Junk facility Watts Bar New Inspection Report: Site Spinning Wildly Out Of the Control Of The NRC

Not putting in the required paperwork to the NRC indicates the site is spinning out of control from the NRC.

This is not the normal new plant start-up process in Unit 2...it indicates widespread poor quality issues with all the components.
wildly

IR 05000390/2016-002; 05000391/2016-002; April 1, 2016 – June 30, 2016; Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2; Triennial Fire Protection Inspection, Operability Evaluations, Surveillance Testing, Problem Identification and Resolution, Event Follow-up. 

Summary of Plant Status 

Unit 1 started the reporting period at 100 percent rated thermal power and remained there until March 22, 2016, when the reactor tripped due to a main turbine trip caused by a governor valve circuit card failure. Unit 1 returned to 100 percent rated thermal power on March 28, 2016, and remained there until June 11, 2016, when power reductions were necessary to maintain main low pressure turbine #3 back pressure limits during warmer weather. Unit 1 operated between

89 and 97 percent power, as necessary to maintain main turbine backpressure limits, until June 25, 2016, when power was reduced due to turbine building sump overflowing, resulting from turbine building sump pump failures. The rising water level approached the running unit 1 #3 high pressure heater drain tank pumps. The licensee decided to secure the #3 high pressure heater drain pumps and, as a result, lowered unit 1 power. Power reduction continued to 60 percent on June 27, 2016, then increased over the next three days to 79 percent by the end of the reporting period.

Unit 2 started the reporting period in mode 3 and remained there until April 2, 2016, when it entered mode 4 for repairs to leaking safety injection check valves. The unit re-entered mode 3 on April 8, 2016, where it remained until April 17, 2016, when it re-entered mode 4 due to failure of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFW) to meet mode 3 operability requirements. The unit re-entered mode 3 on May 1, 2016, where it remained until May 18, 2016, when it re-entered mode 4 for repairs to the solid state protection system. The unit reentered mode 3 on May 20, 2016. The unit then entered mode 2 on May 23, 2016, and mode 1 on May 25, 2016, where it remained until May 28, 2016, when it re-entered mode 3 due to abnormal indications of foreign material in the main turbine when it was rolled at low speed for the first time. The unit re-entered mode 2 and mode 1 on May 31, 2016. The unit remained in mode 1 until June 5, 2016, when the #1 turbine governor valve failed full open, causing an automatic reactor trip and safety injection. The unit re-entered mode 2 and mode 1 on June 8, 2016. The unit remained in mode 1 until an automatic reactor trip caused by steam generator low level occurred on June 20, 2016. The reactor trip was the result of a secondary transient caused by the loss of the running main feedwater pump. The unit re-entered mode 2 on June 23, 2016, and re-entered mode 1 on June 24, 2016. The unit re-entered mode 2 on June 26, 2016, due to a high pressure steam leak and subsequent lifting of two main steam safety valves

on the #4 steam generator. The unit re-entered mode 3 on June 26, 2016, to repair the steam leak and the safety valves. The unit remained in mode 3 through the end of the reporting period. 

*The report covered a three-month period of inspection by the resident and regional inspectors. Ten NRC-identified and self-revealed findings were identified. 

NRC-Identified Findings and Self-Revealed Findings 

• SL IV. The NRC identified a Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for the licensee's failure to notify the NRC that the technical specification (TS) limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.5.2 required action and completion time were not met when the 1B-B centrifugal charging pump (CCP) was inoperable due to an inoperable room cooler. Subsequently, the licensee submitted LER 2016-006-00 for this event on June 30, 2016. This issue was placed in the licensee’s corrective action program (CAP) as CR 1165380.

Since the failure to submit an event report within the time requirements may impact the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function, this performance deficiency was dispositioned under traditional enforcement and the violation was assessed using Section 2.2.4 of the NRC’s Enforcement Policy. Using the example listed in Section 6.9.d.9, “A licensee fails to make report required by 10 CFR 50.73,” the issue was determined to be a SL IV violation. In accordance with IMC 0612, “Power Reactor Inspection Reports,” dated May 6, 2016, traditional enforcement violations are not assessed for cross-cutting aspects. (Section 1R15)

• SL IV: The NRC identified a SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for the licensee's failure notify the NRC that the TS LCO 3.1.8 required action and completion time were not met when the analog rod position indication (ARPI) and the demand position indication system were not operable. Subsequently, the licensee submitted LER 2016-007-00 for this issue on June 20, 2016. This violation was placed in the licensee’s corrective action program as CR 1163150.

Since the failure to submit an event report within the time requirements may impact the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function, this performance deficiency was dispositioned under traditional enforcement and the violation was assessed using Section 2.2.4 of the NRC’s Enforcement Policy. Using the example listed in Section 6.9.d.9, “A licensee fails to make report required by 10 CFR 50.73,” the issue was determined to be a SL IV violation. In accordance with IMC 0612, “Power Reactor Inspection Reports,” dated May 6, 2016, traditional enforcement violations are not assessed for cross-cutting aspects. (Section 4OA3.6)

• SL IV. The NRC identified a SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for the licensee's failure notify the NRC that the TS LCO 3.6.3 required action and completion time were not met for an inoperable emergency raw cooling water (ERCW) containment isolation valve. Subsequently, the licensee submitted LER 2016-009-00 for this issue on July 15, 2016. This issue was placed in the licensee’s corrective action program as CR 1174000.

