Dresden Has Pilgrim's SRV Resonance Vibration Problem?

Note to Nuclear industry: You keep this shit up, we will go back to the bat upside the head philosophy or era in order to protect the politician (from you). 

Dresden NRC Senior

Again, a really technically impressive senior resident and a easy guy to talk to. Basically he talked about all corrective actions coming out the Quad Cities and Dresden since uprate working the electromatic Safety Valves. I chided him these guys are on welfare and need to not trust these guys. There poor as hell! My take, the primary responsibility is to not allow these components to degrade in the first where we don’t know what condition they are in. You all utterly failed in that job and I worry it will happen again and again. I told him the NRC and licensee works for me as a licensed operator. It is your job to provide me always with a pristine environment with no surprises in a transient or accident… without any component degradation or failure.

I told him I am still shocked that the licensee and NRC did not understand the main stream line vibration changes…to demand those sturdy valves were installed prior to the uprate. You primary duty is anticipate problems and fix it before problem are seen…not the primary job today of writing after incident reports on broken safety equipment. You work for me…that is how you got my back. 

In unit 3 he said the big headache is unexplainable high“B” steam line vibrations.

The rudimentary calculations would be: 

2957 megawatt thermal / 2527 = 1.17

That means a 17% power uprate. 

( 1.17) ^2 (squared) = 1.367 

That is possible 36% INCREASE IN vibration

Bottom line to the resident NRC staff: the problem is the NRC doesn't provide you with the proper tools to manage a plant like Dresden. I consider the NRC residents as our front line heroes! NRC Washington DC don’t give you a big enough bat to hit these guys squarely between the eyes and teach you how use force and influence in order to prevent chaos in these plants. 

Basically somewhere in here you shutdown a plant for six months for not doing proper engineering. Once the other plants see that, they will all straighten up on their own accord.   

Oyster Creek NRC Resident 

I just talked to the Oyster Creek senior resident. He was another good NRC senior resident. He says a in-depth inspection is going to be released within days. He say the fix is like Dresden and Quad Cities, more sturdy Electromatic Relief Valves. I said fine, but what caused it? The reliefs seemed to have good reliability through the years and then bam we ran into 2014. The Oyster Creek resident has worked closely with Dresden to develop the new inspection report. He told me to read the inspection. 

He reminded Dresden had another ERV failure.  I am trying to speak to the Dresden resident. He called once and I didn't answer the phone because I was busy. He left me recording he would  call back later today.  

First posted on 2/2/2015; Republished

All you need to know about Dresden: 

Dresden had 15 LERs in 2014.

Had about 6 in 2013.

Maybe 2001, 2003 and 2004 averaged 2 and 3 a year.

working on it!
remember check out Oyster Creeks Electromatic Relief Valve problems?

megalomaniac

Dinosaurnastic

http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-03-09/business/ct-exelon-closing-nuclear-plants-0308-biz-20140309_1_quad-cities-plant-byron-plant-exelon

As Exelon threatens to shut nuclear plants, Illinois town fears fallout

Profit eludes Clinton site, 5 others in state for years, Tribune analysis finds

March 09, 2014|By Julie Wernau and Alex Richards, Tribune reporters

Chicago-based Exelon, parent of Commonwealth Edison, and the nation's largest operator of nuclear power plants, said last month that unless market conditions improve, it will announce plant closings by the end of this year.

As recently as mid-2008, competing sources of generation had very high costs relative to nuclear plants, said Travis Miller, director of utilities research at Chicago-based Morningstar. "As those fossil fuel costs came down substantially from those peaks five years ago, nuclear has lost a lot of its cost advantage when you consider the amount of capital investment it requires."
The Tribune analyzed hourly power prices that Exelon's reactors in Illinois received over six years and determined the plants haven't made enough money to cover operating and ongoing capital costs since 2008. Among the newspaper's findings:
Exelon's plant in Clinton, the only one without a second reactor, is in the worst financial shape of the company's Illinois nuclear installations. The plant's power prices plummeted from $42 per megawatt-hour in 2008 to $22 in 2009 and have held below $29 on average each year since. Single-reactor plants like Clinton cost between $45 and $55 per megawatt-hour to operate, according to the NorthBridge Group.
•Exelon's Dresden plant is faring the best of the Illinois plants, but it still isn't profitable. In 2010 and 2011, the plant eked out $33 per megawatt-hour in sales, offset by operating costs ranging between $35 and $40 per megawatt-hour.
•Quad Cities and Byron have been hit the hardest by "negative" price conditions, meaning Exelon paid the operator of the electric grid to take its power. Because nuclear plants operate around the clock, they are continually producing power, and in 2012, the Quad Cities plant was paying the grid operator to take its power 8 percent of the time. In 2010, the Byron plant was paying out 7 percent of the time.


Lets establish some basic facts here.

1) It's the responsibility of the NRC and Exelon to make sure the power unrate doesn't wear out  or impair the Electromatic Relief Valve out or impair the operation of Dresden before the uprate. These are old style Safety Relief Valves.

2)Dresden is under severe financial pressure.

3) Exelon is financial impaired,

4) You know what sounds like crazy, doing a big uprate, then can't afford to uprate the main turbine.

5) Dresden's post EPU vibration level is 10 to 20 lower than Quad City justifying not sturdy ERV...while both plant's
 ERV immediately start.


January 29, 2014: DRESDEN UNITS 2 INSPECTION REPORT 05000237/2014005; 05000249/2014005 AND PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING 

Failure to Ensure Continued Operability of Unit 3 Electromatic Relief Valve 3–0203–3E Following Implementation of Extended Power Uprate Plant Conditions

If Exelon is incapable of for fulfilling their licencing responsibilities, we pay the NRc to step in and make them comply. So this went through a licence amendment request, why didn't the NRC the NRC catch this? Is their something wrong with the way the NRC does verifying a LAR. It is almost like the NRC pats the licencees on the shoulder, go ahead with the illegal LAR, if the component fails with going to ding with a insignificant violation.

Introduction: A finding preliminarily determined to be of low to moderate safety significance (White) and an associated AV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified for the licensee’s failure to establish measures to ensure that the ERV actuator for 3–0203–3E remained suitable for operation at EPU power levels prior to fully implementing the Unit 3 EPU in November 2010.

