What Is More Valuable with SRVs: Manual Remote or Auto Operation Of The Valve

These guys just were never following the rules based on profits. There are two attributes here. Is it safe? Does not following the rules lead to wider culture safety problems. The Safety Relief valves here has another unstated and regulated function. Basically a melt down at Fukushima informs us (so far) in a full scale meltdown they never challenged the integrity of the pipes and vessel. I contend the primary function of the SRVs is a tool to the operators to prevent or mitigate a meltdown independent of the bursting the vessel or pipes. A meltdown is just marginally less worst than a burst of a pipe or vessel. My version of this would make the operator functioning of the valves (opening and shutting the manually the valves to control a accident) more important than the fear of bursting a large pipe or the vessel.

But there is absolutely no doubt the genesis of this BWROG is the work I had done on the SRVs.

The bitch I got is outsiders never get credit for pushing the industry and the NRC in the safe direction and getting results. Like a thank you letter in the docket. 

Remember inaccurate or out of spec pressure testing inaccuracy is highly related to leaking SRV and damage to the manual operation of the valve.     

TSTF
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TSTF‐576 “Revise Safety/Relief Valve  Requirements” Presubmittal Meeting September 12, 2019
Ryan Joyce, Southern Nuclear, BWROG Licensing  Committee Chairman Brian Mann, Excel Services
Technical Specifications Task Force A Joint Owners Group Activity TSTF Background •The Safety/Relief Valve (S/RV) LCO requires eachS/RV to be operable.  The associated Surveillance Requirement (SR) requires that each valve  opens within the specified tolerance around the lift setpoint. •The need for TSTF‐576 was highlighted by many LERs describing failure  to meet the S/RV SR, even though the safety function (to prevent  vessel over‐pressurization) would still have been performed. –This indicated that the S/RV LCO is not consistent with 10 CFR  50.36(c)(2), “the lowest functional capability or performance levels  of equipment required for safe operation of the facility.” –The SR is not consistent with 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3), to verify that  “facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the limiting  conditions for operation will be met.” •As a separate action, the BWROG continues to pursue improvements  to the S/RVs to address the underlying cause of the test failures.
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Technical Specifications Task Force A Joint Owners Group Activity TSTF Background •The safety function of the S/RVs is to collectivelyensure that  the reactor steam dome pressure doesn’t exceed the value in  Safety Limit (SL) 2.1.2, “Reactor Coolant System Pressure SL.” –The SL is based on not exceeding the ASME Boiler and  Pressure Vessel Code, Section III limit of 110% of the  design pressure. •The S/RVs collectively are typically able to perform the safety  function, even if individual S/RVs may open above or below  the setpoint.
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Technical Specifications Task Force A Joint Owners Group Activity TSTF Background •The TS contain multiple specifications that govern the S/RVs  depending on the function they are fulfilling.   –BWR/4 STS 3.4.3 and BWR/6 STS 3.4.4, both titled,  “Safety/Relief Valves,” which requires the S/RVs in safety  mode and, for BWR/6 plants, relief mode. •This TS is the subject of the traveler. –STS 3.5.1, "ECCS ‐Operating," that requires a subset of the  S/RVs to actuate in ADS mode  –STS 3.6.1.6, "Low‐Low Set (LLS) Valves," that requires a  subset of the  S/RVs to actuate in LLS mode.   •STS 3.5.1 and 3.6.1.6 are not affected by the traveler.
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Technical Specifications Task Force A Joint Owners Group Activity TSTF Proposed LCO Changes •The BWR/4 STS 3.4.3 LCO is changed from: –The safety function of [11] S/RVs shall be OPERABLE. •To: –The safety mode of the S/RVs shall be OPERABLE. •The safety mode is the capability of the S/RVs to mechanically  open to relieve excess pressure when the lift setpoint is  exceeded.
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Technical Specifications Task Force A Joint Owners Group Activity TSTF Proposed LCO Changes •The BWR/6 STS 3.4.4 LCO is changed from: –The safety function of [seven] S/RVs shall be OPERABLE. AND The relief function of [seven] additional S/RVs shall be OPERABLE. •To: The safety mode of the S/RVs shall be OPERABLE. AND The relief mode of [seven] additional S/RVs shall be OPERABLE. •In the relief mode, the S/RVs are opened by switches located in the  control room or by pressure‐sensing instrumentation.
