Historic Blizzard Juno Warning Going Over Pilgrim Nuclear Plant

Jan 28, 2015

Is anyone asking the question why is Millstone and Pilgrim both going down the tubes together? 

Equipment breakdowns are nothing but a distraction from keeping the reactor safe in a historic blizzard and LOOP. 

***I don't buy the first part of this below...Entergy could have raised the roof through all federal and state authorities asking that (I believe) National Grid up grade these transmission lines. I doubt these lines meet FERC and FERC quality and reliability standards with the wood poles falling over or the lines shorting in a storm. They also could sue them?

We talking about a destructive fiduciary conflict or competition thing going on between National Grid and Entergy? Hell, if I was National Grid, I'd be thinking Pilgrim not might not be around in a short time, so why waste money on investing in their transmission system? 

I'd wonder if National grid is intentionally sabotaging Entergy, as they figured out away to make a few extra pennies in financial markets by speculating...creating stress on the electric grid or natural gas lines?

The coincident loss of transmission lines from faults external to Pilgrim resulted in a LOOP, main generator load reject, and reactor scram. This cause was determined to be outside the control of Entergy (Root Cause); 

 Entergy failed to ensure that procedures established adequate pre-defined, riskbased criteria to guide operators confronted with deteriorating switchyard conditions during and following a blizzard (Root Cause); 

 Entergy failed to ensure that procedure 2.1.42, “Operation During Severe Weather,” provided guidance for operators to determine which severe snow storms were most likely to challenge Pilgrim switchyard reliability (Contributing Cause); 

 Entergy did not ensure that CAPRs from previous severe weather events prevented recurrence (Contributing Cause); and 

 Previously identified internal OE was not successfully utilized by Entergy to direct removal of snow and ice from transformer insulators prior reenergizing (Contributing Cause).

The risk profile with 55 LOOPs per 100 years, in another LOOP and HPCI broke was pretty pathetic. Must have had annunciation alarms going up the ying hang all during the storm.

Entergy identified that individuals did not always understand the importance of adhering to nuclear standards and that station leaders have not consistently exhibited behaviors that set the appropriate standards

The cornerstone safety program at a nuclear plant..Corrective Action Program (CAP). You think the breakdown of the CAP program is just limited with their scram record?  

(new inspection report 201408) 

"In particular, Entergy identified that implementation of the station’s CAP has not been effective in ensuring adequate corrective actions are taken to address issues in a timely manner."

So it is more than equipment problem...the safety components of the whole organization is misfiring. Notice the NRC doesn't disclose what safety culture aspects were impaired?  

(new inspection report 201408) 

"With respect to the safety culture review, inspectors determined that Entergy’s evaluations appropriately identified the safety culture aspects that caused or significantly contributed to the performance issues."

It sounds like they had a inspector in the control room during this and that is the reason for the down power.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON TURBINE TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

"On Tuesday January 27, 2015 at 0402 hours, with the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Reactor Mode Select Switch (RMSS) in Run and reactor power approximately 52% an automatic reactor scram signal was received due to the automatic trip of the main turbine that was initiated by the opening of the main generator breaker, ACB-104. The event occurred during winter storm 'Juno.' Prior to the event off-site transmission Line 355 was de-energized due [to] weather conditions and its associated PNPS switchyard breakers (ACB-105, a main generator breaker and ACB-102), were open. Per station procedures, reactor power was being lowered, a reactor protection system bus had been placed onto a back-up power supply, the Emergency Diesel Generators had been started and were powering the associated safety related 4 KV buses. The second off-site transmission Line 342 de-energized and the associated PNPS switchyard breakers (ACB-104 main generator breaker and ACB-103) opened. The Shutdown Transformer off-site power supply has remained available throughout this event. All control rods were verified to be fully inserted. Per plant design, Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group lI sampling systems, Group VI Reactor Water Clean-up (RWCU) system and Reactor Building Isolation System (RBIS) isolations occurred. Currently, the EDG's are powering the safety related 4KV buses, reactor water level is being maintained by the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system and reactor pressure is being maintained by High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. The station is conducting a plant cool down at this time. All systems responded as designed with the exception of a non-safety-related diesel air compressor, K-117 that failed to start."