Description: The licensee experienced a failure of the 3E ERV with the reactor shutdown in Mode 5 during surveillance testing in accordance with licensee procedure DOS 0250–07, “Electromatic Relief Valve Testing with the Reactor Depressurized” on November 6, 2014. During this surveillance, operators in the main control room (MCR) manually actuate open the

This is when it broke

ERV’s. When cycling the 3E ERV, MCR operators noted that the valve position indication did not change out of the closed condition, and locally assigned equipment operators heard a click when the demand signal was given but the actuator plunger did not move, therefore the ERV did not reposition open.

The ERV actuator is a solenoid assembly that energizes to reposition the ERV pilot valve. When an open signal is sent to the ERV actuator, its solenoid energizes causing a plunger to travel downward and contact the strike lever on the pilot valve assembly. The plunger causes the ERV pilot valve to mechanically reposition relieving pressure internal to the ERV main valve causing it to open and direct steam from the main steam system to the torus suppression pool. The ERVs serve as a component of the automatic depressurization system (ADS) designed to depressurize the RCS during certain loss of coolant accidents in order for the low pressure coolant injection and core spray systems to be able to inject make-up water to the RCS. In addition, the ERVs provide RCS over pressure protection in order to minimize the likelihood that the main steam safety valve will have to actuate to protect the RCS from over pressurization.

The licensee performed an Equipment Apparent Cause Evaluation (EACE 2407705) and determined the apparent cause of the ERV failure to be that the actuator design is susceptible to vibration induced wear in conjunction with the increased vibration on the Unit 3 ‘B’ main steam line near the 3E ERV. The increased vibration is associated with EPU steam flows as a result of

So me it sounds like it was the increased vibration EPU and some other mysterious forces.

full implementation of EPU plant conditions. Specifically, the actuator design installed on Unit 3 ERVs at the time of the event allowed for excessive movement of the solenoid plunger when vibrated. This excess movement resulted in friction wear on the solenoid plunger guides, spring guides, and springs. As a result of the wear on the spring and plunger guides, mechanical binding of the actuator occurred preventing the plunger from physically operating the ERV.

The licensee received a license amendment from the NRC to operate at EPU conditions

There is the LAR?

increasing licensed core rated thermal power (RTP) from 2527 MWth to 2957 MWth starting with fuel cycle D3C18 which went into effect following refueling outage D3R17 in the fourth quarter of 2002. Due to limitations of the main generator, Dresden operated at higher thermal output power but was not able to consistently operate at RTP conditions. Full RTP was achieved only for short durations in the warmer summer months when plant efficiency was poorest and full thermal power resulted in a lower steam/electrical plant output which was within the capacity of the main generator. During this time, Dresden and Quad Cities Generating Station, which also received a licensee amendment to operate at EPU power levels,

Quad cities got actuator damage from violation. The question yet to be answered is at what level of vibration does damage begin.

experienced steam dryer cracking. Quad Cities Generating Station also experienced vibration damage and failures of ERV actuators. As a result of this operating experience regarding the ERV failures at Quad Cities, the licensee performed main steam line vibration recording on Dresden Unit 3 at 2851 MWth on December 29, 2003, and 2951 MWth on October 8, 2004.

Ok, the base line vibration reading at the new max power. What is causing the high vibration QC?

The results indicated that steam line vibrations on Unit 3 were significantly lower (10–20 times)

This is so unethical...what the hell was the reading at Dresden. This is basically engineering malpractice by Dresden assuming there was a relation between the violation at Quad Cities and Dresden. Did the NRC eyeball the both the vibration reading of Dresden and  Quad Cities.

Something is really fishy here, Dresden says Quad City’s vibration is 10 to 20 times higher than Dresden…that justified not putting in sturdy reliefs like QC right after EPU. QC has problems with damaged ERVs right after the EPU with high vibration levels, while when Dresden’s finally goes into EPU with low vibrations, they immediately get ERV damage just like QC. We really don’t know the magnitude of the change of vibration and how it relates to power changes and valve damage. The engineers should know relative vibration levels and damage.

in magnitude than those experienced at Quad Cities and the licensee used engineering judgment to conclude that there was no expected increase in wear rate of the internal actuator components at Dresden.

On April 20, 2007, the licensee submitted a letter to the NRC entitled, “Request for Acceptance for Continuous Extended Power Uprate Operation.” This letter chronicled corrective actions taken at Dresden and Quad Cities Nuclear Plants with regards to steam line vibrations and committed to performing inspections of ERV actuators during the next Dresden refueling outage. Of note, was the installation of ERV hardened actuators at Quad Cities Nuclear Plant to address vibration induced failures of ERVs experienced immediately following implementation of EPU. The NRC responded to this letter on June 11, 2007, acknowledging

Quad Cities has EVRs failures right after EPU.

the corrective actions and inspection that had been completed at both sites and stated that the agency had no further objection to continuous operation at full licensed thermal power of 2957 MWth and that the licensee would be expected to fulfill the commitments made in their April 20, 2007 letter.

During refueling outage D3R21 in 2010, the licensee performed a main generator rewind on Unit 3 thus permitting the main generator to supply electrical output power sufficient enough for the reactor to operate at RTP during the entire operating cycle. This upgrade meant that the main steam lines would be operating at full steam flow during the entire two year operating

Did the Vibration at QC change from 203 to 2010?

cycle and would be, along with attached components including the ERVs, subject to higher vibrations for a significantly greater time period.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s inspection and maintenance records of the Unit 3 ERV actuators dating back to 2004. Following required surveillance testing of the ERVs each refueling outage, the licensee performed internal inspections of the ERV actuators to identify any components that were degrading due to vibration induced wear. During the time period between 2004 and 2010, the licensee experienced no surveillance failures and noted only minor vibration induced wear of ERV actuator internal components. The licensee proactively replaced all internal components showing wear following these inspections. During the surveillance testing and inspections that have occurred in the refueling outages following the two operating cycles ending in 2012 and 2014 since the generator rewind, the licensee has experienced two failures

Just at in Quad Cities, the Dresden ERVs failed right after full power operation.

of the 3–0203–3E, 3E, ERV, and noted significant wear damage to the actuator internals of the 3B and 3E ERV with notable but less significant wear to the 3C ERV. During refueling outage D3R22 in 2012, following multiple successful operations in the course of surveillance testing the 3E ERV actuator became mechanically bound due to significant wear induced damage and a loose bolt in the spring guide mechanism. As the ERV had performed successfully prior to that testing, the failure was considered to have occurred at the time of discovery and the licensee determined that the ERV would have performed its function during the previous cycle. The

How do you know it wouldn't have failed last operating period... maybe the failure is intermittent. Would the conservative judgement come to the conclusion to say it failed half way into the last operating period.

licensee made the decision to replace the actuator with a similar model actuator even though the wear degradation was significant as they planned to replace all four ERV actuators with the hardened design utilized at Quad Cities Generating Station since 2007 during the next refueling outage in 2014.

