Update 5/16
On the scheme of things, these large breaker aren't that complicated. Why can't they take these breakers into a lab and figure out what wrong in a short time. Mostly the bad vendor does the investigation. I believe there is huge corrupt collusion between the vendor and the plant. The vendor will "engineer" the investigation length in order to throw a favor to the plant. This will allow them to find replacements and fit into a outage. It is basically overriding the regulations. It facilitates increasingly tolerating degraded and defected parts in a nuclear plant. It creates a chilling inviroment in a control room. If you make it expensive to tolerate degraded in a plant with a immediate shutdown, it will send a message to the rest of the plants. The cheapest way out, replace degraded components when they first appear. These vendor are two steps away from NRC attention are notoriously corrupt. They make it so the licencee don't do the falsifying of documents risking their licence, the vendors faces the unlikely risk of the NRC wrath. I'd like these inventions done under the NRC's dime, then they would control the investigation.
On the scheme of things, these large breaker aren't that complicated. Why can't they take these breakers into a lab and figure out what wrong in a short time. Mostly the bad vendor does the investigation. I believe there is huge corrupt collusion between the vendor and the plant. The vendor will "engineer" the investigation length in order to throw a favor to the plant. This will allow them to find replacements and fit into a outage. It is basically overriding the regulations. It facilitates increasingly tolerating degraded and defected parts in a nuclear plant. It creates a chilling inviroment in a control room. If you make it expensive to tolerate degraded in a plant with a immediate shutdown, it will send a message to the rest of the plants. The cheapest way out, replace degraded components when they first appear. These vendor are two steps away from NRC attention are notoriously corrupt. They make it so the licencee don't do the falsifying of documents risking their licence, the vendors faces the unlikely risk of the NRC wrath. I'd like these inventions done under the NRC's dime, then they would control the investigation.
Power Reactor Event Number: 51928 Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ROB MELTON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCONotification Date: 05/13/2016
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/13/2016
Event Time: 12:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2016Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD RELPerson (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
Event Text
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode 1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
EXISTING DESIGN INADEQUACY COULD PREVENT STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM OPERABLITY
"At 1200 [CDT] May 13, 2016, while the plant was operating at 100% power, it was brought to the attention of the River Bend Station Main Control Room staff that an existing design inadequacy could prevent both trains of the Standby Gas Treatment System (GTS) from performing its design function. Under certain specific conditions, the installed Masterpact breakers may not close to allow energization of the filter train exhaust fans. A start signal (reactor level 2, drywell pressure 1.68 psid, annulus high radiation, annulus low flow) combined with a trip signal within a certain time differential, could result in a failure of the breakers to close. As a result of this condition, both Standby Gas Trains were declared inoperable, which required entry into LCO 3.6.4.3 Condition C (requires entering Mode 3 in 12 hours). Declaring both trains of Standby Gas Treatment System inoperable resulted in loss of the safety function since a system that has been declared inoperable is one in which the capability has degraded to the point where it cannot perform with reasonable expectation or reliability.
"The Standby Gas Treatment System (GTS) limits release to the environment of radioisotopes, which may leak from the primary containment, ECCS systems, and other potential radioactive sources to the secondary containment under accident conditions.
"At 1240 [CDT] May 13, 2016, one division of GTS, GTS 'A', was manually started from the Main Control Room. This action prevents the breaker failure mode, restored the operability of one train and restored the safety function of the GTS system. LCO 3.6.4.3 Condition A (restore Operability in 7 days) is currently entered for Standby Gas Train 'B'. During the 40 minutes of inoperability, both trains of Standby Gas remained available. At no time was the health or safety of the public impacted.
"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event that could have caused a loss of safety function to control the release of radioactive material. The Senior NRC Resident was notified."
Me on 5/13
"The utilities should be forced to assume all masterpact breakers are unsafe and immediately enter the appropriate tech spec LCO until masterpact breaker are eradicated from the plant."
Really, this is what is wrong in the industry. They have been deciding this since early 2115? This is NRC trickery, as letting them get away with it until replacements are on site. Why don't we see a slew of these reports all through the nation?
Updated
This is a excerpt from a NRC allegation Department letter to me below. I didn't make a official allegation here, but have made many other allegations not related to the plant. I am very familiar with how to make a proper allegation. Just wanted a talk to the resident. The NRC made it a allegation without my permission.