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Technical Specifications Task Force A Joint Owners Group Activity TSTF Proposed LCO Changes •The proposed change revises the LCO to no longer specify the  number of safety mode S/RVs required to be operable, but to  instead require the safety function to be operable, which is tied to  the Safety Limit. •In the BWR/6 design, as well as two non‐BWR/6 plants (Dresden  and Quad Cities), the licensing basis permits limited credit for S/RVs  in the relief mode to protect the ASME overpressure limit.  –That LCO requirement is not changed. •The terms “safety function” and “relief function” are replaced with  “safety mode” and “relief mode” for consistency.    –Both terms are used in the Bases. –The term "safety function" could be easily confused with the  term "specified safety function" used in the definition of  operability. 7
Technical Specifications Task Force A Joint Owners Group Activity TSTF Proposed SR Changes •The existing SR specifies the number of S/RVs at each setpoint and  the as‐found tolerance, the as‐left tolerance, and any allowances: SR  3.4.3.1---------------------NOTE------------------------[2] [required] S/RVs may be changed to a lower setpoint group. --------------------------------------------------Verify the safety function lift setpoints of the [required] S/RVs are as follows: Number ofSetpoint S/RVs(psig) [4][1090 ±32.7] [4][1100 ±33.0] [3][1110 ±33.3] Following testing, lift settings shall be within ±1%. •The proposed SR states: –Verify the safety mode of the S/RVs will prevent reactor steam dome pressure from exceeding Safety Limit 2.1.2.
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Technical Specifications Task Force A Joint Owners Group Activity TSTF Proposed SR Changes •The ASME Code (required to be met by 10 CFR 50.55a(f)) continues  to require as‐found testing of each S/RV to licensee‐controlled  setpoints and tolerances. •The results of the ASME testing will be used to verify the SR: –If all S/RVs lift within the as‐found tolerance, the proposed SR is  met. –If one or more S/RVs fail to lift within the as‐found tolerance, an  analysis is performed to determine if the S/RVs, collectively,  would protect the Safety Limit and accident analyses, using  NRC‐approved methods. •This type of analysis‐based SR is used in other TS, such as, “Verify  each [control room AC] subsystem has the capability to remove the  assumed heat load,” which is performed by means of a combination  of testing and calculation.9
Technical Specifications Task Force A Joint Owners Group Activity TSTF Proposed SR Changes •For the BWR/6 plants (as well as Dresden and Quad Cities), the  relief mode SR is not changed. •The existing SR that verifies that each required S/RV opens when  manually actuated is deleted. –Manual actuation is not required to verify the S/RVs can  mechanically open to  relieve excess pressure when the lift  setpoint is exceeded. Inability to be manually actuated should  not render the LCO not met. –The BWR/6 relief mode is not manually actuated. –ADS and LLS TS contains a similar test as SR 3.5.1.12 and  SR 3.6.1.6.1, which are not being revised.
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Technical Specifications Task Force A Joint Owners Group Activity TSTF Proposed Action Changes •Given that the LCO requires the safety function to be operable, the  existing Actions are replaced with a single Action that applies when  the requirements of the LCO are not met. –Requires being in Mode 3 in 12 hours and Mode 4 in 36 hours. •While the BWR/6 STS has several actions applicable to inoperable  S/RVs, the TS for the four BWR/6 plants (River Bend, Grand Gulf,  Perry, and Clinton) contains a single action for one or more required  S/RVs inoperable, that requires being in Mode 3 in 12 hours and in  Mode 4 in 36 hours.   That Action is adopted in the BWR/6 STS.
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Technical Specifications Task Force A Joint Owners Group Activity TSTF Conclusion •TSTF‐576 revises the Safety/Relief Valve specification to  reflect the plant design and accident analysis, and to be  consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36. –S/RV requirements pertaining to ADS and LLS are  unchanged.
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Technical Specifications Task Force A Joint Owners Group Activity TSTF TSTF‐576 Review •TSTF‐576 is a management priority for the BWR fleet and the  NRC. •The TSTF intends to request an 18‐month review of  TSTF‐576 and to request licensee adoption under the CLIIP