***

Doesn't that seem strange, four nuclear plants all of a sudden coming up with Vibration problem damaging safety relief valve or like.

All caused by vibrations. 

*Dresden...uprate related, but vibrations levels 10 to 20 times lower than Quad Cities 

Pilgrim...change in specs (reduction in quality) 

*Quad Cities...uprate related 

Oyster Creek...mysterious and no change in specs and or power

Plants with similar Dresser EMRVs: Nine Mile Point, Quad Cities, and Dresden.
*involved in EPU 

You get it, Dresden says the damage is related to uprate, Oyster Creek had no uprate, now sure what caused it. 

Different manufacturers Dressor Target Rock

Oyster Creek  

PART-21 REPORT - ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE EXCESSIVE WEAR
The following report was received via e-mail: "This is a non-emergency notification from Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning the design of Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) actuators.

"On June 20, 2014, during as-found bench (stroke) testing of the EMRV actuators removed from the plant during refueling outage 1 R24 (October 2012), two of five EMRV actuators failed to operate. Subsequent inspection of these actuators found unexpected wear of the posts (grooves approximately 1/2" from the top), springs (thinned and broken at the top), and guides (grooves inside), with one spring having a piece axially wedged between the post and the guide.

"The root cause of this failure was determined to be the inadequate design of the EMRV actuators in that when placed in an environment where the actuator is subject to the vibration associated with plant operation, the allowed installation tolerances between posts and guides can create a condition where the springs can jam the actuator plunger assembly by wedging between the guides and the posts. If the EMRV actuators are set up in a condition where the posts are not optimally aligned, preferential wear of the post is observed due to interaction of the post, spring, and guide. Additionally, the vendor guidance for refurbishment of the EMRV actuator does not provide the necessary acceptance criteria for alignment of the posts to guides to ensure that the springs, posts, and guides do not interact in a way that causes preferential wear of the post allowing the jamming mechanism to exist. "By OCNGS process, the EMRV actuators are refurbished with new springs, posts, guides, and microswitches every 24 months during refueling outages due to the known wear of these parts. The actuator inspection/refurbishment frequency of 24 months exceeds the manufacturer's (i.e., Dresser Industries)
V
09/25/2014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page 2
recommended frequency of 36 months (per Vendor Manual VM-OC-0030, Installation and Maintenance Manual for Electromatic Relief Valves, Revision 1, Section VII, Ref. 4.5). In addition, in 2008, the station implemented the manufacturer's recommended material changes intended to minimize part wear, and prevent potential actuator failures.

It doesn't make since: why does it fail in 2014, but not in prior year.

Root Cause: The root cause of this failure was determined to be the inadequate design of the EMRV actuators in that when placed in an environment where the actuator is subject to the vibration associated with plant operation, the allowed installation tolerances between posts and guides can create a condition where the springs can jam the actuator plunger assembly by wedging between the guides and the posts. If the EMRV actuators are set up in a condition where the posts are not optimally aligned, preferential wear of the post is observed due to interaction of the post, spring, and guide. Additionally, the vendor guidance for refurbishment of the EMRV actuator does not provide the necessary acceptance criteria for alignment of the posts to guides to ensure that the springs, posts, and guides do not interact in a way that causes preferential wear of the post allowing the jamming mechanism to exist.

New Pilgrim LOOP

Lucky they didn't start-up?

The Mike Mulligan's NRC Special Inspection At Pilgrim Plant

Feb 2: Another Possibility told by an engineer, is the re circulation main coolant loop and main steam line piping 

bracing and restraints are worn out and corroded. He thinks the piping structure itself is impaired. He'd seen this at fossil plants. Actually the cover-up is piping vibration was increasing unabated…this damaged the SRVs. All the resonance limits specs thing, the damaged SRV components and it reporting was coverup for the increasing recir and main steam line vibrations. Naw, the core wouldn't be jumping around on its cement pedestal? 

I am just saying, this would be a possible nuclear industry extinction level event and it would severely damage the USA and our peoples. It would place 20% of our electricity at risk and it would widely raise electric rates. It might knock off the grid an enormous amount of nuclear power plants based on everyone losing trust in the NRC.

I am certain the NRC would immediately strip all nuclear plants from Entergy. It is not my theory.    

This is how I am trying to persuade the NRC to have a special inspection last Thursday through their NRC Blog. I sent this to the NRC's blog page and this is a copy of what I posted. I using the NRC's blog very creatively. I am trying to influence them though this blog and then communicate my needs in the upcoming inspection. Nobody uses the NRC blog like I do. It is very positive the NRC allows this to occur. They would throw sand in my eyes if they refused just one of my entries. If I got too snotty or unprofessional, then I deserved to not get my issues posted. I sticking a lot of painful issues to them right up to their eyes. It is just amazing they are allowing me to communicate like this. I like the idea they independently time and date stamp this...I got no control in removing my comments. I prize this very much. I am much happy if I just get my issues dispersed to many people. I can stick it right in their face what I wrote if things go south.   

They disclosed the inspection on Saturday Jan 31.  Many special inspection aren't initiated until weeks after the event...it is very particular they are coming this early.

From what I can read, the poles and lines on the only transmission lines (two lines) were completely knocked down. They had one dalaminated pole who broke in Blizzard Nemo tripping one line. It indicate weakened poles might be all over the transmission system.  

Additional Scrutiny at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant Set to Continue

Mike Mulligan January 29, 2015 at 7:10 pm (Thursday) 

So when you sending the special inspection team? An augment inspection?

Sound like I had a little birdy whispering in my ears? 

Just when you could think the repetitive TDAFWP couldn't get any worst at Millstone…now we got the poor quality SRVs failing over and over again at Pilgrim for 4 years just like the TDAFW pumps did. Is this going to take three special inspection to fix it just like Millstone? Wait, this is like the TDAFWP and both half capabilities electric aux feed water pumps being simultaneously inop for 4 years. You should conservatively call “all” the SRVs/ADS valves inop and not according to tech specs since 2011.

