thought the components in the valves are of a poor quality. There is generially poor service from Target Rock. I don't trust these guys and I don't trust the NRC's diagnoses with why the failing and why target rock is getting to unreliable.  

The SRV pilots were disassembled and inspected while investigating the reason for the drift. SNC has determined that the abutment gap closed pre-maturely. The pre-mature abutment gap closure is most likely due to loose manufacturing tolerances leading to SRV setpoint drift. They assume they know what caused this.

I am pretty sure if they were up at power with two SRVs inop, then they would be immediately be required to shutdown the plant.  

The two SRVs which failed to meet their Tech Spec required actuation pressure setpoint lifted early (3.2% low and 3.8% low). None of the eleven SRVs tested this cycle had as-found test results out of range high. Therefore, since the two identified SRVs lifted earlier than expected, the ASME Code Limit of 1375 psig peak vessel pressure would be maintained under normal and accident conditions. The opening of one or more SRVs at lower pressures would result in a less severe transient with reduced peak vessel pressure. Also, the slightly lower actuating pressure does not pose a significant LOCA initiator threat because the reactor steam dome would not experience > 11 00 psig during normal operation.

It is utterly disgraceful they can't detect these problems before installation in the plant.

The vendor specifications will be revised to tighten as-left tolerances of abutment and pre-load gap, increase the minimum set for abutment pressure at the high end of specification, and tighten diametrical and face run-out tolerances for bellows assembly on pre-load spacer mounting end.

Junk New Plant Watts Bar Has Another Scram

The first scram accrued on June 5. Did TVA throttle their employees from discovering these problems before start-up?  

Power Reactor	Event Number: 52026
Facility: WATTS BAR Region: 2 State: TN Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: MATTHEW MILLER HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS	Notification Date: 06/20/2016 Notification Time: 17:19 [ET] Event Date: 06/20/2016 Event Time: 15:40 [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/20/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): BINOY DESAI (R2DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	A/R	Y	32	Power Operation	0	Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP "On June 20, 2016 at 1540 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 reactor tripped due to [reaching the] automatic Lo-Lo steam generator trip [setpoint] on [the] #4 steam generator. Concurrent with the reactor trip the Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated as designed. "All control and shutdown rods fully inserted. All safety systems responded as designed. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3, with decay heat removal via Auxiliary Feedwater and main steam dump systems. The station is in a normal shutdown electrical alignment. "The cause is currently under investigation. "This is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B). "The NRC Senior Resident has been notified." There was no effect on Unit 1.

Junk Plant Pilgrim: Why Did They Shutdown Yesterday?

Update 6/23

Now at 30%

Correction, I misread the list. Salem and Pilgrim are right near each other. I was reading the Salem power level as Pilgrim. Sorry.

Pilgrim was always at 100% power.


????

Indian Point 2 Is Beginning To Make Power

Where is the outrage by the governor: I think they are all in cahoots with each other.

Why is River Bend and Pilgrim shutdown?

Indian Point 2

2%

Coordinated Attack On Israel and USA?

Basically 3 days later? 

June 8 : "The military wing of Palestinian terror group Hamas called the Muslim holy month of Ramadan the “month of jihad,” in an article published on Tuesday — a day before two West Bank terrorists killed four people in an attack in Tel Aviv"

Should we bulldoze his parents house like they do in Israel??? 

Junk UCS: Maybe Dave Should Retire?

I think Dave is captured by the NRC. He is trading access for a independent description and the anticipation of future conditions in the nuclear industry.

UCSat NRC Region II: Downsizing without Compromising Nuclear Safety Margins

Maybe Dave is giving himself green across the board for the access the NRC gives him?

We in a historic financial crisis in the industry. They are cutting back funding across the board willy nilly.  The republicans are attacking the NRC as never before. They are blackmailing by threatening budget cuts, the NRC into reducing oversight. What do you think about de-coupling the LOCA from the LOOP?   

I give the NRC a red finding with their inability to control the nuclear industry. 

The UCS gets a yellow finding...

NRC Is A Power Unto Themselves (Uncontestable): What The Court Said

I understand the NRDC doesn't speak for the interest of us all and they wrote up the contention for their own agenda.

It is beyond chilling in a big way, where the court are too afraid to criticize congresses handling of nuclear waste on the big picture.