Diesel Air compressor...you know what hell looks like, it shutting down a power plant without the air compressors. It is another example where they don't make these backup safety gear measure up to the necessary quality and testing. This gear is just a figurehead. 

In reminds me with ANO and Entergy killing a employee. Don't they care about the safety of their Pilgrim employees. You don't want your employees running inside and outside the plant sitting on the ocean's edge in a historic and terrible blizzard. You want them hunkered down in a stable mode to ride out the storm. In other words, at 100% or shutdown. These plants should be designed for the climate...it is not that hard to do. I don't hear about Millstone shutting down.  It is terrible unsafe to force their employees in a panic, in blizzard after blizzard to run around the plant inside and out like chickens with the heads cut off. 

The licensee will notify the State and local governments and plans on issuing a press release. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

LOSS OF HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION

"On Tuesday, January 27, 2015, at 0948 EST, with the Reactor Mode Select Switch (RMSS) in the Shutdown position and Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) at 0% core thermal power, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was isolated by the main control room operating crew and declared INOPERABLE. HPCI had been in service for reactor pressure control following the automatic reactor scram experienced during winter storm 'Juno' reported in EN# 50769. It appears there was a malfunction of the HPCI turbine gland seal condenser blower or associated condensate pump. Reactor pressure control was transitioned to the safety relief valves and the reactor cooldown was continued. The plant is stable. The Emergency Diesel Generators are powering the safety related 4KV buses and reactor water level is being maintained by the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system. HPCI is required to be OPERABLE in accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.C.1. Since HPCI is a single train system, the INOPERABILITY is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The cause of the HPCI malfunction is not known at this time and troubleshooting continues.

"This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public.

"The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

Jan 26 from the NRC

PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION- NRC 95002 SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000293/2014008 AND ASSIGNMENT OF TWO PARALLEL WHITE PERFORMANCE INDICATOR INSPECTION FINDINGS

• The current loss of offsite power frequency used in the agency’s risk models is slightly less than 3 events per 100 years. (Victor Dricks)

****Prediction below on Jan 25****

Jan 25, 2015: What do you say, I think the plant will trip and they will get some kind of LOOP in storm Juno. Bet you they got a 50% chance. 

It might be historic in nature....

With 20 "Lost Of offsite Power (LOOPS)accidents since 1980 according to the NRC...one of the highest rates in nation.

The NRC estimates a nuclear plant will get 2,3 or 5 LOOPs per one hundred years.I believe the Pilgrim estimated prorated rate is 55 LOOPs per one hundred years. Pilgrim is really susceptible to LOOPs and especially in the winter...

Pilgrim had 2 LOOPs last Nemo blizzard...

Jan 27: Basically the NRC and Entergy think the quality of the grid is out of the control of Entergy...

The progress here was they were powering down and at 50%...

Pilgrim nuclear plant offline because of storm outage 

JAN 27 2015: The Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth could be offline for days after a storm-related outage shut down two of the major lines carrying electricity from the generating facility.Officials said the problem is similar to one that hit during a 2013 blizzard, and poses no safety threat. The lines failed about 4 a.m., at a time when Pilgrim’s output had already been reduced to 20 percent because of storm-related conditions on the electrical grid.Continue reading below

“All safety systems worked as designed and plant conditions are currently stable,” said plant spokeswoman Lauren Burm. “There’s no threat to the safety of plant workers or the public.”She said it could be days before Pilgrim resumes normal operations, but that the plant would be able to stay offline for much longer than that without safety concerns.

Speaking at a morning news conference, state energy secretary Matthew A. Beaton said he had received no reports of the storm causing broader problems with the electrical grid.

About 7:45 a.m. Tuesday, there were 21,881 reported outages in the state, concentrated largely on the South Shore, Cape Cod and Nantucket.