I bet you the SRV was leaking for a prolonged period of time and the agency hid it on us. The hide the leak philosophy first, before fix it quickly philosophy. This caused the valve to fail. The ADS/ SRV valves were inop since 2011 when first installed. Before they even got warmed they were inop. You get it, after “new” installation of the “new” three stage SRVs (4 of them), the first leak impairing the operation of one of these valve occurred within one or two months. Maybe within weeks of first start-up. This situation is unprecedented in the nuclear industry. I’ll bet you we are heading to a cover-up of a red finding. This is not about one valve…the whole group of them have a design defect and uncontrollable poor quality components from day one. A common mode failure of the automatic depressurization system and safety relief valve for four years. These nuclear safety valves weren't fit to be in nuclear power plant.

(Yesterday) “We knew Pilgrim was going down the tubes beginning in 2011 when they accepted poor quality brand new SRVs (all four of them)…the pathetic host of leaks, down powers and shutdowns over this new equipment. We were shocked the agency would treat these important last ditch core cooling components so cavalierly.”

We have had a dangerous meltdown of the effectiveness of the NRC. i am writing up a 2.206 requesting the Pilgrim plant remain shutdown. All plants in Region I should be shutdown because there was such a severe breakdown in the NRC.

What level of risk would that get you to: HPIC inop, SRV/ads inop, in a LOOP and the risk of 55 loops per 100 years (52 more LOOPs than assumed in calculations)? I think this is the most severe accident we have had in a long time.

“The station experienced equipment issues while cooling down after the scram including: the station diesel air compressor failed to start, one of four safety relief valves could not be operated manually from the control room, and high pressure coolant injection had to be secured due to failure of the gland seal motor.”

This is the NRC announcing their Pilgrim Special Inspection. Do you think I influenced the NRC to do this? You got to admit I new enough about the process and I knew a way to get my two cents in...I had the skills to accurately predict the outcome.    

Feds to investigate storm shutdown at Pilgrim nuclear plant

Saturday, January 31, 2015

By: Associated Press

PLYMOUTH, Mass. — The Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth says federal regulators are sending a special inspection team to the plant related to an unplanned shutdown during last week's blizzard.

Plant spokeswoman Lauren Burm said the Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspection is expected to begin Monday. She said Saturday the Entergy-owned plant continues to investigate and share information with the NRC about its procedures and actions it took "that helped assure safety, before, during and after the storm."

The Boston Globe reports the NRC says it will review the response to equipment problems after the Tuesday shutdown. An outage related to the blizzard was blamed for shutting down two of the major lines carrying electricity from the generating facility. Plant officials said the shutdown was similar to one in a 2013 snowstorm and wasn't a safety threat.

Pilgrim SRV Leaks and Bellow's Failure Timeline

Added  Jan 32 2015:

 Licensee Event Report 2013-002-01, SRV-3B Safety Relief Valve Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage and Setpoint Drift

Originally published on May 8, 2013. Republished today. 

April/May 2011: New SRV valves installed.

*May 18, 2011 (disclosed on April 18, 2013) first small leak on SRV RV-203-3C

*Nov 25, 2011 (disclosed on April 18, 2013) second small leak on SRV RV-203-3C

Dec 26, 2011: First Pilgrim plant leak, shutdown and 3 day shutdown. Replaced SRV RV-203-3D per LER 2013

*RV 203-3C on this shutdown per LER 2013-002-00

LER 2011-007-00

LER 2011-007-01

*Jan 20, 2013: Second leak, required shutdown and another 3 day shutdown. ("On Sunday, January 20, 2013, at 2050 hours, the station entered a 24-hour action statement...)

Feb 3, 2013: Third leak, restricted to 80-84% power to control leak.

Feb 6, 2013: Pilgrim admitted leaking media.

*Feb 8, 2013: Nemo blizzard strikes, plant trip, two LOOPs, and just repair and replace of one SRV.*Feb 26, 2013: New leak develops and restricted to 94% power to control leaks.

*March 3, 2013: Discovered gross failure of a SRV bellows, assumed to come out of the Nemo shutdown and leaking SRV replacement.

March 30, 2013: Power restricted to 85%. We don't know if the leak got worst or an addition SRV is leaking, or something else.

April 11, 2013: My Pilgrim Safety Relief Valve NRC Petition.

April 14, 2013: Pilgrim shuts down and had difficulties during shutdown for refueling.

April 18, 2013: Feb 20, 2013 SRV leak and plant shut down LER 2013-02-00

*Added April 19, 2013

1) Get a load of the title: SRV-3B Safety Relief Valve Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage and Setpoint Drift

2) March 18, 2013: Entergy's LER 2013-02-00 date of submittal is March 21, 2013.

3) Event date: Jan 20, 2013 per Entergy

4) Submitted my Pilgrim SRV request for emergency shutdown on March 13, 2013.

4) Reported date: March 21, 2013 per Entergy

5) Pilot

S/N SRV Position As-Found Deviation 23 RV-203-3B 1112 psig (-)3.8%

6) This LER disclosed:

a) First small SRV leak on May 18, 2011 (SRV RV-203-3C)

b) Second small leak on Nov 25, 2011 (SRV RV-203-3C)

c) Shutdown on Jan 26, 2013 RV- 203-3 DRV- 203-3D

*May 7, 2013:INTERIM PART 21 REPORT OF POTENTIAL DEFECT IN A (Pilgrim SRV) RELIEF VALVE BELLOWS gets disclosed on NRC site

1) The date of a unprecedented loud pop bellows failure was on March 3, 2013.

2) It is assumed this valve came out of the Nemo Feb 9, 2013 shutdown and pilot valve replacement. There are heavy hints the it might have come from a prior event.    

Pilgrim Blizzard LOOP And Plant Trip...Worst Accident in Plant's History.

Jan 30:

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System 

The RCIC is used in BWR-3 through BWR-6 boiling water reactor designs. The RCIC system is a single train standby system for safe shut down of the plant. The system is not considered part of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS), and does not have a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) function. The RCIC system is designed to ensure that sufficient reactor water inventory is maintained in the vessel to permit adequate core cooling. This prevents the reactor fuel from overheating in the event that the reactor is isolated from the secondary plant. 

Following a normal reactor shut down, core fission product decay heat causes steam generation to continue, albeit at a reduced rate. During this time, the turbine bypass system diverts the steam to the main condenser if the reactor is not isolated from the secondary plant, or to the suppression pool through operation of safety/relief valves (SRVs) if the reactor is isolated. 