Since the failure to submit an event report within the time requirements may impact the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function, this performance deficiency was dispositioned under traditional enforcement and the violation was assessed using Section 2.2.4 of the NRC’s Enforcement Policy. Using the example listed in Section 6.9.d.9, “A licensee fails to make report required by 10 CFR 50.73,” the issue was determined to be a SL IV violation. In accordance with IMC 0612, “Power Reactor Inspection Reports,” dated May 6, 2016, traditional enforcement violations are not assessed for cross-cutting aspects. (Section 4OA2.3)

• SL IV. The NRC identified a SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for the

licensee's failure to report, within 60 days of discovery, a condition which was

prohibited by the plant’s TS associated with recent performances of TS surveillance requirement (SR) 3.5.2.3 for verification that emergency core cooling system (ECCS) piping is full of water. Subsequently, the licensee submitted LER 2016-003-00 for this issue on May 10, 2016. This violation was placed in the licensee’s corrective action program as CR 1166564.

Since the failure to submit an event report within the time requirements may impact the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function, this performance deficiency was dispositioned under traditional enforcement and the violation was assessed using Section 2.2.4 of the NRC’s Enforcement Policy. Using the examplelisted in Section 6.9.d.9, “A licensee fails to make report required by 10 CFR 50.73,” the issue was determined to be a SL IV violation. In accordance with IMC 0612, “Power Reactor Inspection Reports,” dated May 6, 2016, traditional enforcement violations are not assessed for cross-cutting aspects. (4OA3.4)

• SL IV. The NRC identified a SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V,

“Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” at Watts Bar Unit 2 for the licensee’s

failure to follow procedure OPDP-8, Operability Determination Process and Limiting Condition for Operation Tracking, Revision 22. Specifically, the 2A-A motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (MDAFW) was potentially inoperable in mode 3 due to inadequate compensatory measures that were being controlled outside of the operability process. The issue was corrected and the pump returned to operable status on April 19, 2016. The issue was entered into the licensee’s corrective action program as CR 1163431.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because it represented an

improper or uncontrolled work practice that could impact quality or safety, involving safety-related SSCs. Specifically, failure to appropriately use the operability process when measures must be established to compensate for degraded or nonconforming conditions can lead to SSC inoperability. As described in IMC 2517, the significance of this issue was determined using traditional enforcement, because the cornerstone associated with this finding was not being assessed by the reactor oversight process (ROP). The inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance, SL IV because it represented a failure to meet a regulatory requirement, specifically a quality assurance (QA) criteria to follow quality-related procedures, which had

more than minor safety significance. The finding was assigned a cross-cutting

aspect of Work Management in the Human Performance area because the minor

maintenance work order created to compensate for the oil loss from the 2A-A

MDAFW pump was never reviewed by operations, which could have identified the out of process error. [H.5]. (Section 1R15)

• SL IV. The NRC identified a SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V,

“Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” at Watts Bar Unit 2 for the licensee’s

failure to follow the surveillance test program procedure by making adjustments to the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump control system during the performance of a surveillance instruction. The licensee reperformed the surveillance instruction with satisfactory results. The issue was entered into the licensee’s corrective action program as CR 1167102.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because making adjustments to the TDAFW pump control system during the performance of a surveillance

instruction could invalidate the test and result in the TDAFW pump being

inappropriately declared operable. As described in IMC 2517, the significance of this issue was determined using traditional enforcement, because the cornerstone associated with this finding was not being assessed by the reactor oversight process (ROP). The inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance, SL IV, because it represented a failure to meet a regulatory requirement, specifically a QA criteria to follow quality-related procedures, which had more than minor safety significance. The finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect of Conservative Bias in the Human Performance area because numerous individuals were aware the speed adjustment had been made while completing the surveillance instruction but did not question the appropriateness of that adjustment until prompted by NRC inspectors. [H.14] (Section 1R22)

• SL IV. A self-revealed Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” was identified at Watts Bar Unit 2 for the licensee’s failure to follow procedure 0-MI-1.003, Disassembly, Inspection, and Reassembly of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine. Specifically, the valve stem spring coil gap was not set in accordance with procedure, causing the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump to trip on electrical overspeed when the level control valves (LCVs) were closed. This issue was corrected on May 30, 2016, when the proper spring coil gap was set and verified and the post maintenance test was performed satisfactorily. The issue was entered into the licensee’s corrective action program as CR 1175968. 

The performance deficiency was more than minor because it represented an

improper or uncontrolled work practice that could impact quality or safety involving safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs). The finding was a SL IV violation because it represented a failure to meet a regulatory requirement, specifically a quality assurance (QA) criteria to follow quality-related procedures, which had more than minor safety significance. The finding was assigned a crosscutting aspect of resources in the Human Performance area because the licensee failed to ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, the procedure that set the coil spring gap lacked sufficient detail and rigor to ensure that the coil gap would be set appropriately by the technicians. [H.1] (4OA3.1)