"On January 26, 2015, the NRC began the special inspection. This inspection was concluded on May 21. Similar issues to those listed by you were identified during this inspection. The results of this inspection will be documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000458/2015009. This inspection identified a number of observations, issues, and findings-with regard to the licensee's equipment, maintenance, and operations personnel performance.
In addition to the above event, on March 9, 2015, the River Bend Station experienced another event, whereby the HVK chiller 1 C failed to start, followed by the subsequent loss of the control building ventilation system. This event and associated equipment failures revealed a much broader concern that has been ongoing with an identified master pact breaker deficiency related to the breaker's ability to open and close. This, along with the issues associated with the GE Magne Blast circuit breakers described above, calls into question the overall adequacy of the licensee's breaker maintenance program. These concerns resulted in a second special inspection, which began on March 30, 2015 and was completed on May 28. Again, similar concerns to those listed by you were identified during this inspection."
The NRC standard of safety in nuclear plants is you have to unattainable, triplicate and absolute proof a safety component is unsafe, while the utilities can use any old internet troll assertion to keep a plant up at power when unsafe.
The NRC sent me a letter saying the River Bend Special inspection was initiated on my call to the Resident inspectors and they found similarly related problems with the masterpact breakers. Read the letter in the link below with how the NRC discribed my safety assertion.
NRC: Proof I Instigated The 2014 Christmas River Bend plant Scram Special Inspection
The utilities should be forced to assume all masterpact breakers are unsafe and immediately enter the appropriate tech spec LCO until masterpact breaker are eradicated from the plant.
Brand new River Bend LER indicating identification of the masterpact breaker problem emerged from the Mike Mulligan River Bend special inspection. That is one hell of a LER title.
LER 2016-005-00: Potential Loss of Safety Function of Onsite AC Sources and Operations Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Uncorrected Circuit Breaker Control Logic Design Causing Intermittent Failure to Close
I can make the case I got the River Bend NRC residents off their asses and they discovered a cascade of problems at the plant, one being the masterpact issue among other big problems. This thing
They found so much junk broken in the first special inspection, it would have too long, they finished documenting the junk in the second special inspection.
NRC Special Inspection 2015010 And Preliminary White Findingwith half ass breaker overhauls has been simmering in the industry for decades. Since my 2015 concern about having problems with controlling reactor vessel in scrams, this has unbelievably cascaded into into four special inspections within a year. Basically each with seperate components, but each with identical models of the other. Basically Entergy keeps the nuclear staff maliciously and intentionally in a "confused state" in order to enhance profits.
Excerpts:
PART 21 - INITIAL NOTIFICATION OF MASTERPACT BREAKER FAIL TO CLOSE
The following information was a licensee received facsimile;
"Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), AZZ/NLI is providing written notification of the identification of a potential defect or failure to comply.
"On the basis of our evaluation, it has been determined that there is sufficient information to determine if the subject condition is left uncorrected could potentially create a Substantial Safety Hazard or could create a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications. The plants will need to evaluate their application to determine if the identified condition could have an impact to the plant operation.
"Possible 'failure to close' condition of Masterpact breakers NT and NW style, that are being used with specific logic schemes that are subjected to 'anti-pump' conditions during normal operation. These breakers have a higher susceptibility to not return to the ready to close position after the close signal has been removed.
"PSEG reported approximately 14 instances with different breakers in different cubicles where they initiated an electric close order, and the breakers failed to close. All of the 14 instances were in applications of being used to start an inductive load.
"Plants which have been supplied the Masterpact circuit breakers.Did this come out of the River Bend Special inspection. I provoked the NRC into discovering this. OMG!!!
"PSEG Hope Creek - Issue Identified for NW style
River Bend - Issue identified for NT style
Callaway - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
St. Lucie - This issue has not been identified however. the potential should be evaluated.
Turkey Point - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Beaver Valley - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Davis Besse - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Three Mile Island - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Calvert Cliffs - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Hatch -This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
STP - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
SONGS - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
KHNPUlchin - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
KHNPKor i- This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Duke Oconee - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Duke McGuire - Non-safety (not supplied by NU), This issue has not been identified.
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