The RCIC system supplies the makeup water required to maintain reactor vessel inventory. The turbine-driven pump supplies makeup water from the condensate storage tank (CST) to the reactor vessel. An alternate source of water is available from the suppression pool. The turbine is driven by a portion of the steam generated by the decay heat and exhausts to the suppression pool. This operation continues until the vessel pressure and temperature is reduced to the point that the residual heat removal (RHR) system can be placed into operation. 

First, I documented I predicted a LOOP...think I am the first person who ever predicted a extremely rare Loss Of Offsite Power accident and then it occurred. 

I believe so far the important inop component are.

1) HPCI

2) LOOP 

3) Four ADS/SRV since 2011

I think the plant is going to get a special inspection and maybe a Augment inspection. It might get raised to a red level finding...national implications. 

Should have shutdown 4 hours before the blizzard struck.

I believe the smaller shutdown off site line, it wasn't safety qualified, bet you they were afraid to test it with a load it was so fragile. 

So it scrammed at 52% power.

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE - PNO-I-15-001
This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public
interest significance. Some of the information may not yet be fully verified or evaluated by the
Region I staff.
Facility Licensee Emergency Classification
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. __ Notification of Unusual Event
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ___ Alert
Plymouth, MA ___ Site Area Emergency
Docket No. 50-293 ___ General Emergency
License No. DPR-35 X Not Applicable 

SUBJECT: PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION: SHUTDOWN GREATER THAN 72 HOURS DUE TO REACTOR SCRAM FOLLOWING A PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

On January 27, 2015, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station experienced an automatic scram following a turbine trip due to a partial loss of offsite power. The station was experiencing high winds and heavy snowfall during a severe winter storm when the station began experiencing degrading switchyard conditions. The station had already transferred the emergency busses onto their respective emergency diesel generators and was downpowering to 20% power to take the turbine offline. At 4:02 a.m. with the reactor at 52% power, the second offsite line was lost and the station experienced a load reject.

The station experienced equipment issues while cooling down after the scram including: the station diesel air compressor failed to start, one of four safety relief valves could not be operated manually from the control room, and high pressure coolant injection had to be secured due to failure of the gland seal motor.

The station is currently in cold shutdown, the safety buses are being powered by their respective emergency diesel generators, and all safety-related equipment required for safe plant shutdown are available. The licensee is working on restoring their 345kV lines.
Resident inspectors and region-based inspectors are providing oversight and performing
follow-up inspections.

This preliminary notification is issued for information only. The information presented herein has been discussed with the licensee and is current as of 1:00 p.m. on January 29, 2015. Commonwealth of Massachusetts officials have been kept informed.

Nobody considers the 23 kilo-volt a legitimate safety line. You get it, they use it and it trips, that is proof it is a pure LOOP. As I said, they are preserving the operability of the 23 kilo-volt line just to mitigate the violation coming out of this. Or to conn the public that the grid was still connected to the plant.    

One of two 345-kilovolt offsite lines was deenergized due to weather concerns. At about 52 percent power, the second 345-kilovolt line that provides off-site power to the plant tripped, resulting in a reactor shutdown, or scram, at about 4 a.m. (Nuclear power plants not only generate power and send it to the grid, they also receive a certain amount of power from the grid for operational purposes.)

A third off-site power line, a 23-kilovolt line, remains available. However, the emergency diesel generators for now remain the primary source of power for safety systems. The reactor was safely shut down, with plant safety systems performing as expected. The exact cause of the loss of the 345-KV power lines is still being investigated.

The moderator has indicated they moved my article ..they have taken notice of my title of "From the Hands of God." The blizzard has stuck overnight and we are getting indications of the plant trip and LOOP. This God thing is me indicating I think this is a big deal and I got people talking to me.  This NRC at the below is indication they added the next blog article about the new NRC inspection just for me.

Moderator January 28, 2015 at 9:53 am

"From the hands of God"

How many individuals in the USA ever predicted a LOOP at a specific plant at a particular timeframe and had the prediction openly documented on the internet two days before it happened? I think I am the first?

“Historic Blizzard Juno Warning Going Over Pilgrim Nuclear Plant”

1. The NRC documents 20 LOOPs at Pilgrim since 1980 (42 years of operation). I estimate the per one hundred year rate for Pilgrim is 55 LOOPs. Pilgrims relicensing documents say it is about 6.5 LOOPs per one hundred years. What is the bounding LOOP rate…pilgrim had three LOOPs in about three days during blizzard Nemo? That is an astronomical rate. I request the NRC use the worst case LOOP rate of about 55 LOOPs in all Pilgrim’s violation risk calculations and any other risk calculation used in Pilgrim. It gets you wondering what generic LOOP rate would bound all loops rate uncertainties?
   “This got to be an act of god: A blizzard that knocks Pilgrim off the grid on Jan 27 and this below inspection report is dated on Jan 26. It explains why Pilgrim has so many LOOPS and why the NRC remains inconsequential with controlling bad actor licensees. I yet can’t get a copiable document…have to wait till it gets on Adams.
   ‘Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station – NRC 95002 Supplemental Inspection Report 05000293/2014008 and Assignment of Two Parallel White Performance Indicator Inspection Findings’
   Did the agency see the blizzard coming in anticipation of the LOOP and decided it has to be released the IR yesterday! This is proof the agency seen the LOOP coming and didn’t force Pilgrim to shutdown prior to the storm. They should have ordered Pilgrim to shutdown 4 hours before the blizzard hit. This would have more caused them incentive to repair their fleet wide nuclear endeavors. It would have been invaluable for all the rest of the utilities to see.
   If you were god, would your release Pilgrim’s inspection report before the LOOP or after the LOOP?
   This is my proof that an intelligent god exist!!! I never needed any proof.
   Bill, why haven’t you put your hat in ring to be a NRC commissioner?
   I have to give “great” credit to the NRC for publishing my items! Thank you Victor.
   steamshovel2002@yahoo.com
   Note: Moved by the moderator

   Reply
• ModeratorJanuary 28, 2015 at 9:54 am
  

  Please see our post today for more information on Pilgrim.

Just for me: 

Additional Scrutiny at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant Set to Continue

9 Comments Posted by Moderator on January 28, 2015

Neil Sheehan
Public Affairs Officer
Region I
Last fall, a team of NRC inspectors was tasked with evaluating whether issues at the Pilgrim nuclear power plant that triggered increased agency oversight had been satisfactorily addressed. That team has now returned its findings in the form of a newly issued inspection report.
And the answer – at least at this point in time – is that Entergy, the Plymouth, Mass., plant’s owner, still has some more work to do.