Big picture, I think they are saying congress set up regulation over nuclear power power beyond the preview of the courts. If congress runs the nuclear power federal oversight as a candy jar, the courts have no power to maintain order with the NRC and the industry. The courts have no power to make the nuclear power to serve the greater nation ends or public ends. Fundamentally the republicans and businesses have weakened the independence and separation of  three branches of government...they have drastically weakened the power of the courts to serve the public good. This is what the controversy with the philosophy of a activist courts. Gaming the activist court issue...the courts can't make at independent interpretation of the congressional rules on the greater interest of the peoples interest, but you can go full steam ahead with court activism if its in the interest of the elites and business interest. Its as if  the republicans, the elites, the businesses, through congress, has captured Congress and the presidency.  

I get it our Constitution sets up our government with three seperate and independent branches...but the courts still have the power to keep (supposed) the politicians clean. I see this this court as too timid to make political waves.

And most chilling of all, our opinion of congress is at historic lows. It is as our votes don't count and the courts don't care.  

Vermont appeal of NRC rule shot down by court By Robert Audetteraudette@reformer.com @audette.reformer on Twitter Posted:   06/09/2016 11:08:21 AM EDT | Updated:   about 10 hours ago Click photo to enlarge A federal appeals court in Washington, D.C., shot down a petition filed by... (Reformer file photo) « 1 » BRATTLEBORO >> If the states and the National Resources Defense Council are unhappy with regulations promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, then take it up with Congress. That was the conclusion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to an appeal lodged by several attorneys general, environmental organizations and one Native American community about the NRC's spent fuel handling and storage regulations. "We acknowledge the political discord surrounding our nation's evolving nuclear energy policy," wrote the court. "But the role of Article III courts in this debate is circumscribed." The scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency, stated the decision, rendered on June 3. "To the extent that the petitioners disagree with the NRC's current policy for the continued storage of spent nuclear fuel, their concerns should be directed to Congress." The appeal contended that the NRC utilized "several unreasonable assumptions," including that spent nuclear fuel will be removed from spent-fuel pools within 60 years of reactor decommissioning; that after the 60-year period, spent fuel will be stored in dry casks that are replaced every 100 years; and that institutional controls over spent nuclear fuel will exist into perpetuity. "We hold that none of these assumptions is so unreasonable as to render the NRC's decision-making arbitrary or capricious," noted the court. "We therefore deny the petitions for review on this issue." The NRC deserves "deference" in its decisions, wrote the court, because "An agency does not engage in arbitrary or capricious decision-making by making 'predictive judgment(s)' or even by relying on '(i)ncomplete data.'"

Nuts

PUBLIC MEETING ANNOUNCEMENT

Title: Meeting to Discuss the Need for a Rule for Risk Informed Decoupling of Assumed Loss-of-
Offsite Power from Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis

Date(s) and Time(s): June 28, 2016, 01:00 PM to 02:00 PM

Updated:There is a hell of reduction in the burdens with supporting safety. You couple the LOCA and LOOP together because of the enormus complexity of the system. This makes you have a sense that the system might not respond as intended. I seen it personally in Vermont Yank's LOOP in 1992, you can see many times in all  the Pilgrim LOOPs  and in the recent dual plant Millstone. 

Who is going to speak to all of the problems in troublesome LOOPs in this presentation? 

Meeting to Discuss the Need for a Rule for Risk Informed Decoupling of Assumed Loss-ofOffsite Power from Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis Date(s) and Time(s): June 28, 2016, 01:00 PM to 02:00 PM Location: NRC One White Flint North, O 9B4 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD Category: This is a Category 3 meeting. Public participation is actively sought for this meeting to fully engage the public in a discussion of regulatory issues. Purpose: Provide an opportunity for external stakeholders and the NRC staff to exchange information on the need for a rulemaking action for Risk Informed Decoupling of Assumed Loss-of-Offsite Power from Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis and related petition for rulemaking (PRM) 50-77

Contact: Robert H. Beall 301-415-3874 Robert.Beall@nrc.gov NRC NRC Staff Participants: External NEI representatives Teleconference: Interested members of the public can participate in this meeting via a toll-free teleconference. For details, please call the NRC meeting contact.