To My WIPPs and DOE OIG buddies

I believe this emerged from a political system dysfunction.  We had had tremendous budget problems…broad-based DOE and WIPP cutbacks. So the DOE forces a competition to the lowest priced contract. Then the DOE feels they need to give back favors…maintenance and safety give backs in order that the contractors make a reasonable profit. I think the contractor place a lot of pressure on the administration and Congress…this facilitates the give backs.

But this thing at WIPPs is the whole agency in scope and I think political in nature.

The nation’s defense nuclear facilities, including Savannah River Site, are not adequately prepared to respond to earthquakes, fires and other emergencies, according to a federal nuclear safety oversight panel

In a recommendation to U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board said the federal government has become complacent on updating emergency response procedures and safety standards at nuclear weapons facilities.

Additionally, the Department of Energy did not fully integrate lessons learned from the nuclear reactor meltdown at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan into site programs, the board stated.

The recommendation, based on several years of inspections at the facilities and public hearings, was published Tuesday in the Federal Register. There is a 30-day public comment period on the report.

The response to a truck fire and radioactive material release at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, N.M., highlighted the prevalence of shortcomings at other defense nuclear facilities, the board wrote. Many sites have insufficient emergency preparedness and response programs, planning and training, it continued.

“The board is concerned that these problems stem from DOE’s failures to implement existing emergency management requirements and to periodically update these requirements,” according to the report.

At SRS, the board highlighted issues with requiring workers to “shelter-in-place” no matter the type of emergency; in some cases, more immediate evacuations could protect workers from exposure to hazardous materials.

The site has corrected procedures, however, to identify various shelter types for different emergencies, such as an earthquake instead of radioactive releases.

SRS and the Pantex Plant in Texas were two sites where emergency exercise scenarios were not challenging enough to show that the sites were adequately prepared to respond to a major emergency, according to the board. The board commended SRS, however, for a “well developed and executed” training program for emergency response personnel that is lacking at other facilities, including the Pantex Plant and Sandia National Laboratories.

The DOE must improve its oversight at nuclear facilities or risk worker and public safety should an emergency occur, the board wrote.

On March 21, 2014, and March 28,

RECOMMENDATION 2014-1 TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY

Emergency Preparedness and Response

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2286d(a)(3)

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, As Amended

...2014, the Board communicated to the Secretary of Energy its concerns regarding shortcomings in the responses to a truck fire and radioactive material release event at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico. The DOE Accident Investigation Board explored and documented these shortcomings in its reports. Many of the site-specific issues noted at WIPP are prevalent at other sites with defense nuclear facilities, as documented in the attached report.

...Through its participation in DOE nuclear safety workshops in response to the events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant and its lines of inquiry regarding emergency preparedness and response at recent public hearings and meetings, Board

members have been supportive of DOE’s efforts to improve its response to both design basis and beyond design basis events. However, the Board believes DOE’s efforts to adequately address emergency preparedness and response at its sites with defense nuclear facilities have fallen short as clearly evidenced by the truck fire and radioactive material release events at WIPP.

...Based on an evaluation of the problems observed with emergency preparedness and response at DOE sites with defense nuclear facilities, the most important underlying root causes of these problems are ineffective implementation of existing requirements, inadequate revision of requirements to address lessons learned and needed improvements to site programs, and weaknesses in DOE verification and validation of readiness of its sites with defense nuclear facilities.