The implications of the LOOP, plant trip and components degradation are hitting me...there has been no public discussions about the failed SRV valve as of yet. I know the  SRV valve didn't work and I am hinting to the NRC pretty heavy I am  into the details with the history of the SRVs.  

1. Mike MulliganJanuary 28, 2015 at 11:18 am
   

   Does Scrutiny ever lead to a behavior change with a licensee? Why didn’t it work from this new inspection report preventing the plant trip and newest in storm Juno LOOP. Ring that up you cash register risk perspectives with a broken HPCI and 55 LOOPs per one hundred years.
   Makes me laugh…have to wait until pilgrim is ready to receive the inspection?
   Maybe if the inspection was more timelier to the 2013 events…Pilgrim wouldn't have had the yesterday’s LOOP. How come the NRC didn’t force Pilgrim to shut down prior to storm Juno as identified in the new inspection report, as their switchyard and the outside transmission system was so fragile for the expected climate and especially winter storms.
   We knew Pilgrim was going down the tubes being in 2011 when they accepted poor quality brand new SRVs (all four of them)…the pathetic host of leaks, down powers and shutdowns over this new equipment. We were shocked the agency would treat these important last ditch core cooling components so cavalierly. You know how I feel, read my 2.206s. I contend if the agency would have slapped Entergy hard in the head with a big fine or prolonged shutdown then… you would have woke Entergy up from their nap. Then Pilgrim would have sailed through storm Juno uneventful at 100% power.
   I call the NRC a “paper cut” regulator….the only power they got over these giant companies as incentive to get their heads on straight is to give them one insignificant paper cut after another to no results.
   Why is the NRC allowing our NE grid to become so fragile? Why is the two plant Millstone (Dominion) unit and Pilgrim (Entergy) going down the tubes together…why can’t the agency control these plants? I think it extremely dangerous to allow a plant to be operating in “organizational dysfunction” and impaired “safety culture” mode knowingly for prolong periods of time: repetitively spewing out of the plants safety component breakdown, unseen component degradation and showing contempt towards the agency with knowingly violating tech specs, licensing conditions and the USFARs. It is like operating your car carelessly with the low oil pressure red warning light for days and weeks. I think it is in the greater interest of the United State of American to drive a plant early and quickly out of disorder and chaotic organizational conditions?

The NRC talking to me again. The USFAR don't cover ever aspect of a plant condition. The current state of the organization, the condition of the equipment and how the plant in the past responded to to similar problems...the conditions expressed by the NRC itself in the new inspection. The NRC recently has stated they take it very seriously when a plant keeps challenging and testing needlessly it safety systems. It is a very dangerous practice and it wears out the gear. You just can't keep testing your plant safety components...putting or turning a safety response into the normal operating regime of a plant. Because switchyard and transmission component are't reliable and causing plant trips and deep safety challenge...you can't explain this as the normal and expected operational events. 

Nuclear Power Plants Ready For Major Winter Storm

15 Comments Posted by Moderator on January 26, 2015

• ModeratorJanuary 27, 2015 at 11:32 am
  

  Thank you for the comment
  We should have stated that the limits on wind speed are defined in the plants’ Emergency Action Levels (EALs) and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). While plants’ Technical Specifications do not contain explicit limits with respect to wind speed, the operability of the associated systems can be impacted by external events which may require a plant shutdown. For most plants, the Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs) and EALs will direct plant shutdown based upon actual and forecasted wind velocities to ensure the associated safety-related systems remain operable.
  Neil Sheehan

Then this: 

Additional Scrutiny at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant Set to Continue

9 Comments Posted by Moderator on January 28, 2015

Neil Sheehan

Public Affairs Officer

Region I

Here I am laying out why this needs a Special or Augmented inspection...the failed components and I am giving the NRC deep details with the operational problems documented in the docket. I giving them the short story documented in the docket with why I think all ADS and SRV valves are not operable based on the cumulative recent operating experiences and agency documents. They  all know this story is tracking with all the documents.   

1. Mike MulliganJanuary 29, 2015 at 7:10 pmYour comment is awaiting moderation.
2. 
   
3. So when you sending the special inspection team? An augment inspection?
   Sound like I had a little birdy whispering in my ears?
   Just when you could think the repetitive TDAFWP couldn’t get any worst at Millstone…now we got the poor quality SRVs failing over and over again at Pilgrim for 4 years just like the TDAFW pumps did. Is this going to take three special inspection to fix just like Millstone? Wait, this is like the TDAFWP and both half capabilities electric aux feed water pumps being simultaneously inop for 4 years. You should conservatively call “all” the SRVs/ADS valves inop and not according to tech specs since 2011.
   I bet you the SRV was leaking for a prolonged period of time and the agency hid it on us. The hide the leak philosophy first, before fix it quickly philosophy.This caused the valve to fail.The ADS/ SRV valves were inop since 2011 when first installed. Before they even got warmed they were inop. You get it, after “new” installation of the “new” three stage SRVs (4 of them), the first leak impairing the operation of one of these valve occurred within one or two months. Maybe within weeks of first start-up. This situation is unprecedented in the nuclear industry. I’ll bet you we are heading to a cover-up of a red finding. This is not about one valve…the whole group of them have a design defect and uncontrollable poor quality components from day one. A common mode failure of the automatic depressurization system and safety relief valve for four years. These nuclear safety valves weren’t fit to be in nuclear power plant.
   (Yesterday) “We knew Pilgrim was going down the tubes beginning in 2011 when they accepted poor quality brand new SRVs (all four of them)…the pathetic host of leaks, down powers and shutdowns over this new equipment. We were shocked the agency would treat these important last ditch core cooling components so cavalierly.”
   We have had a dangerous meltdown of the effectiveness of the NRC. i am writing up a 2.206 requesting the Pilgrim plant remain shutdown. All plants in Region I should be shutdown because there was such a severe breakdown in the NRC.
   What level of risk would that get you to: HPIC inop, SRV/ads inop, in a LOOP and the risk of 55 loops per 100 years (52 more LOOPs than assumed in calculations)? I think this is the most severe accident we have had in a long time.
   “The station experienced equipment issues while cooling down after the scram including: the
   station diesel air compressor failed to start, one of four safety relief valves could not be operated
   manually from the control room, and high pressure coolant injection had to be secured due to
   failure of the gland seal motor.”

I think the small transmission line is just a shame...going to be used as risk mitigation strategy for the violation. It is going to have great worth in calculating the violation level, but absolutely no worth for the operators in house. It just doesn't have the redundancy or the proper safety quality to be use as a source of power in nuclear plant.
The mysteriously discovered third line leading to a partial LOOP is nothing but regulator and licencee fraud...they ginned it up just to reduce the violation level. The 23 kilo-volt line is never mention in any of the new inspection report LOOPs...whether it was energized or not. The recent inspection report treats the plant as only having two viable lines into the plant. I find it highly suspicious now they are talking about partial LOOPs. 

Complicated Reactor Scram due to Loss of Offsite Power on October 14, 2013 Entergy assembled a multi-discipline team to perform the RCE for this issue. In addition to the direct cause of the failure of a defective pole at an offsite substation, which was determined to be outside the control of Entergy, the RCE documented one root and one contributing cause:

 Entergy failed to ensure that station procedures contained adequate pre-defined, risk-based criteria for planned maintenance on offsite transmission equipment which places Pilgrim in an SPV to an automatic scram (Root Cause); and

 The design for generation at Pilgrim is less than robust, with only two paths for generation output and offsite power supply (Contributing Cause).

Proposed Director's Decision on My Palisades PCP Impeller Blades!

It will be significant if I catch them all on this.

It will be so sweet if they really need a 50.59 and the staff didn't catch them on it??? 

Jan 26 at 12:32 PM 

Dear Michele G. Evans, 

https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML14338A435 

Thank you for the NRC's response. The report was pretty detailed. I am sure people will look at me admiring if a worst PCP blade problem occurs or Palisades and the facility continues to develop bad plant problems. Got to love that new CDBI inspection results at this old plant. 

Information Notice No. 85-03: Separation of Primary Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft and Impeller

The scenario not explained yet by the NRC yet is: A set of blades getting flung off and creating a bad vibration issues with the pump. The staff then doesn’t think it is that bad and continues to run the pump. The vibration level build up to where it damages “all” the pump seals and this creates a LOCA. On the above IN, they almost separated the impeller from the shaft. 

Remember a nuclear plant doesn't need a severe core melt to get a license yanked...all they need is for the public to lose trust in the plant.
Thank you for answering me.
Sincerely,

Michele G. Evans(NRR): Mulligan’s Palisades 2.206

Mrs. Rankin, 

Additional Concerns: 

I think an accident coming out of broken PCP impeller blades is basically too complex to understand. I honestly don’t think anyone really understands completely how or why these blades fail. What can happen in the future not contrary to licensing. The normal way they handle this is they make a quality requirement over the global uncertainties. Why isn't there a quality requirement where these impellers are supposed to be replaced before cracks and broken blades shows up? 

Why isn't this an adverse to quality” violation? I am not certain how the USFAR and licensing treats quality for the PCP components “Why isn't this related to a 10 CFR 50.59 or licensing amendment request? I considered the PCP impeller problem contrary to plant licensing and the USFAR. Why didn't “not operating to plant licensing”, the NPSH issue…not cycle through a 50.59 or licensed amendment request change? I request the Palisades Plant immediately comply with all NRC regulations and UFSAR requirements. 

As far as the Salem plant primary coolant pump problem and Palisades plant PCP problems being dissimilar…I disagree. Basically defects have shown up in prior outage and inspections at both plants. The licensees and the NRC failed to immediately correct the problem. I fear this attitude would carry over to a much larger problem…where the licensee and the NRC would detect an incipient early problem and decide not to repair it. Then it leads to a much larger problem later on or it becomes a runaway repetitive problem. It is noticed the NRC doesn't do a comprehensive inspection write up about the early problems. You wait until to you are hunting around inside the core and coolant piping for broken off blades and missing screws to comprehensively report on it. I could make a case these inspection reports are still rather skimpy. 

Does the NRC have any actually testing with these 4000 hp pumps…proof…that the loose ductile blades won’t shatter the impeller? 

I have issues with the transparency of the OIG. Your staff reports these issues to the OIG. But there is no paperwork trail (like on the docket) that I can see showing you sent documents to the OIG and OIG never contacts me indicating they'd seen my concern and it is taken into consideration one way or another? 

I wish I had an industry wide perspective on PCP impeller blade problem? The blade problem seems only related to Palisades. I request the LERs and inspection reports on PCP problem be more comprehensively. This is an early indicator with licensee and safety culture problem. The public should see this.

Sincerely,Mike MulliganHinsdale, NH16033368320

ACTION: Proposed director's decision under 10 CFR 2.206;issuance. [7590-01-P]

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing a proposed director's decision with regard to a petition dated March 5, 2014, as supplemented on April 8, May 21, and September 3, 2014, filed by Mr. Michael Mulligan (the petitioner), requesting that the NRC take action with regard to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENO or the licensee) at Palisades
Nuclear Plant (PNP). The petitioner's requests and the proposed director's decision are included in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.

Historic Blizzard Juno Warning Going Over Pilgrim Nuclear Plant

Jan 28, 2015

Is anyone asking the question why is Millstone and Pilgrim both going down the tubes together? 

Equipment breakdowns are nothing but a distraction from keeping the reactor safe in a historic blizzard and LOOP. 

***I don't buy the first part of this below...Entergy could have raised the roof through all federal and state authorities asking that (I believe) National Grid up grade these transmission lines. I doubt these lines meet FERC and FERC quality and reliability standards with the wood poles falling over or the lines shorting in a storm. They also could sue them?

We talking about a destructive fiduciary conflict or competition thing going on between National Grid and Entergy? Hell, if I was National Grid, I'd be thinking Pilgrim not might not be around in a short time, so why waste money on investing in their transmission system? 

I'd wonder if National grid is intentionally sabotaging Entergy, as they figured out away to make a few extra pennies in financial markets by speculating...creating stress on the electric grid or natural gas lines?

The coincident loss of transmission lines from faults external to Pilgrim resulted in a LOOP, main generator load reject, and reactor scram. This cause was determined to be outside the control of Entergy (Root Cause); 

 Entergy failed to ensure that procedures established adequate pre-defined, riskbased criteria to guide operators confronted with deteriorating switchyard conditions during and following a blizzard (Root Cause); 

 Entergy failed to ensure that procedure 2.1.42, “Operation During Severe Weather,” provided guidance for operators to determine which severe snow storms were most likely to challenge Pilgrim switchyard reliability (Contributing Cause); 

 Entergy did not ensure that CAPRs from previous severe weather events prevented recurrence (Contributing Cause); and 

 Previously identified internal OE was not successfully utilized by Entergy to direct removal of snow and ice from transformer insulators prior reenergizing (Contributing Cause).

The risk profile with 55 LOOPs per 100 years, in another LOOP and HPCI broke was pretty pathetic. Must have had annunciation alarms going up the ying hang all during the storm.

Entergy identified that individuals did not always understand the importance of adhering to nuclear standards and that station leaders have not consistently exhibited behaviors that set the appropriate standards

The cornerstone safety program at a nuclear plant..Corrective Action Program (CAP). You think the breakdown of the CAP program is just limited with their scram record?  

(new inspection report 201408) 

"In particular, Entergy identified that implementation of the station’s CAP has not been effective in ensuring adequate corrective actions are taken to address issues in a timely manner."

So it is more than equipment problem...the safety components of the whole organization is misfiring. Notice the NRC doesn't disclose what safety culture aspects were impaired?  

(new inspection report 201408) 

"With respect to the safety culture review, inspectors determined that Entergy’s evaluations appropriately identified the safety culture aspects that caused or significantly contributed to the performance issues."

It sounds like they had a inspector in the control room during this and that is the reason for the down power.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON TURBINE TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

"On Tuesday January 27, 2015 at 0402 hours, with the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Reactor Mode Select Switch (RMSS) in Run and reactor power approximately 52% an automatic reactor scram signal was received due to the automatic trip of the main turbine that was initiated by the opening of the main generator breaker, ACB-104. The event occurred during winter storm 'Juno.' Prior to the event off-site transmission Line 355 was de-energized due [to] weather conditions and its associated PNPS switchyard breakers (ACB-105, a main generator breaker and ACB-102), were open. Per station procedures, reactor power was being lowered, a reactor protection system bus had been placed onto a back-up power supply, the Emergency Diesel Generators had been started and were powering the associated safety related 4 KV buses. The second off-site transmission Line 342 de-energized and the associated PNPS switchyard breakers (ACB-104 main generator breaker and ACB-103) opened. The Shutdown Transformer off-site power supply has remained available throughout this event. All control rods were verified to be fully inserted. Per plant design, Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group lI sampling systems, Group VI Reactor Water Clean-up (RWCU) system and Reactor Building Isolation System (RBIS) isolations occurred. Currently, the EDG's are powering the safety related 4KV buses, reactor water level is being maintained by the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system and reactor pressure is being maintained by High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. The station is conducting a plant cool down at this time. All systems responded as designed with the exception of a non-safety-related diesel air compressor, K-117 that failed to start."

Diesel Air compressor...you know what hell looks like, it shutting down a power plant without the air compressors. It is another example where they don't make these backup safety gear measure up to the necessary quality and testing. This gear is just a figurehead. 

In reminds me with ANO and Entergy killing a employee. Don't they care about the safety of their Pilgrim employees. You don't want your employees running inside and outside the plant sitting on the ocean's edge in a historic and terrible blizzard. You want them hunkered down in a stable mode to ride out the storm. In other words, at 100% or shutdown. These plants should be designed for the climate...it is not that hard to do. I don't hear about Millstone shutting down.  It is terrible unsafe to force their employees in a panic, in blizzard after blizzard to run around the plant inside and out like chickens with the heads cut off. 

The licensee will notify the State and local governments and plans on issuing a press release. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

LOSS OF HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION

"On Tuesday, January 27, 2015, at 0948 EST, with the Reactor Mode Select Switch (RMSS) in the Shutdown position and Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) at 0% core thermal power, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was isolated by the main control room operating crew and declared INOPERABLE. HPCI had been in service for reactor pressure control following the automatic reactor scram experienced during winter storm 'Juno' reported in EN# 50769. It appears there was a malfunction of the HPCI turbine gland seal condenser blower or associated condensate pump. Reactor pressure control was transitioned to the safety relief valves and the reactor cooldown was continued. The plant is stable. The Emergency Diesel Generators are powering the safety related 4KV buses and reactor water level is being maintained by the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system. HPCI is required to be OPERABLE in accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.C.1. Since HPCI is a single train system, the INOPERABILITY is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The cause of the HPCI malfunction is not known at this time and troubleshooting continues.

"This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public.

"The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

Jan 26 from the NRC

PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION- NRC 95002 SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000293/2014008 AND ASSIGNMENT OF TWO PARALLEL WHITE PERFORMANCE INDICATOR INSPECTION FINDINGS

• The current loss of offsite power frequency used in the agency’s risk models is slightly less than 3 events per 100 years. (Victor Dricks)

****Prediction below on Jan 25****

Jan 25, 2015: What do you say, I think the plant will trip and they will get some kind of LOOP in storm Juno. Bet you they got a 50% chance. 

It might be historic in nature....

With 20 "Lost Of offsite Power (LOOPS)accidents since 1980 according to the NRC...one of the highest rates in nation.

The NRC estimates a nuclear plant will get 2,3 or 5 LOOPs per one hundred years.I believe the Pilgrim estimated prorated rate is 55 LOOPs per one hundred years. Pilgrim is really susceptible to LOOPs and especially in the winter...

Pilgrim had 2 LOOPs last Nemo blizzard...

Jan 27: Basically the NRC and Entergy think the quality of the grid is out of the control of Entergy...

The progress here was they were powering down and at 50%...

Pilgrim nuclear plant offline because of storm outage 

JAN 27 2015: The Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth could be offline for days after a storm-related outage shut down two of the major lines carrying electricity from the generating facility.Officials said the problem is similar to one that hit during a 2013 blizzard, and poses no safety threat. The lines failed about 4 a.m., at a time when Pilgrim’s output had already been reduced to 20 percent because of storm-related conditions on the electrical grid.Continue reading below

“All safety systems worked as designed and plant conditions are currently stable,” said plant spokeswoman Lauren Burm. “There’s no threat to the safety of plant workers or the public.”She said it could be days before Pilgrim resumes normal operations, but that the plant would be able to stay offline for much longer than that without safety concerns.

Speaking at a morning news conference, state energy secretary Matthew A. Beaton said he had received no reports of the storm causing broader problems with the electrical grid.

About 7:45 a.m. Tuesday, there were 21,881 reported outages in the state, concentrated largely on the South Shore, Cape Cod and Nantucket.